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A few words from  
the Director of the IFDD
Two years after COP21, which culminated in the historic signing of the Paris Agreement adopted by the countries in December 2015 and which entered 
into force on 4 November 2016, the 23rd session of the Conference of the Parties 
to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (COP23) taking place in 
Bonn finds itself on the cusp of having to turn commitments into reality. 
Admittedly, there is cause for celebration on the unprecedented speed of rati-
fications (170 Parties to date), the rapid entry into force of the Paris Agreement and 
global determination to implement it quickly and fully, as shown in the Marrakech 
Proclamation for Climate Action and the unprecedented commitment by cities, 
investors, civil society organisations and businesses.
Recent extreme meteorological events this year (2017) have nevertheless 
reminded us yet again of the urgent need for action. The adverse effects of climate 
change are worsening, with severe droughts and unprecedented rainfall, storms 
and floods, especially in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, causing tremendous losses 
and damage estimated at several billion dollars. 
Although progress has been made, since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, 
in Marrakech and Bonn during the inter-session negotiations held in May 2017 
(46th session of permanent subsidiary bodies), the negotiators still have their work 
cut out to agree on all the details that will ensure an operational Paris Agreement. 
Concrete milestones must be marked out during COP23. Postponing certain 
critical decisions until the COP24 in December 2018 is not an option. 
COP23 should therefore establish clearly bridges between progress made in 
Marrakech during COP22 and the next step in implementing the Paris Agreement. 
Going beyond its technical nature this time, COP23 will only be successful if 
players are able to reach consensus on the modalities, procedures and guidelines 
that will assist all Parties in complying with their obligations under the Paris 
Agreement.
Everyone agrees on the irreversible nature of the Paris Agreement, but the 
time has come to give it the means for implementation. This message is in line 
with the declarations by ministers and heads of delegations attending the Meeting 
of the Committee of the Least Developed Countries in Addis Ababa and the 
pre-COP23 Meeting in Fiji in October 2017.
Without losing the central objective of substantially reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions, the momentum for the implementation of the Agreement must be 
maintained through a series of concrete climate actions that requires the involvement 
of all State and non-State stakeholders.
In this context, a key task in Bonn will be to prepare the Facilitative Dialogue 
scheduled to take place throughout 2018, culminating at COP24 in Warsaw, 
Poland. At the end of COP23, precise guidelines should be laid down to direct the 
global effort required to put the world on a pathway lower than a 1.5°C rise in 
temperature. 
It is also important to take stock of progress made and process the renewal of 
nationally-determined contributions (NDC). As such, only increased cooperation 
between the developed and developing countries will provide the most vulnerable 
countries with the necessary financial, technological and capacity-building support 
to implement ambitious NDC capable of meeting the challenges.
The issues being debated are at the heart of concerns of the Francophonie. An 
effective global response to climate change is inextricably linked to achieving the 
Sustainable Development Goals, as climate change creates new costs and exacerbates 
the existing development problems. By implementing the Paris Agreement, a substantial 
proportion of vulnerable communities in French-speaking and worldwide countries 
will emerge from poverty.
For this reason, readers, the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie 
(OIF), through its subsidiary body, the Institut de la Francophonie pour le dévelop-
pement durable (IFDD), will continue to support actions favouring a transition 
towards a low-carbon economy of its member countries as well as the active 
participation of French-speakers in the international climate change negotiations.
I hope that this new edition of the Guide to the Negotiations produced 
by IFDD will enlighten you on the issues of COP23. The purpose of this guide is 
to keep you advised of progress in the negotiations and on the key points to be 
discussed during COP23. 
Its production has been made possible through the mobilisation of the 
French-speaking expertise and of our partners, especially Energies 2050, who we 
thank most warmly. 
Negotiators and partners, I wish you excellent work and a successful outcome 
in Bonn, where the keyword will therefore be converting commitments into deeds. 
Pleasant reading!
Jean-Pierre Ndoutoum
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vHow to use this guide
The Guide to the Negotiations and the Summary for policymakers is enhanced year on year and goes beyond the climate change negotiating structure. This 
is even truer within the framework of current international climate actions, 
which, following the adoption of the Paris Agreement, formally aims to set up a 
multi-party and multi-sector, de-compartmentalised dynamic. Academics, public 
or private stakeholders, representatives of civil society organisations or interna-
tional institutions, increasingly use the analytic and dynamic content of the issues 
outlined in the Guide and the Summary as a source of factual information, that is 
independent and up to date on negotiations.
Once again this year, the drafting team wanted to break new ground by pro-
moting the accessibility of information to readers with varying degrees of knowl-
edge about the negotiation process – whether they have in-depth knowledge or are 
knowledgeable about the topics or are first-time attendees. The goal is still that 
everyone can browse through the Guide and access all the information he needs, 
based on his priorities and the time he has available for this. With this in mind, 
efforts have been made to engage with a wider audience. Summary boxes support 
the detailed descriptions and analyses of the various questions addressed in the 
negotiations wherever possible so that the notion addressed can thus be grasped 
immediately. Illustrative and summary figures thus complete the picture, so the 
reader will have all the keys they need to understand the negotiations. 
The 2017 edition of the Guide is once more benefiting from input from a 
group of authors comprising eminent members from different French-speaking 
countries who have been involved in the climate negotiations for many years. 
Known and recognised players, their early involvement in the negotiation chamber 
as well as in implementing policies and measures resulting from climate agreements 
brings this collective work as close as possible to the negotiation realities and to the 
major issues and challenges. A proofreading Committee comprised of individuals 
also known for their expertise was also set up for this edition to ensure that it would 
be of the highest quality. We are hopeful that the various contributions will make 
the work even more relevant and useful for the negotiators and actors implementing 
concrete projects resulting from the negotiations.
Part I puts the main negotiation issues under the Paris Agreement and 
its supporting Decision 1/CP.21 into perspective. This includes especially the 
implementation of commitments forming part of the Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDC), mechanisms, ambition, financing issues, adaptation and 
the role of non-State players. Each theme has its own analysis to bring out the main 
points of negotiations in progress and the challenges to achieve implementation of 
objectives and convert the ambitions of the international community into reality. 
Part II proposes a general framework for the understanding of elements 
comprising the document in its entirety. As such, a brief history of international 
climate negotiations is outlined (Section II.A) since the adoption of the United 
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Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) up to the 23rd 
session of the Conference of the Parties (COP23, November 2017, Bonn, Germany). 
Special emphasis is given to the main cycles that led to COP21 and the adoption 
of the Paris Agreement. A description of the structure of the Convention and the 
role and mandate of its main ad hoc working groups (Section II.B) rounds out this 
historical framework so that the reader can understand the negotiation architecture. 
Lastly, the main negotiating groups and their positions (Section II.C) are presented. 
This introduces the negotiation stakeholders and their views for the spokespersons.
Part III presents in detail the execution of objectives from Paris between 
COP22 and COP23 (Section II.A), focusing on the sessions of the permanent 
Subsidiary Bodies (Section II.A.1) and of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris 
Agreement (Section II.A.2). This part also summarily deciphers the Paris Agreement, 
its main provisions and operational modalities emerging from Decision 1/CP.21 
(Section II.B). 
The authors have attempted to propose a global, analytical overview of the 
issues in each of these three parts. Numerous synthetic diagrams figure in the body 
of the document. These are designed to give the reader an overview and simplified 
perusal of the various topics addressed. The outlook within each section on the 
expectations of the COP23 is presented in terms of execution and operationalisation 
of major issues. Readers are referred to other sections of the Guide and to the source 
documents the length of the text so that they can broaden their understanding of 
a topic if they so wish.
Terminology sheets relating to the French and equivalent English vocabulary 
specific to the climate change negotiations and the abbreviations and acronyms 
currently used under the negotiations are also provided. Note that only the document 
listings are quoted when reference is made to documents resulting from negotiations. 
These listings, designed to make reading easier, can furthermore be used to find 
the documents referred to very easily on the Convention website1. A table was 
added as an appendix to this document to make the listing easy to understand2.
We hope that this Guide will meet readers’ expectations. We ask them to share 
their assessment and suggestions with us by filling in the form at the end of the 
guide.
This Guide to the negotiations and its accompanying Summary for policymakers 
were updated on 3 October 2017.
Climate change is a universal issue where the effects are very real for an increasing 
proportion of the world population. More than ever there is an urgent need for 
action and the negotiations, even if they are still the remit of the UNFCCC States-
signatory Parties, must not remain within the restricted enclave of specialists. This 
Guide to the Negotiations and its accompanying Summary for policymakers augment 
the firm commitment to give every reader the keys to understand and act.
1. http://unfccc.int/documentation/documents/items/3595.php
2. See A.2.: List of the documents from the negotiations.
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1Introduction
International climate action confronted  
to the challenge of implementation
Scientific analyses highlight gradual disruptions of the climate system and a global 
rise in temperatures over the last two centuries, at an increasing pace during recent 
decades3. These events are mainly caused by greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) 
associated with our consumption and production modes, with consequences that 
could quickly prove irreversible4. The 5th Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) restated in 2013 the anthropogenic (human) origin of this 
phenomenon, deeming “extremely likely5” (indicating more than 95% probability) 
the link between the rise in temperatures noted since 1950 and human activities. 
Despite international negotiations, it is clear that progress in combating climate 
change has remained very modest compared with the numerous challenges raised. 
According to this same IPCC report, the increase in average temperatures could be 
between +2.6°C and +4.8°C by 2100. This increase would have major impacts, in 
particular changes to rainfall conditions, melting ice, rising sea levels (from 26 to 
85 cm by the end of the century, depending on scenarios), the salinisation of soils, 
advancing desertification, ocean acidification or increasing extreme climatic events. 
These consequences would furthermore make already complex environmental, 
economic and social issues more pronounced, particularly in developing countries6.
The negotiation process put into place to face up to this global challenge is a 
pioneering experiment in the history of our societies. For the first time ever, the 
governments of almost all States are working jointly in the framework of a complex 
process which questions our economic development and social models replacing 
the environment, human development, inclusivity or solidarity among peoples as 
central concerns. This negotiation process has been conducted united Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) since its adoption in 19927. 
These negotiations are ambitious in scope. In fact, they simply mean protecting 
present and future generations from the multiple and devastating consequences of 
too significant and rapid increases in global planet temperatures. 
The responsibility weighing on the shoulders of negotiators and policymakers 
is therefore huge. In a context where everyone defends their country’s legitimate 
interests and focusses on their own national circumstances, delays in implementing 
ambitious actions, in line with the urgency and the scope of the issues, will have 
3. IPCC, 2013.
4. IPCC, 2013.
5. IPCC, 2013.
6. Source: IPCC, quoted in ENERGIES 2050, 2016a.
7. Came into force on 21 March 1997. To find out more about the UNFCCC: see Annex 
A.1 – Sheet 1. 
consequences for everyone. Although these consequences will be very unevenly 
spread, placing a burden particularly on the most vulnerable countries, which are, 
however, only slightly or not responsible for the current climate situation.
Within this context the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (COP21, 
organised in Paris in 2015) to the UNFCCC was an historic step with the adoption 
of a new crucial international agreement to progress climate negotiations. The 
outcome of a process that started several years ago, the Paris Agreement copperfastens 
the hope for a global agreement of the States and a strengthening of the measures 
undertaken to combat climate change. This Agreement traces a roadmap towards 
international climate action for the years to come, and for the first time it brings 
together all the Parties to the UNFCCC. On this basis, it aims to significantly 
reduce their GHG emissions, but also addresses the implementation of measures 
required to increase the resilience of the human being and its environment to climate 
disturbances. 
The Paris Agreement therefore takes into account the necessary mitigation 
efforts by the Parties, focusing on the objective to maintain warming “significantly 
below” the 2°C of pre-industrial levels from now until the end of the century, whilst 
at the same time encouraging the pursuit of efforts to stay within 1.5°C. The concerns 
of the developing countries have also been integrated and adaptation has also been 
recognised as an objective in its own right on the same level as mitigation. This 
is also true for loss and damage, capacity-building, technology transfer or again 
financing so that the Agreement can be implemented.
To achieve the objective of maintaining the average global temperature, but 
also to allow each Party State to enhance their own national realities, the commitments 
of the countries are presented in the form of Contributions decided on a national 
level (NDC) defined by the Party-States themselves. This “bottom up” process 
is the outcome of an unusual approach by the UNFCCC, whereby each Party 
is invited to formulate their own commitments and challenges in line with the 
Convention’s founding principles of equality, common but differentiated respon-
sibilities and their respective capacities regarding national realities.
By adding these additional individual contributions arising from the NDCs 
implies collectively achieving the objectives set by the Paris Agreement. Nevertheless, 
despite the process established by the Paris Agreement to renew and increase NDC 
commitments every five years, this momentum does, however, run the risk that 
the amount of national commitments is not enough to reach the target of 1.5°C/2°C. 
It should be recalled that, despite repeated warnings from the IPCC, which was 
already calling on developed countries in 2007 to collectively reduce their greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions from 25 to 40% by 2020 compared with levels in 19908, 
global anthropogenic GHG emissions have not stopped rising9. We worryingly note 
that according to the United Nations figures, “temperatures have continued to increase 
in 2016 [globally] establishing a new record of 1.1°C above pre-industrial levels”10.
8. IPCC, 2007.
9. IPCC, 2014a, p. 6.
10. United Nations, 2017, p. 44.
2
3Prior to COP22, a report produced by the secretariat of the Convention, 
taking into account the national contributions communicated by the Parties up to 
4 April 2016, confirmed that the commitment of the States will not be sufficient 
to achieve a trajectory compatible with temperature increases below 2°C11. Other 
studies carried out since then have confirmed the failure of the collective ambition 
to achieve the objective of maintaining temperatures12. Following the adoption 
of the Paris Agreement, the challenges linked to its implementation cannot be 
underestimated, specifically the challenge of ensuring a continuous increase in the 
level of ambition. International cooperation provides initial leverage, such as the 
mobilisation of all stakeholders in the process. 
As a positive sign for international climate change, the Paris Agreement, 
barely a year after its adoption in December 2015, came into force on 4 November 
201613, a few days after COP22 (Marrakech, November 2016). Propelled by this 
dynamic, COP22 was announced as the “Conference of action” and the launch of 
work in the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement which had officially come 
into force. A great deal of progress was expected, particularly regarding market 
mechanisms, the pre-2020 Agenda, capacity-building, the improvement in access 
to financing sources and technology transfer for the benefit of developing and less 
advanced countries, or again in the area of transparency and monitoring. Finally, 
the Parties ended two weeks of negotiations by adopting over 30 decisions, even 
though14, numerous points are still outstanding. At the end of COP22, the Parties 
agreed to end the discussions to allow for the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement 
with the view to making decisions at the latest at COP24, in 2018.
Discussions on all elements of the talks continued during the inter-session 
negotiations held in May 2017 in Bonn during the 46th session of the permanent 
subsidiary bodies (SBI46 and SBSTA46) and the third part of the first session of 
the Ad Hoc working group on the Paris Agreement (APA-3). Although since the 
adoption of the Paris Agreement progress has been made in Marrakech and Bonn, 
the negotiators still have a considerable amount of work to agree on all the details 
to ensure that the Paris Agreement will be operational from day one of its implemen-
tation. The contribution of COP23 will be central to the pursuit and finalisation 
of the work regarding the implementation of the elements to ensure the effective 
operationalisation of the Paris Agreement, given the short time left before COP24. 
A key element of the COP23 negotiations will be to prepare the facilitation 
Dialogue taking place in 2018 to take stock of the progress achieved and to 
instruct the renewal of the NDCs.
11. UNFCCC, 2016a.
12. See in particular UNEP, 2016; or, Climate Interactive, 2017.
13. The inherent conditions for the entry into force of the Paris Agreement (55 Parties – 
55% of global emissions) were met on 5 October 2016 and the official ratification of 
72 Parties accounting for 56.75% of global emissions occurred on the same date. It was 
planned that the Paris Agreement would come into effect 30 days after reaching these 
thresholds, i.e. 4 November 2016 under these conditions. See United Nations, 2016a.
14. Access all the decisions adopted during COP22 [online] http://unfccc.int/meetings/
marrakech_nov_2016/meeting/9567/php/view/decisions.php#c
4In addition to other crucial points, it will also mean pursuing the efforts for 
an ambitious action by the Party States, but also for an international climate 
action, that is de-compartmentalised and multi-actor to reduce the gap between 
the objectives of the Paris Agreement and achieving them. This requirement for 
multi-actor collaboration established at COP21 was re-confirmed in Marrakech 
with the adoption of the Marrakech Partnership for global climate action, which 
seeks to strength the global climate action Programme 2017-2020, adopted at 
COP20 in Lima. This is therefore a crucial challenge for the new Fijian presidency 
at COP23, particularly taking into account that current failure of the State Parties 
in achieving the objectives to limiting temperatures part of the Paris Agreement.
Across all the points being negotiated, it is indispensable that the “spirit of 
Paris” initiated since the adoption of the Agreement is preserved at the Bonn 
COP23 and beyond. The objective being that the ambitions of the international 
community become imbued more than ever, with trust and a long-term perspective, 
even though the Parties agreed in Marrakech to postpone certain final decisions 
until December 2018 at COP24.
A Guide to understand, share and increase  
the opportunities to act
The Guide to the Negotiations and its accompanying Summary for policymakers fall 
under the wider context of the support provided by the Institut de la Francophonie 
pour le développement durable, a subsidiary body of the International Organisation 
of La Francophonie (OIF), to French-speaking countries in the international climate 
change negotiations.
Although this Guide is intended especially for the negotiators from OIF 
member countries, it has year on year become a reference document translated 
into several languages. We hope that it will be a useful tool for all delegates and 
that it will make an effective contribution to facilitating the search for a consensus 
for ambitious progress realistically in line with the challenges. 
Aimed at helping negotiators to understand better the challenges of the 
COP23, this Guide the major issues being debated (Part I). Part II proposes a 
concise summary of the Paris Agreement and the challenges related to achieving 
the objectives from it, focusing upon the work carried out by the permanent 
subsidiary bodies and the special Paris Agreement Ad Hoc working group. The 
major issues at stake are then presented in Part III Lastly, Part III gives a brief 
history of the negotiations and presents the UNFCCC structure and the main 
negotiation groups and their positions.
5Summary table of negotiation issues at COP2315
Section 
of the 
Guide
Issues in the negotiations
Session agenda items
COP
6-17 Nov.
CMP
6-15 Nov.
CMA
6-17 Nov. 
SBI
6-15 Nov.
SBSTA
5-15 Nov.
APA
I.1 Issues of permanent subsidiary bodies
I.1.1
Facilitative sharing of views 
facilitation in the framework 
of the international 
consultation and analysis 
process
2 (d)
I.1.2
Modalities and procedures for 
the operation and use of the 
public registry referred to in 
Article 4, para. 2, and Article 7, 
para. 12
6, 7
I.1.4 Paris Committee on Capacity-building 16 (b)
I.1.5
Modes of functioning, work 
programme, and functions 
anticipated under the Paris 
Agreement for the forum  
on impact of measures of 
response implemented  
(joint agenda with OSCST) 
17 (b) 9 (b)
I.1.6 Questions relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement 11
I.2 Issues relating to
I.2.3 Project issues:
Mitigation 3
Adaptation 4
Transparency 5
15. Indicative selections based on the issues dealt with in this Guide and corresponding to 
the agenda items of the Bonn sessions (November 2017).
To find out more: consult the detailed agendas for the Bonn sessions in the annex (A7).
Part I.  
The issues and positions
6T
h
e
 
i
s
s
u
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
Section 
of the 
Guide
Issues in the negotiations
Session agenda items
COP
6-17 Nov.
CMP
6-15 Nov.
CMA
6-17 Nov. 
SBI
6-15 Nov.
SBSTA
5-15 Nov.
APA
Global stocktake 6
Implementation of and 
compliance with the Paris 
Agreement provisions.
7
Other issues related to the 
implementation of the Paris 
Agreement:
8
I.2.4 Issues of the CMA1-2
I.3 The mechanisms of  the Paris Agreement
Article 6, paragraph 2 
(“concerted approaches”) 11 (a)
Article 6, paragraph 4  
(“mechanism for sustainable 
development”)
11 (b)
Article 6, paragraph 8 
(“non-market based 
approaches”)
11 (c)
Clean development 
mechanism 4 8 (a)
I.5
National considerations 
related to the implemen-
tation of the NDCs
5 3, 4
I.7 Transfer of technologies 8 8 14 6
I.8 Capacity building 13 10 16
I.9 Financing questions 10 15
Green Climate Fund. 10 (c)
Permanent finance committee 10 (b) 15 (a)
Third review of the  
Adaptation Fund 7 (b) 15 (b)
I.10 Adaptation 6, 14 (a), 15 7 11, 12 3, 4 4
I.12 Transparency 3 (b), 5
I.15
Equality of the sexes  
in the context of climate 
change negotiations
16 20
7Guide to the Negotiations - UNFCCC (COP23) - OIF/IFDD, 2017
I.1. Issues of permanent subsidiary bodies 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)
I.1.1 Exchange of views focusing on the facilitation in the framework 
of the international consultation and analysis process
A very first exchange of views focusing on facilitation in the framework of the 
international consultation and analysis process took place during the 44th session 
of the SBSTA (SBSTA44) in Bonn in May 201616. This process, established dur-
ing the COP17 in Durban in 2011, aims mainly to enhance the transparency of 
mitigation measures implemented by the countries not included in Annex I17 to 
the Convention. Starting from a participative, Party-driven approach, the efforts 
highlighted by the developing countries are firstly communicated via a biennial 
updated report (BUR) and then analysed by a team of technical experts (TTE) 
under modalities which are neither intrusive nor punitive and which respect 
national sovereignty18.
During the first exchange of views, in May 2016, thirteen developing countries 
had submitted their BUR to the process19. Most countries taking part in the exchange 
of views underlined, during individual presentations, the need for international 
financial support in their own national processes, mainly in respect of improving 
their national measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) system20. This type of 
capacity-building need, mainly in terms of the MRV of national GHG emissions 
was also reflected during subsequent exchanges of views21. Workshops relating to 
these exchanges of views also took place under the COP23 and SB 46 at Bonn in 
May 2017. In the first instance, seven other countries submitted their BUR to the 
inter-Party discussions, namely Andorra, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Lebanon, 
Mexico and Paraguay. In the second instance, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, 
Mauritania, Montenegro, Morocco, Republic of Moldavia, Thailand and Uruguay 
participated in the process. A new workshop relating to exchanges of views is 
scheduled for 10 November 2017 during COP23.
Following the technical analysis process by the TTE in conjunction with each 
of the Parties in question, each Party received written questions from all their 
counterparts from the Convention based on a succinct report submitted by the 
TTE and each party to the SBI22. These issues were then reviewed during a meeting 
16. SBI, 2016.
17. Decision 2/CP.17, Annex III.
18. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 63.
19. SBSTA, 2016, namely South Africa, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Chile, Ghana, Namibia, Peru, Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, Tunisia and Vietnam.
20. UNFCCC, 2016b.
21. To consult the reports of individual reports from each Party: http://unfccc.int/national_ 
reports/non-annex_i_parties/ica/technical_analysis_of_burs/items/10054.php
22. See the Summary and technical reports:http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_
parties/ica/technical_analysis_of_burs/items/10054.php
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coordinated by the SBSTA during its sessions. These have until now related to the 
aspects below, among other things23: 
(i) institutional arrangements in place to prepare the BUR; 
(ii) the design of national MRV systems; 
(iii) the national greenhouse gas (GHG) emission inventory improvement 
plans and, in association;
(iv) their needs for capacity-building to implement the 2006 International 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) guidelines; and
(v) the ex-post review of the implementation of mitigation action;
(vi) the capacity-building requirements to improve transparency under a second 
BUR24;
(vii) the role played by the Clean Development Mechanism to achieve the 
GHG emission reduction targets of a Party25 or relating to accounting of 
emission reductions achieved thanks to market mechanisms26;
(viii) the MRV system used to measure the emissions from the land use and land 
use changes sector along with lessons learned from the assessment process of 
repercussions from mitigation measures in this sector27.
The exchanges of view then allow the Parties to respond directly to these questions 
raised in writing or orally during workshops. This question and answer process 
gave the Parties a better understanding of the noted difficulties and shortcomings 
confronting these thirteen developing countries and was also a chance for them 
to learn more about the experience lived and acquired, the lessons learned from 
compiling the BUR and the optimum practices used28.
It seems therefore that the process has demonstrated its relevance for two 
issues in particular. Firstly, holding a first exchange of views gave the developed 
countries a better understanding and knowledge of the needs of their developing 
counterparts on the implementation of measures to limit their GHG emissions 
and their financing needs to achieve this. The process was then an opportunity, 
for developing countries yet to submit their BUR or where the TTE technical 
analysis with Party feedback was in progress, to find out more about the potential 
challenges and to benefit from the experience acquired by their counterparts. As at 
25 September 2017, 37 BUR had been submitted by the Parties, of which 35 were 
the subject of a succinct report. The Parties had not yet exchanged views on the 
succinct reports from Armenia, Serbia, Ecuador, Georgia and Jamaica29. There 
were no succinct reports attached to the BUR of China and Mongolia. 
23. See the Record of facilitative sharing of views:http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non- 
annex_i_parties/ica/technical_analysis_of_burs/items/10054.php
24. FCCC/WEB/FSVR.1/IND/2017.
25. FCCC/WEB/FSVR.1/IND/2017.
26. FCCC/WEB/FSVR.1/CRI/2017.
27. FCCC/WEB/FSVR.1/COL/2017.
28. UNFCCC, 2016b.
29. See the International consultation and analysis – Outcome: http://unfccc.int/national_
reports/non-annex_i_parties/ica/technical_analysis_of_burs/items/10054.php
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Biennial Updated Reports (BUR) and the international  
consultation and analysis process
The Cancún Decision (2010) requires the Parties not included in Annex I to 
submit their national communications every four years, and their GHG inventories 
every two years, through their biennial updated reports (BUR)1. The national 
communications are not however examined specifically, as is the case for the 
Parties included in Annex I. During the COP17 in Durban in 2011, the Parties 
agreed that the first BUR from developing countries should undergo such an 
examination from December 2014 onwards. The least developed countries 
(LDC) and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have to decide collectively 
whether they wish to submit their report, of their own volition, to this type of 
review2. As of 3 October 2017, 37 of the non-Annex I Parties had submitted a 
first BUR and eight Parties had submitted a second3.
The BUR consists of (i) an update of national greenhouse gas inventories, mainly 
a national inventory report; (ii) information on action taken; (ii) noted needs; 
(iv) needs and aid received in terms of financial, technological and capacity-building 
resources4.
The BUR are submitted as separate updated reports or as a summary by certain 
parties of national communications during the year where the national communi-
cation is submitted by the Party. 
Once the BUR have been submitted by the Parties, a Technical Team of Experts 
(TTE) starts a technical examination. The TTE must submit to the Party in question 
a summary report within three months of it starting its work5.
The Party then has another three months to review the report and formulate 
its comments on its contents. A final period of three months can be used by the 
TTE and the Party in question to draft, together, a final version of the summary 
report. This is then submitted to the SBI for publication on the website of the 
Convention6. The other Parties may use this summary report as a basis for 
formulating their questions prior to a workshop specific to the exchange of 
views intended to facilitate the international consultation and analysis process 
arranged by the SBI at regular intervals7.
1. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 60.
2. Decision 2/CP.17, para. 41.
3. See Submitted Biennial Updated Reports (BURs) from Non-Annex I Parties: http://unfccc.int/nation-
al_reports/non-annex_i_natcom/rapportage_on_climate_change/items/8722.php
4. Decision 2/CP.17, Annex IV.
5. Decision 20/CP.19.
6. See International consultation and analysis—Outcome: http://unfccc.int/national_reports/
non-annex_i_parties/ica/technical_analysis_of_burs/items/10054.php
7. Decision 2/CP.17, Annex IV.
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Figure 1. Statutes of the biennial updated report submissions30
I.1.2 Modalities and procedures for the operation and use of the 
public registry referred to in Article 4, paragraph 12 of the Paris 
Agreement and Article 7, paragraph 12 of the Paris Agreement
To implement the Paris Agreement, the Parties agreed during the COP21 that all 
would be required to “undertake and communicate ambitious efforts”31 with respect 
to six issues, namely:
(i) reduction of their collective GHG emissions32;
(ii) the building up of their capacities to mitigate climate change33; 
30. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017 – Figures updated on 
1 September 2017.
31. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 3.
32. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4.
33. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 7.
11
Guide to the Negotiations - UNFCCC (COP23) - OIF/IFDD, 2017
(iii) climate financing34; 
(iv) technology development and transfer35; 
(v) enhancing the capacities of developing countries36; and 
(vi) (vi) transparency of action and support37.
It is planned that the efforts be communicated to the Convention Secretariat 
as NDC, which inserts them for the moment in provisional public registry38. 
Under the Agreement, the Parties have agreed on the relevance of this registry 
particularly regarding two points: 
• efforts to reduce anthropogenic GHG emissions39; and 
• communication of needs in terms of implementation, support, adaptation 
projects and measures40.
However, in the adoption of the Paris Agreement, the Parties requested the 
SBI to develop modalities and procedures for the operation and use of the public 
mitigation registry41, while refraining from giving any instructions to the subsidiary 
bodies or to the Secretariat regarding the potential development of a public registry 
recording countries’ adaptation efforts. An item on the SB 44 agenda therefore 
provided for addressing with the Parties the registry dealing with mitigation efforts, 
but this quickly became a stumbling block as soon as it was time to adopt the 
agenda for the session42. The disagreement seems to primarily arise from the fact 
that Parties do not agree about how to interpret the Paris Agreement and, at the same 
time, to establish such a registry43. In particular, certain concerns were raised during 
the first day of the SB 44 session over the lack of an explicit mention of adaptation 
in the agenda item addressing the NDC registry44.
Thus in Bonn, in May 2016, the developing countries, led by the G77+China, 
made known to the SBI Chairman that they disagreed with the formulation of the 
provisional agenda item dealing with the registry45, maintaining that it would be 
more appropriate to deal with a NDC registry as a whole, without specifying other 
fields of intervention like mitigation and adaptation. Some observers believe that 
one reason for broadening the type of information to be communicated to the public 
registry, rather than preferring a more restricted interpretation of the Agreement46, 
34. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9.
35. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10.
36. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 11.
37. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 13.
38. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 30.
39. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 12.
40. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 7, paras. 10 and 12.
41. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 29.
42. TWN, 2016a, p. 1.
43. TWN, 2016a.
44. IISD, 2016a, p. 2.
45. TWN, 2016a, p. 1.
46. More especially paragraphs 29 and 30 of Decision 1/CP.21.
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would be to prevent setting up a public registry focusing on mitigation47. These 
observers think that, for the developing countries, it would be more appropriate 
rather to request the Parties to communicate to the public, and therefore transparent, 
registry the relevant information on the six central components of the Agreement 
and NDC48 mentioned previously. Such an approach would be more representative 
of the exhaustive nature expected from the NDC for use by the countries in 
“undertaking and communicating ambitious efforts”49.
However, the Umbrella Group and EU countries would rather see a strict 
interpretation of the consensus emanating from Paris50, which is restricted to 
addressing a public registry compiling mitigation elements contained in the NDC. 
These same groups of countries prefer the same approach to the Paris Agreement51, 
which urges the Parties to submit adaptation communications rather than requesting 
them to do so, as is the case for mitigation. Where appropriate, these countries 
were thus not in a position to support the amendment proposed by the G77+China 
to item 5 on the provisional agenda, resulting in the adoption of an initial agenda for 
the SB 44 session which initially ignored any talks at all about a public registry52, 
until the Parties could agree, during informal discussions, on the most suitable way 
of addressing this topic.
Ultimately, item 5 of the agenda was amended and adopted as follows: 
“Establishment of the modalities and procedures for the operation and use of the public 
registry referred to in Article 4, paragraph 12 of the Paris Agreement”, whereas a new 
item 6 on the agenda was also adopted: “Development of modalities and procedures 
for the operation and use of a public registry referred to in Article 7, paragraph 12, of 
the Paris Agreement”53. 
Still during SB 44, Egypt suggested, when adopting this new agenda, that both 
the adaptation and the mitigation measures should be compiled in one and the 
same registry54. Whilst the SBI split these two agenda items into two separate 
informal groups55, the Africa Group instead expressed its wish for them to be 
addressed at the same time by the same co-mediators, with a view for just one NDC 
registry be set up when the Agreement entered into force, rather than two56. When 
talks were closed on this topic, the Umbrella Group and EU countries reiterated 
their view that tying these two public registries together under the agreement 
47. TWN, 2016a, p. 1.
48. TWN, 2016a, p. 1.
49. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 3.
50. Paragraph 29 of Decision 1/CP.21: TWN, 2016a, p. 3.
51. Mainly Article 7, paragraphs 10 and 12, of the Convention.
52. IISD, 2016a, p. 2.
53. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.2.
54. IISD, 2016d, p. 2.
55. IISD, 2016d, p. 3.
56. IISD, 2016e, p. 1.
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would overstep the scope of the decision taken in Paris57, referring especially to the 
delicate balance between mitigation and adaptation on which the Parties managed 
to agree during the COP21.
Talks surrounding the creation of one or two registries continued in Marrakech 
and Bonn in 2017, with continuing tension. Among other things, two draft 
conclusions were submitted initially to the Parties in Marrakech under informal 
consultations on setting up two public registries; one under Article 4 of the Agreement 
on mitigation and a second under Article 7 on adaptation. In the case of a registry 
for mitigation efforts, two groups of developing countries quickly showed their 
unwillingness to debate this, calling instead on continued exchanges of viewpoints 
between the Parties until the termination of the work of the APA on NDC58. 
Finally, a draft conclusion submitted by the SBI merely noted the exchange of views 
in the talks and to agree to continue these discussions in Bonn59. In particular, the 
discussions stalled over stating that talks held under agenda item 5 should relate to 
the NDC provided for under Article 4 as its description suggests or that reference 
should be made rather to “NDC provided for under Article 3” as proposed by a 
group of developing countries in Marrakech60.
As part of the creation of a registry relating to adaptation efforts by Parties, 
two groups of developing countries, during informal consultations in Marrakech, 
expressed their preference for talks about this registry to be grouped with those 
about a registry under Article 4. Several developed countries opposed this proposal61. 
Here again, some participants expressed their preference to postpone talks on this 
issue until certain aspects had been clarified within the framework of the work 
carried out by the APA, including “additional guidelines for communications on 
adaptation”62. Furthermore, the Parties addressed the option of requesting that the 
Secretariat assess the costs associated with developing two registries, a stumbling 
block between the Parties during the informal talks in Marrakech. In addition to 
continuing these discussions in Bonn at SB46, the Parties adopted a draft conclusion 
recognising the existing or potential links between items 5 and 6 of the SBI agenda.63. 
At the close of the talks on item 6 of the agenda in Marrakech, Saudi Arabia 
highlighted the fact that certain Parties wanted to see these two items combined.64.
Again when the Parties met in Bonn within the framework of SB46, the 
talks on the creation of one or two public registries were conducted as informal 
discussions65. Nevertheless the Parties focused more on the function of the public 
57. TWN, 2016a, p. 3 See also IISD, 2016e, p. 2.
58. IISD, 2016g, p. 4.
59. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.35.
60. IISD, 2016h, p. 1.
61. IISD, 2016g, p. 4.
62. IISD, 2016g, p. 4.
63. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.36, FCCC/SBI/2017/L.6 and FCCC/ SBI/2017/L.8.
64. IISD, 2016i, p. 27.
65. IISD, 2017a.
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registry, notably in relation to the form of the provisional and current registry66 
(see box below). A fact of interest is that a group of developing countries suggested 
that the Parties adopt “a paragraph on eliminating the duplication of work undertaken 
under APA agenda item 3” covering mitigation measures, a suggestion which proved 
a stumbling block for one group of developing countries.67. The discussions regarding 
the public registries continued at SB47 and the Parties were invited to submit their 
comments regarding items 5 and 6 of the SBI agenda by September 21, 2017, notably 
in relation to the potential links between the work on these two items of the agenda68.
Secretariat’s interim public registry
Until the modalities and procedures for the operation of a public mitigation 
registry and a public adaptation registry have been adopted by the Parties, they 
have mandated the Secretariat to set up an interim registry1. The NDC from 
160 Parties have been published in it as at 3 October 2017.
All the Parties have their own logins to the registry where they can upload 
documents, including their NDC, which they can subsequently manage themselves2. 
The portal is configured so that a set of documents can be grouped to form one 
and the same NDC3. The Secretariat checks the authenticity of all the documents 
to ensure Parties’ security and makes them available to the public thirty minutes 
after the necessary checks have been completed4. When Parties update their 
documents, earlier versions may be stored at the Parties’ discretion5.
The public can access the information added to the public registry by going to 
the website home page. Here the documentation communicated by all Parties 
can be accessed via their individual pages6 (see Figure 4 below). The home page 
offers web surfers an immediate search facility with options to browse using key 
words or Parties7 (see Figure 3 below). A description of each Party’s most recent 
version of its NDC is found on its home page along with a list of all documents 
submitted to date8 (see Figure 2 below). The documents appear in chronological 
order of submission – the date is displayed – and are classified by whether it 
involves the NDC from the country, a translation or an additional document, 
among other things9.
At the SB46 held in Bonn in May 2017, the Parties took note of certain specific 
aspects of the current provisional registry submitted by the Secretariat, which 
elements they took into account when developing the public registry under  
article 4 of the Paris Agreement. These elements are10: (i) only allowing national 
coordinators of the Parties to register the NDC in the public registry; (ii) 
ensuring the security of the accounts and the accessibility to the contents of the 
registry; (iii) maintaining the NDC already communicated by the Parties; (iv) 
providing a user guide for Parties; and (v) ensuring continuous support in 
operating the public registry.
Lastly, the Parties were invited to submit to the SBI “experience and lessons 
learned in using the interim registry [...] and which could prove useful in developing the
66. IISD, 2017b, p. 1.
67. IISD, 2017c, p. 2.
68. FCCC/SBI/2017/L.6, para.5 (e).
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registry”, their views on the registry functions, structure and design elements of the 
public registry” and “ways of enhancing the security, accessibility and user-friendliness 
of the public registry”11.
1. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 30. Consult the registry [online] http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/ 
Pages/All.aspx
2. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 10.
3. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 11.
4. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 11.
5. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 12.
6. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 13.
7. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 14.
8. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 15.
9. FCCC/SBI/2016/INF.6, para. 16.
10. FCCC/SBI/2017/L.6
11. FCCC/SBI/2017/L.6, para. 5.
Figure 2. Home page – NDC registry
Figure 3. Search engine – NDC registry
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Figure 4. Individual home page – NDC registry
I.1.3  Scope and modalities for the periodic evaluation of  
the Technology Mechanism for the implementation  
of the Paris Agreement (joint agenda with the SBSTA)
The development and transfer of technologies assume special importance within 
the UNFCCC as they turn numerous mitigation and adaptation measures into 
reality69. Several decisions encourage the development and transfer of technologies, 
headed by those that created the Technological Mechanism (Cancún, 2010)70. The 
aim of this mechanism is to facilitate the reinforcement of technological development 
and transfer to support the climate change mitigation and adaptation policies. 
In recognition of the relevance of the work that the Technology Mechanism 
has carried out thus far, the Parties made it a body that will serve the Paris Agreement71. 
In this respect, in May 2016 the SBI adopted draft conclusions aimed at developing 
the scope and modalities for the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism 
in relation to supporting the implementation of the Paris Agreement72, as the Parties 
had tasked it with doing so during COP2173. In strengthening the Technology 
Mechanism, the Parties would like the TEC and CTCN to carry out further work, 
in particular to develop and enhance endogenous capacities and technologies, on the 
one hand, and to undertake technology research, development and demonstration, 
on the other74.
69. Article 4.1.(c), 4.5 and 9 of the UNFCCC, in particular.
70. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 117.
71. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10, para. 3.
72. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.5.
73. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 70.
74. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 66.
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The purpose of this periodic assessment includes looking at the effectiveness 
and of the support provided to the Technology Mechanism and its adequacy75. 
On the whole, this periodic assessment must take into account matters relating 
to technology development and transfer. The assessment must also consider the 
conclusions emanating from the first independent review of the CTCN76. The 
assessment of the Mechanism should also take account of the development of 
modalities of the global stocktake referred to in Article 14 of the Agreement, work 
on the transparency of the action and support referred to in Article 13 and the 
preparation of the technology framework (see box below). It is intended that the 
scope and modalities of this periodic assessment are adopted during the COP25 
in 2019. 
To achieve this, the Parties made their views known on the scope and modalities 
for the periodic assessment of the Mechanisms prior to the SB 46 session in May 
2017. The SBI compiled these submissions into a summary compilation which 
was presented to the Parties at SB 4677 which noted them78 (see box below). The SBI 
also requested the Secretariat to continue its work in this respect, by establishing 
“a technical document on the experience, lessons learned and best practices obtained by 
reviewing various provisions of the Convention and of the Kyoto Protocol that are relevant 
for the periodic assessment, including a list of reviews performed”79. The Parties have 
not yet managed to agree on whether the COPor the CMA should be the body to 
carry out this assessment80. The SBI should continue with the talks on the scope 
and assessment of the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism at SB 48, 
in April-May 201881.
Summary compilation by the Secretariat  
of Parties’ observations on the scope and modalities  
of the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism1
In its summary compilation of 25 April 2017, the SBI reported on the observations 
of 98 Parties communicated in eight submissions from Parties listed below:
• Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay;
• Canada, Australia, Japan and Norway;
• LDC;
• IALAC;
• Indonesia;
75. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 69.
76. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.5, para. 3.
77. FCCC/SBI/2017/INF.2.
78. FCCC/SBI/2017/L.4, para. 2.
79. FCCC/SBI/2017/L.4, para. 3.
80. IISD, 2017d, p. 13.
81. FCCC/SBI/2017/L.4, para. 4.
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• European Union;
• Republic of Korea;
• South Africa.
Effectiveness of the Technology Mechanism
A certain number of Parties2 have underlined that the periodic assessment 
should take account of the measure whereby the two Technology Mechanism 
bodies, i.e. the TEC and CTCN, comply with their mandates.
Regarding the periodic assessment by the TEC, the measures below have been 
singled out by some Parties as potential issues for the assessment, especially in 
terms of their relevance and number and the quality of the process3:
• the recommendations of the TEC to the COP;
• its activities, including topical discussions and workshops; 
• its reports and other documents.
As regards the CTCN, several Parties have emphasised the periodic assessment 
of the effectiveness of three essential services to be provided by the CTCN in 
implementing the Paris Agreement. In particular, certain tasks that should be 
submitted to the review were listed by some of the Parties, namely to4:
• answer questions from developing countries5; 
• promote collaboration and access to information6; 
• improve networks, partnerships and capacity building7; 
• networking8;
• an institutional provision9; 
• designated national authorities10. 
Certain Parties11 have also mentioned technological needs assessments (TNA) 
as elements that should be included in the periodic assessment of the Mechanism. 
In this respect, a group of Parties have listed the following items as being relevant 
to the periodic assessment12:
• the number of countries and geographical areas that carry out TNA;
• the number of TNA performed;
• the number of published documents relating to TNA;
• the level of satisfaction of the countries that had carried out TNA; and
• the number of projects implemented arising from a technological action plan.
Appropriate nature of the support provided to the Technology 
Mechanism
Regarding the appropriate nature of the support, several Parties13 noted that 
the periodic assessment should assess the financial support made available by 
the Technology Mechanism bodies to determine whether it is appropriate so that 
bodies can fulfil their mandates in implementing the Paris Agreement. Regarding 
the TNA, the European Union noted that the periodic assessment should take 
account of the support to the TNA working groups, events and studies14. On 
the subject of the CTCN, a few Parties stated that the assessment should depend 
on the amount, the predictability and the appropriate nature of the financial 
resources received by the CTCN15. 
The rest of the text page 19
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Modalities of the periodic assessment
In this respect, certain Parties have noted the importance of avoiding overlapping 
efforts and of keeping costs as low as possible16. One group of Parties has also 
underlined that the instruments used for the periodic assessment should be 
simple and that complex indicators should be avoided17. Lastly, the Parties have 
raised the general questions below as potential issues to be addressed to define 
clearly the modalities of the periodic assessment18:
• Who will be responsible for the periodic assessment?19 
• How will the assessment be carried out?20 
• Which the sources of information will be relevant to the assessment?21 
• When will the assessment be carried out?22 
• How will be assessment results be presented?23 
1. FCCC/SBI/2017/INF.2
2. FCCC/SBI/2017/INF.2, para. 11 on LDC, 2017, Republic of Korea, 2017 and EU, 2017
3. FCCC/SBI/2017/INF.2, para. 12 on Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 2017 
4. FCCC/SBI/2017/INF.2, para. 12
5. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 2017 
6. LDC, 2017 and Republic of Korea 2017 
7. IALAC, 2017, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 2017, LDC, 2017 and Republic of Korea, 
2017 
8. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 2017 and LDC 2017 
9. LDC, 2017
10. LDC, 2017
11. rgentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 2017 and LDC 2017 
12. FCCC/SBI/2017/INF.2, para. 15 on Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 2017
13. South Africa, 2017d, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 2017, Indonesia, 2017, LDC, 2017, 
Republic of Korea, 2017 and EU 2017 
14. EU, 2017
15. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 2017
16. Australia, Canada, Japan and Norway, 2017 
17. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 2017
18.  FCCC/SBI/2017/INF.2, paras. 21-29
19. South Africa, 2017d and Republic of Korea, 2017
20. South Africa, 2017d and Republic of Korea and EU, 2017
21. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 2017, Australia, Canada, Japan and Norway, 2017, LDC, 
2017, Republic of Korea, 2017 and EU, 2017 
22. Republic of Korea, 2017 and EU, 2017 
23. Republic of Korea, 2017 and EU, 2017
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I.1.4  The Paris Committee on capacity-building: mandate, composition 
and first meeting
In Paris, the Parties created the Paris Committee on Capacity-building82. In this 
respect, the Parties launched a five-year workplan overseen by the Committee for 
the 2016-2020 period. This work plan aims to “increase synergies through cooperation 
and avoid duplication among existing bodies established under the Convention that 
implement capacity-building activities of capacity.”83 This work may also take into 
account the bodies which are dedicated to capacity-building within and outside 
the Convention. The parties also requested the SBI to organise annual in-session 
meetings of the Committee84.
The objective of the Committee through its initial work plan will also be to 
assemble a broad range of information relevant to the Parties’ capacity-building, 
including: 
• (i) “capacity gaps and needs”85; 
• (ii) the “good practices, challenges, experiences and lessons learned from work 
on capacity-building by bodies established under the Convention”86; and 
• (iii) “the opportunities to strengthen capacity at the national, regional and 
subnational level”87.
The workplan that will be supervised by the Committee also envisages promoting 
“the development and dissemination of tools and methodologies for the implementation 
of capacity-building88”, as well as “exploring how developing country Parties can take 
ownership of building and maintaining capacity over time and space”89. This effort should 
allow the Committee to “provide directives to the secretariat to maintain an updated window 
on line [of the Convention] dedicated to capacity reinforcement”90. This acquisition and 
sharing of knowledge should also allow the Committee to “foster world global, regional, 
national and subnational cooperation” in terms of capacity-building91, in addition to 
“fostering dialogue, coordination, collaboration and coherence among relevant processes 
and initiatives under the Convention”92.
The Committee should also be called upon to carry out work “in the context 
of the third comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity-building 
framework93, which is aimed at assisting developing countries to implement the 
82. Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 71-81.
83. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 73(a).
84. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 75.
85. Decision 1/CP. 21 para. 73(b).
86. Decision 1/CP. 21 para. 73 (e).
87. Decision 1/CP. 21 para. 73 (g).
88. Decision 1/CP. 21 para. 73 (c).
89. Decision 1/CP. 21 para. 73 (f ).
90. Decision 1/CP. 21 para. 73 (i).
91. Decision 1/CP. 21, para. 73(d).
92. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 73(h).
93. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 76.
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provisions of the Convention and the processes emanating from the Kyoto Protocol94. 
This review was concluded during COP22 in Marrakech, when the Parties adopted 
its conclusions95 (see also Section I.8). In this context, the Parties adopted the 
mandate and composition of the Committee during COP22 so that it could start 
its work96.
Mandate and composition of the Paris  
Committee on capacity-building
In Marrakech, the Parties adopted a mandate for the Paris Committee, whereby 
it is composed of twelve members distributed according to the procedures 
listed below1: 
(i) Two members from each of the five United Nations regional groups;
(ii) One member from the least developed countries;
(iii) One member from the Small Island Developing States.
These members are nominated by their respective groups or constituencies to 
serve two-year terms. They are only eligible to serve two consecutive terms2. 
Furthermore, “six representatives of the bodies created under the application of  
the Convention and the functional bodies of the finance Mechanism will be invited to 
participate in all the Committee meetings based on the Committee’s annual theme”3. 
Lastly, from the twelve nominated members, the Committee itself elects two 
co-chairs annually to serve for a term of one year4.
The Committee meets annually as organised by the SBI during its in-session 
meetings5. Every year, the work of the Committee relates to “an annual focus 
area or theme related to enhanced technical exchange on capacity-building, with the 
purpose of maintaining up-to-date knowledge on the successes and challenges in building 
capacity effectively in a particular area”6. In this respect, the Committee drafts an 
annual technical progress report. These reports must be submitted to SBI during 
sessions that coincide with the COPsessions so that SBI can communicate them 
to the Parties7.
In accordance with its mandate, the Committee met for the first time during SBI46 
in Bonn in May 2017 and elected its first co-chairs. Representatives from the 
Climate Technology Centre and Network, the Consultative Group of Experts 
and the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism were 
invited to attend the meeting and make brief presentations at the opening of the 
session.
At its first meeting, the Committee focused on three points from the 2016-2020 
capacity-building workplan, i.e.8:
• to implement, to the extent possible, pillar 1 of its work;
94. Articles 4.5 et 5 of the UNFCCC; and Article 10(e) of the Kyoto Protocol.
95. Decision 16/CP.22, para. 12.
96. Decision 2/CP.22.
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• to adopt its rolling work plan for 2017-2019 and to include in it the technical 
reports submitted to the parties at COP23; and
• to recommend to the Parties to invite other institutions to support the imple-
mentation of its work plan.
Following its initial meeting, the Committee finalised its sliding workplan for 
2017-2019 which the Committee then made available on the UNFCCC web 
portal9. The plan underpins some fifty deliverables that the Committee plans to 
produce over the next three years to fulfil the mandates assigned to it by decision 
since COP21.
1. Decision 2/CP.22, Annex, para. 2
2. Decision 2/CP.22, Annex, para. 5
3. Decision 2/CP.22, Annex, para. 3
4. Decision 2/CP.22, Annex, para. 8
5. Decision 2/CP.22, Annex, para. 11
6. Decision 2/CP.22, Annex, para. 12
7. Decision 2/CP.22, Annex, para. 17
8. FCCC/2017/1/10, para. 16
9. Available online: http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/standing_
committee/application/pdf/scf_8_background_paper_fifth_review_of_the_financial_
mechanism.pdf.
Field or annual theme of the Paris Committee for 2017
At its first meeting, the Committee spent a full day on addressing the following 
annual theme: capacity-building activities in the implementation of the nationally 
determined Contributions (NDC) under the Paris Agreement97. At the end of this 
day, the Committee agreed to move forwards with a number of points during the 
forthcoming year, including98:
(i) perform an assessment of capacity-building needs as identified in relevant 
sources (such as nationally determined contributions, biennial updated reports, 
national communications, reports of the Durban Forum);
(ii) perform an assessment of the work conducted by other constituted bodies 
of relevance to this subject matter with a view to identifying gaps, solutions 
and synergies;
(iii) to appoint Committee representatives who could act as liaisons between 
the other bodies in order to share synergies;
(iv) strengthen the capacity-building portal as appropriate. 
The Committee also invited the Parties, the constituent bodies and any other 
stakeholder interesting in so doing to submit information that is relevant to the 
work of this annual theme. During this same meeting, the Committee agreed to 
97. PCCB/2017/1/10, para. 21.
98. PCCB/2017/1/10, para. 22.
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continue its work on the same theme in 2018, i.e. on the topic of “capacity-building 
activities for the implementation of nationally determined contributions in the context 
of the Paris Agreement”99. To achieve this, the Committee members also decided to 
invite representatives of the following bodies to take part in its 2018 meeting100:
• Global Environment Facility;
• Green Climate Fund;
• Adaptation Committee;
• Least Developed Countries Expert Group;
• Permanent finance committee;
• Technology Executive Committee.
I.1.5 Modalities, work programme and functions under the Paris 
Agreement of the forum on the impact of the implementation 
of response measures (joint agenda with SBSTA)
The Paris Agreement, in the spirit of the Convention, recognises the importance 
of “taking into consideration in the implementation of this Agreement the concerns of 
Parties with economies most affected by the impacts of response measures, particularly 
developing country Parties”101, whilst the Paris Agreement aims to “hold the increase 
in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels”102. 
When then Convention was adopted, the Parties recognised the effect that achieving 
its objective could have on countries whose economies were highly dependent on 
revenues derived from the extraction, refining and export of hydrocarbons such as 
oil103. Since Bali, the integration of this issue on the agenda of climate negotiations 
has resulted above all in a demand supported partly by Gulf countries which want 
it to be considered in the same way as adaptation and mitigation104.
This impact of response measures crystallises a strong opposition between 
developed countries and developing countries. The latter desire that concrete measures 
be taken by the first to limit the negative impacts of their measures linked to climate 
change and that this element of the agenda lead to strong decisions. In addition, 
they plead for supplementary support from developed countries to counter the 
destructive consequences of their measures105. This element of the agenda has evolved 
during the last years towards the creation in 2011 of a Forum operated jointly by 
SBI and the SBSTA106.
99. PCCB/2017/1/10, para. 26.
100. PCCB/2017/1/10, para. 27.
101. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 15.
102. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, art. 2, para. 1(a).
103. Convention, Art. 4, para. 8(h).
104. FCCC/SB/2012/MISC.2 for example.
105. FCCC/SB/2012/MISC.2 for example.
106. Decision 8/CP.17, para. 3.
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In light of this, the Parties decided, at the COP21, to maintain and improve 
the forum on the impact of response measures implemented whose work will be 
centred on “the provision of concrete examples, case studies and practices in order to 
enhance the capacity of Parties, in particular developing country Parties, to deal with the 
impact of the implementation of response measures”107. The improved work programme 
of the Forum, which will continue to meet twice a year108 under the joint guidance 
of SBI and SBSTA, works in two areas109:
a. Economic diversification and transformation;
b. A just transition of the workforce, and the creation of decent work and quality 
jobs.
The subsidiary bodies are requested to advance the improved forum’s work by 
forming special technical expert groups110 and by the “assessment and analysis of 
impacts, including the use and development of economic modelling”111. The plan is for 
the subsidiary bodies to review the work of the improved forum every three years 
from COP24 onwards112. This revision should also deal with operating modalities 
of the forum. 
In this respect, the Parties instructed the Secretariat of the Convention, in Paris, 
to prepare in the framework of the 44th session of subsidiary bodies a technical 
document that facilitates, for developing countries, “the assessment of various 
impacts that can result from the response measures implemented “, on one hand, and 
that identify also the options of economic diversification that can, at least in part, 
neutralise these impacts113.
The Secretariat has thus prepared two technical documents that could help 
guide the work of the improved forum and offer more precise data to the Parties 
regarding the impact of response measures during the talks on the matter under 
COP22. A first technical document evaluates firstly the impact of response measures, 
in particular by using several economic modelling tools114. 
The document identifies seven categories of response measures in particular115 
which could have “impact on economic growth, income distribution, employment, the 
environment, public health and food security”116: 
• carbon tax; 
• subsidies favourable to low-carbon technology, granted simultaneously with 
removal of subsidies to technologies with stronger GHG intensity; 
107. Decision 11/CP.21, para. 2.
108. Decision 11/CP.21, para. 3.
109. Decision 11/CP.21, para. 5.
110. Decision 11/CP.21, para. 4.
111. Decision 11/CP.21, para. 6.
112. Decision 11/CP.21, para. 7.
113. Decision 11/CP.21, para. 9.
114. FCCC/TP/2016/4.
115. FCCC/TP/2016/4, para. 36.
116. FCCC/TP/2016/4, para. 37.
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• policies on energy reform and green investments; 
• ceiling systems and trading of GHG emission credits and the compensation 
credits at the international level; 
• commercial measures such as customs duties and border adjustments for car-
bon; 
• implementation of standards and labelling; and 
• technology cooperation”.
A second technical document deals with the concept of economic diversification 
in the context of response measures117. The document identifies four economic 
sectors where the impact of response measures could be felt more significantly and 
that could benefit from economic diversification118: 
(i) conventional fossil fuels (coal, gas and oil); 
(ii) energy-using products that are also exposed to foreign competition 
(aluminium, iron and steel, cement, chemical products and pulp and paper 
sectors); 
(iii) tourism; and 
(iv) agriculture. 
It appears, however, for the moment, to be more complex to identify solutions 
available to developing countries that wish to diversify their economy119.
During discussions in the contact group on response measures that took place 
in Bonn in May 2016, the G77+China identified numerous fields that could 
enhance cooperation in terms of acquisition of knowledge on the impact of response 
measures and tools available in order that this impact be minimised particular for 
developing countries, i.e.120: 
(i) technical cooperation, 
(ii) cooperation in terms of modelling and evaluation considering priorities of 
developing countries, 
(iii) partnerships with research organisations, and 
(iv) cooperation for equitable transition”. 
The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), for its part, stressed in the past 
a “focus oriented towards action “for the forum121, a proposal that received the 
support of numerous Parties in Bonn, in May 2016, whilst the importance of 
concrete results, accompanied “by clear schedules for identified actions” was raised 
by these Parties122. South Africa for its part wished to orientate the talks in terms 
117. FCCC/TP/2016/3.
118. FCCC/TP/2016/3, para. 114.
119. FCCC/TP/2016/3, paras. 129-155.
120. IISD, 2016b, page 2.
121. FCCC/SB/2016/L.2/Rev.1, Annex I.
122. IISD, 2016c, page 2.
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of identification of vulnerabilities faced by developing countries123. These two last 
elements were dealt with in part by the technical documents prepared by the 
Secretariat, as mentioned above.
The European Union specially stressed the sharing of knowledge so that 
the different actors be called upon to contribute pragmatically and globally to the 
discussion on the impact of response measures. Such an interactive framework 
where exchanges of views and knowledge are encouraged could introduce favourable 
conditions for the identification of themes that could lead to meetings of a special 
group of technical experts124.
During a first meeting of the forum in Bonn in May 2016, the subsidiary 
bodies also prepared the work programme of the forum until November 2018. T 
o this end, a “workshop on views and experiences on economic diversification and 
transformation and on a just transition of the workforce and the creation of decent 
work and quality jobs” was held on 7-14 November during COP22125. Five sessions 
were held at the workshop discussing the following issues126:
(i) the status of the knowledge acquisition on sustainable economic and social 
transition within the scope of implementation of mitigation measures;
(ii) integration of economic diversification within the national strategies: discussions 
on experiences and apprenticeships;
(iii) management of the social repercussions caused by sustainable development;
(iv) fair transition for the active population and the creation of decent and quality 
jobs; and
(v) next steps.
In addition, in Marrakech, the Parties agreed to set up an ad hoc group of 
technical experts (GET) to “elaborate on the technical work on the areas of the work 
programme in the context of sustainable development and that it would spend two days 
on considering the two areas of the work programme”127. These experts met as planned 
in Bonn during SB 46128. Participants addressed more than ten issues on diversification 
and transformation of the economy, nearly ten issues specific to a fair transition 
for the active population and the creation of decent and quality jobs were also 
discussed with a further ten or so additional issues relating to both themes at the 
same time129. 
123. IISD, 2016c, page 2.
124. IISD, 2016c, page 2.
125. FCCC/SB/2016/INF.2.
126. FCCC/SB/2016/INF.2.
127. FCCC/SB/2016/L.6.
128. SBSTA and SBI, 2017.
129. See the short summary of the workshop online: http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_
support/response_measures/application/pdf/summary_teg.pdf
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As for how to include the forum in the impact of response measures to the 
Paris Agreement, the SBI and SBSTA invited the Parties to submit their views “on 
concrete elements of the modalities, work programme and functions under the Paris 
Agreement of the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures” by 
30 September 2017 at the latest130. The Parties were also invited to base their 
observations, amongst other things, on the discussions held to date on this issue as 
well as on the concept note prepared jointly by the permanent subsidiary bodies 
and the secretariat131. This offers the Parties some pathways as well as taking into 
account past submissions communicated by the Parties on this topic (see box below).
Work programme to be envisaged under the Paris Agreement  
for the forum: possible stumbling block in Marrakech?
A work programme with a broad rather than targeted range could also create 
a stumbling block regarding implementation for the period covering current 
works up to November 2018, whilst certain Parties in Bonn in May 2016 opposed 
the forum covering too much material and statements simultaneously1.
In this respect, the United States, Saudi Arabia, AOSIS, the G77/China and the 
EU propose that the work programme be limited for the time being to the two 
areas determined in Paris2. Russia, on the other hand, presented a submission 
that simply reiterated that the fundamental requirement of the forum was to 
ensure compliance with paragraph 15 of Article 4 of the Paris Agreement, i.e. to 
ensure that the Parties, under implementation of the Agreement, take account 
of the concerns of Parties most affected by the response measures, mainly the 
developing countries.3
Whilst concentrating the forum efforts around these two areas, AOSIS suggests 
moreover that the work programme take place in two stages: (i) evaluation and 
analysis of current and possible effects on developing nations, in particular the 
SIDS and LDC, of response measures implemented by developed nations in 
particular unilateral measures, and (ii) specific activities to be carried out in the 
work programme4. 
The G77+China for its part suggested adding exchange of views and experience 
on (i) support and capacity-building and (ii) measures that can mitigate damaging 
effects of response measures in workshops that could take place under the 
auspices of the forum5.
For its part, the Africa Group prioritises an expanded work programme covering 
five issues6: (i) sustainable development with a view to determining the damaging 
effects of response measures for sustainable development in Africa and mitigate 
them; (ii) examination of the impact of response measures implemented, to 
improve mobilisation and transparency in order to reach common answers;
130. FCCC/SB/2017/L.3, para. 2.
131. Available online: http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_support/response_measures/appli-
cation/pdf/rm_reflection_paper.pdf
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(iii) enhanced capacity-building; (iv) development of guidelines on the subject of 
reporting and consideration of response measures; and (v) economic modelling. 
Ghana suggested a broader work programme similar to that of the Africa Group.
1. IISD, 2016e, p. 2
2. Saudi Arabia and United States, 2016, AOSIS, 2016b and EU, 2016b
3. Russian Federation, 2016 
4. AOSIS, 2016, pp. 2-3
5. G77+China, 2016
6. Africa Group, 2016
7. Ghana, on behalf of the Africa Group, 2017
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological  
Advice (SBSTA)
1.1.6 Questions relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement
Decision 1/CP.21 recommends that the CMA adopts directives, rules, modalities 
and procedures, as well as a framework for new mechanisms drawn up as per Article 6 
of the Paris Agreement132.
The parameters that contribute to the GHG mitigation mechanism and that 
promote sustainable development are:
• Voluntary participation authorized by each Party involved;
• Real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate 
change (GHG emissions reduction);
• Specific scope of activities;
• Reductions in emissions that are additional to reductions that would have 
already been made anyway;
• Verification and certification of emission reductions resulting from mitigation 
activities by designated operational entities;
• Experience gained with and lessons learned from existing mechanisms and 
approaches adopted under the Convention.
The type of system to implement to enforce Article 4 is still a major question for 
the Parties. The new mechanism could be a continuation of the previous approach, 
through which credits were issued for projects and programmes. In Paris, Brazil 
made a proposal to consider a mechanism whose scale is similar to that of the 
CDM, an “improved CDM” or a “CDM+”133. Conversely, during the preliminary 
discussions for a New Market Mechanism (NMM), the European Union (EU) 
and the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) proposed a mechanism encouraging 
action at the scale of entire sectors134.
132. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, art. 6, paras. 1, 4 and 9.
133. CEPS, 2016.
134. SBSTA, 2014.
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Accounting
The existing accounting system under the UNFCCC is differentiated for developed 
parties and developing parties. By virtue of the Convention, industrialised countries 
must submit GHG inventory updates each year, whereas developing countries 
may include these inventories in their biennial updated reports that they must 
submit every two years—except for LDCs and SIDS, which may submit their 
reports at their discretion—or include them in their national communications, 
which are submitted every four years. 
The Paris Agreement sets a framework for strengthening the transparency of 
the action and of the support provided to implement these actions. However, it has 
some flexibility that incorporates the various national capacities. In this framework, 
each party must submit a national GHG inventory. The SBSTA is tasked with 
drawing up and formulating opinions on how to apply the provision of the strength 
of the accounting for cooperative approaches, for adoption at the first CMA session. 
According to paragraphs 89, 92b and 94a of Decision 1/CP.21, given the flexibility 
offered as part of the strengthened transparency framework, the developing countries 
must make efforts to be aligned with this to the extent possible, even if they do not 
necessarily strictly follow these directives, especially in the first years of their appli-
cation. The Paris Agreement does not specify how compliance of the accounting 
of a country will be ascertained, but the new transparency system will probably 
look into this (see also section I.B.13 with Article 13 of the Agreement).
As for the accounting system, the CMA may play an active role in making 
transfers more transparent, via a central registry similar to the existing CDM registry, 
for example135. If the system is more decentralised, the directive could ask parties 
to keep their own registry with double-entry accounting and count based on the 
transparency rules suggested in Article 13, to ensure that the monitoring is sufficient 
to avoid double counting. All of Article 6 requires that the activities of Parties also 
promote sustainable development and ensure environmental integrity. As such, 
the directives, rules and procedures to be drawn up should also provide for modalities 
that ensure and assess these results based on development objectives.
NDCs and markets
The role of the market-based instruments in the NDCs needs to be clarified, in terms 
of the accounting—especially concerning the possibility of combining climate 
funding and market-based mechanisms to implement political instruments as well 
as mitigation projects.
Mitigation “results”
Until the decisions shed more light on some questions, it will be useful to define 
the scope of what can be considered as a “mitigation result” that can be transferred 
between countries. Under the Kyoto Protocol, Certified Emission Reductions 
(CER) from CDM projects are an accounting unit for transferring obligations as 
135. CEPS, 2016.
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well as for defining the scope of the international transfers that are accepted. In 
other words, only the transfers involving CERs are accepted in the presentation of 
national GHG accounts. The Parties will also need to examine if other forms of 
cooperation could be considered, as per paragraph 2 of Article 6. For example, the 
Joint Crediting Mechanism, a Japanese initiative that has some similarities with 
the CDM, or the bilateral link between the two exchange systems. The transfer 
concept implies that one or several countries that do not have an absolute target 
for all of their economies may trade mitigation units. This poses problems for the 
objective of avoiding double counting.
The institutional aspect
The Parties must decide on the institutional governance modalities for the new 
mechanism. The CDM is managed by an Executive Board composed of ten repre-
sentatives, including one member from each of the five UN regional groups, two 
members from the parties referred to in Annex I, two members from Non-Annex 
I parties, and one representative from the SIDS. Similarly, JI has a supervisory 
committee to monitor project verification. The new mechanism from Article 6.4 
could directly include one of these institutions. The CDM and JI already have 
procedures for developing projects that are ultimately credited. The Parties may 
decide to transfer part of this set of rules to the new mechanism, or they may 
decide to adopt new procedures.
Developing new rules
The Kyoto Protocol established the CDM in 1997. However, it took four years to 
set the CDM, in the Marrakech Accords in 2001. It is possible and advisable to not 
take as much time to draw up the rules of Article 4, in light of all the experience 
with the CDM and JI. However, as the governments have diverging views on the 
role of market-based mechanisms, it will be difficult to quickly draw conclusions 
on these fundamental issues. The difficulty in reaching a consensus on market-based 
mechanisms has been reflected in the slow progress in their negotiation since 2011, 
in the UNFCCC framework, working towards a Framework for Various Approaches 
(FVA) and the NMMs. However, the fact that several countries have attached 
importance to international markets in their NDCs suggests that there may be a 
strong impetus to find a viable system quickly.
The sustainable development component of Article 6
With its adoption of the 17 sustainable development goals in 2015, the international 
community has a robust base for using the concept of sustainable development, in 
the context of Article 6 of the Agreement, for example. Although the voluntary 
market produced some experience with the co-benefits of mitigation activities in 
terms of the activity programmes and projects, the CDM does not have strict rules 
for analysing the positive impacts of sustainable development and the prevention 
of negative impacts. It preserves the prerogative of the host countries to design and 
implement review procedures according to their own sustainable development 
priorities.
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The Parties will therefore have to decide (i) whether the participants in the 
Sustainable Development Mechanism (SDM) and cooperative approaches (CA) 
should analyse in advance the positive and negative effects of proposed activities, 
(ii) if they should following an internationally-defined assessment procedure and 
(iii) whether strict monitoring of sustainable development results from SDM and 
CA activities will be required.
As the Paris Agreement aims to mitigate GHG emissions, it incorporates 
part of the sustainable development goals. SDM rules could thus require that the 
implemented results of the Agreement be monitored by MRV approaches that 
have yet to be determined. The Parties must decide whether an upstream assessment 
and results follow-up in terms of sustainable development will be mandatory or 
voluntary, and whether the rules will be set up in a centralised manner, or if the Parties 
will be free to set up their own approaches to integrate sustainable development.
Finalising the CDM reform and the NMM and FVA negotiations
The future of the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol is also uncertain, 
particularly regarding the integration of elements of the CDM and JI in this new 
mechanism. The Paris Agreement does not mention the CDM or JI. However, it 
does note that the new mechanism must build on the experience of the existing 
mechanisms. Likewise, it is difficult to know if the units produced by the Kyoto 
mechanisms will be eligible after 2020. If they are eligible, it is not easy to ascertain 
whether they should be converted into some type of alternative credit, to comply 
with the framework of the new mechanism. 
The negotiators may also decide to transfer the methodologies of CDM projects 
to apply them in the new mechanism, to not incorporate some of these existing 
approaches, or to develop more of them (for example, by developing methodologies 
for sector-level activities). The negotiators may also envisage other methods used 
outside of the UNFCCC.
At the same time, it will be important to continue and potentially complete 
the CDM reform, so that lessons from this process can be used to develop the 
SDM, and to start a coordinated and transparent transition from the CDM to the 
SDM. As such, it is also important for the Parties to set the terms of the eligibility 
of the CDM portfolio for the SDM. They may be various levels of eligibility, to 
restrict the supply, and also to ensure CDM project developers that it will be possible 
to continue high-quality projects. It will be interesting to see if, and under what 
conditions, an activity transition from the CDM / JI toward the SDM will be 
authorised. Continuing CDM activities might only be possible if these activities 
fulfil criteria that ensure environmental integrity136. 
These criteria could be: additionality, benefits for the host country and contri-
bution to global mitigation of global emissions. The last two criteria may require 
adapting baselines to make them more conservative. This approach could make 
it easier to make the new mechanism operational more quickly, and could send a 
136. Voigt, 2016.
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positive signal to the private sector, even though it might not settle the fundamental 
question of the origin of the request. Regarding all the rules inherited from the 
CDM and JI, assigning a mandate to the Executive Board to review all of the exist-
ing rules in order to identify the elements that may be used, and those that must 
be modified in the Paris Agreement, would offer an opportunity to respond to 
these questions.
At the same time, it is important to make progress on simplifying the method-
ologies (such as the standardised baselines), and to share these results so that they 
can be applied to the SDM.
The Parties met in Marrakech and Bonn to continue discussions about Article 6 
under the Paris Agreement. The decisions adopted for all sub-items mainly involved 
noting exchanges of views between Parties and invited them to continue with their 
talks. In Bonn, the Parties also considered three informal notes prepared by the 
SBSTA that reported on outlines included in the written observations submitted 
by the Parties prior to SB 46 along with exchanges during a round table held dur-
ing SB 46. In all three cases, the Parties were invited to submit new observations, in 
connection with the talks held in Marrakech and Bonn, by 2 October 2017 at the 
latest. Each of these three notes contains more than sixty or so issues raised by the 
Parties during these talks. They can be consulted online using the links below:
(i) Cooperative approaches: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_may_2017 
/in-session/application/pdf/sbsta_10a_informal_note_final.pdf;
(ii) Mechanism created under Article 6: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_
may_2017/in-session/application/pdf/sbsta_10b_informal_note_final.pdf;
(iii) Market-based approaches http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_may_2017/ 
in-session/application/pdf/sbsta_10c_informal_note_final.pdf.
Lastly, note that certain Parties did not wish observers to be allowed to participate 
in the round tables and negotiations taking place under Article 6. Should this 
practice continue, it could prevent the talks benefiting from valuable contributions 
from miscellaneous stakeholders with actual practical and technical experience in 
this matters.
I.2. Issues relating to the ad hoc working groups 
(AWG) and the Conference of the Parties 
acting as a meeting of the Parties of the 
Paris Agreement (CMA)
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA)
By adopting the Paris Agreement, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) also decided to run a major work programme 
accompanying it, via Decision 1/CP.21. The UNFCCC decided to establish the 
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA)137.
137. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 7, p. 3.
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Currently, in the post-Paris context, this new process is the most important 
climate change negotiation round in the various bodies that have been mandated 
to prepare the entry into force of the Paris Agreement and making it operational. 
As such, this process determines the future of the fight against the effects and 
consequences of climate change, especially for the most vulnerable countries, 
including the LDCs and SIDS.
For the first time, the Parties reached an agreement on the obligation of 
achieving “together” the goal of holding the global temperature increase “well 
below” 2°C by 2100, or even 1.5°C, thereby sharing the same vision for mitigation 
and a global adaptation goal to be determined. Furthermore, these Parties agree to 
work together and to make support, transfer, and various other forms of cooperation 
available, be it financial, technical, technological or building capacities. This coop-
eration aims to respond more effectively to climate change, via mitigation, adapta-
tion, loss and damage, deforestation, land degradation, etc. in a transparent, evolv-
ing and sustainable framework.
The mandate of the Ad Hoc Working  
Group on the Paris Agreement (APA)
• Prepare the entry into force of the Paris Agreement;
• Prepare and convene the first Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting 
of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA);
• Prepare draft decisions that the CMA should adopt at its first session.
The APA shall mainly be guided by the work programme elements that Decision 
1/CP.21 mandates. It must develop further the provisions of the Paris Agreement 
and prepare the implementation of its components, especially in terms of: 
(i) the objective;
(ii) mitigation;
(iii) nationally-determined contributions;
(iv) adaptation;
(v) loss and damage;
(vi) financing; 
(vii) technologies; 
(viii) capacity building; 
(ix) transparency;
(x) Global Stocktake;
(xi) Preparation of the entry into force of the Paris Agreement.
This work must be conducted in the negotiation sessions of the APA, as well as 
in the two other subsidiary bodies (SBI and SBSTA) of the UNFCCC. Several 
bodies constituted under the Convention have also been mandated to help to 
implement the work programme preparing for the implementation and opera-
tionalisation of the Paris Agreement. This involves the Adaptation Committee, the 
The rest of the text page 34
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Least Developed Countries Expert Group, the Standing Committee on Finance, 
the Green Climate Fund, the Global Environment Facility, the Technology Executive 
Committee, the Paris Committee on Capacity Building, and the Executive Committee 
of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage.
Figure 5. The implementation of the Paris Agreement...  
Main arrangements “for consideration and adoption”  
during CMA1 – Summary138
138. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.
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Figure 6. Implementation of the Paris Agreement … The agenda 
items for Bonn and the upcoming Conferences – Summary139
139. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017 – See also the UNFCCC 
Progress tracker (latest version available on 20 June 2017) [online] http://unfccc.int/
files/paris_agreement/application/pdf/pa_progress_tracker_200617.pdf
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Figure 7. Ambition-related mechanisms – Main arrangements for 
“consideration and adoption” during the CMA1 and the agenda 
items for Bonn and the upcoming Conferences140
140. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.
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Figure 8. Cooperative approaches and pre-2020 Ambition – Main 
arrangements for “consideration and adoption” during the CMA1 
and the agenda items for Bonn and the upcoming Conferences141
141. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.
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Figure 9. Adaptation and Loss and Damage – Main arrangements 
for “consideration and adoption” during the CMA1 and the agenda 
items for Bonn and the upcoming Conferences142
142. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.
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Figure 10. Financing – Main arrangements for “consideration and 
adoption” during the CMA1 and the agenda items for Bonn and 
the upcoming Conferences143
143. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.
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Figure 11. Technology – Main arrangements for “consideration  
and adoption” during the CMA1 and the agenda items for Bonn  
and the upcoming Conferences144
144. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.
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Figure 12. Capacity-building – Main arrangements for “consideration 
and adoption” during the CMA1 and the agenda items for Bonn 
and the upcoming Conferences145
145. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.
42
T
h
e
 
i
s
s
u
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
Figure 13. Transparency and compliance – Main arrangements for 
“consideration and adoption” during the CMA1 and the agenda 
items for Bonn and the upcoming Conferences146
The APA activities, similar to those of the other bodies and groups constituted 
and mandated by Decision 1/CP.21 should be completed, considering and based 
on the existing procedures and modalities, by improving, strengthening and/or 
developing new elements as needed for new measures.
For example, countries could continue to consider the issues of transparency 
within the existing system, via international consultation and analysis for developing 
countries, and assessment and review for developed countries, based on two parallel 
reporting systems—biennial updated reports for the former and biennial reports 
for the latter.
146. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.
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In Marrakech, the Parties requested the APA and the other permanent subsid-
iary bodies and bodies created by virtue of the Convention to report on their 
progress in implementing the Paris Agreement, at the latest at COP24 in 2018147. 
The plan is also for the COP23 to review progress made by the APA in terms of 
executing its work programme148. 
I.2.1 Conduct of the first APA session
The first APA session was held on 6-16 May 2016 in Bonn (Germany), during SB 
44. It was a step of crucial importance for the success of the current negotiation 
process. Although the session got off to a rough start, it was able to note significant 
progress finally on the following fundamental points:
• Adoption of the APA agenda;
• Adoption of the APA work organisation mode;
• Election of the APA Bureau;
• Agreement on some lines of work of the subsidiary bodies that are important 
for the coherence of the work programme.
In fact, prior to and after the APA session in May 2016, countries and country 
groups had expressed reservations regarding the concept note149 jointly presented 
by the COP21 Chairmanship (France) and by the future COP22 Chairmanship 
(Morocco), especially regarding the proposals for priority items that need to be 
added to the draft APA. These Parties consider that the initially suggested agenda 
was focused on mitigation, and that an acceptable agenda should equitably reflect 
all the elements of the Paris Agreement.
As mentioned earlier, other bodies constituted under the Convention were 
mandated just like the APA, and the two other standing subsidiary bodies of the 
Convention were mandated to run the work programme to prepare the entry into 
force and implement the Paris Agreement. Some of these bodies are not directly 
under the authority of the Convention Secretariat, such as the Global Environment 
Facility and the Green Climate Fund, which are mandated to develop provisions 
related to financial issues, and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) 
for technological aspects150.
Thus, for some Parties, the APA agenda should be designed so that negotiators 
can feel confident that all the elements of the Paris Agreement will be treated in a 
balanced and equitable manner, all treated with the same importance. This would 
still be the case even if some elements of the work programme established by Decision 
1/CP.21 were on the agendas of the two other standing subsidiary bodies of the 
Convention or of other mandated committees and groups.
147. Decision 1/CMA.1, para. 8.
148. Decision 1/CMA.1, para. 10.
149. UNFCCC, 2016f.
150. UNFCCC, 2016f, Annex II, pp. 6-11.
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Many countries and country groups also asked for explanations and clarifications 
on the content of certain items in the initial provisional agenda, such as the description 
of the elements of the Nationally Determined Contributions (the “characteristics” 
of NDCs), the modalities for organising and running the global stocktake and 
questions relating to transparency and compliance.
After APA1work began on 17 May 2016 in Bonn, and following the speeches 
of countries, country groups and alliances, the expected difficulties in adopting the 
agenda took centre stage for APA1. The APA Co-Chairs (Saudi Arabia and New 
Zealand) had to spend two days on consultations to reach a consensus on the APA 
agenda. Minor amendments151 were made to the initial draft agenda, which essen-
tially consisted of the addition of the following two items:
1. Item 4: New communication guidelines for adaptation, which are included in 
the Nationally Determined Contributions, referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 
10 and 11 of the Paris Agreement. 
2. Item 8(c): Reports on the progress made by subsidiary bodies and bodies consti-
tuted in the mandate received in virtue of the Paris Agreement and Section III 
of Decision 1/CP.21, to promote and facilitate the coordination and coherence 
of the execution of the work plan, and if necessary, to take measures that may 
be in the form of recommendations.
In addition to showing the APA agenda items, Diagram 14 below also shows 
the work of the subsidiary bodies that are mandated to implement the work programme.
151. United Nations, 2016b.
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Figure 14. The issues of permanent subsidiary bodies related to the 
elements of the Paris Agreement and the accompanying decision152
I.2.2 Organising the APA1 negotiation work
One of the main issues for this first session was to agree on how to organise the 
work of this new body. Despite the keen interest for and the momentum arising 
from the adoption of the APA agenda, and the availability of all countries to start 
152. © Guide to negotiations of COP23-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2017– to the UNFCCC [online] 
http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/items/8892.php
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negotiating quickly, the opening statements, following the adoption of the agenda, 
revealed that most developing countries, and some developed countries, would 
like the negotiations to take place with a minimum number of formal and informal 
groups. This implied accommodating mainly the small delegations and avoiding 
that similar or connected topics (for example, financing, technology, transparency, 
etc.) would be discussed in parallel in different groups, given that the negotiators, 
who generally specialise in topics, could not be present at more than one meeting 
at a time.
The Parties agreed with the proposal of the APA1 Co-Chairs to continue their 
work in a single contact group153 that should consider the six essential items of the 
agenda, to handle the issue of funds, review progress, determine the path to take 
and review the draft conclusions. 
I.2.3 Issues of the APA in Bonn
The first session of the APA met again in Marrakech, during COP22, to continue 
its work (APA1-2). However, progress was slower than expected on the issues 
addressed by the APA at the second half of its first session. In this respect, the 
formal APA work had been cut short at the beginning of the second week of talks 
under the COP22 before continuing as informal consultations until the end of the 
conference.154 
With apparent signs of policy stumbling blocks on several of the agenda items 
of the APA for the implementation of the Paris Agreement, the Parties agreed in 
Marrakech to set 2018 and the COP24 as the deadline date to adopt the modalities 
that would allow the Agreement to be implemented.155. In this respect, certain 
observers qualified the COP23 as the “transition COP”156, during which the Parties 
would no doubt be called on to adopt draft decisions to execute the APA agenda 
items during COP24. Nevertheless, for some Parties, mainly the least developed 
countries, it would be more relevant for the APA to submit decisions relating to its 
substantive agenda items (items 3 to 8) to adoption as and when ready rather than 
submitting a “package” of decisions to the CMA during COP24157. This would 
avoid especially having to compromise on certain decisions so that they can be 
adopted as a block.
At the Marrakech session, the APA mainly noted the majority of informal 
notes drafted under informal consultations about its agenda items 3 to 8, which 
reflect in detail viewpoints issued by the Parties during these consultations158. No 
153. IISD, 2016a.
154. IISD, 2016i, p.41.
155. IISD, 2016i, p.41.
156. IISD, 2017d, p.24.
157. IISD, 2016i, p.41.
158. Each informal note can be accessed at: http://unfccc.int/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/
items/9974.php
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draft decision was drawn up at APA1-2 and, as discussed below, the talks continued 
at APA1-3 in Bonn in May 2017, mainly emphasising the technical aspects of the 
agenda items whilst at the same time postponing some more policy-type questions 
to a later date159.
In this respect, the APA presented the Parties with a full reflection note 
describing the progress of work for every APA1 agenda item following the first 
two parts of its first session160. Referring to item 8 of the APA agenda, which touches 
on various issues regarding the implementation of the Agreement, the Parties 
agreed that the APA was directly responsible for a least one “orphan” issue, namely 
the inclusion of the Adaptation Fund under the Paris Agreement161 (see part I.10 
regarding the issues on adaptation). 
To facilitate progress on the work on this point at the APA1-4, the Parties 
requested that the secretariat draft a report and publish its contents on the UNFCCC 
website at the latest by 15 September 2017, covering all the decisions taken on the 
Adaptation Fund and which addressed its governance, institutions provisions, its 
guarantees and its operational rules. In addition, it was also possible to advise the 
Parties, during APA1-3, about legal issues relating to the inclusion of the Adaptation 
Fund under the Paris Agreement, as for the moment this falls under the auspices 
of the Conference of the Parties acting as the Conference of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol (CMP) and serves to implement the Kyoto Protocol162. Thus, it seems 
that in order for the Adaptation Fund to serve the Paris Agreement, it would be 
necessary that the CMP and the CMA both adopt complementary decisions on this, 
which would allow, to some extent, a transfer of the Funds from one instrument 
to the other.
The Parties were also asked to submit their viewpoints on items 3 to 7 of the 
agenda prior to APA1-3163. These communications should have enabled to frame 
the talks taking place at the round tables of APA1-3, in Bonn, in May 2017, 
Nevertheless, certain observers have underlined the challenges facing delegates 
attending the APA1-3 in Boon, despite little concrete progress being made in this 
respect in Marrakech164, apart from the call for communication in an attempt to 
hold workshops and round tables in May 2017165. Mainly, the work of the APA in 
Marrakech stalled overall in relation to the balance to be attributed to all the elements 
for the implementation of the Paris Agreement, by avoiding prioritising some 
aspects such as mitigation166. 
159. IISD, 2017d, p.22.
160. APA.2017.1.InformalNote [online] http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/apa/eng/ 
1infnot.pdf
161. APA.2017.1.InformalNote, para. 41-44.
162. IISD, 2017d, p.7.
163. FCCC/APA/2016/L.4.
164. IISD, 2016i, p.43.
165. IISD, 2016i, p.42.
166. IISD, 2016i, p.43.
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For example, during the talks on mitigation, a group of developing countries 
clearly emphasised that it was essential to address “the full scope of the NDC” 
including the “resources required to implement them, namely financing, technologies 
and the support for capacity-building”167. If this was not possible, this group of 
countries did not wish to continue with the talks. Disagreement still exists between 
the Parties in terms of implementing the differentiation of the responsibilities 
between developed and developing countries for various elements of the Paris 
Agreement, stumbling blocks which had remained during APA1-3168.
To help progress in the talks at the APA1-4, new informal notes were prepared 
for each item and sub-item of the APA1-3 agenda169. With regard to mitigation 
of the NDC (item 3), the Parties were invited to submit their viewpoints to the 
APA regarding the content of the informal notes referring to each sub-item by 
15 September 2017, so that a new informal note could be prepared at the latest by 
October 15 in preparation of a round table to be held on 6 November 2017. This 
would however be closed to observers, which would also be the case for all the 
round tables planned for the time being within the framework of the AP 1-4 talks 
(see also section I.5 for further information on the implementation of the NDC).
Regarding the communications on adaptation (item  4), the Parties were 
invited to submit their viewpoints regarding the “elements” and “a basic summary” 
proposed in the informal note of APA1-3170. These communications should be 
submitted until 15 September 2015 so that the UNFCCC Secretariat can prepare 
a technical document on the type of information relating to adaptation in the 
NDC by 1 October 2017 at the latest. An informal note should also be drafted by 
15 October 2017 at the latest to prepare for the round table discussions scheduled 
for 4 November 2017, prior to the COP23 (see also Section I.10 for more infor-
mation about adaptation).
On the subject of the framework for transparency of measures and support 
referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement (item 5), the Parties have been invited 
to submit their views in relation to “titles” and “sub-titles” found in the APA1-3 
informal note171. In this case, the communications should be submitted up to 
30 September 2017, to prepare for discussions at two round tables scheduled for 
4 and 5 November 2017, prior to the COP23. The round table of 4 November 
will focus on the transparency of the support, with the round table of 5 November 
focusing on the transparency of the action172 (see also section I.12 for further 
information on the topic of transparency).
167. IISD, 2016i, p.43.
168. IISD, 2017d, p.22-23.
169. FCCC/APA/2017/L.2. Each informal note can be viewed at: http://unfccc.int/meetings/ 
bonn_may_2017/in-session/items/10277.php
170. UNFCCC, 2017e.
171. UNFCCC, 2017f.
172. FCCC/SBI/2017/L.2, para. 13.
49
Guide to the Negotiations - UNFCCC (COP23) - OIF/IFDD, 2017
Regarding the Global Stocktake referred to in Article 14 (item 6), the Parties were 
unable to agree to accept the contents of the informal note submitted at APA1-3 
which noted in particular the divergences and convergences of the viewpoints of 
the Parties on this matter173. They were unable to find common ground for agreement 
both on the observations to be included in the Global Stocktake, particularly 
regarding equity between the Parties, and on accepting a technical document 
reporting on the lessons learnt in 2013-2015174. The Parties were therefore asked 
to submit their viewpoints once again on the Global Stocktake in preparation for 
APA1-4 in relation to potential topics to be included as sources of information 
and to develop the modalities of the Global Stocktake. A round table is planned 
for November 5, 2017. Nevertheless, no informal document is planned in prepation 
for this round table considering the stumbling blocks at the previous APA sessions. 
Regarding the modalities and procedures to ensure the proper function of the 
committee responsible for implementing and promoting compliance of the provisions 
of Article 15, paragraph 2 of the Agreement (item 7), talks in both Marrakech and 
in Bonn made little progress, particularly in relation to the notion of the differen-
tiation between the Parties regarding their obligations under the Paris Agreement. 
For example, the developing countries reiterated the need to take into account 
their national capacities and circumstances175. Many of them have also suggested 
that the mechanism for compliance with provisions and means of implementation 
be interlinked176. To move forward with the work at the APA1-4, the Parties were 
invited to submit their viewpoints by 15 September 2017. A round table is 
planned for this purpose on the first day of COP23, i.e. on 6 November 2017. 
The Parties have been invited, within the framework of the reports, to answer the 
following three questions177:
1. How can links be created between the Committee and other provisions of the 
Agreement whilst at the same time ensuring, on the one hand, the efficacy of 
the Committee and on the other hand that the independence of these other 
provisions is preserved?
2. What type of activities suggested by the Committee would fully facilitate the 
implementation of the provisions of the Agreement and their compliance? 
How could this be achieved?
3. How could the modalities of the Committee’s function under Article 15 take 
into account the national capacities and circumstances of the Parties?
At the APA1-4, the challenges will be significant in order to make progress on 
the work in adopting the decisions required to implement the Paris Agreement at 
the COP24, one year later. In Bonn, in November 2017, the Parties would no 
173. IISD, 2017d, p.6.
174. IISD, 2017d, p.6.
175. IISD, 2017d, p.6.
176. IISD, 2017d, p.6.
177. UNFCCC, 2017g, Annex, p.9.
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doubt wish to set down the foundations for the options, elements and clear provisions 
of items 3 to 8 of the APA agenda, although certain specific policy aspects of the 
APA, or related element treated in parallel by other UNFCCC bodies could stall 
on these. Nevertheless, the same co-chairs of the previous year will oversee the 
work of the APA1-4 in the hope of achieving significant progress during this 
“transition COP”178. The precise work programme submitted to the Parties by 
these co-chairs will no doubt be propitious to such advancement of works, whilst 
five round tables are planned, the views of the Parties have been sought before the 
APA1-4 on the main agenda items and informal notes should be drafted for most 
of them before the Parties meet in November 2014.
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA)
I.2.4 Issues of CMA1-2 in Bonn
Under the entry into force of the Paris Agreement on 4 November 2016179, just a 
few days before the COP22 (Marrakech, 6-17 November 2016), the first session 
of the Conference of the Parties acting as a meeting of the Parties to the Paris 
Agreement (CMA1) was held at the same time. Given this entry into force of the 
Paris Agreement, it was decided to extend the duration of the first session of the 
CMA to December 2018 to improve the chances of agreeing on the issues that 
should have been decided at the first CMA session.
One of the key issues of the first CMA session held at the same time as COP22 
was the rapid entry into force of the Paris Agreement, extolled by the Parties, combined 
with the need laid down by Decision 1/CP.21 to adopt numerous decisions to 
implement the Agreement at CMA1. The Parties thus found themselves faced 
with a sizeable challenge: firstly, whether or not to adopt a decision at CMA1 and 
secondly, what type of decision to adopt180. So, in Marrakech, the Parties debated 
various elements that could be included in the decisions of the CMA, including a 
meeting calender of the CMA1, and tackling the so-called “orphan” issues previously 
addressed181.
On the subject of the CMA1 timetable, the talks stalled mainly between 
developing and developed countries. The LDC mainly wished that the CMA1 meet 
again in 2017 at the same time as COP23, under the CMA1-2182. They argued 
that some of the elements to implement the Paris Agreement would be already 
included in the draft decisions submitted ether by the APA or by the permanent 
subsidiary bodies. If not. the developing countries argued that these drafts should 
be rapidly adopted and there was the risk of pushing this out until 2018. Finally, 
178. IISD, 2017d, p.24.
179. UN, 2016a.
180. IISD, 2016i, p.4.
181. See Decision 1/CP.22, title V.
182. IISD, 2016i, p.4 
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one group of developing countries suggested that the Parties meet anyway in 2017 
within the framework of the CMA1-2 to take stock of the progress achieved in the 
last year. Although other Parties opposed this idea, this appears to have prevailed, 
with the CMA1-2 taking place at the same time as the COP23183.
On the other hand, the developed counties as well as some developing countries 
were more in favour of postponing the next part of the CMA1 until 2018184. These 
countries particularly highlighted that the Marrakech Agreements which enabled 
the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol needed three years of negotiations and 
that these are effectively a “set” of rules, namely decisions taken across a group of 
elements in a consistent manner. They also highlighted the risk for the Parties 
meeting again in 2017 without any decision ready to be adopted, and that given 
the limited time prior to COP24, the negotiators should be focussing more on 
progressing with the work within the permanent subsidiary bodies and in the 
APA, without being distracted by another CMA meeting185.
Thus, the Parties will meet in Bonn, during the COP23, mainly “to review 
progress on the implementation of the work programme under the Paris Agreement, 
whereas the COPwill be tasked with reporting on progress made in this respect by 
the various bodies in question at the latest at the CMA1-3 in December 2018186. 
The agenda adopted by the CMA1-2 can be consulted in annex 6 of this guide187. 
A high-level meeting of the Parties is planned within the framework of the CRA1-2.
I.3. The cooperation mechanisms of the Paris 
Agreement
The negotiations on the mechanisms of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement are charac-
terised by strong interdependence between the technical and political requirements, 
particularly regarding transparency188, nationally determined contribution (NDC) 
accounting189, and the Global Stocktake190.
Regarding the objective to ensure “environmental integrity”, many questions 
remain outstanding, particularly regarding the definition of additionality for mitigation 
related to political instruments or for entire sectors. For the accounting, the main 
issue is to avoid double counting, particularly under paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6. 
More specifically, the issue is how to ensure robust accounting for internationally 
transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) in the NDC context, although the targets/ 
parameters are very different.
183. Decision 1/CMA.1, para. 10
184. IISD, 2016i, p.4 
185. IISD, 2016i, p.4 
186. Decision 1/CMA.1, para. 5
187. A.6. Meeting Agenda during COP23 – Agendas
188. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 13
189. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 13
190. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 14
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Other major issues question which elements of the Kyoto regulation mechanisms 
(clean development mechanism – CDM and joint implementation – JI) will be 
directly used under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. For the new mechanisms, 
paragraph 37 of Decision 1/CP.21 recommends using the experiences and lessons 
learned from the CDM – regarding norms, methodologies, governance model and 
transparency, for example191. In this respect, several legitimate questions have been 
brought up:
• Are the CDM reference and monitoring scenario to be directly used as per the 
conditions stipulated in Article 6 paragraph 4? 
• What happens to the certified emission reductions (CERs) granted under the 
CDM that have not been cancelled or removed under the Kyoto Protocol?
• Can future CERs serve as internationally transferred mitigation outcomes 
under the regime of Article 6?
• Can the activities registered under the CDM be directly transferred to the 
mechanism stipulated in Article 6 paragraph 4? 
Another question regards defining international regulations to avoid diluting 
the global mitigation ambition for cooperative approaches (CA)192. At the same time, 
another question that is just as sensitive aims to determine whether emission credit 
issues will be taxed only for Article 6 paragraph 4, or also for Article 6 paragraph 
2. Lastly, the definition of the contribution to global mitigation efforts193 under 
Article 6 paragraph 4 remains pending. As for the non-market based approaches 
referred to in paragraph 8 of Article 6, the orientation of the mechanism also 
remains completely open. 
The ultimate objective of the negotiations194 is to adopt the directives based 
on the modalities referred to paragraph 2 of Article 6 of the Agreement195, and the 
rules, modalities and procedures that are applicable to the mechanism established 
by paragraph 4 of Article 6 of the Agreement196. 
Progress at COP22 in November 2016 in Marrakech
The premature entry into force of the Paris Agreement just a few days before the 
start of COP22 in Marrakech197 caused some confusion. Less than 30 days before 
the start of the Conference, the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving 
as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA1) was added to the 
191. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 37(f )
192. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 2
193. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 6, para. 4(d); which aims to “deliver 
an overall mitigation in global emissions”.
194. In accordance with paras. 36, 37 and 38 of Decision 1/CP.21
195. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 36
196. Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 37-38.
197. UN, 2016a.
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programme. It seems that the atmosphere of COP22 – which was also “influ-
enced” by the election of a candidate to the United States presidency who made the 
dismantlement of the Paris Agreement one of his campaign promises – affected the 
negotiations, including the negotiations on the cooperation instruments established 
under Article 6.
Although informal consultations aimed to advance negotiations on Article 6, 
the results were meagre198. The questions of the co-facilitators of the European 
Union and the Maldives for this contact group included:
• Regarding the cooperative approaches referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of 
Article 6:
 – What are the options for ensuring environmental integrity?
 – What are the options for ensuring sustainable development?
 – How does the related adjustment work?
 – Regarding paragraph 2 of Article 6, what subject will the guidance address: 
Will the guidance target the subject of the entire life cycle of internationally 
transferred mitigation outcomes, or just part of the cycle (for example, the 
procedure of issuing units, transferring, and removal)?
 – How should the link between paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6 and the 
provisions of Articles 4 and 13, which regard accounting, be managed?
• Regarding non-market based approaches referred to in paragraph 8 of Article 6:
 – Is the governance relevant for non-market based approaches?
 – Do non-market based approaches require an international collaboration 
component?
 – Is quantification useful for non-market based approaches?
Lastly, the conclusions in Marrakech regarding all of Article 6 consisted of the 
invitation for the Parties to communicate their views, before 17 March 2017199, 
especially regarding the aspects to consider (including their implementation), the 
directives for the cooperative approaches, the links between paragraphs 2 and 4, 
the rules, modalities and procedures concerning Article 6 para. 4, as well as the 
sustainable development aspects to consider in the work programme relating to 
the framework for non-marked based approaches (para. 101). The decision made 
in Marrakech also included a request for the Secretariat to plan a round table that 
brings together the Parties based on the views they have communicated, at the same 
time as the 46th meeting of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice (SBSTA), and thus continue to examine these questions200. The main differ-
ences are presented in the following sections.
198. IISD, 2016i.
199. UNFCCC, 2016g, paras. 105, 114 and 123.
200. UNFCCC, 2016g, paras. 86, 94 and 102.
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Discussions specifically on Article 6, paragraph 2 (“cooperative  
approaches”)
During informal consultations, the Parties discussed the framework issues proposed 
by the co-facilitators201. Several Parties suggested that the issue of the corresponding 
adjustment202 was too technical for the discussion at the 45th SBSTA meeting203. 
Regarding the directions of the units that may be transferred, some participants 
suggested leaving the question of the scope of Article 6, paragraph 2 open. Others 
called for centralised governance and the use of appropriate institutions as part of 
the CMA204. Regarding the link between paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6, one Party 
suggested that the internationally transferred mitigation outcomes could be exchanged 
under Article 6, para. 2 by letting the mechanism drawn up in virtue of Article 6, 
para. 4 produce the internationally transferred mitigation outcomes205.
Discussions specifically on Article 6, paragraph 4 (“sustainable  
development mechanism”)
During informal consultations, the Parties tried to clarify these questions by 
expressing their opinions concerning Article 6, paragraph 4 in particular. One question 
that captured much attention was the impact on the centralised mechanism, 
which may be inadequate, in a new regime where all Parties have NDCs, in contrast 
with the “universe” (the regime) of the Kyoto Protocol206. The Parties also discussed 
additionality, governance, and how to achieve “global mitigation”, the procedure 
required to draw up project and activity rules, as well as the need to use the experience 
of existing mechanisms207. 
Regarding additionality, one Party suggested that this will be indicated by the 
fact that all new projects that are not planned as part of the NDC of a country but 
that have still been implemented would not have happened without Article 6, 
para. 4. Other Parties highlighted that additionality is closely linked to environ-
mental integrity208. 
The Parties expressed their strong support for centralised government and for 
building upon the knowledge and experiences resulting from the Kyoto Protocol 
(especially from the CDM)209. The interconnections with the other provisions of 
Article 6 have been identified, particularly concerning the need to avoid double 
counting units. Regarding the implementation of rules aiming to include new 
activities, one Party advocated giving priority to project-based rules210. 
201. IISD, 2016i.
202. See Decision 1/CP.21, para. 36.
203. IISD, 2016i.
204. IISD, 2016i.
205. IISD, 2016i.
206. IISD, 2016i.
207. IISD, 2016i.
208. IISD, 2016i.
209. IISD, 2016i.
210. IISD, 2016i.
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In Marrakech, the end result for paragraph 4 of Article 6 resulted in the invitation 
for the Parties to communicate their views on the subject prior to 17 March 2017211. 
Regarding Article 6 para. 4, in particular, this invitation aimed to have the Parties 
state the elements relating to rules, modalities and procedures of the mechanism 
to be considered (including their implementation). There was also emphasis on 
the issue of the links between paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of Article 6. These questions 
were to be discussed afterwards in a round-table discussion at the same time as the 
46th SBSTA meeting212.
Discussions specifically on Article 6, paragraph 8 (“non-market based 
approaches”)
During the work programme discussions on non-market based mechanisms, the 
Parties answered various questions, particularly regarding the relevance of governance, 
quantification, accounting and international cooperation within the context of 
non-market based mechanisms213. 
A few countries noted the importance of governance concerning the identifi-
cation of contributions to NDCs. From a general point of view, it would seem that 
the majority of the Parties considered that the quantification was useful214. Some 
Parties also suggested that the established notification practices as well as the existing 
greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories should be used to complete the quantification. 
Furthermore, one Party also indicated that accounting should not be mandatory, 
that the procedures and directives could be drawn up for voluntary use. Several 
Parties noted the possibility of forging synergies between paragraphs 2 and 6 of 
Article 6. Lastly, one group warned that great care must be taken to avoid double 
counting due to potential overlaps215. 
Regarding the question of whether non-market based mechanisms should 
necessarily constitute international collaboration, the Parties did not find a clear 
vision: some Parties indicated domains in which international cooperation could 
support and strengthen national action216.
Regarding institutional arrangements, one group suggested workshops to 
strengthen international cooperation, and other Parties suggested the creation of 
a mechanism devoted to sharing information on non-market based mechanisms. 
To improve the clarity of the subject and identify potential synergies, it was also 
suggested to classify and map non-market based approaches217.
211. UNFCCC, 2016g.
212. UNFCCC, 2016g; para. 94.
213. IISD, 2016i.
214. IISD, 2016i.
215. IISD, 2016i.
216. IISD, 2016i.
217. IISD, 2016i.
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In Marrakech, the outcome for Article 6, paragraph 8 was to invite the Parties to 
communicate their views on non-market based approaches as well as their submissions 
concerning paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6218. Concerning non-market based 
approaches, the invitation targeted the elements to consider, particularly regarding 
sustainable development (as referred to in paragraph 9 of Article 6) and the links 
between paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article 6. It was also decided that a specific round 
table including the subject of paragraph 8 of Article 6 would be organised at the 
SBSTA46219.
The reform of the CDM, which was a “hostage” of the lack of progress 
on Article 6 of the Paris Agreement
In the generally difficult context of the negotiations related to the market mecha-
nisms, the process of reforming the modalities and procedures of the CDM did 
not result in a formal and concrete finalisation. At the same time, the major task 
of implementing a recourse procedure was delayed until 2019. This new deadline 
plans (or counts on the fact that) that by this date, the regulations related to Article 6 
will be implemented.
During the discussions held in November 2016, the Parties differed over several 
questions220. The contact group decided to delete a large part of the draft text and 
send a “clean” version of the draft decision to the CMP for examination221. The 
Parties differed over questions regarding the reference scenarios and the methods 
for monitoring and registering CER issuance, regional and subregional distribution, 
and resources for the CDM work. Likewise, voluntary cancellation of CERs, their 
use in international aviation, references to the Green Climate Fund (GCF), and 
the duration of credit periods were challenged. The climax was the question of the 
relevance of the CDM within Article 6. Finally, the Parties reached a consensus 
to delete the references to the Paris Agreement. Several Parties made it a point to 
highlight that the lack of demand for CERs and the unpromising status of the 
Doha Amendment were subjects of high concern that could pose a problem222. 
In its annual decision on the directives relative to the CDM223, the CMP 
encourages the Executive Committee (EC) to continue its work to simply the 
CDM, particularly via the process of registering and issuance, and via the methods. 
The CMP requests the EC to assess the overall cost of the designated operational 
entities and report to CMP13. The directives also contain sections on the methods 
for the baseline and monitoring scenarios. The monitoring methodologies are now 
meant to make it possible to choose between the values that are kept by default or an 
approach using direct measurements. The system of subsidised loans of the UNFCCC 
218. UNFCCC, 2016g.
219. UNFCCC, 2016g; para. 123.
220. IISD, 2016i.
221. IISD, 2016i.
222. IISD, 2016i.
223. FCCC/KP/CMP/2016/L.4.
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for the CDM project developers has been withdrawn, and the EC continues to 
examine the connection with international climate financing. Compared with the 
previous years, the annual guidance for the CDM is extraordinarily general.
Regarding the resources of the Adaptation Fund reserved at the end of COP22 
(despite the opposition of developed countries224), Fund representatives highlighted 
the need to reform the CDM in order to improve the a predictability and sustain-
ability of the resources of the Fund225.
Submissions of the Parties on Article 6 prior to the meetings of May 2017
The submissions of the Parties in September 2016 and March 2017 show the 
different views and positions on various points of the negotiations. In the below 
paragraphs, the positions are organised into common themes in order to identify 
similarities and differences among the positions.
Fundamental principles of the mechanisms
According to the European Union (EU), the fundamental principles referred to in 
paragraph 1 of Article 6 should guide the implementation of paragraphs 2, 4 and 
8 of the same Article226. The Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) requests that 
the principle of environmental integrity be the same for paragraphs 2 and 4 of 
Article 6227. As for the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), it asks that the 
incentives from Article 6 be aligned with the principles and objectives of the Paris 
Agreement228. The Africa Group of Negotiators (AGN) asks that the units referred 
to in paragraph 4 of Article 6 be guided by the provisions of paragraph 2 of the 
same Article229. Ecuador demands that all the mechanisms be submitted to the 
non-commercial mechanism platform in accordance with paragraphs 8 and 9 of 
Article 6230.
Accounting and environmental integrity
The EU would like the emissions that are verified and certified in accordance with 
the provisions provided for in paragraph 4 of Article 6 to become internationally 
transferred mitigation outcomes once they are transferred to another country to be 
used in the NDCs231. The EIG considers that the design of all the instruments of 
Article 6 should incorporate the provisions regarding NDC accounting232, which 
is closely linked to internationally transferred mitigation outcomes, and by virtue 
224. Sethi, 2016.
225. IISD, 2016i.
226. Republic of Malta, 2017.
227. Switzerland, 2017.
228. Republic of Maldives, 2017a.
229. Republic of Mali, 2017a, b.
230. Obergassel et al., 2017.
231. Republic of Malta, 2017.
232. In accordance with the provisions of Art. 4 para. 13 of the Paris Agreement.
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of Article 13 on transparency233. Canada also insisted on the principle of avoiding 
double counting and of adding that the principle aiming to ensure environmental 
integrity not be compromised234. As for the AGN, it suggests supporting the CDM 
project and evaluation cycle process, including verification by third parties235. The 
AGN asks that the MRV system not be overloaded236, that enough space be given 
to the surveillance body. The AGN also notes that there must be a reporting system 
at the international level237. AOSIS notes that the reports should include information 
on consulting Stakeholders, and notes the importance of technical reviews by 
third parties, especially for inventories, suggested baselines and suggested credit 
thresholds238. AOSIS also requests that the accreditation standards of the designated 
operational entities (DOEs) be set up.
Different roles of the instruments of paragraphs 2, 4 and 8 of Article 6
The Arab Group countries consider that the dynamic carries risks that could 
negatively impact sustainable development (as mentioned above)239. In this respect, 
paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article 6 are an opportunity to integrate targeted tools that 
would address these risks and that would lead to the holistic implementation of 
cooperative approaches. The mechanisms from paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article 6 
are particularly qualified for this role, as they focus on promoting sustainable 
development and on a distinctive cooperative approach240. As such, the development 
of mechanisms from paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article 6 should be consolidated and 
complement the mechanisms from paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6241.
Ambition and contribution to global mitigation
The AG highlights that the mechanisms should contribute to improving mitigation 
and adaptation242. The AG describes the need to define how the mechanisms can 
increase the ambition. AOSIS requests a redefinition of market-based mechanisms 
to generate net global emissions reductions, beyond compensation, and also beyond 
the concept of the advantage that the host Party may obtain from conservative 
baselines243. The Arab Group countries specify that cooperation mechanisms must 
preserve national prerogatives in defining NDCs and concerning sustainable develop-
ment244. As such, the Arab Group countries suggest that cooperation mechanisms 
233. Switzerland, 2017.
234. Canada, 2017.
235. Republic of Mali, 2017b.
236. Measuring, Reporting and Verification.
237. Republic of Mali, 2017b.
238. Republic of Maldives, 2017a.
239. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2017.
240. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2017.
241. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2017.
242. Republic of Mali 2017b.
243. Republic of Maldives, 2017a.
244. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2017.
59
Guide to the Negotiations - UNFCCC (COP23) - OIF/IFDD, 2017
may offer flexibility. At the same time, this Group observes that mechanisms offer 
an opportunity to increase the adaptation ambition. Furthermore, it observes that 
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6 offer the option of boosting the mitigation ambition. 
Lastly, the Arab Group countries state that all countries may participate in the 
mechanisms245. The EIG asks that the mitigation outcomes obtained in virtue of 
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6 lead to emissions reductions beyond the efforts that 
the host country may make, and lead to verifiable, permanent and real reductions246.
Lessons learned from the experience and questions concerning the CDM 
transition to Article 6
The AG and the Arab Group countries consider that Article 6 para. 4 must be 
based on the CDM outcomes247. They also note that it will be important to not 
lose ongoing mitigation activities in the field and to not risk losing their upscaling 
potential simply due to a regime change. The EIG highlights the importance of not 
discouraging current emissions reduction efforts implemented via CDM programmes 
or projects248. It suggests that a discussion is required to determine whether – and 
in what circumstances – CDM projects could be included in Article 6. It thus 
suggests an option in which CDM projects may be registered again under the 
mechanisms provided for in paragraph 4 of Article 6. In contradiction, the EU 
considers that the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms should not be maintained at the 
end of the second commitment period249; as such, any discussion regarding the 
transition arrangements should only be held within the context of the definition 
of the rules relating to paragraph 4 of Article 6. As for Brazil, it suggests that the 
objectives of the new Paris mechanism reflect the CDM logic by widening its 
scope250. In order to conduct a successful and productive transition, Brazil foresees 
the need for a smooth transition by using the existing CDM methodologies as well 
as the CDM accreditation system251. This would make it possible to continue 
ongoing CDM projects and programmes, and also to make existing CDM CERs 
eligible under Article 6, para. 4.
Sustainable development
Regarding sustainable development, the AG considers that the sustainable devel-
opment tool that the Secretariat developed for the CDM may be used on a voluntary 
basis252. The Arab Group considers that non-market based mechanisms constitute 
an opportunity to integrate a series of instruments that could address the risk of a 
245. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2017.
246. Switzerland, 2017.
247. Republic of Mali, 2017b; and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2017.
248. Switzerland, 2017.
249. Republic of Malta, 2017.
250. Brazil, 2017b.
251. Brazil, 2017b.
252. Republic of Mali 2017b.
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negative impact on sustainable development from the dynamic of the instruments 
related to paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6253.
At the same time, instruments relating to paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article 6 are 
considered as opportunities to conduct cooperative approaches in a more holistic 
manner. As such, the development of paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article 6 should be 
consolidated and complement paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6.
The Arab Group countries foresee the gradual achievement of sustainable 
development by implementing the mechanisms that encourage a transition toward 
a sustainable economy, and the Group suggests introducing economic and social 
safeguards254. The Arab Group considers that sustainable development criteria 
must be defined and monitored at the national level255. Brazil also notes that the 
promotion, examination and monitoring of sustainable development is a national 
prerogative, and that it is not appropriate for the UNFCCC to offer an interna-
tional definition of sustainable development or to suggest how the Parties should 
promote sustainable development at the national level256.
The EIG states that activities related to paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article 6 should, 
at least, be compatible with the sustainable development goals (SDGs) defined 
under the 2030 Agenda, and also with the sustainable development objectives and 
strategies of the Parties, and with human rights257. The EIG suggests that the host 
Party confirm compliance with the SDGs and human rights, whilst noting the need 
for an international tool aiming to describe this compliance in sharing information 
and evaluating activities. AOSIS requests that the publication of sustainable devel-
opment criteria be made mandatory, and notes that at the same time, host Parties 
should have the flexibility required to make decisions regarding relevant norms258.
Specific aspects of cooperative approaches
The Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) suggests 
that national governments be able to authorise interactions and links between 
national, regional and subnational systems before transferring mitigation outcomes 
to the international level259. AOSIS notes that the directives should address the 
quality of the internationally transferred mitigation outcomes, and identify the 
need for a centralised control mechanism at the same time260. It also suggests that 
internationally transferred mitigation outcomes should constitute additional 
emissions reductions and that these transfers should be limited to NDCs that have 
a quantified economy-wide reduction target. The AG requests that internationally 
253. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2017.
254. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2017.
255. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2017.
256. Brazil, 2017b.
257. Switzerland, 2017.
258. Republic of Maldives, 2017a.
259. Guatemala, 2017.
260. Republic of Maldives, 2017a.
61
Guide to the Negotiations - UNFCCC (COP23) - OIF/IFDD, 2017
transferred mitigation outcomes be expressed in quantitative terms and that they 
result in adjusting the NDCs that require a degree of coherence (that could be 
reached by following the IPCC guidelines)261. The AG emphasises the importance 
of transparency regarding the scenarios and the need to report on internationally 
transferred mitigation outcomes at the time of the exchange, and also the need to 
have a centralised registry supervised by the UNFCCC secretariat262. It suggests 
that the Parties show the methodologies used and the introduction of safeguards 
that guarantee environmental integrity and sustainable development. The Group 
also postulates that internationally transferred mitigation outcomes should comply 
with the rules in virtue of Article 13 on the framework for strengthened transparency 
of measures and support. Lastly, it suggests that internationally transferred mitigation 
outcomes should not be globally fungible, and that solely Article 6 para. 4 should 
be able to lead to fungible and negotiable units. 
Brazil suggests that paragraph 2 of Article 6 allows Parties that go beyond 
their mitigation commitment registered in their NDCs to exchange this surplus263. 
It notes that the guidance should include accounting rules and the requirements 
for international transfers. Brazil notes that the exchange regimes for national, 
subnational or regional rights should be indicated in the communications of the 
Parties264. Furthermore, Brazil proposes an international transaction mechanism 
that could transmit units to different registries. It also suggests that each unit 
transmitted should have a unique serial number to identify and monitor it265.
Canada proposes that Article 6 para. 2 makes it possible to use bottom-up 
approaches and experiment with this approach using a variety of methods, including 
transferring innovative mitigation actions. This guidance should be able to facilitate 
the participation of several market players, including subnational governments 
and other non-Party stakeholders. The Coalition for Rainforest Nations asks that 
the results of the REDD+ mechanism be fully eligible under Article 6 para. 2. 
According to the EU, the Parties must establish an accounting balance by making 
the adjustments relevant to the accounting balance of each Party concerning the 
emissions and removals covered by the NDCs266. The reports should also provide 
initial information on how Article 6 was implemented at the national level.
Venezuela considers that internationally transferred mitigation outcomes 
must not be reimbursable, and should be automatically cancelled if they are not 
used after a specific period (not exceeding five years)267. Venezuela considers that 
internationally transferred mitigation outcomes should not be transferable more 
than once. 
261. Republic of Mali, 2017b.
262. Republic of Mali, 2017a.
263. Brazil, 2017a.
264. Brazil, 2017a.
265. Brazil, 2017a.
266. Republic of Malta, 2017.
267. Venezuela, 2017.
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Specific aspects of the mechanism established in virtue 
of Article 6 para. 4 
Role of the mechanism established in virtue of Article 6 para. 4
Brazil proposes that the mechanisms help to demonstrate that NDCs have been 
made, and to introduce additional tools to implement mitigation actions by non-Party 
stakeholders (public and private entities) by cancelling the units268. ASOIS proposes 
that the instruments related to paragraph 4 of Article 6 add value by helping countries 
to reach their NDCs at a lower cost and by facilitating the commitment of private 
entities in emissions reductions269. Furthermore, the group considers that there is an 
inherent value in this, beyond compensation. It proposes to start with project-based 
activities and policy activities to include sectoral approaches afterwards, as they 
require more experience and stricter standards. AILAC and the EU suggest that 
the mechanism be used to mobilise a range of including project-based, policy, sectoral 
and other initiatives that could receive credits for emissions reductions achieved270. 
The EU notes that the mechanisms should catalyse action for a low-emissions future, 
create incentives to broaden, quantify and incorporate NDCs, and avoid perverse 
incentives.
Degree of centralisation and role of the supervising body of Article 6 
para. 4
The AG suggests equal treatment of the provisions provided for in paragraphs 2 
and 4 of Article 6, and adds that all the mechanisms provided for in Article 6 
should be placed under the auspices of the same supervising body271. Brazil suggests 
that the supervising body of Article 6 para. 4 designated the CMA should follow 
the CDM EC in nearly all aspects272. AILAC proposes that the supervising body 
have the ability to allow other international mechanisms to generate mitigation 
outcomes after certification273. AOSIS notes that the surveillance body should be 
managed by the CMA, and that the national focal points should play a certain role 
in the activities acceptance process274. South Africa275 identifies a need for centralised 
governance, including for the mechanism of Article 6, para.2 according to rules 
drawn up by the CMA.
268. Brazil, 2017b.
269. Republic of Maldives, 2017a.
270. Guatemala, 2017; and Republic of Malta, 2017.
271. Republic of Mali, 2017a.
272. Brazil, 2017b.
273. Guatemala, 2017.
274. Republic of Maldives, 2017a.
275. South Africa, 2017a.
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Concrete approach to establish in virtue of Article 6 para. 4
The EIG considers that the supervisory body should develop tools and standards 
relating to additionality, baselines, and permanence276. Furthermore, the EIG proposes 
to define the procedures aiming to ensure that all the activities fulfil these criteria. 
The EU proposes a gradual approach for implementing rules, and initially only 
drawing up general rules, leaving more specific provisions for the supervisory body 
to develop under the authority and control of the CMA277. Regarding national 
arrangements, South Africa proposes that they draw from lessons learned from the 
CDM, and adopt similar governance bodies278. The group of Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) proposes a large-scale reproduction of the CDM rules and of JI 
for Article 6 paragraph 4, and using a hybrid approach: applying similar rules to 
the CDM or the JI, depending on the whether project activity that a Party has 
undertaken, is conducted within or outside of the sectors identified in its NDC279.
Specific aspects of the mechanism established in virtue of Article 6 
para. 8
New Zealand280 observes that the function of Article 6 para. 8 is to recognise that 
there are other ways to implement the NDCs that are not market-based.
The AG suggests that Article 6 para. 8 should strengthen the links and synergies 
between existing mechanisms without duplication281. Non-market based mechanisms 
should provide funding for NDCs and include any action or activity that does not 
depend on international negotiation. The AG considers that the work programme 
should clarify the function and provide a definition of the typologies of activities 
included (for example, appropriate national mitigation measures not credited, buy 
back rates, removal of fossil fuel subsidies and carbon taxes). It will be important 
to establish a process to identify links and synergies with other mechanisms and 
find an approach to avoid duplication in the areas of finance and technology.
AOSIS considers that the decision on the work programme may concern the 
modalities, the targeted thematic areas, a schedule to examine the targeted areas, a 
process to identify other thematic activity areas, results and recommendations282. 
The work programme could be based on the results of the technical examination 
process on mitigation and the technical examination process on adaptation. AOSIS 
also offers thematic areas for the work programme: reforming fossil fuel subsidies, 
deploying renewable energy technologies, and eliminating inefficient and polluting 
technologies283.
276. Switzerland, 2017.
277. Republic of Malta, 2017.
278. South Africa, 2017, b.
279. Ethiopia, 2017b.
280. New Zealand, 2017.
281. Republic of Mali, 2017c.
282. Republic of Maldives, 2017b.
283. Republic of Maldives, 2017b.
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The EIG suggests that non-market based approaches could arise from sharing 
best practices and information on various subjects relevant to mitigation and 
adaptation284. Furthermore, it proposes to address specific measures that directly 
or indirectly contribute to GHG emissions mitigation or to adapt to climate 
change. Relevant initiatives should also emphasise a more balanced involvement 
of the public and private sectors. Lastly, the EIG states that the programme should 
examine specific areas of cooperation such as: encouraging the use of international 
sustainability standards, eliminating ineffective fossil fuel subsidies, and encouraging 
measures aimed at reducing climate-related risks285.
Lastly, the EU considers that Article 6 para. 8 as one of the most transversal 
points of the Paris Agreement, with potential links with mitigation, adaptation, 
financing, technology transfer and capacity building286. As such, the decisions to 
take within the framework of its work programme must carefully avoid duplication 
between Article 6 para. 8 and other provisions of the Paris Agreement.
South Africa287 considers that Article 6 para. 8 is a mechanism that cannot be 
regulated in virtue of the convention as long as it remains a domestic imperative288. 
Requirements for declaring could be needed for climate financing.
Progress during the subsidiary body sessions in Bonn 
in May 2017
During its 46th meeting, the SBSTA, in accordance with Decision 1/CP.21, 
paragraph 36, pursued its work on drawing up the guidance referred to in paragraph 2 
of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. The round table between the Parties on the 
guidance referred to in Article 6 was held on 8 and 9 May 2017, followed by a 
“traditional” contact group from 10 May. 
The round table aimed to address funding issues in a more open setting than 
in the “usual” negotiation meetings. Participation in the round table was limited 
to one representative per Party. The following observations on the round table 
are from the author, who participated in the round table discussions in person. 
Unfortunately, the Parties obstructed the publication of the discussion outcomes. 
The lack of trust amongst Parties could also be seen in the fact that Venezuela, 
Saudi Arabia, Papua New Guinea and Dominica asked that solely the Parties have 
access to the contact group.
The co-facilitators proposed a rough schedule that planned to identify questions 
considered as “high priority” during the 46th session, to develop a draft project at 
the 47th session, and to finally negotiate the text at the 48th session.
284. Switzerland, 2017.
285. Switzerland, 2017.
286. Republic of Malta, 2017.
287. South Africa, 2017c.
288. South Africa, 2017a.
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Emphasising the implications of using an international cooperation mechanism 
for the NDCs, regarding the mechanism referred to in paragraph 4 of Article 6, 
the Parties noted that the scope of the NDCs in terms of sectors, gas and their time 
horizon would affect emissions reduction accounting. Several Parties noted the 
necessity to take NDCs forward, toward economy-wide targets, and the importance 
of avoiding perverse incentives that could limit the ambition. 
It was observed that it would be important to synchronise the activity notifi-
cation intervals under the mechanisms with the planned deadlines for the NDCs, 
and to make a distinction between conditional and unconditional targets. 
An important point of the discussion concerned the interaction of the NDCs, 
determining additionality, as well as defining the baseline (or reference point). 
Several Parties called for a new definition of additionality to replace the definition 
used in the Kyoto Protocol. One proposal was to evaluate activities using the baselines 
to evaluate increased ambition.
As for leveraging past experience in the design of the mechanism, especially 
experiences resulting from the Kyoto Protocol, Parties suggested strengthening the 
role of the designated national authorities. Regarding the transition of rules and 
units between existing mechanisms to new instruments, the Parties discussed the 
eligibility of existing projects and the conditions in which the certified emissions 
reductions would be valid.
Following the negotiations, the co-facilitators prepared an informal information 
note containing an informal list of elements brought up by the Parties. The elements 
of these lists are enumerated below. They show that the approach used still aims to 
collect elements, and does not endeavour to define clear options from which the 
policymakers may choose. It is also clear that new elements may still be added to 
the lists because each subcomponent includes an open element. 
Informal list in Article 6 para. 2289
A. Overarching issues, principles, considerations, context, criteria 
1. Voluntary cooperation
2. Context of the Paris Agreement
3. Context of Article 2
4. Unitary nature of Article 6 and the Paris Agreement
5. Environmental integrity 
6. Sustainable development
7. Preserving national prerogatives 
8. Manageable sustainable development transition
289. SBSTA, 2017a.
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9. Avoiding negative social and economic impacts of internationally transferred 
mitigation outcomes
10. Avoiding negative ecological impacts
11. Incentivizes for higher ambition
12. Incentives for progression
13. Incentives for domestic mitigation
14. Bottom-up approach
15. Accounting integrity, avoiding double counting 
16. Mitigation co-benefits of adaptation
17. Mitigation co-benefits of economic diversification 
18. Not erode the environmental integrity of NDCs, implementation of NDCs
19. Centralized oversight
20. Equal treatment of Article 6.2 and Article 6.4 
21. Distinctive nature of Articles 6.2, 6.4 and 6.8 
22. Benefits and opportunities of sustainable developments 
23. Transparency
24. Avoidance of undue burden 
25. Top-down approach
26. ...
B. Definitions
1. ...
C. Scope and applicability of guidance for Article 6.2 
1. ...
D. Governance
1. Objective and scope of governance 
2. Form of oversight
3. Transparency in governance 
4. Demonstration of conformity with guidance
5. Review process for guidance 
6. Avoidance of duplication of institutional arrangements
7. ...
e. Participation
1. Authorization by Parties 
2. Eligibility 
3. Participation requirements
4. Inclusivity
5. ...
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f. Internationally transferred mitigation outcomes in Article 6.2 
1. Scope and definition of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes 
2. Measurement, reporting and verification 
3. Standards – real, additional, permanent
4. Issuance
5. ...
G. Robust accounting 
1. Impact of scope, types, time period, conditionality of NDC, vintage of mitigation 
outcomes 
2. Emissions balance, NDC permitted emissions, accounting balance
3. Avoiding double counting, double usage 
4. Avoiding double counting with other processes 
5. Corresponding adjustment, additions and subtractions
6. Inventories 
7. ITMOs issued before 2020
8. ...
H. ensuring environmental integrity 
1. Guidance on the establishment of baselines 
2. Standards
3. ...
I. Promoting sustainable development
1. ...
j. Transparency 
1. Initial NDC accounting starting point, information required for commencement, 
information on NDC to allow accounting, calculation report of NDCs permitted 
emissions
2. Format and frequency of reporting 
3. Tracking of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes, compilation and 
accounting reports
4. Reporting on environmental integrity 
5. Reporting on sustainable development
6. National level information 
7. Publicly accessible information
8. Final accounting of NDC, information for completion of NDC contribution 
period, report upon expiration of additional period for tracking progress
9. ...
k. Infrastructure
1. National registries 
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2. Multilateral, centralized registry
3. International transaction log
4. Compilation and accounting database
5. ...
l. limits and safeguards
1. Supplementarity
2. Limits and controls on internationally transferred mitigation outcomes, trading, 
tradable units
3. Human rights
4. No conflict with other environmental aspects 
5. Other Preamble rights
6. Addressing negative social and economic impacts
7. System for addressing hot air
8. ...
M. Interlinkages
1. Relationship between Article 6.2, Article 6.4, Article 6.8
2. Links to Article 4.7 mitigation co-benefits
3. Links to Article 4.13 accounting guidance, TACCC principles (Transparency, 
Accuracy, Completeness, Comparability, Consistency)
4. Links to Article 4.15 impacts of response measures
5. Article 10 technology
6. Links to Article 13.7(a) GHG inventories
7. Links to Article 13.7 (b) information to track progress
8. Links to Article 13.11 multilateral consideration
9. Links to Article 13.12 technical expert review
10. Links to Article 13.13 modalities, rules and procedures
11. Links to Article 14 global stocktake
12. Links to Article 15 mechanism to facilitate implementation and promote 
compliance
13. ...
N. Share of proceeds
1. For adaptation, the Adaptation Fund
2. ...
O. Overall mitigation in global emissions 
1. ...
P. Transitional issues
1. ITMOs issued before 2020 
2. ...
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q. Other
1. ...
For Article 6 para. 4, the list is even longer290:
A. Overarching issues, principles, considerations, context, criteria 
1. Context of the Paris Agreement 
2. Context of Article 2
3. Voluntary cooperation
4. Unitary nature of Article 6 and the Paris Agreement
5. Environmental integrity
6. Sustainable development
7. Preserving national prerogatives
8. Incentives for higher ambition
9. Incentives for progression
10. Incentives for domestic mitigation
11. Transparency
12. Overall mitigation in global emissions
13. Bottom-up approach
14. Party-driven process
15. Accounting integrity
16. Carbon market credibility, development, strengthening
17. Distinctive nature of Articles 6.2, 6.4 and 6.8 
18. Equal treatment of Article 6.2 and Article 6.4 
19. Real, measurable, long-term benefits, additionality
20. Top-down, centralized and multilateral nature
21. Share of proceeds
22. Lessons learned from existing mechanisms 
23. Article 6.4(c)
24. Not erode the environmental integrity of NDCs, implementation of NDCs
25. ...
B. Definitions
1. Activities
2. Article 6.4 units, credits
3. ...
C. Scope and applicability of rules, modalities and procedures  
for Article 6.4
1. Mitigation inside, outside NDC 
290.SBSTA, 2017b.
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D. Governance
1. Roles of the CMA
2. Roles, composition and procedures for the supervisory body 
3. Roles of participating Parties and institutional arrangements 
4. Role of the secretariat
5. Accreditation and roles of designated operational entities
6. Operational cost 
7. Appeals process
8. Certification of non-UNFCCC mechanisms
9. Review process for rules, modalities and procedures
10. ...
e. Participation
1. Participation by Parties
2. Participation by public and private entities 
3. Inclusivity and incentivizing the participation 
4. ...
f. Scope of activities
1. Types of eligible activities, sectors, methodologies
2. Projects 
3. Programmes of activities
4. Sectoral approaches 
5. Inclusivity
6. ...
G. Aspects of activity
1. National control, priority and prerogatives
2. Approval by Parties
3. Development of methodologies
4. Quantification of mitigation, emission reductions and avoidance
5. Permanence
6. Determining baselines, conservativeness
7. Determining additionality
8. Measures to ensure environmental integrity
9. Sustainable development
10. Stakeholder consultation
11. Grievance process
12. Resolving disputable issues
13. Mitigation co-benefits of adaptation and economic diversification 
14. ...
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H. Activity cycle
1. Activity design
2. Validation
3. Registration
4. Monitoring and reporting 
5. Verification
6. Certification
7. Issuance
8. Cancellation
9. ...
I. Share of proceeds
1. For administrative expenses
2. For adaptation, the Adaptation Fund 
3. ...
j. Overall mitigation in global emissions 
1. Responsibility
2. Timing
3. Methodological approaches, best-available-technology benchmarks, conservative 
baselines, cancellation, Article 6.4(c) 
4. Accounting modalities
5. ...
k. limits and safeguards 
1. Supplementarity
2. Limits to transfer, acquisition 
3. No infringement of human rights, other preamble rights, no conflict with other 
environmental aspects 
4. Avoiding negative incentives, speculative policies, interferences
5. Addressing negative social and economic impacts
6. Addressing negative ecological impacts 
7. Avoidance of fraudulent trading
8. ...
l. Infrastructure
1. International transaction log 
2. Article 6.4 registry
3. Other registries
4. Infrastructure cost
5. ...
72
T
h
e
 
i
s
s
u
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
M. Transparency
1. Public availability of data
2. ...
N. Accounting
1. Impact of scope, types, time period, conditionality of NDC
2. Article 6.4 registry transactions (forwarding, transfer, acquisition) to Parties and 
non-Parties
3. Use of Article 6.4 credits or units for achieving NDC
4. Common accounting system 
5. Applicability of Article 6.2 accounting, applicability of corresponding adjustment
6. Avoidance of double counting, avoidance of double use (Article 6.5)
7. Accounting integrity
8. Article 6.4(c)
9. ...
O. Interlinkages
1. Relationship between Article 6.4 and Article 6.2
2. Relationship between Article 6.4 and Article 6.8
3. Links to Article 2, 3
4. Links to Article 4.7 mitigation co-benefits
5. Links to Article 4.13 accounting guidance, TACCC principles 
6. Links to Article 4.15 impacts of response measures
7. Links to Article 13.7(a) GHG inventories
8. Links to Article 13.7(b) information to track progress
9. Links to Article 14 global stocktake
10. Links to Article 15 mechanism to facilitate implementation and promote 
compliance 
11. Links to Article 19 subsidiary bodies and other institutional arrangements
12. ...
P. Transitional issues
1. Transition of rules, methodologies, infrastructure, accreditation 
2. Transition of activities, issuance 
3. Transition of credits, units
4. Fungibility
5. Impact of new rules 
6. ...
q. Other issues
1. Capacity building
2. ...
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For Article 6 para. 8, the list is diverse due to various views on this 
mechanism291:
A. Overarching issues, principles, considerations, context, criteria 
1. Voluntary cooperation
2. Context defined by Article 6.1 
3. Context of Article 2
4. Unitary nature of Article 6 and the Paris Agreement
5. Environmental integrity
6. Sustainable development
7. Poverty eradication
8. Preserving national prerogatives
9. Bottom-up approach
10. Manageable sustainable development transition
11. Addressing negative social and economic impacts of response measures
12. Flexible, in the context of implementation of NDCs
13. Adaptation activities with mitigation co-benefits and/or economic diversification
14. Promote higher ambition in mitigation and adaptation actions 
15. No infringement of rights
16. Distinctive nature of Articles 6.2, 6.4 and 6.8 
17. No commoditization of emissions or environmental functions
18. Enhancement of linkages and synergies between existing mechanisms without 
duplication
19. Avoiding duplication of work with existing arrangements under the UNFCCC
20. ...
B. NMAs under the framework
1. Non-tradeable, no transfer of mitigation outcomes, no commoditization
2. Applicability of any or all of Article 6.8 (a), (b), (c)
3. International (bilateral, regional or multilateral) cooperation between Parties, 
including North-North, North-South and South-South cooperation, to implement 
NDCs
4. More than one mitigation measure (including GHG reductions and avoidance 
of GHG emissions) adaptation, finance, technology transfer, capacity building 
in each NMA
5. No duplication of work under the UNFCCC and other fora
6. ...
291.SBSTA, 2017c.
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C. Governance of the framework
1. Institutional arrangements for the framework
2. Avoiding duplication in institutional arrangements 
3. ...
D. functions of the framework
1. To be available to Parties to the Paris Agreement
2. Ensuring inclusivity of access to the framework
3. Enhancing access to greater number of Parties
4. Enhancing public and private sector participation
5. Promoting mitigation and adaptation ambition
6. Establishing process for identifying gaps in, and developing instruments 
to enhance linkages and synergies across, existing UNFCCC instruments and 
institutions. 
7. Ensuring no international transfer of mitigation outcomes from NMAs and 
ensuring no double counting
8. Enabling opportunities for coordination across instruments and relevant 
institutional arrangements
9. Identification of best practices and case studies
10. Identifying roles of public and private sectors
11. Involving representatives from the private sector and international organizations 
with expertise in different areas of NMAs 
12. Developing guidance
13. Providing recognition of NMAs 
14. Tracking of NMAs 
15. Managing timeframe for work programme
16. Monitoring, reporting and accounting for transparency of emissions reductions 
resulting from NMA against NDC
17. MRV that is appropriate to the NMA 
18. Avoiding double counting
19. Assessment, evaluation and follow-up process, link to global stocktake, ensuring 
effectiveness of NMAs 
20. Voluntary reporting of NMAs under existing arrangements of the UNFCCC 
21. Addressing social and economic impact of operationalization of Article 6.2 
and Article 6.4 
22. ...
e. Work programme activities
1. Identification of NMAs, fossil fuel subsidy reform, deployment of renewable 
energy technologies, elimination of inefficient and polluting technologies
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2. Identifying existing linkages, synergies, coordination and implementation 
already occurring between identified NMAs and positive experiences
3. Development of guidance, conceptual basis, instruments and institutional 
arrangements
4. Development of guidance on the development and implementation of the 
framework
5. Identifying opportunities for enhancement of existing linkages, creation of 
synergies, coordination and implementation of NMAs 
6. Enhancing linkages and create synergies, including recommendations
7. Facilitating implementation and coordination of NMAs 
8. Establishment of institutional arrangements for facilitating the implementa-
tion, monitoring, evaluation and follow-up of the framework
9. Establishment of a task force to develop and lead the work programme, includ-
ing preparing draft decisions on the work programme
10. Developing a needs-based registry and matchmaking facility
11. Development of a UNFCCC web platform to register NMAs 
12. Developing possible linkages with the existing UNFCCC platforms
13. Establishment of an information-sharing process for the development and 
implementation of NMAs at the national/regional/international levels
14.  Sharing by doing and sharing best practices and information
15. Profiling of national experience, research on lessons learned from other processes
16. Identification of international, regional and private sector initiatives and making 
recommendations to other initiatives 
17. Exploring synergistic policy approaches to leverage and generate mitigation 
and adaptation co-benefits
18. Coordinating with the Technical Expert Process 
19. Assessing impact of NMA on international trade
20. Evaluating options for using revenues gained from the application of NMA 
21. Developing process for identifying initial and additional thematic areas of focus
22. Launching dialogue amongst Parties and non-Party stakeholders
23. Assessing the result of previous steps and drawing conclusions
24. ...
f. Modalities of work programme
1. Discussion on the function of the framework 
2. Written submissions, workshops and workshop reports, technical papers, synthesis 
reports, case studies, recommendations, milestones and targets 
3. ...
G. Transparency
1. ...
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H. Interlinkages
1. Links to Article 6.2 and Article 6.4 
2. Links to Article 2 objectives 
3. Links to Article 3 communication of NDCs
4. Links to Article 4.7 mitigation co-benefits
5. Links to Article 4.8 information necessary for NDC clarity 
6. Links to Article 4.13 account for NDC 
7. Links to Article 4.15 response measures 
8. Links to Article 4.16, 4.18 regional economic integration organizations 
9. Links to Article 7 adaptation 
10. Links to Article 9 finance 
11. Links to Article 10 technology transfer 
12. Links to Article 10.5
13. Links to Article 11 capacity building 
14. Links to Article 12 adaptation 
15. Links to Article 13 transparency 
16. Links to Article 14 global stocktake Global stocktake 
17. Links to Article 15 compliance
18. ...
I. Other
1. ...
The concrete result of the 46th session of the SBSTA was to invite the Parties 
to, prior to 2 October 2017, present their viewpoints on the content of the guidance 
concerning Article 4 para. 2 in particular292, including the “structure”, “areas” and 
“issues” to consider on the rules, modalities and procedures of Article 6 par. 4293 with 
the same keywords, as well as questions concerning the non-market mechanism 
work programme294. Again, the SBSTA asked the secretariat to organise a round 
table for the Parties based on the presentation of the Parties – jointly with SBSTA47 
in Bonn in November 2017.
I.4. Pursuing efforts towards 1.5 °C 
By implementing the Paris Agreement, the Parties aim to strengthen the global 
response to the climate change threat by “holding the increase in the global average 
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit 
the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels”295. 
292. FCCC/SBSTA/2017/L.15.
293. FCCC/SBSTA/2017/L.16.
294. FCCC/SBSTA/2017/L.17.
295. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 2.
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In this respect, at the 16th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) 
in 2010, the Cancun Agreements recognised that a significant decrease in greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) is required to limit to global average temperature rise to 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels296. Within the framework of these Agreements, the Parties 
agreed to periodically review the global long-term target they set for themselves to 
limit the global temperature rise297, as it could be necessary to strengthen this 1.5 °C 
target based on the accumulation of scientific knowledge298 (see Figure 16 below) 
and also effective efforts that are and/or will be qualitatively and quantitatively 
implemented by all countries. The first review of the long-term global target took 
place between 2013 and 15299, and should incorporate “various matters presented by 
the science, including in relation to temperature rises of 1.5°C300”.
The work of this first review, led by two permanent subsidiary bodies, was 
completed at COP21 in Paris in 2015. The expert dialogue report that supported 
the review states that the 2 °C limit should be considered as a “defence line”301. It adds 
that the “guardrail” concept is inadequate. The concept considers that a “guardrail” 
of 2 °C of warming is safe. The report recommends considering 2 °C as the upper 
end of the range of an increase in the global average temperature compared to pre-
industrial levels. This is a line of defence that must be protected, keeping in mind 
that less warming is advisable. The report also states that the scientific literature is less 
substantial when it comes to the effect of a global temperature rise limited to 
1.5 °C compared to a rise of 2 °C302. Since then, this shortcoming has been partially 
compensated for by some more recent scientific articles (see Figure 15 below).
Thus the review of the long-term 2013-2015 global target allowed the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, as part of its 
work to draw up the Paris Agreement, to incorporate the scientific inventory on a 
global average temperature rise that would be limited to 1.5°C or 2°C above pre-
industrial levels from the Cancún Agreements. 
Afterwards, in Paris, several developing countries emphasised that it is was 
important for them to limit the global temperature rise to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial 
levels, rather than 2 °C, as their populations are dealing with various repercussions 
of the warming that has already happened. Thus the Bolivarian Alliance for 
the Peoples of Our America303, Alliance of Small Island States304, Coalition for 
296. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 4.
297. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 138.
298. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 4.
299. FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1.
300. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 139.
301. FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1, Message 5.
302. FCCC/SB/2015/INF.1, Message 10.
303. BAPOA, 2015.
304. AOSIS, 2015.
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Rainforest Nations305, Africa Group306 and Least Developed Countries Group307 
all made reaching 1.5°C one of their main targets for Paris. The Africa Group and 
AILAC have also suggested that an increase of over 1.5 °C should involve developed 
countries offering more funding to developing countries, which would probably 
be confronted with the most harmful effects of global warming308. 
For the first time, the Paris Agreement set a target of limiting global warming 
to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. In Paris, the Parties also recognised that the 
2030 emissions pathway from Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
(INDCs) submitted by the Parties should be decreased by 28% to reach the 2°C 
target by 2100, and more scientific data is required to establish a least-cost pathway 
to reach the goal of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels309.
However, limiting the global temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial 
levels is a major challenge. This is partly because most of the scientific work to date 
has examined the options to limit the increase to 2 °C. This is also partly because 
there is barely a decade left before we cross the threshold of an average global 
temperature rise of 1.5 °C, compared to pre-industrial levels310. In its most recent 
synthesis report published in 2014, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) highlights that there is currently little work analysing emissions trajectories 
that limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above preindustrial levels. However, 
the IPCC has identified three action areas that could limit the temperature increase 
to 1.5 °C: 
(i) immediate mitigation action; 
(ii) rapid implementation of all emissions mitigation technologies currently 
available; and 
(iii) development that encourages low-carbon energy demand311.
To fill these knowledge gaps, at COP21, the Parties invited the IPCC to 
“provide a special report in 2018 on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above 
pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways”.312 The 
IPCC accepted this invitation at its 43rd meeting313. Nevertheless, the IPCC may 
face various challenges in compiling this special report which is henceforth slated 
305. Coalition for Rainforest Nations, 2015.
306. Africa Group, 2015.
307. Group of Least Developed Countries, 2014 .
308. Africa Group, 2013 and IISD, 2015b, p. 5 for AILAC, Mexico and the Dominican 
Republic.
309. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para. 17.
310. Reuters, according to data from the UK Met Office’s Hadley Centre, 2016, [online]
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-impacts-conference/climate-change- 
could-cross-key-threshold-in-a-decade-scientists-idUSKCN11S1FE
311. IPCC, 2014a.
312. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para. 21.
313. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para. 20.
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for September 2018, examined in the below box. There is no doubt that this is a 
major challenge, with the current commitments of the Parties leading to an average 
temperature increase that could reach approximately 2.8°C314 to 3.3°C315 at the 
end of the century, according to two independent analyses (see Figure 17 below). 
In October 2016, the IPCC adopted a decision aiming for the adoption of its 
special report on a 1.5 °C rise (see the box on this subject below). It will thus be 
published early enough to be incorporated in the negotiations that will take place 
under the Facilitative Dialogue (see Section I.13). 
However, the discussions on the 2018 Facilitation Dialogue may hit a stumbling 
block, as an independent analysis published in November 2016 suggests that reaching 
the 1.5 °C target would imply that developed countries would reduce their GHG 
emission by 45% by 2030, compared to their 2005 emissions baseline. This means 
that the efforts currently proposed in the NDCs of some of these countries would 
be intensified 316. 
For example, the analysis suggests that the European Union should increase 
its effort in its NDC by 22% for the 2025-2030 period, reducing its GHG emissions 
by 62% in 2030 compared to the 1990 baseline, in contrast to the 40% reduction 
that is currently planned. As for the United States, the effort recorded in its NDC 
is based on its 2005 emissions. The analysis suggests that limiting the global 
temperature increase to 1.5 °C would require the ambition of the United States to 
be almost 2.5 times higher, with an emissions reduction of 60% by 2030, instead 
of 26%. As for all the other developed countries, their cumulative effort for 2030 
implies an increase of their collective GHG emissions by 2% compared to the 
2005 baseline. The analysis also suggests that reaching 1.5 °C would require them 
to actually reduce their emissions by 60%, over this same period. Still according to 
this same scenario, China would need to cap its GHG emissions in 2025 rather 
than in 2030. The rest of the developing countries would be asked to cap their 
emissions in 2027. Lastly, it is obvious that the industrialised countries should 
pursue and achieve mitigation objectives over and beyond 100% in the 2050 to 
2100 period317.
314. Analysis of the Climate Action Tracker dated 1 November 2016. This includes both 
the NDCs of Parties that have ratified the Agreement and the INDCs of the Parties 
that have not ratified it yet [online] http://climateactiontracker.org/assets/publications/ 
briefing_papers/CAT_temperature_update_November_2016.pdf
315. Analysis of Climate Interactive at 5 April 2017. This includes both the NDCs of Parties 
that have ratified the Agreement and the INDCs of the Parties that have not ratified 
it yet [online] https://www.climateinteractive.org/programs/scoreboard/; and to access 
the data [online] https://www.climateinteractive.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Climate-
Scoreboard-Output-5April2017-to-share.xlsx
316. Climate Interactive, 2016.
317. Robiou du Pont, Y., et al., 2017.
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In addition to this independent analysis, there is also the most recent analysis 
of the “Emissions Gap Report” published in 2016 by the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), which also stated that most of the current scenarios forecast 
a 50% chance of limiting the temperature rise to 1.5°C by 2100, highlighting that 
the increase would most likely surpass this threshold in any case, and then fall back 
to 1.5°C if sufficient efforts are made. UNEP notes that there is currently too little 
data to evaluate pathways, with an over 2/3rds chance of limiting the temperature 
increase to 1.5 °C over pre-industrial levels. To reach this, it seems that global 
GHG emissions would need to drop by 13% by 2030 compared to the 1990 
threshold—knowing that these emissions actually increased by 36% between 
1990 and 2014318.
Special IPCC report on the impacts  
of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels  
and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways
Consequences of global warming of over 1.5 °C 
For several developing countries, it is essential to improve scientific knowledge 
of the consequences of a global temperature rise of 1.5°C. Their populations 
are already suffering major impacts from the global warming that is already hap-
pening. These repercussions are mainly weather or hydrologic events that are 
either intense, or take time to be felt, such as sea level rise, the loss in biodiversity, 
the salinisation of seas, the disappearance of glaciers, and longer droughts. These 
events are already becoming more frequent. The global temperature rose by 
approximately 0.6 °C between 1986 and 2005 compared to the pre-industrial 
era1. In the past, the IPCC has highlighted that there are already anthropogenic 
disturbances to the climate2. 
These consequences already entail a high economic and social cost, mainly for 
developing countries. One analysis considers that in 2016 alone, natural disasters 
caused nearly USD 100 billion in damages, in addition to affecting the lives of 
nearly 411 million individuals3. The IPCC has thus set a major and important 
challenge—to better understand how the climate system could respond to a 
temperature rise that is more subtle than the 2 °C increase compared to the 
pre-industrial baseline. The idea is to provide concrete scientific tools to States 
at the next Facilitative Dialogue on reaching the objective enshrined in the Paris 
Agreement, if the Parties would like to execute the most ambitious part—limiting 
the increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. Some observers consider that 
this mandate of the Parties to the IPCC demonstrates the will to finally define 
what society considers as a dangerous interference to the climate system. 
These observers also add that the 1.5 °C limit represents the least risk that is 
socially acceptable4.
318. UNEP, 2016.
The rest of the text page 81
81
Guide to the Negotiations - UNFCCC (COP23) - OIF/IFDD, 2017
Related global GHG emissions pathways
The special report will surely enable a portrayal of the expanding academic debate 
concerning the feasibility of fast mitigation pathways5. A number of relevant 
populations indicated that there are significant stakes involved in the political 
and technical measures required for their implemtnation6, including the need to 
deploy new technologies which for the most part have not been tested yet, and could 
thus lead to quantified impacts of several GtCO2 per year (for example, bioenergy 
with carbon capture and storage)7. A large proportion of these technologies 
remain untested and could cause potential significant socio-economic conflicts. 
The 1.5 and 2°C scenarios forecast the elimination of GHG directly from the 
atmosphere and their storage at a scale of several GtCO2 per year. A review of 
the academic literature reveals a general outline, whereby it will be necessary to 
pursue mitigation objectives over and beyond 100% (negative net emission levels) 
to achieve the 1.5°C target8.
Major points of the special report9
During its 44th session in Bangkok in 2016, the IPCC agreed to target September 
2018 as the date on which its special report could be adopted. Furthermore, the 
Group agreed to draw up a report that may be up to 225 pages long, with a 
table of contents that should address the following subjects:
• Chapter 1: Framing and context;
• Chapter 2: Mitigation pathways compatible with the 1.5°C in the context of 
sustainable development;
• Chapter 3: Impacts of 1.5°C global warming on natural and human systems;
• Chapter 4: Strengthening and implementing the global response to the threat 
of climate change;
• Chapter 5: Sustainable development, poverty eradication and reducing inequalities;
• Through the report: integrated case studies/regional and cross-cutting themes;
• FAQs.
1. IPCC, 2014a
2. See IPCC, 2007; IPCC, 2012; IPCC, 2014b
3. CRED, 2016
4. Nature Climate Change, 2016a
5. Peters, 2016
6. Anderson and Peters, 2016
7. Boysen, Lucht and Gerten, 2017
8. Robiou du Pont et al., 2017
9. IPCC, 2016, Decision IPCC/XLIV-4
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Figure 15. Examples of differentiated consequences caused by a 
temperature increase of 2°C vs 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels319
319. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017, according to Schleussner 
et al., 2016.
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Figure 16. Evolution of the Convention’s goal and consideration  
of 1.5 °C320
320. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.
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Figure 17. Projected rise in global temperature by 2100 based  
on 1990-2030 emissions pathways321
321. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017 – Estimations based 
on the below emissions: 37.04 Gt eq-CO2 (1990); 69.85 Gt eq-CO2 (2030: +4.2 °C); 
55.95 Gt  eq-CO2 (2030: full implementation of NDCs) drawn from the detailed 
independent analysis of Climate Interactive from 5 April 2017 (see Climate Interactive, 
2017); 41.8 Gt eq-CO2 (2030: +2 °C); 38.8 Gt eq-CO2 (2030: +1.5 °C) from the most 
recent Emissions Gap Report of UNEP (see UNEP, 2016).
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I.5. National considerations related  
to the implementation of the NDCs
from INDCs to NDCs, a process at the core of the Paris 
Agreement
Intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) 
As part of the international negotiation process on climate change by virtue of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 
Kyoto Protocol was the first international climate agreement that was legally binding. 
It was adopted on 11 December 1997 and entered into force on 16 February 2005322, 
The industrialised countries committed to quantitative reduction targets for their 
GHG emissions for the 2008-2012 period, compared to a 1990 baseline323, whilst 
the developing countries did not have quantitative targets324, in accordance with 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities325. 
At the end of the 18th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP18 in 
2012 in Doha), the Parties to the UNFCCC began the second commitment 
period under the Kyoto Protocol326. As of now, this only covers approximately 
15% of global GHG emissions for the 2013-2020 period327. Despite significant 
progress resulting from the Kyoto Protocol, especially concerning the methodology 
and related mechanisms, this second stage is considered as a failure, particularly 
due to the fact that few States have renewed their commitments328, and due to a 
globally limited commitment329. Another point that must be brought up is that 
the second commitment period continues to differentiate the targets, and imposes 
reduction commitments solely on developed countries and economies in transition. 
These various points have revealed the limits of an instrument such as the Kyoto 
Protocol in combating global climate change effectively, in light of the portion of 
emissions covered. To this end, the Parties to the UNFCCC re-examined how they 
approach the fight against climate change, incorporating the need to bring together 
the States in a new global climate agreement.
322. UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol [online] http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php
323. The Parties referred to in Annex I (developed countries) that have ratified the protocol 
were to reduce their emissions of six GHGs by 5% compared to a 1990 baseline during 
the 2008-2012 period, as per Article 3, paragraph 1 of the Kyoto Protocol.
324. National Assembly of the French Republic, 2016, p. 3.
325. United Nations, 1992a, UNFCCC, Article 3 para. 1, p. 5.
326. This second period is initiated by the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol [online] 
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/kp_doha_amendment_english.pdf
327. National Assembly of the French Republic, 2016, p. 4.
328. As of 3 October 2017, the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol was ratified by 
83 countries [online] http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/items/7362.php
329. Indeed, a very small number of countries have fulfilled their commitments, and some 
countries have even questioned their commitments in the process as a whole. For example, 
Canada withdrew in 2011, and the United States never ratified the Protocol.
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The top-down approach showed its limits with the Kyoto Protocol, making 
way for a bottom-up approach. The aim was also ensure that all States Parties to 
the UNFCCC (developing and developed countries) are involved in a collective 
process based on the incorporation of all national mitigation contributions. The 
addition of the commitments made by the by Party State should collectively enable 
the joint restriction of the average temperature rise to 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels. This resulted in the invitation for the Parties to draw up “Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions” (INDC).
The dynamic of drawing up INDCs was a key vector at COP21 and in drawing 
up the Paris Agreement, by enabling all players to participate in a proactive dynamic 
that considers the reality of each player. From an official point of view, mitigation 
is the initial entry point for the INDCs. However, the developing countries 
emphasised what is realistic in terms of adaptation, in addition to their potential 
contributions to the global GHG reduction effort. For example, some of them 
have structured their INDCs so that they begin by introducing adaptation stakes 
and the objectives of low-carbon development, with mitigation co-benefits. In 
their INDCs, developing countries were also able to bring out their needs in terms 
of financing, and in terms of North-South and South-South capacity and technology 
transfer, as part of the so-called “conditional” targets330, which go beyond their 
“unconditional targets”331. This innovative approach was decisive in obtaining the 
Paris Agreement, the first universal climate agreement, which applies “to all Parties”. 
The contributions of the States were reported to the UNFCCC Secretariat all 
throughout 2015, prior to COP21. When the Paris Agreement was adopted, 
nearly all the Parties to the Convention had submitted their INDCs, all of which 
were compiled in the INDC registry332 that the Secretariat set up.
330. Conditional on external support (financial, technological, etc.).
331. Not conditional on external support.
332. Accessible at the address: ,http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/indc/Submission%20
Pages/submissions.aspx
As of 3 October 2017, the gateway had received 165 submissions.
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Figure 18. The INDCs, an innovative and inclusive process  
for implementing the first universal climate agreement333
333. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.
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Nationally determined contributions (NDCs)
Once the INDCs – declarations of intent (“intended” contributions) – are submitted, 
they are to become concrete action plans and implemented. The Agreement provides 
that the INDCs will be replaced by nationally determined contributions (see 
section II.B.) when the Parties submit their Paris Agreement ratification instruments.
In line with the submission of the instruments of ratification, the number of 
NDCs increases at the same time334. These NDCs are recorded in an interim public 
registry under the UNFCCC Secretariat as per Article 4, paragraph 12 of the Paris 
Agreement)335. The modalities and procedures for the operation and use of this 
public NDC registry are still being negotiated, as the States Parties have not 
reached a consensus regarding this yet (see section I.1.2.).
With the entry into force of the Paris Agreement, these NDCs become concrete 
action plans that must be transposed into national measures.
Entry into force of the Paris Agreement: The NDCs become effective
In the process of implementing the Paris Agreement, the ratification of China 
and the United States336, the two main global emitters, on 3 September 2016 
was an important step. It was also fundamental for the European Union to ratify 
the Agreement, to ensure that the two thresholds in Article 21 of the Paris 
Agreement would be reached337. As of 4 October 2016, the European Parliament 
approved the ratification of the Paris Agreement by the EU, following its adoption 
by the council of European ministers on 30 September. As of this date, seven 
Member States (Hungary338, France339, Austria340, Slovakia341 and Germany342, Malta343 
334. As per paragraph 22 of Decision 1/CP.21, which “invites Parties to communicate their first 
nationally determined contribution no later than when the Party submits its respective instrument 
of ratification, accession, or approval of the Paris Agreement. If a Party has communicated 
an intended nationally determined contribution prior to joining the Agreement, that Party 
shall be considered to have satisfied this provision unless that Party decides otherwise”.
335. UNFCCC, NDCs Registry (interim) [online] http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/
All.aspx
336. United Nations Treaties Depositary, Status of the Paris Agreement [online]
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7- 
d&chapter=27&clang=_en
337. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, art. 21, para. 1 – “This Agreement shall enter 
into force on the thirtieth day after the date on which at least 55 Parties to the Convention 
accounting in total for at least an estimated 55 per cent of the total global GHG emissions 
have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession”.
338. Climatechangenews, 2016a.
339. Climatechangenews, 2016b.
340. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/09/c_135499491.htm
341. https://www.euractiv.com/section/climate-environment/news/slovakia-becomes-
fourth-eu-country-to-ratify-the-paris-climate-agreement/
342. http://phys.org/news/2016-09-german-lawmakers-ratify-paris-climate.html
343. http://www.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/L-Union-europeenne-ratifie-l
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and Portugal344) had already completed all the national formalities for ratification. 
These countries, as well as the European Union, submitted their instruments to 
the depositary, the United Nations Secretary-General, on 5 October, with 3 other 
countries (Bolivia, Canada and Nepal).
On the same date, the two thresholds (55-55%) required for the entry into force 
of the Paris Agreement were met, with the ratification of 72 Parties, representing 
56.75% of global emissions. Less than one year after its adoption, the Paris 
Agreement thus entered into force a few days before COP22 in Marrakech 
(November 2016)345. For all of the States that have already sent their INDCs, 
these INDCs become NDCs that must be transposed into national measure to 
ensure their effectiveness.
Realistic implementation of NDCs in each country
The NDCs are one of the cornerstones of the Paris Agreement, as contributions of 
each Party to reach the targets set by the Agreement. The capacities of countries are 
considered and re-asserted in the Agreement, reflecting equity, common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities, and different national contexts346. At the national level, 
converting NDCs into concrete measure will indeed require a significant effort 
from States and from all national stakeholders based on their different national 
realities. To reach the targets made together in virtue of the Paris Agreement, the 
process related to the NDCs will also be subject to the smooth functioning of 
operations at the international level (during the upcoming negotiation rounds, and 
also at the level of international institutions), to fine tune the modalities of execution 
and monitoring, and to find resources to support successful implementation.
An ambition to build together, incorporating different national realities
NDCs are the result of an inclusive and participatory process that is unprecedented 
in the history of the UNFCCC. The INDCs reflect a shared understanding of as 
well as a shared ambition of the fight against climatic disruptions and the sustainable 
development of our societies. As such, the national ambitions related to the imple-
mentation of the NDCs not only reflect the objectives of the States based on their 
actual situations, but are also a unique and new global opportunity to reconsider 
our modes of development, to foster more solidarity and become more resilient 
and sustainable. As such, the participation of all States in the Paris Agreements must 
also involve their cooperation, which is just as important, to reach the objectives.
344. http://www.lorientlejour.com/Article/1010246/portugal-le-parlement-ratifie-laccord- 
de-paris-sur-le-climat.html
345. In compliance with Article 21 of the Paris Agreement in virtue of which the Agreement 
enters into force 30 days after the double threshold is reached (55-55%).
346. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 2.
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As the Paris Agreement states, industrialised countries must thus take the lead 
“by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets”347. For developing 
countries, climate ambition must be incorporated into development goals, which 
may include adaptation measures with mitigation co-benefits348. They are, however, 
also encouraged to “enhance their mitigation efforts”349, for low-carbon development. 
In order to allow them to take more ambitious measures, “in accordance with 
Articles 9, 10 and 11” of the Paris Agreement, (financial and technical) support 
will be provided to them350.
Overall, the NDCs of developed countries mainly include mitigation, whereas 
those of developing countries are more targeted towards adaptation, loss and damage, 
capacity building and sustainable development, in addition to mitigation. Support 
for funding and technology transfer is mainly in the conditional targets of devel-
oping countries. Overall, in their NDCs, developing countries have highlighted 
adaptation (according to the UNFCCC figures based on the review of 161 INDCs351 
prior to COP22, 137 Parties included adaptation targets in them352), financing, 
and capacity building. However, developed countries have not highlighted this. 
This is despite the fact that implementation will require close collaboration 
amongst States, because whether the targets are conditional or unconditional, 
developing country targets may not be upheld without appropriate technical and 
financial support. 
Funding remains an essential corollary
Faced with the funding needs of DCs, since Copenhagen in 2009, the developed 
have committed to mobilising USD 100 billion annually between 2013 and 2020, 
and then from 2020353. This amount is henceforth a lower threshold, and by 2025, 
a new target will need to be set, “taking into account the needs and priorities of develop-
ing countries”, “in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Agreement”354.
Article 9 of the Paris Agreement thus states that “developed country Parties 
shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both 
mitigation and adaptation in continuation of their existing obligations under the 
Convention. ”355. It also states that the latter must report quantitative and qualitative 
347. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 4.
348. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 7.
349. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 4.
350. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 5.
351. As of 3 October 2017, 165 INDCs were submitted [online] http://www4.unfccc.int/
submissions/indc/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx 
352. UNFCCC, 2016a. 
353. European Parliament, 2014, p. 2.
354. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 54.
355. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9, para. 1.
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information on funding allocated to developing countries every two years356. Article 9 
also specifies that “such mobilization of climate finance should represent a progression 
beyond previous efforts”357. Going beyond just the developed countries, “other Parties 
are encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily”358.
In practice, beyond the descriptive detail of the commitments, the ambition 
to mobilise USD 100 billion annually is only mentioned in the introduction of 
the official documents, and is not an integral part of the text of the Agreement. 
Although this is not binding and there are no official instruments, financing 
perspectives are firming up. Nevertheless, as of yet, little progress has been made 
toward mobilising USD 100 billion annually by 2020, despite the perspectives to 
make the Green Climate Fund gradually operational. A detailed definition still 
must be drawn up of the objectives and instruments relating to it, as well as the 
funding modalities in general, for several aspects of the implementation of the 
objectives of the NDCs.
Following COP22 for example, it was decided that the Adaptation Fund 
would be use to implement the Paris Agreement359. The contribution of COP23 
to continuing work on making these objectives a reality, and their implementation 
must reflect significant progress, by encouraging and resulting in ever-increasing 
cooperation amongst States.
Monitoring the implementation of objectives and raising the NDC 
ambition 
As at 3 October 2017, 165 INDC had been submitted to the UNFCCC360, covering 
193 Parties (the European Union submitted one single INDC for all its Members). 
These contributions represent 98% of the Parties to the UNFCCC361 and a total 
of over 95%362 of global GHG emissions.
356. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9, para. 5.
357. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9, para. 3.
358. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9, para. 2.
359. For further information, see Countries Affirm in Closing Hours of COP22: The Adaptation 
Fund Should Serve the Paris Agreement [online] https://www.adaptation-fund.org/
countries-affirm-closing-hours-cop22-adaptation-fund-serve-paris-agreement/
360. See the gateway INDCs as communicated by Parties [online]
http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/INDC/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx
361. Which, as of 3 October 2017, has 197 Parties [online] http://unfccc.int/essential_
background/convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php 
362. These estimations are based on the review of 163 INDCs – L’ONU met à jour son rapport 
de synthèse des plans climat nationaux, 189 pays inclus, 95.7% des émissions mondiales 
[online] http://newsroom.unfccc.int/fr/actualit%C3%A9s/mise-a-jour-du-rapport-de-
synthese-des-plans-climat-nationaux/
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However, the current pledges, even if they were fully met, would not be sufficient 
to keep the temperature increase “well below 2°C” (even 1.5°C) by the end of the 
century, which is the target set in the Paris Agreement. Paragraph 19 of Decision 
1/CP.21 asked the Secretariat to prepare an assessment report on the contribution 
of INDCs to combating climate change363. According to this document, with the 
title “Synthesis report on the aggregate effect of intended nationally determined 
contributions”364, average global GHG emissions are expected to be 8.7 GtCO2e 
and 15.2 GtCO2e in 2025 and 2030, respectively, above a scenario that is compat-
ible with the 2°C pathway. 
Other more recent studies365, have not overturned this observation366. This is 
particularly the case of an independent study that Nature Climate Change published 
at the end of July 2017367. In this study, the researchers specify that there is only a 5% 
chance of reaching the 2 °C target by the end of the century (and a 1% of reaching 
the 1.5 °C target), with warming that would actually be between 2° C and 4.9 °C, 
with a median temperature of 3.2 °C. The increase in the ambition relating to 
NDCs is thus an essential corollary for reaching not only long-term targets, but 
medium- and short-term targets as well, especially to reach a peak of GHG emissions 
“as soon as possible” within half a century368. 
In this framework, the monitoring process that the Paris Agreement imple-
mented will be an effective instrument for inviting Parties to increase the ambition. 
Indeed, to reach the Paris Agreement targets, each Party must report and renew its 
NDCs every 5 years369. The Parties may modify their NDCs at any given time, as 
long as the level of ambition is increased370. In addition to all this reflection, the 
implementation of the NDCs must absolutely be clear and transparent.371 This is at 
the core of the current process. As such, the strengthened mechanism for transparency 
and monitoring established by the Paris Agreement is central. The methodological 
criteria for Measuring, Reporting and Verification are all important and must be 
fully part of the implementation of the NDCs. They will be essential for monitoring 
and demonstrating the progress made via the process of increasing the ambition to 
reach the targets. 
363. This report, which was released in 2016, takes into account all of the INDC submitted 
by 4 April 2016.
364. UNFCCC, 2016a
365. See, in particular, Climate Interactive, 2017.
366. This is due in particular to the fact that the main emitters already submitted their 
contributions when the Secretariat report was published.
367. Nature Climate Change, 2017.
368. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 1.
369. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 9.
370. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 11.
371. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 8.
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Monitoring the implementation of targets linked to NDCs
A set of interconnected Articles in the Paris Agreement implements a binding 
legal architecture to reach the level of ambition in the mitigation targets linked 
to the NDCs. This includes the goals of holding the increase in the global average 
temperature in the long term372, the relevant mitigation goals373, while putting 
pressure on Parties to gradually increase their mitigation goals, in order to collec-
tively reach the level of ambition of the Paris Agreement. This dynamic should be 
strengthened by a renewal of the NDCs in five-year cycles that are increasingly 
ambitious, and informed by scientific assessments.374
The Paris Agreement thus creates two cycles:
The first cycle commits the Parties to present their NDCs when they accede375 
to the Paris Agreement, if they have not already done this via their INDCs, or 
when they decided to modify them376. Each future contribution should constitute 
progress compared to the previous contribution, and also reflect common but 
differentiated responsibilities and the respective capacities of each country, in 
light of the various national contexts. Parties whose INDCs have a 10-year schedule 
are asked to report or update these contributions.
The second cycle consists of a Facilitative Dialogue in 2018377, followed by a first 
Global Stocktake of collective efforts that will be conducted in 2023.378 This will 
then take place every five years. All the Parties must present a report using a 
shared transparency framework, and support shall be provided to developing 
countries to enable them to fulfil their commitments to draw up reports.
To achieve the targets, the IPCC is invited to “provide a special report in 2018 on 
the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global 
greenhouse gas emission pathways”379. This report will also inform the Facilitative 
Dialogue of the same year.
Also note that whilst the vast majority of States Parties have sent an INDC, 
only 166 Parties ratified the Paris Agreement380, and 160 NDCs are recorded in 
the interim registry381.
372. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 2, para. 1.
373. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 1.
374. Nature Climate Change, 2016b, p. 830.
375. Ratification or equivalent process.
376. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 22.
377. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 20.
378. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 14, para. 2.
379. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 21.
380. http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php (dernière consultation le 3 octobre 
2017)
381. http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/All.aspx (last consulted on 3 October 2017)
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Figure 19. Status of the ratification of the Paris Agreement and NDC 
submissions compared to the number of parties to the UNFCCC382
Although the combined effects of INDCs/NDCs is still insufficient (as indicated 
above), although there are currently less NDCs (and thus less commitments that 
become effective), the ambition challenge is as crucial as ever. The ambition deficit 
must endorse more actions and must invite a rapid transposition of targets recorded 
in the NDCs into national measures. It is true that the level of ambition is currently 
not enough. However the process of converting NDCs into concrete action plans 
is still crucial.
In other words, the challenges of ambition, implementation and monitoring 
of targets are still core issues, and should not be underestimated. Alongside these 
challenges for the States Parties in the implementation in the field, several crucial 
points are still outstanding or are being discussed in negotiations. In this sense, 
COP23 will be an important step to fine tune the work on several aspects of the 
NDCs.
The continuation of the work on the NDCs and the main 
outcomes expected from the upcoming negotiation 
sessions
After COP21, COP22 (held from 7 to 18 November 2016 in Marrakech in 
Morocco) made it possible to continue the work to make the Paris Agreement 
possible, with the Parties adopting over thirty decisions383. Among other discussion 
382. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017 – Figures updated 
on 1 September 2017.
383. Access all the decisions adopted during COP22 [online] http://unfccc.int/meetings/
marrakech_nov_2016/meeting/9567/php/view/decisions.php#c
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points, various aspects of the NDCs were discussed, in accordance with the elements 
in Decision 1/CP.21 and the Paris Agreement, particularly via the work of Subsidiary 
Bodies, the CMA and APA. The discussions on some of these points continued in 
May 2017 at the 46th session of the permanent Subsidiary Bodies (SB 46 – from 
8 to 18 May 2017, in Bonn, Germany), and during the continuation of work 
under the auspices of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA).
To ensure monitoring of the work programme and the achievements of 
the elements relevant to Decision 1/CP.21384, the Secretariat regularly publishes a 
document on the progress made385. This tool is a progress tracker that aims to386:
(i) Provide updated information on the implementation of the elements in 
Decision 1/CP.21; and
(ii) Provide information on the next relevant steps.
Furthermore, the Secretariat acknowledged that this document was useful in 
May 2017, during the intersession of the Bonn negotiation. The Secretariat was thus 
invited to continue to update and regularly publish the aforementioned document387.
Amongst the issues covered, this progress tracker gives information on the 
progress on NDC work. Below are the main upcoming deadlines (including the 
progress that COP22 made possible, during the negotiation intersession in Bonn 
in May 2017 and the important points for COP23): 
• Planning a Facilitative Dialogue in 2018 to take stock of progress made388 and 
guide the renewal of NDCs389.
This is the mandate of the COP. To this end, the presidents of COP22 and 
COP23 commenced consultations during SB 46, in accordance with Decision 1/
CP.22. These consultations will continue at COP23 and will be recorded in the 
publication of a joint report390.
• Draw up additional directives on the characteristics of NDCs for review and 
for adoption by the CMA391.
This is the mandate of the APA and the CMA. These directives are slated to 
be drawn up in 2018 (at the latest)392. Following the first CMA session in Marrakech 
at COP22, negotiations continued on this point at APA1-3 (held at the same 
time as SB 46, from 8 to 18 May 2017 in Bonn, Germany)393. Based on concept 
384. http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/cop/application/pdf/overview_1cp21_tasks_.pdf
385. UNFCCC, 2017a.
386. UNFCCC, 2016c.
387. FCCC/SBI/2017/L.10, para. 13.
388. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 1.
389. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 8.
390. UNFCCC, 2017a, pp. 1-2.
391. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 26.
392. UNFCCC, 2017a, p. 2.
393. For further details on the results of these negotiations, see APA, 2017c, para. 11.
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notes from the sessions held at APA1-3394, the negotiations will continue during 
COP23 under the auspices of APA1-4. The Parties are invited to send in their 
views until 17 September 2017.
• Establish a common timetable for NDCs for the CMA to review and adopt395.
This is the mandate of the SBI and the CMA. This common timetable is 
slated to be drawn up in 2018 (at the latest)396. In accordance with the decision 
that the CMA adopted at COP22, this point should be examined at the 47th ses-
sion of the SBI (SBI47) at COP23397. 
• As stated previously, the Parties may modify their NDC at any given time, 
provided that the ambition is raised, in accordance with the directives adopted 
by the CMA398.
This mandate of the Parties (to revise their NDCs) and of the CMA (to adopt 
the directives) runs until 2018399. This point was discussed at APA1-3, and the 
negotiations will continue at APA1-4 at COP23.
• Based on the NDCs submitted by the Parties (with information to make the 
contributions clearer, transparent, and easy to understand), the Secretariat 
will prepare a summary report in 2020400.
• Draw up broader directives for information that makes the NDCs clearer, 
transparent, and easy to understand, for the CMA to adopt401.
This is the mandate of the APA (for the directives to draw up) and the CMA 
(for their adoption). These directives are slated to be drawn up in 2018 (at the 
latest)402. The negotiations on this point continued at APA1-3, and will continue 
at APA1-4 at COP23. A report will be published to highlight the reflections 
from the APA1-3 sessions. The Parties were invited to submit their views until 
15 September 2017. Following this, a paper aiming to summarise points of 
convergence and divergence, as well as the various options to examine, will be 
published on 15 October 2017. A specific workshop on this point will be organised 
by the Secretariat and the APA for COP23 on 6 November 2017403. This point is 
a key issue for the upcoming negotiations, as it will play a major role in determining 
the information that the Parties must provide in their future communications on 
the NDCs.
394. APA, 2017a.
395. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 10.
396. UNFCCC, 2017a, p. 2.
397. FCCC/PA/CMA/2016/3, para. 3.
398. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 11.
399. UNFCCC, 2017a, p. 2.
400. The first revision of the NDCs on this common timetable should be this year.
401. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 28.
402. UNFCCC, 2017a, p. 2.
403. UNFCCC, 2017a, p. 3.
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• Draw up directives for the NDC accounting of the Parties, “drawing from 
approaches established under the Convention and its related legal instruments” 
for the CMA to adopt404.
This is the mandate of the APA (for the directives to draw up) and the CMA 
(for their adoption). These directives are slated to be drawn up in 2018 (at the 
latest)405. These directives for NDC accounting are subject to the same schedule 
(see below) as for the directives on NDC information. The next negotiations will 
take place on 6 November at COP23.
Another important point also concerns communications directives on adap-
tation as a component of the NDCs (with the Secretariat and the APA planning a 
workshop on this at COP23, on 4 November 2017)406.
In brief, the COP23 schedule will be full, and the negotiations should be able 
to fine tune the work on the NDCs in several ways. Furthermore, COP23 will be 
a crucial step towards 2018. 2018 is a major step, especially in the framework of the 
Facilitative Dialogue, particularly as at COP22, the Parties decided to set 2018 as 
the deadline for adopting the rules on the making the Paris Agreement opera-
tional.
I.6. Ambition and sectoral approaches
Ambition 
Ambition mechanisms in the Paris Agreement 
The need to take effective measures to limit global warming and confront its 
adverse effects is urgent, which is why several players concerned about climate change 
consider that the Paris Agreement is not ambitious enough, although it constitutes 
major and unprecedented progress in international climate negotiations. A major 
reason for this firm belief is that there are no binding provisions formally recorded 
in the Agreement, such as quantified commitments on emissions reductions, carbon 
pricing provisions, or abandoning fossil fuels and substituting them with renewable 
energy.
However, it must be remembered that the objective that guided the process of 
drawing up the Paris Agreement was to draw up a consensual text that may strike 
the right balance between ambition, the participation of everyone, solidarity and 
equity, and which prepares for the future (long-term targets), all while presenting 
solutions for the present (short- and medium-term targets). It is true that the Paris 
Agreement—adopted during COP21—and Decision 1/CP.21 which accompa-
nies are lacking in terms of the legitimate expectations of several stakeholders—
404. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 31.
405. UNFCCC, 2017, p. 3.
406. UNFCCC, 2017, p. 5-6.
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especially those who are the most vulnerable to climate change impacts—estab-
lished certain sustainable mechanisms, provisions and instruments. If they are 
effectively implemented, in the long term, they will make it possible to limit the 
temperature rise and confront present and future impacts of climate change.
The main ambition mechanisms of the Paris Agreement include:
• The Paris Agreement provides a sustainable framework that guides the global 
effort for decades to come. The target of limiting the temperature rise to well 
below 2 °C by the end of the century, and to strive to limit it to 1.5 °C, 
is asserted. This ambition is concretely conveyed by establishing a global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions pathway: reach peak emissions “as soon as 
possible”, and emissions neutrality in the second half of the century407 (see 
Section I.4 as well);
• All Parties will submit or update a national contribution (called a “Nationally 
Determined Contribution – NDC) every five years, which must be ever-more 
ambitious than the previous NDC, with the option of revising it at any given 
time, with the obligation of setting the ambition higher (see Section III.5 as 
well);
• The target of mobilizing 100 billion American dollars (USD) per year by 
2020 was maintained through 2025, and strengthened in this decision408: 
This objective is henceforth a lower threshold with a more ambitious financial 
target that should be reached in 2025 to help developing countries strengthen 
the application of their mitigation and adaptation policies, strategies, rules, 
action plans and measures to combat climate change to contribute to accom-
plishing the purpose of the Agreement (see Section III.9 as well);
• The Parties are invited, by 2020, to communicate to the Convention Secretariat 
their mid-century long-term low GHG emission development strategies409;
• The Agreement authorises voluntary cooperation for the timely implemen-
tation of their NDCs to raise the ambition of their mitigation and adaptation 
actions and promote sustainable development and environmental integrity410 
(see Section I.3 as well); 
• A monitoring system for the implementation and “enhanced” support was 
implemented, constituted by the Transparency Framework4, and applicable to 
all, with flexibility for developing countries. It should be gradually developed, 
incorporating the achievements of the current measuring, reporting and 
verification (MRV) system (see Section I.12 as well). It will make it possible to 
ensure the transparency of mitigation and adaptation efforts, and the financial 
of all the Parties;
407. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4, para. 1.
408. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 53.
409. Decision 1/CP.21: para. 35.
410. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 6 para. 1.
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• A Facilitative Dialogue that can take stock of the collective efforts made by 
the Parties to reach the long-term target will be planned in 2018411 and will 
make it possible to guide the revise the NDCs upwards (see Section I.13 as well); 
• A Global Stocktake will be made every five years from 2023 the assess the 
collective progress in terms of the long-term targets of the agreement, and 
to decide on which actions to take to remain aligned with these targets. The 
Parties will thus submit new NDCs, based on the results of the collective 
stocktake;
• For the first time, the Convention formally acknowledges the role of non-State 
actors (local governments, private sector, NGO, etc.)412 to take climate action 
that must be incorporated in the Global Stocktake (see Section I.11 as well);
• The importance of incentives for emissions reduction actions was recognised, 
especially via tools such as national policies and carbon pricing (see Section 
I.3 as well).
The ambition of the Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21 must also be assessed 
by the fact that the documents include important provisions that include:
• The obligation to strengthen support for international cooperation for miti-
gation, adaptation, capacity building, and technology transfers;
• The creation of a new technology framework413, while recognising the need 
to accelerate innovation;
• Strengthening carbon sinks, particularly forests414, through REDD+ actions 
and approaches that combine mitigation and adaptation;
• A global adaptation goal415 (see Section I.10 as well), and the need to balance 
the funding between mitigation and adaptation is asserted;
• Formal recognition of the issue of loss and damage416, with an appropriate 
cooperation framework;
• The public nature of the actions that the Parties implement via their NDCs417, 
as well as the actions of non-State actors418 and the “reputation” effect of this 
transparent publicity, which should have a significant impact on the chances 
of reaching the targets of the Agreement. This should be strengthened by the 
public nature of the results of these joint actions, particularly via the Global 
Stocktake;
411. Decision 1/CP.21: para. 20.
412. Decision 1/CP.21, Chapter V, Non-Party Stakeholders.
413. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10, para. 4.
414. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 5.
415. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 7.
416. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 8.
417. Particularly via the public NDC Registry [online] http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/ 
Pages/Home.aspx
418. Particularly via the NAZCA platform [online] http://climateaction.unfccc.int/
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• A series of provisions and measures for enhanced action for mitigation, adap-
tation, technology and funding for enhance action prior to 2020419. 
Continuation of work, situation since COP21 and in the run-up to COP23
Following the adoption of the Paris Agreement at the end of COP21, it took less 
than a year for it to enter to force on 4 November 2016, a few days before COP22 
(in Marrakech in November 2016). In light of the early and particularly quick 
entry into force of the Paris Agreement, several observers external to the process 
expected COP22 to accelerate the process of drawing up modalities, procedures 
and directives, as well as the provisions and mechanisms for making it operationally 
effective. One of the important outcomes of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris 
Agreement (APA) held on the sidelines of COP22 is the conclusion to set 2018 as 
the deadline for making the Agreement operational and to incorporate important 
issues that have not been explicitly included in the agendas of subsidiary bodies. 
At the end of COP22, the Parties also welcomed the very clear work 
programme through December 2018 established in the APA conclusions for each 
point, which includes calls for communications, summaries and technical notes 
from the Secretariat, workshops, and round tables. It is noted, regrettably, that for 
some of the specific aforementioned agenda items of APA, the round tables (and 
sometimes the negotiation sessions) will only be open to the Parties and Observer 
States, although the Paris Agreement recognised and ratified the important roles of 
non-State actors in combating climate change.
Finally, the APA noted the intention of the APA co-presidents to publish a 
concept note to provide an overview of the outcomes of the last session in May 
2017, and to suggest options for the way forward, based on the viewpoints and the 
ideas suggested by the Parties and expressed in their observations for this session, 
without prejudice to the options or suggestions that the Parties could introduce in 
the future. 
Regarding the negotiations concerning ambition, some progress can be noted 
on certain agenda items of the 45th sessions of the subsidiary bodies (SB 45), the 
COP22, the APA, as well as the Bonn session (SBSTA46 and SBI46) in May 
2017. The following paragraphs take stock of this progress, highlighting the 
upcoming negotiations which will be held at COP23.
• The mechanisms of international cooperation to implement NDCs
Some principles, as well as work methods were defined among Parties at 
round tables and negotiation sessions. Also note the definition of the structure and 
content (informal information notes containing a list of points prepared by the 
co-facilitators) of the modalities, procedures and directives to implement the 
mechanisms and the framework, referred to in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement 
(see Section I.3 as well).
419. Decision 1/CP.21, Chapter IV, Enhanced action prior to 2020.
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• The monitoring system for implementation and “enhanced” support, or 
the Transparency Framework
Significant progress has been noted, and the work of the APA in drawing up 
the transparency framework of the measures and support post-2020. The APA 
informal work group on transparency addressed the points and the information 
sources that the framework must include. Prior to the upcoming sessions, there 
will be submissions, summaries and technical notes followed by round tables and 
targeted subjects (see Section I.12 as well). The next round table420 on this subject, 
held under the auspices of the 4th APA session at COP23 will address: (i) the 
transparency of the support provided and received (4 November 2017) and the review 
of technical experts and the multilateral assessment of progress based on facilitation; 
(ii) for both of these, emphasis on the connection between the transparency of the 
support and the transparency of mitigation and adaptation action (this subject 
will be addressed by a specific point on 5 November 2017).
• The 2018 Facilitative Dialogue
Greater clarity was noted on the preparation for the 2018 Facilitative Dialogue, 
which must take stock of the progress collectively made on the Paris Agreement 
objective concerning long-term emissions, and inform the preparation of the NDCs. 
The Presidencies of COP22 and COP23 were tasked with conducting consultation 
on planning this dialogue and reporting on it at COP23. The target of limiting the 
temperature rise to well below 2 °C, and to strive to limit it to 1.5 °C, is asserted. 
Lastly, note that the Facilitative Dialogue will incorporate the integration of the 
elements of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on the impacts 
of limiting the temperature to 1.5°C.
• The global stocktake from 2023 
The Parties have not yet agreed on the points to consider in the Global Stocktake, 
and prior to the next session, the Parties will send their submissions with targeted 
comments on the possible elements of an outline to identify the sources of contri-
butions and to draw up the modalities of the Global Stocktake, mentioning the 
viewpoint of the Parties in the informal note of the co-facilitators, as appropriate. 
The points included in these submissions will be discussed in a round table prior 
to the negotiation session. Progress on structuring the 2018 Facilitative Dialogue 
could help the Parties on going forward with the agenda item.
• Long-term climate financing
The secretariat was asked to compile and synthesize the biennial communications 
of developed country Parties on their updated strategies and approaches aiming to 
increase climate action funding between 2014 and 2020. The Parties also decided 
that the in-session workshops on long-term climate finance planned for 2017 and 
2018, in order to increase financing devoted to mitigation and adaptation, will 
deal with the experiences and lessons from formulating projects and programmes 
420. FCCC/APA/2017/2.
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based on the needs defined in the frameworks in the dynamic of processes in the 
countries, on the role of policies and conditions conducive to financing mitigation 
and adaptation, and on facilitating enhanced access.
• Links between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism 
of the Convention
Additional discussion on this COP22 agenda item was postponed to COP24. 
However, recommendations were made for the Climate Technology Centre and 
Network (CTCN) and Green Climate Fund (GCF) in order to facilitate the fund-
ing of technology action plans resulting from assessments of technological needs 
of developing countries. 
Although much technical progress was noted, for the negotiations to go forward 
and to comply with the goal of finalising the “Manual” of the Paris Agreement 
procedures in 2018, to sustain the momentum that has been observed since Paris. 
This momentum was particularly consolidated by the Marrakech Proclamation for 
Climate Action421, adopted at COP22, which reasserts the commitment of the 
States Parties to continue the implementation of the set targets, because reaching 
the targets requires strong political will.
Sectoral approaches
The Bali Action Plan422 referred to cooperative sectoral approaches and specific 
sectoral actions to strengthen mitigation after the first commitment period of the 
Kyoto Protocol. This brought a lot of hope for the effective implementation of 
sectoral approaches in the Convention. Unfortunately, the negotiations have never 
resulted in consensus, due to the opposition in principle between developed countries 
and developing countries. Developed countries consider that the implementation 
of these approaches should not result in mitigation commitments for them, which 
thus questions the principle of common but differentiated responsibility of the 
Convention.
Contrary to the stipulations of the Kyoto Protocol, currently all the Parties to 
the Paris Agreement must submit an NDC; nearly all of these NDCs have a mitigation 
component. Certain NDCs have an adaptation component based on international 
cooperation. Furthermore, international cooperation in mitigation among the 
Parties to implement their NDCs is authorised, and the Paris Agreement and the 
decision that accompanies it recognises and encourages the efforts deployed by all 
non-party entities in order to confront and respond to climate change.
421. http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/application/pdf/marrakech_
action_proclamation.pdf
422. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1.
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Already, since Lima, the UNFCCC tried to give more make cooperative sectoral 
actions more visible, particularly those of non-State actors, by inviting them to 
take stock of these efforts via the portal of non-State actors for climate action.423 
COP21 in Paris strengthened this phenomenon by inviting non-State parties to 
increase their efforts424 and support measures meant to reduce emissions and/or 
strengthen the resilience and reduce vulnerability to the adverse consequences of 
climate change.
Currently over 220 climate change initiatives have been launched.425 Most of 
them use sectoral and sub-sectoral approaches, and involve non-State actors (see 
Section I.11 as well). Most of these initiatives are cooperative initiatives at the 
regional or global level. Furthermore, we have initiatives in all of the largest sectors, 
including transport, agriculture, forestry, waste, industry, energy (access to energy, 
renewable energy, energy efficiency) and adaptation, etc.
The main question is to determine the modalities for incorporating recorded 
outcomes in order to avoid double counting, beyond the potential domino effect 
of these results in terms of emissions reduction, improving the resilience of ecosystems 
and populations, and their contribution to climate finance. These provisions must 
be incorporated when drawing up modalities, procedures and directives relating to 
NDCs, market-based and non-market based mechanisms, implementation of the 
transparency framework and of the Global Stocktake, in particular.
Just one example is the significant progress made in one of the highest emitting 
sectors, civil aviation. Through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), 
this sector succeeded in implementing concrete measures for technological devel-
opment and regulatory standards at the international level. In 2016, ICAO set up 
regulations including a market mechanism, CORSIA426, to reduce its emissions 
and help to reach the ambitious targets that the Organisation and its members set 
for themselves for 2030.
The main issue is that the Parties to the Paris Agreement work for this new 
mechanism – similar to the mechanisms that will be established in other sectors 
– to be incorporated in the systems that will be established to ensure environmental 
integrity and sustainable development, and avoid double counting of emissions 
and funding.
423. NAZCA platform [online] http://climateaction.unfccc.int/.
424. Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 133-134.
425. 224 initiatives as at 3 October 2017 [online] http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/
index.php/
426. Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation; for further infor-
mation [online] https://www.icao.int/environmental-protection/Pages/market-based- 
measures.aspx
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I.7. Transfer of technologies
Context: the issue of technology in the climate  
negotiations
The importance of cooperation for adjusting, developing, applying and transferring, 
or access to environmentally sound technologies has been and remains one of the 
levers that the UNFCCC uses to reach its objectives.
Indeed after including specific Article in the Convention (Article 5 paras. 4 
and 5) and its Kyoto Protocol (Article 10), the subsequent decisions of the sessions 
of the Conference of the Parties (COP), after a broad consultation process, enabled 
the creation of the Technology Transfer Framework and the Expert Group on 
Technology Transfer (EGTT) in 2001.
Between 2001 and 2010, the activities conducted to implement this framework 
include the work of the Expert Group, planning meetings and workshops, elabo-
rating methodologies, and creating an information exchange centre on technology 
transfer. This framework has also developed strategies and assessed options to 
accelerate technology and long-term transfer427.
During this period, the GEF launched the Poznan Strategic Programme 
(PSP) to support technology needs assessments (TNAs), following Decision 4/
CP.13, in which the Parties asked the fund to step up the provision of funding to 
prepare a strategic program to acquire environmentally sound technologies. These 
evaluations must enable the identification of priority technologies for mitigation 
and adaptation, for the analysis of obstacles and the implementation of a favourable 
framework, and for working out technology action plans and project ideas.
At COP16 (Cancun in 2010), the assessment of the Technology Framework 
and PSP outcomes resulted in the finalisation of the EGTT mandate and the 
implementation of the Technology Mechanism, composed of the Technology 
Executive Committee (TEC) and the Climate Technology Centre and Network 
(CTCN).
The issue of technology and the Paris Agreement
The Paris Agreement states that “Parties share a long-term vision on the importance 
of fully realizing technology development and transfer in order to improve resilience to 
climate change and to reduce greenhouse gas emissions”428.
As the Parties recalled the need for enhanced action for technology development 
and transfer to implement the mitigation and adaptation measures planned in the 
Paris Agreement, the Parties decided to strengthen the Technology Mechanism, and 
asked the TEC and the CTCN to provide their support in applying the Agreement. 
427. FCCC/CP/2008/7/Add.1- Decision 1/CP.14.
428. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10, para. 1.
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A new Technology Framework responsible for giving general directives for the 
Technology Mechanism work was also created.
The Paris Agreement also particularly highlighted the promotion of innovation 
and financial support to developing countries for technology development and 
transfer at different stages of the technology cycle, and notes that this aspect will 
be incorporated in the Global Stocktake429 that the same Agreement provides for. 
Indeed, Decision 1/CP.21 provides for the enhancement and periodic assessment 
of the effectiveness and adequacy of the support provided to the Technology 
Mechanism430.
Within the framework of the Paris Agreement, COP21 also requested the 
TEC as well as the CTCN to commence new work on the following in particular431:
a. Technology research, development and transfer;
b. Developing and building up of endogenous capacities and technologies.
The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) was 
tasked with drawing up the technology framework introduced via the application 
of paragraph 4 of Article 10 of the Agreement. This framework should particularly 
facilitate:
a. The execution and updating of technological needs evaluations and enhanced 
implementation of their outcome, especially action plans and technology project 
ideas, by preparing projects acceptable to the funding institutions;
b. The provision of enhanced financial and technical support in implementing 
the outcome of technological needs evaluations;
c. The evaluation of technologies ready for transfer;
d. The introduction of more favourable conditions and the elimination of obstacles 
to developing and transferring socially- and environmentally-sound technologies.
Continuation of work, situation since COP21  
and on the run-up to COP23
At SBSTA44 in Bonn, the Parties recognised that the Technology Framework 
will need to be a strategic document that provides guidance for the Technology 
Mechanism, and that the work of the subsidiary body should consist of determining 
the functionalities, characteristics and content, including its objective, role and 
key themes.
SBSTA44 tasked the Convention Secretariat with preparing an information 
note on drawing up a table of the activities and initiatives for the development and 
transfer of climate technologies under and outside the Convention relevant to the 
429. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 14.
430. Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 66 and 69.
431. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 66.
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implementation of the Paris Agreement, including on the status of the implementation 
of the framework for meaningful and effective actions to enhance the implementa-
tion of Article 4, paragraph 5 (transfer from or access to environmentally sound 
technologies and knowledge of developed country Parties and other Parties in 
Annex II, of the Convention, as adopted by decision 4/CP.7 and enhanced by 
decision 3/CP.13432;
SBI44 noted that the scope of the periodic assessment of the Technology 
Mechanism referred to in paragraph 69 of decision 1/CP.21 would be based on the 
provisions of Article 10 of the Agreement, and would highlight the following 
points: 
a. Effectiveness of the support provided by the Technology Mechanisms for the 
implementation of the Agreement on issues relating to technology development 
and transfer;
b. Adequacy of the support provided by the Technology Mechanisms for the 
implementation of the Agreement on issues relating to technology development 
and transfer.
At the Marrakech conference, after intense discussions based on the information 
note that the Secretariat drew up on the activities and initiatives for climate transfer 
technologies under and outside the Convention related to the Paris Agreement433, 
as well as on the submissions received434, SBSTA45 agreed that the objective of this 
framework was as announced in paragraph 4 of Article 10 of the Paris Agreement.
It noted that the Technology Framework could have a major impact on 
enhancing the usefulness and effectiveness of the Technology Mechanism work, by 
incorporating the changes considered in the Paris Agreement, in compliance with 
paragraph 4 of Article 10, and the long-term vision for developing and transferring 
technologies, which is paragraph 1 of this same Article addresses.
SBSTA45 decided that the main initial themes for the technology framework 
would be the following435: 
a. Innovation;
b. Implementation;
c. Enabling environments and capacity-building;
d. Collaboration and stakeholder engagement;
e. Support.
Regarding the review of the scope and modalities of the periodic assessment 
of the Technology Mechanism for the implementation of the Paris Agreement, no 
progress was noted at SBSTA45 in Marrakech.
432. FCCC/SBSTA/2016/L.8.
433. FCCC/SBSTA/2016/INF.9 and Corr.1.
434. FCCC/SBSTA/2016/MISC.4.
435. FCCC/SBSTA/2016/4. paras. 24-31.
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At the same time, dialogue on the relationships between the TEC, CTCN and 
the entities tasked with the operation of the financial mechanism of the Convention, 
to detail them further, was held at COP22, in accordance with Decision 13/
CP.21436, para. 8. 
It was observed that the Green Climate Fund (GCF) has made significant 
progress in applying this Decisions, by providing support to facilitate access to 
environmentally sound technologies in developing country Parties and to commence 
collaborative research and development work in order to enable developing country 
Parties to strengthen their mitigation and adaptation actions.437 
The designated national authorities and the focal points for the GCF were 
invited to make good use of the assistance offered under the readiness and preparatory 
support programme, particularly to conduct technology needs assessments and to 
draw up technology action plans.
Finally, during the last subsidiary body session in May 2017 in Bonn, the 
SBSTA46 conclusions requested438 the Secretariat to prepare a technical document 
on the experience, lessons learned and best practices in the running of reviews of 
various provisions of the Convention and of the Kyoto Protocol that are relevant 
for the periodic assessment, including a list of these reviews.
The issues related to drawing up a scope and modalities for periodic assessment 
must continue, incorporating the decisions and information contained in the 
technical document that the Secretariat is to prepare.
Regarding the implementation of the Technology Framework, the Parties 
highlighted the multisectoral role of technology and of the technology framework 
in achieving the targets of the Paris Agreement, and the important of involving the 
private and public sectors439.
Important discussions, often with diverging views, were held on the principles 
and potential structure of the Technology Framework; the functions of the Technology 
Mechanism; flexibility for the updates of the Technology Framework; the linkages 
between the Framework and other processes of the Paris Agreement, as well as between 
the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism; and the harmonisation 
of the Technology Framework with the periodic assessment of the Technology 
Framework with the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism.
In its conclusions440, SBSTA46 decided that:
• the principles of the Technology Framework, which are coherence, inclusiveness, 
result-oriented approach, transformational approach and transparency, should 
guide the Technology Mechanism in implementing the Paris Agreement;
436. Decision 13/CP.21 – Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial 
Mechanism of the Convention.
437. Decision B.14/02 of the Green Climate Fund Board [online] http://www.greenclimate.fund/ 
boardroom/board-meetings/documents
438. FCCC/SBI/2017/L.4.
439. IISD, 2017d, p. 16.
440. FCCC/SBSTA/2017/L.10.
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• the technology framework should strengthen the Technology Mechanism and 
the involvement of relevant stakeholders in accordance with their respective 
roles in achieving the transformative changes envisioned in the Paris Agreement, 
taking into account the initial key themes agreed at SBSTA45 and the technol-
ogy cycle;
• the possible headings of the Technology Framework include the objective, 
principles and key themes, and the continuing its review of this issue at 
SBSTA47, incorporating the progress made at SBSTA45 and at this session.
In this context, the TEC and the CTCN were invited to provide at SBSTA47 
information on activities that have been or are currently being undertaken, which 
are relevant for the implementation of the Paris Agreement, taking into account 
the key themes and their relation to the technology cycle, as well as additional 
activities that the TEC and the CTCN, subject to available resources, could 
undertake within their respective mandates and functions, individually or jointly, 
to implement the Paris Agreement.
We observe that the processing of the main technology development and 
transfer themes that the Paris Agreement had addressed is becoming very coherent. 
These themes are:
• Enhancing the Technology Mechanism;
• Assessment of the Technology Mechanism; and
• The establishment of MRV provisions.
This is encouraged by the fact that even if these themes are discussed by 
different bodies, the facilitators are more often than not the same, and most of the 
negotiators, which represent the different Parties, have a great deal of experiences 
in the discussion subjects, and many of them have already held positions in 
Convention bodies dealing with technology.
Given the experience acquired with previous bodies such as the EGTT, PSP 
and the former Technology Framework, linked to important work that is underway 
with the TEC, CTCN, and GCF, and making relevant provisions provided in the 
Paris Agreement, could make it possible to make an effective technological contri-
bution to reach the short-, medium- and long-term targets. 
I.8. Capacity building
Context: the issue of capacity-building in international 
climate action 
In the context of the international climate action, capacity-building initiatives are 
based on the observation that developing countries, as well as so-called economies 
in transition will not be able to take ambitious mitigation or adaptation actions 
if the gaps and shortfalls identified as constraints to their formulation and 
implementation;
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What is capacity building?
Combating climate change in the long run requires considerable effort. For this 
fight, not all countries have the capacity, knowledge, tools, public support, scientific 
expertise, and political know-how. In this sense, capacity building consists of 
improving the capacity of individuals, organisations and institutions in developing 
countries and in countries with economies in transition in order to identify, plan 
and implement mitigation measures or low greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
development strategies, or strategies for climate change adaptation.
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
capacity building is planned for at least three levels: individuals, institutional and 
systemic.
In the context of the climate change negotiations, the roots of capacity building 
are in Article 6 of the Convention441, which aims to educate and raise the awareness 
of the public. Indeed, the provisions of this Article442 provide for:
• in paragraph a(iv) – training of scientific, technical and managerial personnel;
• in paragraph b – using cooperation to reach the objectives referred to in the 
Article and in virtue of the Convention.
Since the adoption of the Convention, capacity building has been an integral 
part of the negotiation process. In addition to being addressed implicitly and 
transversally through several other subjects, it was also a negotiation topic in and 
of itself. Capacity building was addressed in particular with the preparation of 
national communications, GHG inventories, technology transfer and adaptation. 
The discussions throughout the many negotiation rounds resulted in the imple-
mentation of a capacity building framework which has evolved into its present 
form (see the below box entitles “The main capacity-building frameworks”). 
Beyond these introductory points, the present section present a brief history 
of the negotiations in terms of capacity building in virtue of the Convention, the 
Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, scoring a point with the most recent 
discussion held at the 22nd session of the Conference of the Parties (COP22 in 
Marrakech in November 2016) and at the 46th sessions of the subsidiary bodies 
(in Bonn in May 2017), followed by an overview of the COP23 stakes, held from 
6 to 17 November in Bonn (in Germany). 
441. Convention text – official English version [online] http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_
and_support/cooperation_with_international_organizations/application/pdf/convfr.pdf 
442. Based, furthermore, on the “Commitments” of the Parties in virtue of Article 4, 
paragraph 1 (i) of the Convention, indicating that the Parties “promote and cooperate 
in education, training and public awareness related to climate change and encourage the 
widest participation in this process, including that of non-governmental organizations”.
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Brief history of the capacity-building negotiations under 
the Convention.
Understand the role of “capacity building”  
in the context of the international climate negotiations
The very first capacity building discussions were launched at the 10th session of 
the subsidiary bodies of the UNFCCC. The Africa Group of negotiators, China 
and the Philippines mentioned it, and at the end of the discussions, the Parties 
expressed that they would like to have a capacity building framework for developing 
countries implemented within an intergovernmental process, which should aim to 
ensure coordination among various ongoing initiatives, and also include a financial 
mechanism. 
Throughout the years, the negotiations acknowledge the constraints that devel-
oping countries face in terms of capacity building, implementing the objectives 
of the Convention, and in particular, the needs of the least developed countries 
(LDCs), small island states (AOSIS) and African countries. Furthermore, the nego-
tiations emphasised that the countries themselves must conduct the capacity 
building, to better reflect national priorities and initiatives. 
With its Decision 2/CP.7 for developing countries, and Decision 3/CP.7 for 
so-called economies in transition, COP7 (in Marrakech in 2001) established a 
capacity building framework aiming to guide activities relating to the Convention, 
and their effective participation in the Kyoto Protocol. These decisions identified 
the principles that should underpin the capacity building actions piloted by the 
countries. In particular, these principles aim to fulfil the specific needs and conditions 
that prevail in developing countries, while reflecting their national sustainable 
development strategies, priorities and initiatives. 
These decisions highlighted that capacity building activities should develop 
synergies between the Convention and other multilateral environmental agreements. 
Furthermore, the decisions highlighted that the implementation of this framework 
must incorporate the circumstances specific to LDCs and SIDS. With the adoption 
of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, the capacity building framework of the Convention 
becomes applicable to the Kyoto Protocol as well443. This framework was examine 
four times by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, in 2004, 2007, 2013 and 
2016.
An important milestone was reached at COP17 (in Durban in 2011), when 
the Parties entrusted the SBI with the task of further enhancing “the monitoring 
and review of the effectiveness of capacity-building by organizing an annual in-session 
Durban Forum for in-depth discussion on capacity-building with the participation of 
Parties, representatives of the relevant bodies established under the Convention [...] 
443. Decision 29/CMP.1 and Decision 30/CMP.1.
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with a view to sharing their experiences and exchanging ideas, best practices and lessons 
learned regarding the implementation of capacity-building activities”444. The Durban 
Forum on Capacity-Building has met five times since May 2012. 
Capacity-building in the context of the Paris Agreement
In 2015, COP21 concluded with the adoption of the Paris Agreement, whose 
Article 11 highlights the importance of strengthening the capacity of developing 
country Parties. The idea is to allow them to take effective climate change actions, 
particularly by implementing adaptation and mitigation measures, in order to 
facilitate technology development, dissemination and deployment, access to climate 
financing, relevant aspects of public awareness, education and training, and rapid, 
precise and transparent communication of information. Furthermore, Article 11 
emphasises the cooperation that is required to do this. It thus states that all Parties 
must cooperate together to strengthen the capacity of developing country Parties 
to implement the Paris Agreement. The developed countries should enhance their 
support for capacity-building measures in the developing countries. 
The Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB) was set up to fill the cur-
rent and emerging gaps and needs in the implementation of capacity building in 
developing country Parties and in the improvement of capacity building efforts, 
including the coherence and coordination in capacity building in virtue of the 
Convention. Decision 1/CP.21445 requested the SBI to detail the mandate of the 
PCCB for the third comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity- 
building framework for developing countries, in order to recommend a draft decision 
in this issue, for COP22 to consider and adopt.
The main capacity-building frameworks in virtue  
of the Convention ... up through the Paris Agreement
Various debates on capacity-building resulted in the implementation of a capacity- 
building framework whose current form is a result of the main steps presented 
afterwards.
By virtue of the Convention 
In 2001, the Parties adopted two capacity-building frameworks in virtue of the 
Convention, which fulfil the needs, conditions and priorities of two key groups: 
developing countries and countries with economies in transition. These frame-
work provide a set of fundamental principles and approaches for capacity-building: 
a process that involves “learning by doing”, based on existing activities. These 
framework also contain a list of priority areas of action in terms of capacity- 
building, including specific needs of LDCs, SIDS and African countries. They 
reaffirm that capacity-building is essential to allow these countries to implement 
the objective of the Convention. 
444. Decision 2/CP.17, para. 144; see FCCC/SBI/2012/22 as well.
445. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 76.
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The two frameworks offer an approach for capacity-building activities such as 
developing and strengthening and skills and knowledge, as well as the possibility 
for the stakeholders and organisations to share their experiences and raise their 
awareness to allow them to more fully participate in the entire climate change 
process. These frameworks also provide advice on support from financial and 
technical resources that the Global Environment Facility (GEF), bilateral and 
multilateral bodies, and other intergovernmental organisations. According to the 
plan of the frameworks, developing countries and countries with economies in 
transition provide information on their specific priorities and needs via national 
communications and submissions, while encouraging the cooperation and partici-
pation of stakeholders.
Entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol 
In 2005, the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol decided that the framework for  
capacity-building under the auspices of the Convention were also applicable to 
the implementation of the Protocol. They approved the frameworks for guiding 
capacity-building activities under the Kyoto Protocol framework in developing 
countries and countries with economies in transition.
By virtue of the Paris Agreement 
The Paris Agreement confirms the aforementioned approaches and fundamental 
principles for capacity-building. It requests all Parties to cooperate in capacity- 
building in developing countries, to implement the Agreement and call on developed 
Parties countries to strengthen support for capacity-building actions in these 
countries. The Parties asked the SBI to supervise the work of the PCCB. It is 
recognised that making the Paris Agreement operational requires building  
capacity, especially in the most vulnerable countries. It is also recognised that 
capacity-building requires mobilising resources. 
Decision 1/CP.21 also implemented a Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency 
(CBIT)446 in 2015 (see Section I.12 as well.). This initiative will make it possible 
to build institutional capacities and techniques to help developing country Parties 
to fulfil the heightened transparency requirements of the Paris Agreement, in 
virtue of its Article 13. The GEF supports the operation of the CBIT in partnership 
with 11 donor countries.
Continuation of negotiations, the situation since 
COP21 in the run-up to COP23
After the PCCB was set up in virtue of COP21, it was expected that COP22 at 
Marrakech would be the occasion conduct an initial assessment of the situation, 
in particular to draw up its mandate. As such, the proceedings on the PCCB took 
place via the SBI sessions, which agreed in its conclusions that:
• The priority area for the PCCB in 2017 is capacity-building to implement 
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement; 
• The representatives of the following operational activities of the financial mecha-
nism and other bodies that have been composed, in virtue of the Convention, 
were invited to attend the first PCCB meeting, jointly organised with the 
446. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 84.
113
Guide to the Negotiations - UNFCCC (COP23) - OIF/IFDD, 2017
46th session of subsidiary bodies (in May 2017); the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF); Green Climate Fund (GCF); Adaptation Committee; Least 
Developed Country Expert Group; Standing Committee for Finance (SCF); 
Technology Executive Committee (TEC);
• The representatives of other bodies created in virtue of the Convention and 
the operational entities of the financial mechanism were asked to identify the 
representatives in order to work together, as necessary, on the specific activities 
related to the work of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB). 
The SBI particularly encouraged a representative of the CTCN to attend the 
first PCCB meeting;
• Furthermore, the SBI recommended a decision to COPfor consideration and 
adoption. 
At the end of COP22, the mandate of the PCCB was adopted, and requested 
the Committee to specify and adopt itss modalities and procedures for operation at 
its 1st meeting, which as held at the 46th subsidiary body session (in May 2017)447. 
At its inaugural meeting, the PCCB, composed of twelve members, was to set the 
guidance of its work programme, and begin identifying capacity-building priorities 
for the full and successful implementation of NDCs in developing countries. The 
Committee also needed to encourage global dialogue amongst all actors that are 
currently working to build the capacities of developing countries, so that they take 
measures to combat climate change. The objective of this dialogue is to rationalise 
and coordinate these efforts, make them more effective, and to avoid duplication 
of actions.
Work programme of the Paris  
Committee on Capacity-Building (PCCB)
The PCCB is responsible for supervising a workplan covering the 2016-2020 
period, which includes the below areas:
• Strengthen synergies through cooperation and avoiding duplication amongst 
bodies involved in capacity-building;
• Inventory the gaps, needs and opportunities to strengthen capacities;
• Disseminate capacity-building tools and methods;
• Encourage cooperation at a levels, from the international to the local level;
• Inventory best practices, difficulties, experiences and lessons;
• Examine how developing countries can create and maintain capacity throughout 
time and space;
• Encourage coordination, collaboration and coherence between processes,  
initiative and strategies for capacity-building;
• Give the secretariat directives on updating and developing the online portal.
447. Decision 9/CP.22 , Decision 16/CP.22 and Decision 6/CP.12.
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The report of the first PCCB meeting448, which was held in Bonn from 11 to 
13 May 2017, shows the progress that the PCCB made during this meeting. The 
following are targeted: the adoption of its working modalities and procedures, and 
the initial implementation efforts of the first phase of its work programme covering 
2017-2019, including in relation with the development of a web portal with the 
support of the secretariat; strengthen synergies with the constituted bodies; the 
modalities of execution, in view of a recommendation on the main theme for 2017; 
as well as the preparation of an annual technical progress report for consideration 
at COP23. In accordance with this last point, COP23 in Bonn is responsible for 
reviewing the annual technical progress report of the PCCB. More generally, 
COP23 should make it possible to continue work aiming to make the Paris Agreement 
objectives operational, particularly via capacity-building, which is henceforth an 
objective in itself, considered as essential for several reasons.
I.9. financing questions 
Climate financing and the COP under the fiji presidency
As for each Conference of Parties (COP), the funding devoted to combating climate 
change, for mitigation and adaptation, is the main stake, and is at the very core of 
the global system for maintaining the temperature rise well below 2 °C compared 
to pre-industrial levels by 2100, and for responding to the needs of an overall 
adaptation objective whose quantitative and qualitative outlines and limits are yet 
to be determined. 
The needs, necessities, mobilisations, availabilities, flow and actors in climate 
financing are included, overall, in a rather complex and diverse structure, as the 
World Resources Institute (WRI) indicated in a recent publication449. This illus-
trates all the funds and sources of finance, and provides a more overall view of the 
architecture of global climate finance450. 
At the twenty-third COP  session (COP23), which will be held in Bonn 
in November 2017, under the Presidency of Fiji, climate financing is a key issue. 
This involves continuing the regular reporting activities for various funding and 
committees, and continuing the reflection on the relevant directives and recom-
mendations that will be receives from States Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to the Kyoto Protocol, and to the 
Paris Agreement. This also involves consolidating the preparation of rules and 
procedures for the implementation of the provisions of the Paris Agreement and 
its accompanying Decision, particularly regarding the mobilisation, provision and 
accounting and transparency in terms of financing.
448. PCCB/2017/1/10 [online] http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/capacity_
building/application/pdf/pccb_1_meeting_report.pdf
449. WRI, 2017.
450. Global architecture of climate finance [online] http://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/
Funds_flowchart_v2.png
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In 2017 and 2018, two activities that are important for the ambition to 
mobilise new and additional financial resources, via:
• the seventh replenishment of the resources of the Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) before the end of 2017; and
• the first constitution of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) during 2018.
At the time that this guide was drawn up, the calendar for the first GEF activity 
is clear and has been implemented properly. Regarding the second GEF activity, 
the decision on the schedule and the modalities of the first replenishment has not 
been made by the GEF Council. These two activities are also forums for negotiations 
on the UNFCCC process, and must fulfil the expectations and hopes of developing 
countries in effectively combating the effects and consequences of climate change. 
Since COP22 in Marrakech (in Morocco) in November 2016, where major 
progress was made on climate financing issues (summarised in each subchapter 
below), it has become extremely urgent to obtain concrete, realistic and more 
ambitious results on financial issues, to support the effective implementation of 
the Paris Agreement, which entered into force early.
long-term climate financing
Since the eighteenth COP  session (COP18) of the UNFCCC, the issue of 
long-term financing is one of the most important aspects of the negotiations on 
climate financing. This is mainly about negotiating a work programme that offers 
predictability and the mobilisation of innovative sources for climate financing in 
the long-term (between 2020 and 2030, for example), from developed countries 
and other voluntary donors to benefit developing countries – especially the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs), Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the 
African Countries.
At the Marrakech Conference, the Parties highlighted the below points451: 
• The progress made by developed countries in mobilising 100 billion US dollars 
(UDS) per year until 2020, thus avoiding a financing gap for the pre-2020 
period;
• The need to consider increasing adaptation financing from developed countries, 
ensuring that this is balanced with mitigation funding;
• The Secretariat was asked to compile and synthesize the biennial communications 
of developed country Parties on their updated strategies and approaches aiming 
to increase climate action funding between 2014 and 2020; 
• For developing countries Parties that have not done so yet, the submission of 
their biennial updated reports (BURs);
451. IISD, 2016i.
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• The organisation by the secretariat of workshops with balanced representation 
(developed countries, developing countries, public/private sectors ...) during 
the 2017-2018 negotiation sessions, mainly on: 
 – the experiences and lessons to learned from formulating projects and 
programmes based on the needs specified in the country-driven processes;
 – on the role of policies and conditions to finance mitigation and adaptation; 
 – on facilitating strengthened access.
• Evaluating financing needs for adaptation in developing countries which can 
lead to an increase in financial resources, which should consider the Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDCs), the communications on adaptation, as 
well as the role that the private sector could play; 
• Access to adaptation financing remains difficult for developing countries, 
especially for LDCs, SIDS and African Countries, which requires work to 
simplify the procedures of the concerned countries and institutions; 
• The need to strengthen national public funding management systems to help 
countries to effectively manage, monitor and control climate financing.
This process is conducted mainly based on holding workshops on long-term 
financing, during the negotiation sessions. Its summaries and report that the secre-
tariat of the UNFCCC draws up are considered and used for the negotiations. 
The objectives of the workshops on Long-Term Financing
In accordance with Decision 7/CP.22, the workshop session on long-term climate 
financing in 2017 and 2018, to step up climate financing for mitigation and adap-
tation, will be on the experiences and lessons learned. The main points will be:
• to articulate and convey the needs identified in the country-driven process in 
projects and programmes;
• the role of policies and environments that promote mitigation and adaptation 
financing;
• to facilitated improved access;
• The main objective of the workshops during the long-term financing workshop 
in 2017 and 2018 is to facilitate technical and concrete discussions on the 
aforementioned questions. The conclusions will be examined by the COP.  
The results will also inform the deliberations of the high-level ministerial dialogue 
at COP24 in 2018.
In addition to reaching the broadest aforementioned objective, the secondary 
objectives of the workshop are to:
• obtain a better understanding to know how climate financing needs identified 
and assessed by developing countries can be articulated and transformed into 
projects and programmes, particularly through international cooperation;
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• identify the stages and actions that can be taken in order to improve access 
to climate finance;
• have a clearer idea of the policy and the regulatory framework required to 
step up climate finance.
The conclusions of the workshop held at the 46th session of subsidiary bodies 
on consolidating climate finance needs in developing countries, and converting 
them into projects and programmes are recorded in a summary drawn up by 
the UNFCCC secretariat452.
In Bonn, in November 2017, at the Fijian COP, developing countries will 
emphasise at least two points in the long-term climate financing negotiations: 
• The new climate finance objective, with a minimum threshold of 100 billion 
US USD;
• A long-term work programme that can leverage the potential for mobilisation, 
innovation and the adequacy of climate finance453. 
Developed countries will continue to want to deepen the understanding of 
the needs, uses, and aspects of transparency and use of this climate finance.
The Standing Committee for finance (SCf)
One of the most important accomplishments of the SCF during 2016 was the 
2016 biennial assessment454 which took stock of climate financial flows, dealing in 
particular with:
• Methodological aspects relating to Measuring, Reporting and Verification 
(MRV)455 of public and private climate change action funding; 
• Climate financial flows during the 2013-2014 period; 
• And, regarding climate financial flows, offering information concerning certain 
topics of central interest in the context of the UNFCCC negotiations, including 
support for adaptation and mitigation, the levels of funding by regions, and 
the way in which funding is provided. 
452. Available at the below address [online] https://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_support/
financial_mechanism/long-term_finance/application/pdf/ltf_2017_short_summary_
note.pdf
453. As a continuation of the programme closed at COP19 in Warsaw.
454. SCF biennial assessment report [online]
http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/standing_
committee/application/pdf/2016_ba_technical_report.pdf
455. Measuring, Reporting and Verification.
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The Standing Committee for Finance (SCF)
At COP17, the UNFCCC Party States decided that the SCF should assist the 
COP in performing its duties with regard to the Financial Mechanism of the 
Convention:
• by proposing guidelines for its bodies;
• by improving the consistency and the operational nature of the components 
of the Financial mechanism (funds)456;
• by offering guideline proposals to the COP for its Financial mechanism’s  
operational bodies457.
During COP22, negotiations resulted in the following conclusions: 
• Notes were taken on the 2016 biennial assessment, taking stock of climate 
financial flows; 
• A request was made to the SCF, as part of its role regarding the MRV of support 
and following its 2017 working plan, to cooperate with the participating parties 
and qualified experts, and to take into consideration the activities currently 
carried out as part of the Convention and additional measures expected under 
the Paris Agreement; 
• Notes were taken on the 2016 SCF forum and on its report on the issue of 
financial instruments that account for the risks of loss and damage associated 
with adverse effects of climate change; 
• The SCF was invited to prepare its 2017 forum;
• The SCF integrated funding relating to forests into its 2017 working plan. 
SCF Forum
For its annual forum, the SCF chose the following as the theme for its 2017 
Forum: Mobilizing finance for climate-resilient infrastructure, during its fifteenth 
meeting, held in March 2017. This forum was held on 6 and 7 September 2017 
in Rabat (Morocco)458. The Committee also suspended the theme of its 2018 
forum during its meeting held between 18 and 21 September 2017 in Bonn 
(Germany).
456. Decision 2/CP.17, para. 121 subpara. (c).
457. FCCC/CP/2014/5, para. 10.
458. The information documents, presentation material and other relevant information are 
available on the SCF website at the following address: http://unfccc.int/7552.php
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In preparation for the COP23 negotiations, the SCF has worked on various 
issues and has drafted its annual report to the Conference, outlining the main points 
to be negotiated459 and concluded during the Fijian COP. These are summarised 
as follows: 
• Update guidelines for the sixth review of the Financial Mechanism of the 
Convention, including expert input, with a view to the review being finalized 
by COP23; 
• Finalise the draft guidance to the operating entities460 of the Financial Mechanism 
of the Convention; 
• Consider the undertaking of the SCF co-chairs on the topic of the operational 
framework for synergy and consistency within the Green Climate Fund (GCF);
• Finalise and present the self-assessment report461 on the functions of the SCF, 
in order to suggest recommendations to the COP to improve its efficacy and 
efficiency. This topic will be considered, in the first instance, by the Subsidiary 
Body for Implementation (SBI), which will propose draft conclusions to the 
COP; 
• Continue to consider the MRV of the support beyond the biennial assessment 
and general overview of the climate finance flows. In this regard, the SCF has 
agreed to begin consultations with the Chairperson of the Subsidiary Body 
for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Co-chairs of the 
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA), with the prospect of 
technically contributing to the ongoing work within these two bodies on the 
transparency of financial support provided to developing countries, in accor-
dance with provisions made by Article 9 paragraph 7 of the Paris Agreement;
• Conclude the work plan for its 2018 biennial assessment and the technical 
work that the SCF must carry out by its first meeting in 2018;
• SCF report to COP23. 
Green Climate fund (GCf)
At each COP, the GCF Council is required to present its annual report and to 
receive guidelines for the continuation of its subsequent actions and activities. For 
results linked to COP22, the following is required of the GCF: 
• The continuation of the implementation of its initial strategic plan, and the 
development of investments in ambitious climate change actions stimulated 
by the countries; 
459. Annotated agenda from the sixteenth meeting of the SCF [online] 
https://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/standing_
committee/application/pdf/annotated_provisional_agenda_scf_16.pdf
460. The operational entities of the Convention and its facilities are: the Green Climate 
Fund, the Global Environment Facility, the Least Developed Countries Fund, the 
Special Climate Change Fund and the Adaptation Fund.
461. SCF Self-Assessment Report: Document SCF/2017/16/7.
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• The finalisation as soon as possible of work related to the COP guidelines on 
planned funding for the forests; 
• The request to Parties that have announced contributions as part of the initial 
GCF resource mobilisation process but that have not yet confirmed through 
contribution arrangements or agreements in due form to do so as quickly as 
possible;
• The simplification of access processes for GCF resources for developing countries, 
including for preparatory actions; 
• The continuation of efforts to address the absence of signed bilateral agreements 
on privileges and immunities for the secretariat and the council members in 
order for the GCF to undertake its activities;
• The increase in supply of resources by finding solutions to the difficulties 
that delay the implementation of projects that have been approved by the 
Council, including the conclusion of accreditation framework agreements 
and activity funding agreements; 
• The development of forms of activity support, enabling effective participation 
of the private sector in LDCs and SIDS, and to find possibilities to involve 
the private sector, more specifically local participants, in adaptation measures 
on a national, regional and international level; 
• The invitation of national authorities appointed by the GCF and national focal 
points of the GCF to use the facility of the Green Climate Fund Readiness 
and Preparatory Support Programme, and to collaborate with accredited bodies 
to draft quality adaptation and mitigation project/programme proposals in 
developing countries; 
• The renewal of the request addressed to the Council to approve the provisions 
related to the first formal GCF resource replenishment process, to take place 
in 2018.
The GCF in 2017
The GCF has continued its efforts to support countries in accessing its resources, 
particularly through its preparatory bodies, but also with regard to the approval 
of public and private sector projects and programmes. 
This year has been defined by a session of the GCF Council, held in July 2017, 
specifically focused on reducing the difficulties linked to rules and procedures, 
in order to enable a more objective endorsement of projects, to give initiatives 
from countries more of a chance of succeeding and to better and further regulate 
issues linked to risk management, country appropriation and GCF body accredi-
tation. On the same date, the level of funding award by the GCF was up to USD 
2.2 billion for a total of 43 projects462.
462. To consult the updated GCF portfolio, see [online] http://www.greenclimate.fund/
what-we-do/portfolio-dashboard.
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It also saw a large number of accreditation agreements signed by the bodies, in 
particular international bodies, and also the first funding agreements for activities 
that benefit developing countries. 
Finally, it was during 2017 that the first actual disbursements for projects funded 
by the GCF took place. The disbursements for preparatory activities began  
long before. The 18th meeting of the GCF Council is planned to take place in 
October 2017463. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that in 2016 and 2017, the GCF was criticized for 
several of its guidelines, including: (i) its choice to not support high volume projects, 
thus limiting access to funds for the least developed countries; (ii) partnering 
with funding institutes that still invest in fossil fuels; (iii) offering unrealistic  
expectations with regard to the state of development of projects that it seeks 
to finance464; (iv) internal procedural problems resulting in excessive delays465.
Main results of the 18th meeting of the GCF Council
Note lastly that the 18th meeting of the GCF Council was held on 30 Septem-
ber-2 October 2017 in Cairo, Egypt466. Attended by its 24 members, with a 
balanced representation by developing and developed countries, the Council 
ended by making major decisions, including:
• The approval of eleven new projects and programmes to a value of USD 
392.68 million, taking the number of approved projects to 54 for a global total 
of USD 2.59 billion financing by GFC;
• The decision to simplify project and programme approval procedures for certain 
small activities through a pilot scheme allocated USD 80 million over two years;
• The adoption of the decision relating to the request for payments based on 
the results of proposals for REDD+, to reduce deforestation;
• The approval for additional financing of USD 50 million for some ten national 
adaptation plans falling within the country preparation support programme 
(readiness; 
• The accreditation of five new entities, all with direct access, taking to 59 the 
number of GFC-accredited entities.
This meeting of the GFC Council also recorded the participation of observers 
as representatives of designated national authorities, civil society and private 
sector organisations, accredited entities and implementation partners.
It was then decided that the annual election of the new GFC joint Chairmen  
for the next financial year would be held from 1 January 2018, whilst awaiting 
the conclusions and the elections of new members to the GFC Council by the 
23rd Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change. The next meeting of the GFC Council (19th meeting) is 
scheduled to be held in Songdo, Republic of Korea, on 27 February-1 March 2018.
463. GCF/notif/2017/06 [online] http://www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/24922/ 
GCF_notif_2017_06_-_Eighteenth_Meeting_of_the_Board.pdf/9e17731e-857e-
42c8-9a35-3926f49be054
464. World Finance, 2016.
465. Eckstein, 2017.
466. http://www.greenclimate.fund/-/gcf-approves-11-projects-at-its-final-board-meeting-
of-the-year
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During the Fijian COP, in Bonn in November 2017, the Party States will 
have to negotiate the contents of the annual report submitted by the GCF Council, 
and will notably have to determine: 
• The COP directives and guidelines to the GCF for the continuation of devel-
opment and improvement or update of GCF procedural rules;
• The process launch of the first GCF resource replenishment, with the aim of 
finalising it in 2018; 
• The enhancement of direct access to GCF resources; 
• The promotion of the most equal geographical division of GCF financial 
resources possible, including those that benefit LDCs, SIDS and African 
countries, guaranteeing a fair balance between funding mitigation and adap-
tation activities; 
• The appeal to contributing and donor countries to disburse the rest of the 
amounts promised to the GCF; 
• The request to accredited bodies and other GCF partnerships to work further 
and better to simplify procedures and to encourage the effective implementation 
of GCF support projects and programmes for countries, regions, territories, etc.;
• Finally, the promotion and preparatory support for the involvement of the 
private sector in GCF activities, in order to raise innovative and additional 
funds from operators and private businesses. 
Global environment facility (Gef)
As one of the operational entities of the UNFCCC and its facilities, the GEF 
presents its annual report on the issues of climate funding that it has implemented 
under the guidelines received at the last COP. The main conclusions of COP22 
are summarised as follows:
• The seventh replenishment of GEF resources must take into account the 
lessons from previous cycles and also from the Paris Agreement and its early 
entry into force; 
• The commitment of developed countries and the invitation of other countries 
that disburse voluntary contributions to the GEF, to guarantee a seventh period 
of the most successful and ambitious resource replenishment possible in order 
to cater to an effective implementation of the Paris Agreement; 
• The continuation of information supply by the GEF on the development and 
operation of the Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT); 
• Consideration by the GEF of climate risks in all its programmes and activities, 
as applicable, by keeping in mind the lessons learned from experience and 
best practices;
• Encouragement from the GEF to developing countries to align their programmes/ 
projects submitted to the Facility on priorities identified in their NDC during 
the seventh resource replenishment, and to continue to promote synergies 
between its different areas of focus;
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• The continuation of the GEF to carry out human and institutional capacity- 
building actions in terms of LDCs in order to develop project proposals by 
putting the emphasis on the identification of potential sources of funding, on 
a national and international level.
GEF-7
It is envisaged that the GEF will hold its assembly for the seventh replenishment 
of financial resources, covering the 2018-2022 period, in Addis-Abeba (Ethiopia), 
in October 2017. It should be noted that the GEF resources are not exclusively 
dedicated to the area of climate change but also cover the fight against deserti-
fication, the conservation of biological diversity, international marine waters, 
various kinds of pollutions, and a significant number of enabling activities. The GEF 
is characterised by its individual allocation system of the majority of financial 
resources it raises, which is for developing countries and transition economies. 
With regard to the GEF, during COP23, the Party States must negotiate 
about:
• The need to continue with GEF support for activities that combat the effects 
and consequences of climate change in the developing countries; 
• The state and level of support given to enabling activities: national communi-
cations, updated biennial reports, etc.; 
• The seventh replenishment of GEF financial resources and the allocation system 
(STAR); 
• The intervention of the GEF in terms of different components of the UNFCCC 
process, including the Poznań strategic framework on technology transfer, the 
Paris Committee for Capacity-building, the Climate Technology Centre and 
Network, the Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency, etc.;
• Procedures and services that should be simplified in order to enable better access 
to financial resources for developing countries;.
Sixth review of the financial mechanism  
of the Convention
The COP regularly conducts467 a review of the financial mechanism and facilities 
of the UNFCCC. It has done so since COP4468, on the basis of guidelines that 
were negotiated and decided upon by the COP.
467. Every four years.
468. Decision establishing the period review of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC 
[online] https://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/appli-
cation/pdf/3_cp.4.pdf
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At COP22, the Party States agreed to continue, through negotiations, the update 
of guidelines469 for the sixth review of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC 
and its facilities, organised by targets, sources of information and criteria. 
The SCF, which had been appointed by the COP to prepare the project for 
this update, agreed, during its fifteenth470 session (March 2017), the organisation 
of work, including the working group, a work schedule, provision outgoings and 
an awareness strategy. 
In Bonn, during COP23, the Party States must negotiate and agree upon the 
final elements of the guidelines which will serve the sixth review of the financial 
mechanism of the UNFCCC.
Adaptation fund 
The report of the Fund Board
At COP22, the Conference of the Parties acting as a meeting of the Kyoto Protocol 
Parties (CMP) examined the Report by the Adaptation Fund Board471 and finalised 
the following, inter alia: 
• The renewal of provisional institutional mechanisms with the GEF, which 
will continue act as the temporary secretariat of the Adaptation Fund Board 
for an additional period of three years, from 30 May 2017 to 30 May 2020;
• The alteration of rules governing the services provided by the World Bank in 
its capacity as acting director of the Fund, for an additional period of three 
years, from 30 May 2017 to 30 May 2020; 
• The consideration of the mobilisation strategy of Adaptation Fund resources;
• Noting, with concern, the need to sustain and make the mobilisation of resources 
for the Adaptation Fund more predictable, also noting a funding deficit 
amounting to approximately three million USD; 
• Inviting developed countries to increase their contributions and donations to 
the Adaptation Fund in order to carry out adaptation projects in developing 
countries, including LDCs, SIDS and African countries;
• Encouraging the Fund Board to explore innovative sources of funding for its 
activities; 
• Noting information given by the Adaptation Fund Board and the additional 
interest it brings to the implementation of the Paris Agreement.
469. Guidelines for the 6th review of the financial mechanism of the convention adopted 
during COP22 [online] http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/appli-
cation/pdf/auv_cop22_i10e_sixth_review_of_fin_mechs.pdf#page=2
470. https://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/standing_
committee/application/pdf/agenda_item_5_sixth_review_8march2000.pdf
471. http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/cmp12/fre/08a01f.pdf
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Also, and since the Paris Agreement came into force in November 2016, the 
negotiations have continued so that the Adaptation Fund, just like the other oper-
ational bodies of the financial mechanism of the Convention, serves the Paris 
Agreement. 
Third review of the Adaptation Fund
This item is listed on the CMP13 agenda and follows the conclusions from the 
46th session of the SBI. The Party States recognise472:
• The important role that the Adaptation Fund has played and continues to 
play, and its unique characteristics that have enabled the Fund to contribute 
in a significant way to the support for developing countries through specific 
adaptation projects, programme development and preparation;
• That the results of the third review do not prejudice negotiations under the 
APA on the Adaptation Fund in the service of the Paris Agreement, but that 
they provide relevant information to enable the Parties to make an informed 
decision.
Points related to the implementation of Article 9  
of the Paris Agreement 
Paragraph 5: Process for information that the Parties must communicate
The review of this point by the COP enables Party States to take stock, overall, of 
the fulfilment and the handling of obligations of the developed countries (and 
other voluntary contributors) in terms of the mobilisation and supply of appropriate, 
sufficient and accessible financial resources for the benefit of developing countries 
and, more specifically, LDCs, SIDS and African countries.
In Marrakech, during COP22, the negotiations were concluded by a reminder 
of the mandatory status of developed countries, although voluntary for others 
regarding the supply of quantitative, qualitative and periodic information473 on 
the mobilisation and availability of financial resources, in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, and under 
paragraph 5 of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement. The COP also asked the Secretariat 
of the UNFCCC to organise a round table on this issue during the 46th session of 
the subsidiary bodies (May 2017), from which the conclusions will be considered 
by COP23.
The round table was held in Bonn on 6 May 2017 and enabled all country 
parties and/or groups to express their points of view and positions on this issue, in 
accordance with the note drafted by the Secretariat474.
472. IISD, 2017d.
473. Every two years.
474. Note and round table programme [online] http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/bonn_
may_2017/in-session/application/pdf/exante_roundtable_programme_1305.pdf
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The Party States will have to examine the round table report during COP23 
and decide on recommendations on the transparency of financial support from 
developed countries for developing countries.
Paragraph 7: Modalities for measuring financial resources
Paragraph 7 of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement deals with the modalities for 
measuring financial resources provided and mobilised by public interventions. 
This is an issue that was negotiated by the SBSTA during its 46th session (May 
2017). It concluded the consultations between the Chairperson of the SBSTA and 
the Co-chairs of the APA in order to ensure, in due course, the integration of 
modalities for accounting in the transparency system, as stipulated in Article 13 of 
the Paris Agreement.
At the 47th session of the SBSTA in Bonn (November 2017), the Party States 
will have to continue their consultations and the deepening of definitions and 
understanding of modalities for accounting in order to submit them for adoption 
at the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the 
Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA1).
Other financial issues
Provision of financial support to national communications 
The process of reporting as part of the Convention never stops evolving, involving 
more and more important obligations for developing countries. This requires the 
most simple availability and access possible to financial resources and support, 
from developed countries for the benefit of all developing countries, and more 
specifically LDCs, SIDS and African countries.
The Party States continued, during the 46th session of the SBI in Bonn, the 
negotiations regarding the provision of financial support, in order to enable devel-
oping countries to be compliant with their reporting obligations and their obligations 
in terms of state communications, efforts and needs in the fight against global 
warming.
The review of this point is based on the GEF report concerning funding 
agreements and funding disbursements for the benefit of developing countries to 
develop their national communications and national greenhouse gas inventories. 
During the May 2017 session, the negotiations were not successful in view of a 
disagreement between developed countries and developing countries about the 
acknowledgement of concerns and frustrations of the latter due to difficulties 
accessing financial resources.
The 47th session of the subsidiary bodies will continue to review this point 
and will be based on the GEF report to COP23, and must produce conclusions in 
favour of a more appropriate access to financial resources for more reporting from 
developing countries and better participation in the transparency process of the 
Convention as with the Paris Agreement.
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Other financial and budgetary issues
Under the title “administrative, financial and institutional issues”, listed on the 
SBI, CMP and COP agendas, various other financial and budgetary issues are 
regularly discussed and negotiated.
The 46th session of the SBI reviewed the programme budget plan of the 
secretariat for the 2018-2019 year, in particular elements concerning:
• annual Party State contributions, where delays in contributions have been 
noted, impacting on the activities of the secretariat;
• flexibility in the special allocation fund for additional activities;
• the budget of the international transactions publication and a methodology 
for collecting fees during the 2018-2019 year.
The conclusions of this session produced the results that follow for consideration 
by the 47th session of the SBI, CMP and COP23:
• A draft decision on the international transactions publication budget and a 
methodology for collecting fees during the 2018-2019 year; 
• Two draft decisions on the programme budget of the secretariat for the year 
2018-2019, under the COP and the CMP respectively.
Furthermore, the secretariat was invited to organise a technical workshop, on 
the fringe of SBI47, to review possible ways to increase the efficacy and transparency 
of the budgetary process, subject to the availability of financial resources.
Conclusion
Climate funding issues will continue to play a central role, not only for the fight 
against climate change but also and above all in the negotiations during sessions of 
the COP and permanent and ad hoc subsidiary bodies.
Besides the issues that regularly recur at each session, relating to mobilisation, 
adequacy, innovation, etc., COP23 will also concentrate on developing rules and 
procedures for the implementation of provisions of the Paris Agreement, including 
those related to climate financing.
In this area, it should be noted that there is a need to only make a commitment 
of possible mobilisations and access to financial resources that make it possible to 
fulfil promises on both sides of the global climate process.
I.10. Adaptation 
In Marrakech, adaptation was considered as a central issue after the announcement 
of the entry into force of the Paris Agreement. During the 22nd session of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP22, November 2016), and during the work of the 
46th Session of the Subsidiary bodies of the Convention and the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on the Paris Agreement (APA, in Bonn, May 2017 )), the negotiations were 
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seeking a new vision and approach (or approaches) to adopt in order to successfully 
complete the preparation of responses to provisions taken by the Paris Agreement 
and Decision 1/CP.21 in terms of adaptation.
The main challenge in this area will be the qualitative and quantitative definition 
of the global objective of adaptation475 and taking it into consideration in the 
facilitation dialogue in 2018 and in the framework of the first Global Stocktake in 
2023. The other challenge will be to effectively consider national communications 
on adaptation, and the elements that constitute it, whether they are part of the NDC 
or not. The countries, individually or in groups, have already submitted their 
opinions in this regard, and will be called, as and when, to advance the process of 
negotiations and establish rules and procedures for the Paris Agreement, to make 
more technical, detailed and operational submissions. 
In addition to recurring issues on the agenda of the COP or subsidiary bodies, 
like those relating to the Nairobi Work Programme (NWP), the Adaptation 
Committee, adaptation scheduling and the needs and support for adaptation, the 
Fijian COP in Bonn will look into technical and methodological considerations 
on national communications, the national register, etc. and also the need for equal 
consideration of adaptation regarding mitigation firstly and the reassignment of 
the issue of vulnerability in the context of the Convention and the Paris Agreement, 
in particular for Africa on the other hand. 
List of provisions of the Paris  
Agreement concerning Adaptation 
(Annex of the Submission of the Africa  
Group of Negotiators, 2016476)
• Article 2.1: Formulates and reiterates the links between the three global goals 
related to temperature increases and mitigation action, adaptation and the 
need for finance to enable both mitigation and adaptations. 
• Article 3: Sets the context for NDCs and provides that NDCs cover all elements 
including mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer 
and capacity-building and transparency of action and support. 
• Article 7.1: Formulates the global goal for adaptation, its assessment towards 
achieving it constitutes part of the global stocktake.
• Article 7.3: Provides for the recognition of adaptation efforts made by developing 
countries, which will also be considered at the global stocktake. 
• Article 7.4: Recognises the link between mitigation (in) action, adaptation needs 
and costs. 
475. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 7 para. 1.
476. http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/586_280_ 
131198158733193507-AGN%20Submission%20on%20APA%20Item%204.pdf
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• Article 7.10: Introduces the adaptation communications and the type of infor-
mation Parties should communicate through them. 
• Article 7.11: Provides flexibility for developing countries in using different vehicles 
to communicate adaptation communications. 
• Article 7.12: Provides for all adaptation communications, e.g. regardless of the 
vehicle used, to be recorded in a public registry.
• Article 7.14: Provides for the adaptation-related aspects that will be considered 
at the global stocktake. 
• Article 9.1: Provides for developed countries to provide financial resources 
for adaptation and mitigation to developing countries 
• Article 9.5: Provides for developed countries to provide qualitative and quanti-
tative information on indicative finance to be provided to developing countries 
on a biennial basis. 
• Article 9.7: Provides for developed countries to provide information on support 
provided and mobilized for developing countries on a biennial basis. 
• Article 13.5: Provides information about the type of information that will be 
considered in the framework for transparency of action, including adaptation.
• Article 13.6: Provides information about the type of information that will be 
considered in the framework for transparency of support, including adaptation. 
• Article 13.8: Provides for the information Parties should provide on adaptation 
under the transparency framework of action and support. 
• Article 13.9: Provides for developed countries to provide information on the 
means of implementation provided to developing countries. 
• Article 13.10: Provides for the type of information developing countries should 
provide on the means of implementation needed and received. 
• Article 13.11: Introduces the technical expert review that Parties have to undergo 
and the need for capacity-building for developing countries in meeting their 
reporting obligations. 
• Article 14.1: Establishes the global stocktake and provides for its consideration 
of all elements, including mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation, 
as well as equity and science. 
• Article 14.3: Provides for the outcome of the global stocktake to inform Parties 
in updating and enhancing their actions and support.
Adaptation Committee 
Since the Paris Agreement was adopted, the adaptation committee has been tasked 
with important mandates and responsibilities. In this context, the COP22 asked 
the adaptation committee to477:
• continue to collaborate with the Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulner-
ability and adaptation to climate change and its partner organisations; 
477. IISD (2016i, 21 November).
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• expedite preparations for the Technical Expert Meetings (TEM) on adaptation 
planned in 2017, including with regard to the choice of topics as part of the 
Technical Review Process (PET) of adaptation measures;
• ensure that the PET of adaptation measures achieves its goal of identifying 
concrete opportunities for strengthening resilience, reducing vulnerability 
factors, and increasing the understanding and implementation of adaptation 
actions, including through technical reports; 
• continue to implement its revised work plan, in particular by prioritising 
activities carried out in support of the Paris Agreement, and searching for new 
ways to reinforce its progress, efficacy and operation. 
COP22 also took note of and came to the, previously mentioned, conclusion 
regarding the budgetary implications and the Secretariat’s need for additional ways 
to successfully complete the new tasks assigned to the Adaptation Committee. In 
doing so, it called upon the countries for more financial contributions. 
In Bonn, in November 2017, the negotiations will touch upon the elements 
of the Adaptation Committee report to the COP, and the progress report on the 
fulfilment of tasks entrusted by the Paris Agreement and the accompanying decision. 
National communication on Adaptation 
The Parties to the Paris Agreement have been trying, since Marrakech, to find 
common ground regarding an understanding and interpretation of the nature 
and the impact of the communication on adaptation. The, frequently informal, 
consultations and negotiations during COP22, like those that followed in Bonn 
during the 46th session of the Subsidiary Bodies, have so far failed due to strong 
disagreements between developed countries and developing countries. They foresee 
implications for financial support that will result from the form, nature and use of 
such reporting. It is evident for the developing countries that any new reporting 
obligation would involve financial support from developed countries, in accordance 
with the provisions of the Convention. A consequence that the developed countries 
would like to avoid, insisting on the voluntary nature of national communication. 
Extract from the Position of the Africa Group  
of Negotiators on the Adaptation Communication, 2016478
The adaptation communications aimed at Article 7.10 and 7.11 of the Paris 
Agreement apply to all Parties, including both developed countries and developing 
countries. The Africa Group of Negotiators (AGN) is of the opinion that in 
order to guarantee the progress of the global adaptation objective, adaptation 
communications must include the five elements/functions mentioned in Article 
7.10, that is to say: 
478. http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/586_280_ 
131198158733193507-AGN%20Submission%20on%20APA%20Item%204.pdf
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• vulnerability and priorities; 
• plans and actions; 
• implementation and support needs; 
• recognition of adaptation efforts by developing countries; 
• guide levels of support provided to developing countries by developed countries. 
These characteristics of the communications will therefore contribute to operation-
alising and pushing forward the global adaptation objective. These characteristics 
concern vulnerability, resilience and capacity for adaptation. Consequently, they 
are key to ensuring the significant progress of an appropriate response in terms 
of adaptation. 
From COP22, the secretariat produced an informative note, which was modified 
by the co-facilitators at the end of the 46th session of the subsidiary bodies noting 
a slight increase in the convergence of opinions479. This document will be picked 
up for the continuation of informal consultations during COP23. 
Nairobi Work Programme (NWP)
The main themes approached by the NWP during COP22 and the 46th session 
of the subsidiary bodies concern climate change and health on the one hand, and 
economic diversification on the other. 
The negotiations and consultations on this point also concern: 
• activities with the partner organisations of the NWP, by inviting them to 
implement relevant actions to face up to the impacts of, vulnerability to and 
adaptation to climate change;
• the improvement in the efficacy of the forum for focal points and coordinators, 
by strengthening, among other things, the participation of experts and expert 
organisations;
• taking reports into account on: 
 – human health and adaptation;480
479. IISD (2017d) – The debate, which was structured around the “draft” of a possible result 
proposed by the co-facilitators, comprises objectives, elements, backing, flexibility 
and relationships. The Parties noted that the objective and elements are clearly inter-
connected, which suggests that, on the one hand, the objectives direct the choice of 
elements but that, on the other hand, several elements contribute to multiple objectives. 
Regarding the elements, the Parties presented various suggestions, including: national 
circumstances, impacts, vulnerabilities and risk assessments; plans, priorities and actions; 
efforts made by the developing countries and progress made; support needs in terms of 
adaptation; monitoring and assessment; and support from developed countries. The 
Parties discussed having a single common list of items or a list filled out with optional 
items.
480. UNFCCC, 2017b.
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 – planning, implementation and evaluation concerning ecosystems and areas 
such as water resources;481
 – the progress made in the implementation of NWP activities.482
In Bonn (COP23), the Party States will have to take stock of the activities 
carried out during the current year and decide on the work programme for 2018. 
The fact remains that the NWP is a matter that is handled by the Subsidiary Body 
for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and therefore it is seldom subject 
to implementation and support from developed countries for the benefit of developing 
countries, – under the provisions of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), when it comes to adaptation and vulnerability. 
The negotiations regarding the NWP will have to evolve, to become an effective 
action scheme in favour of adaptation, particularly for Least Developed Countries 
(LDC), Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and African countries, which need 
it the most. 
Adaptation Communications Registry 
At its 46th session, the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) reviewed the 
issue of modalities and procedures for operation and the use of the public adaptation 
communications registry, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 12 of 
Article 7 of the Paris Agreement. It was a question of discussing, in informal 
consultations, the design of a simple and convivial registry, which is accessible to 
the public. The negotiations successfully concluded the following: 
• to consider the relationships between this registry, that of the NDC (Article 
4, paragraph 12 of the Paris Agreement) and the activities undertaken in 
terms of the Adaptation Plan compiled and summarised by the UNFCCC 
secretariat; 
• to take into account, during its design, the need for the registry to be character-
ised by simplicity, conviviality, secure access and use, and accessibility; 
• to invite countries, country groups and alliances, and observers to submit 
their opinions (before 21 September 2017) on the possible links with the 
issues of planning adaptation (national adaptation plan (NAP), National 
action programme or action (NAPA), etc.). 
The Party States will continue to consider this point at COP23, with the aim 
of move forward as much and as positively as possible with the design and operation 
of the Adaptation Communications Registry. 
481. UNFCCC, 2017c.
482. UNFCCC, 2017d.
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National Adaptation Plan (NAP)
The latest submissions483 from the NAP, by developing countries, to the Secretariat 
of the UNFCCC shows the importance of such a process for the effective fight 
against the effects and consequences of climate change, particularly for the most 
vulnerable countries.
In Marrakech, the review of the National adaptation plans (NAP) process by 
COP22 finalised484 the following items:
• Appreciation for the submission by Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Sri Lanka 
and the Sudan of their national adaptation plans via NAP Central485;
• Encouragement for other Parties to forward relevant outputs and outcomes 
related to the process to formulate and implement NAP to the same platform; 
• Congratulations on the successful conduct of the NAP Expo that took place 
from 11 to 15 July 2016 in Bonn (Germany), and the active participation 
therein of developing countries and other relevant stakeholders;
• Satisfaction regarding the decision of the Board of the Green Climate Fund 
at its 13th meeting that approved up to USD 3 million per country through 
the Green Climate Fund Readiness and Preparatory Support Programme to 
support the formulation of national adaptation plans and/or other national 
adaptation planning processes; 
• A request to the Adaptation Committee and the Least Developed Countries 
Expert Group to continue their respective engagement with the Green Climate 
Fund and to continue to include information on that engagement, including 
on ways to enhance the process to access support for the formulation and 
implementation of national adaptation plans, in their reports for consider-
ation by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation at its forty-seventh session 
(November 2017) with a view to making recommendations to the Conference 
of the Parties at its twenty-third session (November 2017), as appropriate; 
• Congratulations for the support provided by the Global Environment Facility 
for the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans; 
• Encouragement for developed country Parties to contribute to the Least 
Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund and other 
funds under the Financial Mechanism, as appropriate, recognizing the impor-
tance of the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans.
In Bonn, during COP23, this issue will be listed on the SBI agenda but, as 
recommended at its 46th session, the continued review of this issue will be defered 
until the 49th session of the SBI, at the end of 2018, to enable the continuation 
of activities linked to the NAP before evaluating them. 
483. National Adaptaion Plan submissions portal, from developing countries to the Secretariat 
of the UNFCCC [online] http://www4.unfccc.int/nap/News/Pages/national_adaptation_
plans.aspx
484. Decision 6/CP.22 - National adaptation plans. 
485. http://www4.unfccc.int/nap/Pages/Home.aspx
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I.11. Role of non-State actors & evaluation  
of commitments
Non-State actors in international climate action, a role 
of growing recognition with several initiatives already 
under way
If national governments are the main official players of international negotiations 
on climate, non-State actors have played a key role in environmental matters for 
many years as a participant and their role is growing, both in terms of recognition 
and importance. From 1992, Agenda 21, which was adopted at the Earth Summit 
in Rio de Janeiro, has recognised that “one of the fundamental prerequisites for the 
achievement of sustainable development is broad public participation in decision- 
making”486. In this sense, it identified nine “major groups”487 including non-government 
organisations (NGO), local communities and even trade and industry488.
Since then, community organisations have pushed for the adoption of more 
ambitious agreements on climate, at the same time as proposing and implementing 
an array of solutions in favour of production methods and consumption patterns 
that are low-carbon and more favourable for the environment.
As part of the climate negotiations, the mobilisation of non-State actors has 
been formally encouraged by the setting up of the Lima-Paris Action Agenda 
(LPAA)489. This initiative has achieved great success and, to facilitate the details 
and the follow-up for initiatives of the LPAA, the Nazca platform490 was set up. 
Launched in 2014 by the Peruvian presidency of the COP20491, it has the objective 
of identifying as far as possible the involvement of non-State actors in climate 
change action. The voluntarily-registered actions are gathered according to 13 sectors: 
reduction in emissions; resilience; transport; access to energy and energy efficiency; 
renewable energies; agriculture; private financing; forest; innovation; construction; 
carbon enhancement; short term pollutants; and others.
486. United Nations, Agenda 21, Chapter 23, preamble, para. 23.2 line 1 [online]
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf
487. United Nations, Agenda 21, Section III. Strengthening the role of the major groups 
[online] http://www.un.org/french/ga/special/sids/agenda21/action0.htm
488. United Nations, Official text of Agenda 21 [online]
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/Agenda21.pdf
489. LPAA – Lima Paris Action Agenda.
490. “Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action”.
http://climateaction.unfccc.int/
491. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2015. “An initiative from the French and Peruvian governments, 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the administration department of the 
UNFCCC”.
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As of 3 October 2017, 12,549 actions were recorded on this platform, covering 
both the pre-2020 period and the period between 2020 and 2030 (which is also 
the period for the implementation of INDC/NDC) and the long term. On the 
same date, there were commitments from 2,508 towns492, 209 regions493, 479 
investors494, 238 civil society organisations495 and 2,138 companies496, proving that 
there is a growing mobilisations of all stakeholders, both in developed countries 
and developing countries.
On the Nazca platform, the spectrum of commitments is organised into:
•  Cooperative Initiatives: commitments that are undertaken collectively by a 
variety of non-State actors: companies, cities, subnational regions, investors 
from civil society, often in partnership with countries, uniting different actors 
around one objective;
• Individual actions: commitments undertaken by a single actor in order to 
achieve a particular objective.
As at 3 October 2017, 8,093 individual actions were recorded497, apportioned 
as follows:
Figure 20. Number of actors engaged in individual actions by sector 
(NAZCA)
492. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/cities
493. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/subnational-regions
494. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/investors
495. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/csos
496. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/companies
497. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/total-commitment-themes?themeid=0&theme=&open 
=yes&type=individual&Country=0
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As at 3 October 2017, 4,246 cooperative actions were recorded498, apportioned 
as follows:
Figure 21. Number of actors engaged in cooperative actions  
by sector (NAZCA)
Figure 22. Cities engaged in NAZCA499
Among the numerous initiatives, the Covenant of Mayors serves as an example: 
several thousand cities, mainly in Europe and, more and more frequently, elsewhere 
as well, have voluntarily committed to overtake objectives fixed on a national level 
in their lands on the subjects of climate policy. The new Covenant of Mayors for 
climate and energy, launched in 2015, has reaffirmed this ambition until after 
2020. The Convention has gathered, as at 3 October 2017, over 7,600 signatories, 
representing more than 236 million inhabitants500. The Covenant is also accompanied 
by action and monitoring plans501.
498. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/total-commitment-themes?themeid=0&theme=&op
en=yes&type=cooperative&Country=0
499. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/cities
500. Covenant of Mayors’ site [online] http://www.covenantofmayors.eu/index_en.html
501. See the available monitoring reports [online] http://www.covenantofmayors.eu/ac-
tions/monitoring-action-plans_en.html
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Figure 23. Signatories of the Covenant of Mayors
Among other initiatives, the Science based targets502 (iSBT) initiative also serves 
as an example, bringing large multinationals together, all committed to policies to 
reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. As part of this initiative, notably a 
“Practical guide for defining carbon targets aligned with scientific knowledge” was 
published in April 2017, aiming to help companies to define GHG emission 
reduction goals by decrypting methodologies suggest by the iSBT503. The aim is to 
invite companies to sign up to the implementation of the Paris Agreement and 
to commit to implementing ongoing large international programmes, such as the 
Sustainable development goals504.
502. Site of the Science based targets [online] http://sciencebasedtargets.org/
503. Accessible at the following address [online] https://www.globalcompact-france.org/
documents/guide-pratique-pour-definir-des-objectifs-carbone-alignes-sur-les-connais-
sances-scientifiques-76
504. http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/en/
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These items are just a few examples, the list of actions and involvement of 
non-State actors being extremely varied and rich for many years already (see also 
Section I.14.). In respect of their contribution to climate action, COP21 was also 
an opportunity to legitimise once again this soon-to-be key role.
Recognition of the role of non-State actors within  
the Paris Agreement
Decision 1.CP/21 and the Paris Agreement have made it possible to reaffirm the 
major role that non-State actors hold and must continue to hold in future alongside 
the Party States.
Their increasingly central role is mentioned repeatedly, as early as the preamble 
of Decision 1/CP.21, in order to: “mobilise stronger and more ambitious climate 
action by all Parties and non-Party stakeholders, including civil society, the private 
sector, financial institutions, cities and other subnational authorities, local communities 
and indigenous peoples(…)”505.
What non-State actor involvement  
has stemmed from the results of Paris?
In general, Decision 1/CP.21 contains various provisions that specifically request 
or implicitly encourage non-State actors to make a commitment through diverse 
aspects of the implementation of objectives from COP21:
(i) To any “organizations in a position to do so”: Provide support for the preparation 
and communication of the intended nationally determined contributions 
(NDC) of Parties that may need such support506;
(ii) To relevant organisations (as targeted in para. 49 of Decision 1/CP.21) 
and  “relevant organizations and expert bodies outside the Convention, by mobilising 
them as appropriate”: Develop recommendations for integrated approaches 
to avert, minimise and address displacement related to the adverse impacts 
of climate change507;
(iii) To “Parties and non-Party stakeholders”: promote the voluntary cancellation, 
without double counting, of units issued under the Kyoto Protocol, including 
certified emission reductions that are valid for the second commitment 
period508;
(iv) To “non-Party stakeholders”: Register their climate actions in the Non-State 
Actor Zone for Climate Action platform509, “NAZCA”510;
(v) To Parties: Work closely with non-Party stakeholders to catalyse efforts 
to strengthen mitigation and adaptation action511;
505. Decision 1/CP.21, Preamble of the Decision to Adopt the Paris Agreement.
506. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 15.
507. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 49.
508. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 106.
509. See below [online] http://climateaction.unfccc.int/
510. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 117.
511. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 118.
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(vi) To “non-Party stakeholders”: Increase their engagement in the technical review 
processes on adaptation and mitigation512; 
(vii) To “dignitaries of Parties, international organizations, international cooperative 
initiatives and non-Party stakeholders”: Commit to the high-level event relating 
to the (LPAA)513;
(viii) Nomination of two high-level champions to facilitate the successful execution 
and scaling-up of voluntary initiatives of non-Party stakeholders as part of the 
LPAA514 with support from relevant organisations and interested Parties515;
(ix) Setting up a platform for the exchange of experiences and sharing of best 
practices on mitigation and adaptation in a holistic and integrated manner516.
Decision 1/CP.21 even dedicates Chapter V “Non party entities”517 to them. 
The action of non-State actors “including those of civil society, the private sector, 
financial institutions, cities and other subnational authorities”518 is underlined and they 
are invited to scale up their efforts, both in order to find ways to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions and also to build up resilience in the face of adverse effects of climate 
change519.
Local and subnational dimensions of adaptation are also showcased520, clearly 
recognising the role of cities and local governments going forward in the strategies 
and actions to put in place.
International recognition of local and regional governments
From 1947, local government networks benefit from consultative status in the 
capacity of non-government organisations (NGO) in the eyes of the United  
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)521. It is through ECOSOC 
that, for the first time, NGOs have played a role in United Nations deliberations. 
“In 1945, 41 NGOs were granted consultative status by the council; by 1992 more 
than 700 NGOs had attained consultative status and the number has been steadily 
increasing ever since”522.
512. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 119; relying upon the provisions set out in para. 109 and 
para. 124.
513. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 120(d).
514. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 121(b).
515. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 123.
516. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 135.
517. Decision 1/CP.21.
518. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 134.
519. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 135.
520. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Article 7.
521. CGLU, 2016, p. 10.
522. ECOSOC, NGO Branch, Introduction – Introduction to ECOSOC Consultative Status 
[online] http://csonet.org/index.php?menu=30
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In 1992, local authorities were recognised as one of the nine “major groups” of 
Agenda 21. Ever since, local governments have been recognised and included  
in the largest international meetings and those organised by the UN, such as 
Beijing+10, the Millennium Summit of World Leaders+5 and even the World 
Water Forum, etc.523 The role of local and regional governments is increasingly 
recognised on the international scene, demonstrating their essential participation 
in the sustainable development of our societies, including as part of the fight 
against climate change.
Local and regional governments… a demand for results  
in the fight against climate change
Starting from 2007, local and regional governments have published a “Local  
Government Climate Roadmap”524. The objective has stayed the same; participating 
in the implementation of an ambitious climate regime on the post-Kyoto agenda.
In 2010, local and regional governments were recognised for the first time as 
“government stakeholders” within the Cancun Agreements at COP16525. They 
have since been implicated as official stakeholders within the COP, without 
however being negotiating parties.
Beyond climate negotiations, local authorities form the essential link between 
the international sphere, national governments, communities and citizens. They 
have a crucial role to play in the new global climate partnership. Regarding this, 
the United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, announced: “As the world 
strives for a more sustainable path in the years ahead, particularly beyond 2015, local 
voices and local action will be crucial elements in our quest”526.
From a practical point of view, local governments have fairly broad responsibilities 
in the areas of specific skills, which often allows them (by virtue of their expertise, 
decentralisation and subsidiarity principle527) to implement ambitious climate 
policies as close to local geographic, social and economic realities as possible. This 
also includes the mobilisation of regions, as can be seen from the Mediterranean 
Forum, which took place in Tangier (Morocco) on 18 and 19 July 2016 (MedCOP 
Climate 2016)528, before COP22, and event climate stakeholders in general, 
with the Climate Change 2017 Summit529, which took place ahead of COP23, 
from 11 to 13 September 2017 in Agadir (Morocco).
523. CGLU, 2016, p. 10.
524. To find out more: Local Government Climate Roadmap, Official site [online]
http://www.iclei.org/index.php?id=1197
525. UNFCCC, 2010, Decision 1/CP.16, para. 7 p.3.
526. Message from the United Nations Secretary-General: Ban Ki-moon, during a meeting of 
the Global Task Force of local and regional governments in New York, 28 May 2013.
According to CGLU, 2016, p. 6.
527. Contributing to decisions being taken closer to the citizens.
528. For more information, see ENERGIES 2050, 2016b.
Consult the official site of MedCOP Climate 2016: http://medcopclimat.com/fr/
medcop-climat-tanger-2016
Or the official homepage for civil society: http://medcoptanger-sc.com/fr/index.html
529. http://dev.climate-chance.org/climatechance2017/
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Beyond the formal recognition within the Paris Agreement, it has henceforth 
become indisputable that the contribution of all stakeholders is not only a key 
element of climate change action but also that it proves to be vital to be able to raise 
the level of ambition in order to maintain the level of global warming significantly 
below 2°C with respect to pre-industrial level by the end of the century530. In the 
post-Paris era, the role of the non-Party stakeholders will therefore be central. This 
is all the more relevant than the commitments made by the Party States as part of their 
NDC, which are still not enough to achieve a development trajectory compatible 
with the goal of 2°C531. Facing the lack of Party State ambition, the multi-stakeholder 
collaboration, including the contribution of non-State actors, proves to be more vital 
than ever, in order to reduce the gap between the goals and the actions required to 
reach them.
The importance of mobilising non-State actors  
in international climate action in the post-Paris era
The Paris Agreement, based on Decision 1/CP.20, recognised the initiatives and 
commitments by all actors, including those by non-State actors532 launched as part 
of the LPAA533. Decision 1/CP.21, furthermore, reaffirms the urgent need to 
intensify the world response to climate change and to promote a greater ambition 
for governments.
In order to create a link between the Convention and the multiple voluntary 
initiatives, “two high-level champions”534 have been appointed for the period 
2016-2020. These personalities are notably responsible for monitoring the execution 
(of the extension of the LPAA initiatives) and intensification of voluntary initiatives 
by non-State actors535. In other words, these two champions should advance the 
Global Climate Action Agenda through the so-called “non-Party stakeholders”.
Decision 1/CP.21 in this way details the tasks that fall to these high-level 
champions.536 As part of this role, they have defined a new Climate Action 
Agenda537, formed of a “Global Climate Action Agenda”, which was released ahead 
of COP22.
530. Evidenced, for example, by the reaction of certain big stakeholders in the United 
States of America in order to counteract and minimise the impacts of President 
Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.
531. See UNFCCC, 2016a; or, Climate Interactive, 2017.
532. Decision 1/CP.21, Part IV, Enhanced action prior to 2020, paras. 106-132; and, Decision 
1/CP.21, Part V, Non-Party stakeholders, paras. 134-137.
533. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 121.
534. Hakima El Haite (from Morocco) and Laurence Tubiana (from France).
See UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016a.
535. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 122.
536. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 122.
537. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016b.
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Global Climate Action Agenda: The roadmap
Ms Hakima El Haité and Ms Laurence Tubiana, high-level climate champions from 
Morocco and France, have published their roadmap for the implementation of their 
global agenda. The agenda has the objective of strengthening cooperative initiatives 
between governments, cities, businesses, investors and citizens in order to rapidly reduce 
emissions and to help vulnerable countries to adapt to the impact of the climate and 
to develop their own sustainable future using clean energy.538
Presentation of the roadmap539
A. To involve the interested Parties and non-Party stakeholders, including the 
promotion of voluntary initiatives from the LPAA
1. To build on existing initiatives and to support new geographically-varied  
initiatives
2. To connect initiatives and alliances to national action plans such as Nationally 
Determined Contributions (NDC)
3. To assure more transparency, track results and establish credibility
B. To provide guidance to the secretariat on the organisation of technical meetings 
of specialists and to work with the Executive Secretary and the current and future 
presidents of the Conference of the Parties to coordinate annual events to a 
high-level
The two champions also invited governments and non-State actors540 to convey 
their points of view on this roadmap, as well as any useful input, aiming to stimulate 
climate action, up until 1 August 2016541. During the Conference in Bonn, which 
took place in May 2016, the two champions reiterated their commitments, while 
showing their optimism542, notably with regard to the success of COP22 in 
mobilising non-State actors in the continuation of the “spirit of Paris”.
Continuing implementation, review between COP22 
and COP23
During COP22, it was expected that these foundations could be consolidated by 
once again promoting the mobilisation of multiple stakeholders, and notably the 
participation of non-State actors in the fulfilment of objectives set by the Paris 
Agreement.
538. Official site of COP22, Marrakech, Global Climate Action Agenda: Climate champions 
release roadmap [online] http://www.cop22.ma/en/high-level-climate-champions-launch- 
roadmap-global-climate-action
539. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016a.
540. http://unfccc.int/documentation/items/9636.php
541. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016c – To read the champions’ letter [online]
http://newsroom.unfccc.int/media/658506/high-level-champions-invitation- 
submissions.pdf
542. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016d.
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In accordance with recommendations stipulated by Decision 1/CP.21543, a 
high-level meeting aiming to expedite climate change action took place during 
COP22 as part of the Global Climate Action Agenda. The event took place on 17 
November 2016544, following themed sessions545 held during the two weeks of 
negotiations, which made it possible to bring key stakeholders together in order to 
promote expansion and solutions research in each sector:
• 8 November 2016, forests;546
• 9 November 2016, water;547
• 9 November 2016, industry and business;548
• 10 November 2016, cities and human settlements (resilience in cities);549
• 11 November 2016, energy;550
• 12 November 2016, oceans;551
• 12 November 2016, transport;552
• 16 November 2016, agriculture and food security.553
The results of these sessions were notably transcribed by reporters during the 
event on 17 November in order to gauge progress and identify opportunities for 
climate action554. One particular point also touched upon means of mobilisation 
in order to access finance for climate action555.
In the end, all of these session and the results achieved from them made it 
possibly to strengthen and enrich the paper from COP22, drafted by the “Marrakech 
Partnership for Global Climate Action”556. This sets an action programme for the 
2017-2020 period in order to catalyse and support international climate action by 
the Parties and non-Party stakeholders557. During the closing plenary of COP22, 
543. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 120.
544. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/event-calendar/events/cop22-gca-hle/
Or view the programme [online] http://climateaction.unfccc.int/media/1093/1711_
hle-provisional-agenda_final_0830.pdf
545. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/event-calendar/
546. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/event-calendar/events/cop22-gca-forests/
547. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/event-calendar/events/cop22-gca-water/
548. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/event-calendar/events/cop22-gca-industry-business/
549. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/event-calendar/events/cop22-gca-cities-human-set-
tlements-resilience-in-cities/
550. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/event-calendar/events/cop22-gca-energy/
551. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/event-calendar/events/cop22-gca-oceans/
552. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/event-calendar/events/cop22-gca-transport/
553. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/event-calendar/events/cop22-gca-agriculture-and- 
food-security/
554. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/media/1093/1711_hle-provisional-agenda_final_ 
0830.pdf – See pp. 2-3
555. http://climateaction.unfccc.int/media/1093/1711_hle-provisional-agenda_final_ 
0830.pdf – See p. 3
556. UNFCCC, 2016d.
557. To find out more about the announcements relating to events of the Global climate 
action programme from COP22, see UNFCCC, Newsroom 2016e.
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the Conference chairperson Salaheddine Mezouar introduced the document from 
the “Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action”. The text was read out 
loud and was greeted with applause558.
Lastly, COP22 was an opportunity for the Champions, as well as for several 
States, regions, cities, companies and other actors, to launch a new initiative: “2050 
pathways platform”559, “aimed at supporting those seeking to devise long-term, net 
zero-greenhouse gas, climate-resilient and sustainable development pathways”560. For 
this reason, an announcement published after COP22 states that 22 countries have 
launched561 (or are going to launch) a process for preparing a “2050 pathway”562. 
At the same time, this same document states that fifteen cities563, seventeen States 
and regions564 and 196 companies565 have joined the platform, demonstrating 
once again how proactive the non-Party stakeholders are in their commitment to 
innovate in order to contribute to international climate action566.
Following COP22, the negotiations intersession held from 8 to 17 May in 
Bonn567 had to ensure also that the action of non-State actors was strengthened, 
among other things. To that extent, the Convention Secretariat notably published 
two documents on the involvement of non-State actors in climate action568. The 
first document keeps a record of cooperative activities between United Nations 
bodies and intergovernmental organisations that contribute to the work of the 
Convention569 and the second concerns the positions and potential for improving 
effective involvement of non-Party stakeholders in order to strengthen the application 
of provisions from Decision 1/CP.21570.
558. http://sdg.iisd.org/news/marrakech-partnership-for-global-climate-action-launched-
as-cop-cmp-hold-closing-plenaries/
559. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016f.
560. UNFCCC, Newsroom, 2016e.
561. See for example the platform set up in Australia [online] http://www.2050pathways.
net.au/ 
562. UNFCCC, Newsroom 2016f – See Annex 1.
563. UNFCCC, Newsroom 2016f – See Annex 2.
564. UNFCCC, Newsroom 2016f – See Annex 3.
565. UNFCCC, Newsroom 2016f – See Annex 4.
566. For more information, see UNFCCC, Newsroom 2016g.
567. From 8 to 17 May 2017, the 46th sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation 
(SBI46) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA46) 
were held in Bonn, as well as the third part of the first session of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on the Paris Agreement (APA1-3) [online] http://newsroom.unfccc.int/fr/
actualit%C3%A9s/conference-climat-de-bonn-mai-2017/
568. http://sdg.iisd.org/news/unfccc-reports-on-engagement-with-non-state-actors-to- 
enhance-climate-action/
569. FCCC/SBSTA/2017/INF.2 “Summary of cooperative activities with UN entities and 
intergovernmental organizations that contribute to the work under the Convention” [online] 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/sbsta/eng/inf02.pdf
570. FCCC/SBI/2017/INF.3 “Views on opportunities to further enhance the effective engagement 
of non-Party stakeholders with a view to strengthening the implementation of the provisions 
of decision 1/CP.21” [online] http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/sbi/eng/inf03.pdf
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On 9 May 2017, a workshop was organised on the opportunities to enhance 
the effective engagement of non-Party stakeholders with a view to strengthening the 
implementation of the provisions of Decision 1/CP.21. The Secretariat wrote a report571 
on this workshop for the consideration of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation 
(SBI). Beyond the methods for enhancing partnerships between Parties and non-Party 
stakeholders, the workshop also touched upon ways to strengthen the ambition of 
the NDC through climate action; the possibilities of widening the scope of non-Party 
stakeholder contributions on an intergovernmental level; and ways to diversify the 
modalities for engagement and facilitate their participation at an intergovernmental 
level.
Lastly, the intersessional period in Bonn was also an opportunity for non-State 
stakeholders to concretely join forces for research and the dissemination of solutions 
for climate action. This included the organisation between 8 and 12 May 2017 of 
technical expert meetings on mitigation, concerning cross-sectoral issues associated 
with the urban environment and land use572 (another technical expert meeting on 
mitigation, concerning cross-sectoral issues associated with the urban environment 
took place on 29 June 2017 in Cotonou, Benin). In the same vein, technical expert 
meetings on adaptation were held in Bonn between 16 and 17 May 2017, touching 
specifically on ways to integrate adaptation of climate change with the Sustainable 
Development Goals and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction573.
The topic of the technical expert meetings on adaptation set for 2017 demon-
strates the need for adopting an overall view of the issues, on the fight against 
climate change strictly speaking but also so that climate action is a way of aiming 
towards sustainable and resilient development. Furthermore, this expanded scope 
presupposes a recognition of each participant – including non-State actors – in 
achieving this objective.
All these elements are positive signs for international climate action based on 
an open-minded, multi-sector and multi-stakeholder vision, and they should be 
continued during the next negotiation sessions. Despite this optimism and noticeable 
progress in solidarity between all stakeholders concerned by the fight against climate 
change, these complementary, supportive actions will not be able to replace the 
responsibilities of the State Parties to the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol and the 
Paris Agreement in order to achieve the overall objective of mitigation. 
As for COP23, it will represent an important step in continuing this work. In 
particular, it will constitute a crucial step towards 2018 and the preparation of 
facilitation dialogue. In fact, this dialogue will be an opportunity to take stock of 
571. FCCC/SBI/2017/INF.7 “In-session workshop on opportunities to further enhance the 
effective engagement of non-Party stakeholders with a view to strengthening the implementation 
of the provisions of decision 1/CP.21. Report by the secretariat” [online] http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2017/sbi/eng/inf07.pdf.
572. http://unfccc.int/resource/climateaction2020/media/1303/TEMS_March_Agenda.pdf
573. http://unfccc.int/focus/adaptation/technical_expert_meeting/items/10144.php 
or http://tep-a.org/ 
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global progress and to prepare the renewal of NDC and it could be enriched by 
reflections from the combined action of State Parties and non-State actors574. In 
that respect, COP23 will be a landmark for making an initial assessment of the 
most important aspects, in particular progress linked to the Marrakech partnership 
and the ways of continuing to boost international climate change as part of the 
multi-stakeholder cooperation.
I.12. Transparency
Transparency has been an existing issue for several years in the internal processes 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
since the Cancun Agreements, dating from 2010, already set up a verification and 
review mechanism for the Parties. This latter therefore constitutes a solid base for 
defining a strengthened transparency framework, requested explicitly in Article 13 
of the Paris Agreement and in the accompanying Decision 1/CP.21. 
In the difficult context linked to the strong ambition of the Paris Agreement 
and on the proactive basis of of the “rising” mitigation plan575, this new strengthened 
transparency framework must enable us to follow the advances and progress 
regarding the individual and collective goals defined in the Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDC). This strengthened transparency framework must also enable 
us to follow the deals implemented as part of the market-based mechanisms 
defined in Article 6 of the Paris Agreement and to avoid double counting. It will 
also provide key input to the Global Stocktake of Article 14 and to the Facilitation 
of Implementation and Compliance Committee of Article 15.
One of the major challenges is the very different nature of mitigation and 
adaptation commitments taken in the NDC, which makes it difficult to compare 
them and which will require the use of different types of data. However, transpar-
ency does not only affect the actions implemented for mitigation and adaptation, 
but should also enable us to monitor the support provided and received by the 
different Parties. The issue of balance, which will be found between the first and 
second mission of the transparency framework, remains open, as the definition of 
“mobilised climate funding” is still to be made and there are sensitive differences of 
opinion between the countries providing the funding and the countries that receive 
it. Furthermore, the issue of differentiation between the type of country is very 
important as certain Parties wish to avoid any differentiation whereas others want to 
reach a strong differentiation between developed countries and developing countries.
574. Moreover, a summit dedicated to the action of non-State stakeholders is planned for 
September 2018, in order to highlight their efforts for the purpose of facilitation dialogue 
planned for later that same year.
See New Climate Institute, 2017, p. 15.
575. Within which each country has an interest in asserting their mitigation initiatives but 
less of an interest in really implementing them due to their costs and the inherent 
internal political obstacles of the country.
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The paragraphs below present the recent advances on the transparency of 
different working groups operating as part of the UNFCCC, the different initiatives 
put in place for transparency by governments, the barriers still to be overcome and 
the work programme for the 23rd session of the Conference of the Parties 
(COP23).
Progress of different working groups operating as part 
of the UNfCCC
a. Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA)
The activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA), 
created in December 2015 during the adoption of the Paris Agreement576 are 
linked to the development of the new transparency framework defined as part of 
the Paris Agreement. In fact, the APA is notably in charge of developing the:
• New guidelines concerning the section of Decision 1/CP.21 relating to miti-
gation, in particular:
 – The characteristics of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC);577
 – The information to be provided by the Parties to improve the clarity, 
transparency and comprehension of the NDC;578
 – The measurement of the NDC of the Parties;579
• Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework on action 
and support, in connection with Article 13 of the Paris Agreement.
The progress of the APA since COP22 on the two mandates presented below.
2nd part of the 1st working session of the APA – APA1-2 (COP22,  
November 2016)
During the second part of the first session of the APA during COP22 in Marrakech 
in November 2017, work sessions were carried out for the two mandates mentioned 
previously and linked to the strengthening of the transparency framework. For 
each of these items, an informal working note from the co-facilitators f the APA 
was published. 
New guidelines concerning the section of Decision 1/CP.21 relating to mitigation 
(item 3 on the agenda)580
576. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 7.
577. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 26.
578. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 28.
579. Decision 1/CP.21 para. 31.
580. APA, 2016b.
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Concerning this point, the information note from the co-facilitators581 stated 
that certain Parties have requested that the difference between information for the 
clarity, transparency and comprehension of the NDC (ex-ante information) and 
information required for the strengthened transparency framework (ex-post infor-
mation) is well highlighted. The question arose of the need to define the common 
items of information and others that are specific to different aspects of the NDC. 
However, certain Parties have alerted to the fact that establishing common items 
of information would be contrary to the discretionary, optional and voluntary 
nature of the NDC. 
In preparation for the 3rd part of the 1st session of the APA (May 2017, the 
APA invited the Parties to submit their opinion on several issues, including:
• How should we understand the notion of information that makes it possible 
to facilitate clarity, transparency and comprehension of NDC as part of this 
point?
• What should the main subject of the complementary guidelines concerning 
this information be? 
• How could the work be structured and carried out?
Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework on 
action and support in connection with Article 13 of the Paris Agreement (item 5 
on the agenda)582
Concerning this point, the informal note from the co-facilitators583 states that six 
informal consultations and an informal meeting took place. The Parties recognised 
the importance of transparency of action and support and demonstrated an urgency 
to begin technical work as quickly as possible and to engage in a debate on the 
items mentioned during the session dialogue. The Parties also supported the need 
to put a work plan into place, detailing the approach to organising the work, the 
tools to be used (submissions in advance of APA sessions, writing of a technical 
Article or a summary in the future, organising workshops in advance of each APA 
session) and the next steps (submissions of Party opinions and organisation of the 
workshop in advance of the next APA session).
In preparation for the 3rd part of the 1st session of the APA (May 2017), the 
APA notably invited the Parties to submit their opinion584:
• Before 1 April 2017, on the items concerning item 3 on the agenda of the 
“Guidelines in connection with the sections on mitigation of Decision 1/CP.21” 
mentioned above.
581. APA, 2016b.
582. APA, 2016c.
583. APA, 2016c.
584. FCCC/ /APA/2016/4.
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• Before 15 February 2017, on the items concerning item 5 of the agenda on 
the “modalities, procedures and guidelines for transparency framework on 
action and received support” and notably on the following questions:
 – a) What should the exact items of modalities, procedures and guidelines 
be with a view to transparency of measures and support, targeted in para-
graphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of Article 13?
 – b) According to which modalities of provisions relating to the transparency 
envisaged in accordance with the Convention, should the transparency 
framework be based on and strengthen, while knowing that these provisions 
will be part of the experience leveraged for the development of the afore-
mentioned modalities, procedures and guidelines?
 – c) As part of these modalities, procedures and guidelines, how can we ef-
fectively conserve a certain flexibility for developing country Parties that 
need them depending on their capacities?
 – d) What other items should be taken into consideration when developing 
the aforementioned modalities, procedures and guidelines?
3rd part of the 1st work session of the APA – APA1-3 (Conference  
in Bonn, May 2017)
New guidelines concerning the section of Decision 1/CP.21 relating to mitigation 
(item 3 on the agenda)
Concerning this point, the APA report on the second part of its first session585 
mentions in particular the following points for reflection: 
• The introduction of guidelines on information must take into account the 
variety of NDCs and must not negatively impact the definition/review of 
NDCs, nor represent a burden for the Parties. The issue arose of knowing if 
the guidelines should include a minimum level of information for all of the 
different NDCs. On the other hand, the consideration is launched for the 
sake of having common/differentiated guidelines according to the type of 
objectives set in the NDC, or depending if it concerns a developed country 
or a developing country (consideration of the obligatory/voluntary character 
of the guidelines and their awareness of national capacities and circumstances);
• The existence of a real need to understand the relationship between information 
on the clarity/transparencey and comprehension of NDCs and that linked to 
Article 13 of the Paris Agreement.
Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework on 
action and support in connection with Article 13 of the Paris Agreement (item 5 
on the agenda)
585. APA, 2017a.
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Concerning this point, as mentioned previously, an intersessional workshop 
took place ahead of the third part of the first session of the APA. The workshop 
took place from 16 to 18 March 2017 in Bonn, Germany, and welcomed more 
than 95 experts from 84 Parties and 11 regional groups. During this workshop, six 
technical sessions were carried out on the following themes586:
• Reports of national inventories on emissions by sources and removals by sinks 
of greenhouse gases (GHG) (Article 13 paragraph 7);
• Information necessary to track progress made in implementing and achieving 
its NDC (Article 13 paragraph 7);
• Information linked to the impacts and to the adaptation to climate change 
(Article 7);
• Information on the financial support, technical transfer and capacity-building 
provided, needed and received (Article 9 paragraph 11); 
• Technical Review by Experts;
• Multilateral review, oriented towards facilitation, progress made;
• Other elements considered in the development of the modalities, procedures 
and guidelines.
The final version of the informal note from the co-facilitators of the APA on 
item 5 on the agenda for the 3rd part of the first session587 includes a proposal of titles 
and subtitles for the modalities, procedures and guidelines. This document must serve 
as a basis for Party submissions, which should be presented by 30 September 2017. 
b.  Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological  
Advice (SBSTA)
The Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) is in charge of developing the 
modalities for measuring financial resources provided and mobilised by public 
interventions588. This work began during SBSTA44 in May 2016 in Bonn. During 
this first session, a presentation of the work undertaken by the SBSTA, the APA 
and the Standing Committee for Finance (SCF) on the subject was carried out by 
asking the Parties to submit their opinion on this subject. The figure below represents 
the progression of agreements on the transparency of support.
586. FCCC/APA/2017/INF.2.
587. APA, 2017b.
588. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 9, para. 7.
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Figure 24. Progression of agreements on the transparency of support589
SBSTA45 (COP 22, November 2016)
In the conclusions of its 45th session, the SBSTA590 encourages funds, programmes 
and specialised UN agencies, as well as other organisations, to shape the development 
of modalities. It also recognises the need for the swift development of these modal-
ities in a way that they are integrated into the strengthened transparency framework 
requesteed in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement and asks the facilitator of the SBSTA 
to organise consultations with the co-facilitators of the APA regarding their work 
on the development of modalities, procedures and guidelines for transparency 
framework. The SBSTA is also committed to taking the recommendations of the 
co-facilitators into account591, for example: defining what is though of as climate 
funding more clearly (for what type of activities and through which mechanisms), 
clearly identifying the measurement of climate funding provided regarding climate 
funding mobilised through public interventions, exploring the options available for 
strengthening and facilitating the access to and provision of information, providing 
more clarity on the type of public interventions that the Parties use for mobilising 
private climate funding (for example: capacity-building, technology transfer, public 
policies).
589. © Guide to negotiations of COP23-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2017, according to the UNFCCC 
[online] http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/items/8892.php
590. FCCC/SBSTA/2016/4.
591. SBSTA, 2016.
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SBSTA46 (Conference in Bonn, May 2017)
In their informal note592, the co-facilitators highlighted several points that were 
raised during the session discussions, including:
• Intersectoral considerations:
 – For each form of support, drafting a list of factors to take into account 
(year, currency, funding source, etc.);
 – Strengthening the electronic reporting that facilitates the supply of infor-
mation regarding projects/activities;
 – Taking lessons learned on measuring financial resources into account, 
both as part of the Convention and outside of it;
 – Defining the deadline and procedures for the incorporation of this SBSTA 
work into APA work.
• For climate funding from bilateral sources: strengthening the clarity of what 
each Party thinks of as climate funding;
• For climate funding from multilateral sources: differentiation of reporting 
depending on channels, strengthening the clarity of criteria used by the Parties 
and international financial institutions to identify the specific proportion linked 
to the climate of contributions and disbursements;
• For climate funding mobilised through public interventions: clear differentiation 
between provided and mobilised funding, development of a simple, standardised/
common reporting format to facilitate the consistency of quantitative reporting 
for Parties.
Development of initiatives supporting transparency
The importance of setting up a strengthened transparency framework under the Paris 
Agreement has resulted in the setting up of two different governmental initiatives 
described below, namely: the Capacity-Building Initiative for Transparency 
(CBIT) and the Initiative for Climate Action Transparency (ICAT). 
a. The Capacity-Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT)
Paragraph 84 of Decision 1/CP.21 records the establishment of a Capacity-Building 
Initiative for Transparency (CBIT) with the object of supporting developing 
countries in building institutional and technical capacities before 2020 and after 
this date. 
According to the same decision, the CBIT will aim to:
a. Strengthen national institutions for transparency-related activities in line with 
national priorities; 
b. Provide relevant tools, training and assistance for meeting the provisions stipulated 
in Article 13 of the Agreement; 
c. Assist in the improvement of transparency over time. 
592. SBSTA, 2017d.
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During COP22 in Marrakech, 11 countries (Australia, Canada, Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, 
the United States of America and the Walloon region (Belgium)) committed to 
funding a total of 50 million dollars to the CBIT. The Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) is in charge of supporting the implementation and tracking of the CBIT, 
in particular by allocating the voluntary contributions to developing country Parties. 
Three agencies can implement the CBIT funds: the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 
International Conservation.
The Global Coordination Platform (GCP) of the CBIT was launched in 
April 2017593 and has the aim of facilitating the exchange of information on CBIT 
projects across different countries, maximising opportunities for learning and 
strengthening coordination between stakeholders working on transparency 
through an online platform.
All developing countries are eligible for the CBIT. 
As of 3 October 2017, ten national projects and two global projects had 
already been approved by the GEF as part of the CBIT594, of which the list below 
is an example:
Country Project
South Africa Capacity-building programme to implement the National Climate System  of South Africa
Cambodia Capacity-building in the sectors of agriculture and land use to strengthen transparency in the implementation and monitoring of the NDC of Cambodia.
Chile Strengthening of the transparency framework of the NDC of Chile
Costa Rica Integrated System for Reporting and Transparency of Costa Rica
Ghana National capacity-building in Ghana for an ambitious and transparent climate reporting. 
Kenya
Strengthening of National Kenyan Institutions in order to meet the Paris 
Agreement requisite of transparency and share good practices in the region  
of East Africa.
Mongolia
Capacity-building in the sectors of agriculture and land use in Mongolia to 
strengthen transparency in the implementation and monitoring of the NDC  
of Mongolia as part of the Paris Agreement.
Uganda Capacity-building of Ugandan Institutions in order to conform with the Paris Agreement requisite of transparency. 
Papua New Guinea 
Capacity-building in the sectors of agriculture and land use to strengthen 
transparency in the implementation and monitoring of the NDC of Papua  
New Guinea as part of the Paris Agreement.
Uruguay Institutional and technical capacity-building to strengthen transparency  as part of the Paris Agreement.
Global level CBIT Global Coordination Platform
Global level Capacity-building for strengthened capacity in the Land Use, Land Use  Changes and Forestry (LULUCF) sector
593. GEF, 2017a.
594. Source: CBIT Projects database [online] https://www.thegef.org/projects
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Other funding partners have highlighted their intention to dedicate resources 
to the CBIT for the 2018 programme595. Furthermore, the GEF is continuing 
consultations with the UNFCCC in order to ensure adequate awareness of the 
Initiative as part of the seventh GEF resource replenishment operation596. 
Lastly, the evaluation of the implementation of the CBIT set out by paragraph 87 
of Decision 1/CP.21 must be carried out before 2021597. 
b. Initiative for Climate Action Transparency (ICAT)
A combination of governments (Germany, Italy) and NGO (Children’s Investment 
Fund Foundation (CIFF), Climateworks Foundation) have committed up to 16 
million dollars for an Initiative for Climate Action Transparency (ICAT). The aim 
of the initiative is to provide all policymakers with the tools and support required 
to measure and assess the effects of their climate actions. 
ICAT provides recommendations and supports capacity-building as well as 
knowledge sharing. The recommendations concern different topics organised into 
3 categories:
• Greenhouse gases (GHG): renewable energies, building energy efficiency, 
agriculture, forest sector, transport pricing;
• Evaluation of impacts: transformational change, sustainable development;
• Support: non-State and sub-national action, stakeholder participation and 
technical review. 
The aim of ICAT is to work with 20 to 30 countries. Up until now the 
following countries have accepted the invitation to participate in the Initiative598: 
Cambodia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Equador, Ghana, India, 
Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Tanzania. 
On 26 July, the first version of the recommendations (ICAT Guidance) for the 
different topics mentioned above was opened up for public consultation599, until 
24 September 2017600.
Barriers to overcome
Several barriers linked to reporting and transparency were already identified ahead 
of the Paris Agreement. They particularly concern the availability and clarity of 
information required and communicated and also the lack of reporting and 
classification methods for different activities related to climate change. 
595. UNFCCC, 2017a.
596. GEF, 2017b.
597. UNFCCC, 2017a.
598. GEF, 2017b.
599. Initiative for Climate Action Transparency Guidance – Public Consultation [online] 
https://collaborase.com/icat
600. ICAT, 2017.
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However, although an internal record on monitoring mitigation actions 
already exists within the UNFCCC, there is currently no agreement on how to 
monitor and assess adaptation actions. Incidentally, there is no agreement on the 
factors that demonstrate successful adaptation. The new transparency mechanism 
must therefore take these aspects into account.
Furthermore, until the Paris Agreement, the issue of estimating and calculating 
climate funding had only been approached a few times. Only the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and research institutions 
such as the Climate Policy Initiative have tried to define a methodology for calcu-
lating “mobilised climate funding” but this methodology has not been formally 
validated by the Parties and is openly criticised by certain developing countries. 
The SBSTA must therefore work on defining rules and methodologies without 
basing them on possible existing internal UNFCCC procedures. Moreover, in 
addition to the need to establish the rules and methodology for reporting climate 
financing, it also remains to establish a shared vision of the concepts introduced by 
the Paris Agreement. For example, the concepts of “progress in line with previous 
efforts” and the “provision of scaled-up financial resources”. Beyond financial 
means, efforts in terms of technical support and capacity-building must also be 
monitored. 
As mentioned previously, different UNFCCC working groups focus on these 
issues, but several issues have emerged as part of these different working groups, 
including: 
• How to guarantee sufficient detailed information is provided that allows for 
precise and consistent monitoring, without the transparency mechanism 
becoming a burden for the Parties? In fact, detailed information may be costly, 
even if it makes it possible to increase pressure in favour of more ambitious 
commitment during the next NDC review cycle. The issue of differentiation 
is closely linked to this matter, although it is accepted that the Least Developed 
Countries (LDC), the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and African 
countries should benefit from less strict regulation; 
• Given the large differences between the types of commitment made in the 
NDC, how can we ensure information is provided that makes it possible to 
compare Parties? 
• In principle, transparency of support may enable us to put pressure on the 
donor countries in order to mobilise additional resources. Transparency of 
mitigation measures should make it possible to put pressure on countries 
so that they  increase their concrete measures during the NDC review. 
Nevertheless, this will depend on the external and internal pressure placed 
upon that governments, which will depend on the strength/weakness of the 
environmental NGOs as well as the importance the electorate places on the 
issue of climate change.
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COP23 Standing Committee work programme
In order to prepare for the 4th part of the first session of the APA, which will take 
place during COP23 in Bonn from 6 to 17 November 2017, it is envisaged that 
the Secretariat of the Convention will organise, under the aegis of the co-facilitators 
of the APA, a pre-session round table on 4 and 5 November 2017601. The planned 
agenda for these two dates is as follows602: 
• 4 November 2017: transparency of support provided and received; technical 
expert review and multilateral review of progress achieved, focused on facilitation 
(focus on transparency of support for the two latter); 
• 5 November 2017: transparency of action related to mitigation and adaptation.
The negotiations that will take place during COP23 will represent a key 
intermediary step since the aim is to have clear guidelines concerning the imple-
mentation of the Paris Agreement for 2018. Before then, Party submissions are 
expected for the following deadlines:
• APA – New guidelines concerning the section of Decision 1/CP.21 relating to 
mitigation (item 3 on the agenda): 15 September 2017;
• APA – Modalities, procedures and directives for the transparency framework 
on action and support related to Article 13 of the Paris Agreement (item 5 on 
the agenda): 30 September 2017;
• SBSTA47: No submission. The last submissions were made in March 2017.
I.13. facilitation dialogue
The Party States to the Convention submitted their national development plans 
ahead of the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties (COP21), as a voluntary 
contribution to the global effort to reduce greenhouse gases (GHG) (generally by 
2025 or 2030). However, the sum of these Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDC) positions us on a global warming trajectory of close to 3°C by around 2100603.  
Consequently, in order to achieve the Paris Agreement objectives, it is essential 
that the States reevaluate their goals as soon as possible. By 2020, the States are 
invited to: 
• communicate a new NDC; 
• communicate their NDC again; or
• update their NDC.
The 2018 facilitation dialogue has been established by Decision 1/CP.21 with 
the aim of providing an opportunity to present information, conditions and 
required political signals so that the States can scale up their goals by 2020604. This 
601. UNFCCC, 2017a.
602. FCCC/APA/2017/2.
603. UNFCCC, 2016a.
604. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 20.
157
Guide to the Negotiations - UNFCCC (COP23) - OIF/IFDD, 2017
is a key process for determining and implementing several measures that aim to 
progress action plans in terms of climate change, which will also contribute to the 
advancement of various objectives related to sustainable development and welfare.
The facilitation dialogue between Parties aims to take stock in 2018 of collective 
efforts made by the Parties in order to reach the long term objective announced in 
paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Agreement and to ensure clarity during the drafting 
of NDCs in accordance with paragraph 8 of Article 4 of the Agreement. It will also 
involve taking stock of the readiness of modalities and rules for the effective imple-
mentation of the Paris Agreement in good time.
In Marrakech, the COP has asked the COP22 chairperson, in collaboration 
with the chairperson of COP23, to lead open and transparent consultations with 
the Parties on the subject of organising the facilitation dialogue and to jointly 
report on the preparations of this dialogue to COP23.
These consultations began during the sessions of subsidiary bodies in May 
2017, and will continue up to and including COP23605.
I.14. Ongoing Climate Initiatives
The Paris Agreement, which was been adopted by 195 nations in 2015, is both 
historic and universal, in the sense that it unites for the first time ever all the Party 
States to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
Reinforcing this universal character on an intergovernmental level, it furthermore 
translates into efforts committed by a plethora of stakeholders, both governmental 
and non-governmental, in favour of strengthened international climate action (see 
also Section I.11). Monitoring mobilisation and actions is important as they are 
fundamental for reaching and strengthening the goals associated with the Paris 
Agreement. This part of the document presents a summary of major initiatives 
committed on the fringe of the Paris Agreement adoption by a number of significant 
stakeholders: governments, businesses, cities, local authorities, regions, civil society 
investors and organisations, etc. This diverse range of involved stakeholders, as well 
as the multiple ongoing initiatives, are today considered vital in the fight against 
climate change on an international level. 
Taking into account the lack of ambition from the Party States characterised 
by the low number of commitments made through their Nationally Determined 
Contributions (NDC) (see also Section I.4 or Section I.5), this array of initiatives 
taken by non-Party stakeholders makes it possible to reduce the gap between the 
objectives set by the Paris Agreement and achieving them, via multi-stakeholder 
cooperation. The following paragraphs also make it possible to demonstrate the 
fact that these initiatives are a way to respond to multiple aspects of the fight 
against climate change, in the short-, medium- and long-term, under a global and 
605. Decision 1/CP.22, para. 16.
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multi-sectoral approach (be it in the area of mitigation, adaptation, funding, resilience, 
etc.; through actions relating to the areas of agriculture, food, health, energy, water, 
oceans, etc.).
1. Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP)606: The Adap-
tation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme was launched in 2012 by the 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) in order to improve 
the resilience of small agricultural producers to agricultural change. The aim 
being to help the producers financially so that they can access information, 
tools and technologies that enable them to strengthen their resilience to climate 
change. According to the IFAD terms, the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture 
Programme offers a new source of co-funding aiming to reproduce adaptation 
to climate change on a larger scale, which will be integrated into new IFAD 
investments, of an amount of approximately one billion US dollars (USD) per 
year. This programme falls within the standard investment processes of IFAD, 
with strict supervision and quality control schemes.
2. Adaptation of West African Coastal Areas607: This initiative, which is also called 
the West African Coast Management Programme, aims to reduce the areas 
considered to be “hot spots” for coastal erosion by 30% by 2020 and by 70% 
by 2025 in West Africa. It simultaneously aims to protect 30% of the population 
in flood zones that are considered a priority by 2020 and 70% by 2025 in the 
coastal regions of West Africa608. 
3. Africa Clean Energy Corridor Initiative609: The aim of this initiative is to meet 
half of the total electricity demand using renewable, clean, indigenous and 
cost-effective resources in East and South African regions by 2030. The initiative 
mobilises countries from the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) and those 
from the Eastern Africa Power Pool (EAPP). 
4. African Package for Climate-Resilient Ocean Economies610, 611: Through 
this initiative, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
(FAO), the World Bank and the African Development Bank (AfDB) announced 
their ambitious technical and financial assistance to support ocean economies 
in Africa and strengthen resilience to climate change in coastal areas. The initiative 
has a mobilisation goal of 3.5 billion US dollars (USD) to support, between 
2016 and 2021, action for oceans and climate, as well as a vision of action on 
ocean and climate over the next five years for six oceans.
606. https://www.ifad.org/documents/10180/db6939a1-35f0-4bb6-87cf-377ccfc605d4
607. http://www.banquemondiale.org/fr/programs/west-africa-coastal-areas-management- 
program
608. http://www.banquemondiale.org/fr/news/infographic/2016/09/01/saving-west-africas- 
coastal-assets
609. http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/ACEC_brochure_2014_
FR.pdf
610. Courtesy French translation provided by this Guide.
611. http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6441e.pdf
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5. Blue Growth Initiative612: Launched in 2013 by the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and its partners (UNDP, 
NORAD613, WWF, UNEP, ICFA614, Maritime Security Committee, GEF, 
World Bank, the Netherlands), it aims to strengthen resilience among coastal 
collectives and to restore potential fishing and aquaculture productivity in order 
to support food safety, reduction in poverty and the sustainable development 
of aquatic resources in the following developing countries: Algeria, Bangladesh, 
Cape Verde, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Morocco, Mauritania, Senegal and 
the Seychelles. Furthermore, the initiative aims to reduce CO2 emissions by 
10% in five years and 25% in 10 years and to reduce overfishing by 20% in five 
years and 50% in ten years in 10 countries. 
6. Bonn Challenge615: Launched by Germany and the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in 2011, the initiative aims to restore 150 
million hectares of deforested and degraded land on an international level by 
2020. In 2014, the United Nations Climate Summit brought about the objective 
of 350 million hectares by 2030. The 21st session of the Conference of the Par-
ties (COP21) in 2015 gave a new drive to this initiative. Burundi, Honduras, 
India, three Mexican states, a province in Pakistan and the company Asia Pulp 
& Paper have promised to restore 18 million hectares, bringing the promised 
amount to 86 million hectares.
7. Carbon Neutral Cities Alliance616: This initiative was launched in 2014 in 
Copenhagen and brings together cities committed to achieving long term 
objectives by drastically reducing CO2, 80% by 2050. The alliance aims to 
provide solutions to large cities in order to make it possible to focus on ambitious 
levels of reduction and generate collaboration in order to reach their respective 
objectives in a more efficient manner.
8. Caring For Climate617, 618: Launched during COP21, Caring for Climate619 is 
one of the largest global coalitions of businesses committed to the fight against 
climate change. As of 3 October 2017, the initiative included more than 
450 organisations620. The objectives pursued aim to improve energy efficiency, 
reduce carbon footprints and publicly and annually report on progress made. 
612. http://www.fao.org/asiapacific/perspectives/blue-growth/fr/
613. Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, NORAD.
614. International Coalition of Fisheries Associations.
615. http://www.bonnchallenge.org/
616. http://usdn.org/public/Carbon-Neutral-Cities.html
617. Courtesy French translation provided by this Guide.
618. http://caringforclimate.org/about/
619. The Caring for Climate coalition is a member of the organisation Global Compact, 
launched by the United Nations in 2000, which has the objective of encouraging 
businesses from around the world to promote the key principles of the United Nations 
such as human rights, being socially responsible, respecting international norms and 
laws related to work, protecting the environment and not resorting to corruption. 
620. http://caringforclimate.org/about/list-of-signatories/
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9. Blue Belt Initiative621: On the initiative of the Kingdom of Morocco, this 
initiative aims to build resilience within coastal communities and to promote 
sustainable fishing and aquaculture, in accordance with targets set out by 
Sustainable Development Goal 14 (SDG 14), which specifically aims to conserve 
and sustainably exploit the oceans, seas and marine resources622.
10. Cities Climate Finance Leadership Alliance623: This initiative has the goal 
of catalysing and expediting the flow of additional capital in cities, optimising 
investments in low-carbon, climate-resistant infrastructures and bridging the 
investment gap in urban areas by 2030.
11. Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems (CREWS)624: The objective of 
this initiative is to increase the capacity to produce and communicate effective 
information on the risks linked to the impact of dangerous hydrometeorological 
and climate phenomena in Least Developed Countries (LDC) and Small 
Island Developing States (SIDS). This initiative, founded on the results, aims 
to ensure that the LDCs and SIDS affected have “at least a modest” early 
warning and risk information system. By 2020, 100 million US dollars 
(USD) should be mobilised asd part of the initiative to bridge the gaps in 
existing programmes625. It is also envisaged that a Trust Fund will be set up, 
managed by the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery.
12. Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC)626: An initiative aiming to 
strengthen cooperation between governmental and non-governmental partners 
in order to undertake actions aiming to reduce short-lived climate pollutants 
(specifically black carbon, methane and hydrofluorocarbons) to considerably 
reduce global warming in the short term. The objectives of this initiative 
fall within those of the Paris Agreement and a large number of Sustainable 
Development Goals at the same time627.
13. Covenant of Mayors for Climate & Energy628: To reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by at least 20% by 2020 through the implementation of an action 
plan for sustainable energy adopted to the Council and to report on the progress 
made every two years.
621. http://www.laceinturebleue.org/
622. http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/fr/oceans/
623. http://www.citiesclimatefinance.org/
624. http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa-fr/resilience/risques-climatiques-et-systemes-d-alerte- 
precoce/
625. This sum is envisaged based on an estimation made by the Global Facility for Disaster 
Reduction and Recovery, the World Meteorological Organisation and the United Nations 
Office for Global Disaster Prevention, stating that it is the amount needed to achieve 
the objectives of the initiative.
626. http://www.ccacoalition.org/fr
627. http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/fr
628. http://www.covenantofmayors.eu/index_en.html 
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14. Divest-Invest Global Movement629, 630: This initiative consists in ensuring that 
a minimum of 5% of finance investment portfolios are made up of renewable 
products and clean energy through divestment and asset transfer in clean energy 
investments.
15. Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves631: A private-public initiative from 
the United Nations Foundation, which aims to achieve the objective “100 by 
2020”. In other terms, it is about equipping 100 million homes with clean 
cookstoves and clean and ecoenergy fuels by 2020. These objectives aim not 
only to combat climate change but also to improve the livelihoods of populations 
and their health, or even empower women. 
16. Global Geothermal Alliance (GGA)632: Aims to contribute to the realisation 
of the potential of geothermal energy in the long term to achieve a growth five 
times higher than the current capacity reached by the production of geothermal 
energy and to double the growth of geothermal heating by 2030. As for short 
term action, the objective is to develop and operationalise the Global Geothermal 
Alliance as a global platform for improved dialogue, knowledge sharing and 
coordinated action into order to address technical, regulatory, political and 
financial challenges for a higher penetration of geothermal energy in the global 
energy mix. The alliance includes 41 countries and 27 international partner 
institutions.
17. Food Security Climate Resilience Facility (FoodSECuRe)633, 634: Funds 
developed by the World Food Programme (WFP) to provide financial and 
programme support for actions developed by communities in order to strengthen 
climate resilience, reduce loss and damage and to improve the reinforcement 
of resilience during post-disaster recovery.
18. Global Resilience Partnership635, 636: Consists in identifying and expanding 
innovative resilience solutions in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and South and 
South-East Asia.
19. Water for Africa Initiative: Set up by the Kingdom of Morocco and supported 
by the African Development Bank (ADB), this initiative was launched at 
COP22, with the aim of bringing justice to Africa through the adoption of a 
specific action plan which will mobilise different political and financial partners, 
as well as those from international institutions. The three alliances for reservoirs, 
megacities and businesses, created at COP21 in Paris and strongly committed 
629. Courtesy French translation provided by this Guide.
630. http://divestinvest.org/
631. https://cleancookstoves.org/binary-data/RESOURCE/file/000/000/269-1.pdf
632. http://www.irena.org/gga/
633. Courtesy French translation provided by this Guide.
634. http://www.wfp.org/climate-change/initiatives/foodsecure
635. Courtesy French translation provided by this Guide.
636. http://www.globalresiliencepartnership.org
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to action on water and climate (which represent more than 450 organisations 
around the world today), signed a shared commitment that aims to jointly 
mobilise their partners, identify and disseminate good practices and support 
the development of new projects.
20. Initiative for the Adaptation of African Agriculture (AAA)637: This initiative 
aims to strengthen the resilience of African farmers by promoting sustainable 
soil management, better water management and risk management at the same 
time as personalised capacity, policy and funding mechanism development. 
The launch of the Global framework on water shortage helps countries to 
integrate climate change and the sustainable use of water into policies for 
agricultural sectors and cross-sectoral dialogue.
21. African Adaptation Initiative (AAI)638: Launched in December 2015 during 
COP21, the AAI aims to improve actions relating to adaptation and loss and 
damage in Africa. It is based on four pillars, which are (i) to strengthen climate 
information services; (ii) to strengthen political and institutional frameworks; 
(iii) to improve measures on the ground; and (iv) to strengthen funding and 
investment into climate adaptation. This initiative also aims to highlight the 
importance of strengthened action during the pre-2020 period. 
22. 4 to 1000 Initiative639: Launched by France as part of the Lima-Paris Action 
Agenda (LPAA), it aims to demonstrate – by drawing on scientific documen-
tation – that agricultural soils can play a crucial role in food safety and climate 
change, in particular by implementing concrete actions relating to carbon 
storage in soil and agricultural practices to do this.
23. Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI)640: An initiative led by the African 
Union Commission, the New Partnership for African Development, the Africa 
Group of Negotiators, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the International Renewable 
Energy Agency (IRENA). It aims to highlight the enormous potential of the 
continent in terms of renewable energies and aims to achieve a new and addi-
tional capacity of energy production from renewable sources of 10 GW by 
2020 and 300 GW by 2030. This will make it possible to guarantee universal 
access for African populations to sufficient quantities of clean, suitable and 
affordable energy. Furthermore, it aims to set up a favourable framework 
enabling the countries to make a technological leap, which will be a crucial 
advantage for achieving the objectives of the initiative. 
24. International Solar Alliance641: This Alliance was jointly launched by the 
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the President of the French 
Republic François Hollande in order to facilitate a “scaling up” in the deployment 
637. http://www.aaainitiative.org/fr/initiative
638. http://www.africaadaptationinitiative.org/iaa.html
639. http://4p1000.org/
640. http://www.arei.org/
641. http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/renewable-energy/international-solar-alliance/
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of solar energy in countries with strong sunshine. The objective targeted by 
the initiative is to mobilise substantial investments by 2030 (more than a bil-
lion US dollars) for the mass deployment of affordable solar energy. The alli-
ance currently includes 43 countries and several representatives from the pri-
vate sector642.
25. Life Beef Carbon643: The objectives of the project are to develop an action 
plan that aim to reduce the carbon footprint of beef production by 15% in 10 
years in four producer countries in Europe, namely France, Ireland, Italy and 
Spain.
26. Lima Challenge644: This initiative is associated with the New York Declaration, 
is an integral part of the LPAA, includes fourteen signatory countries645 and 
is financed by Germany, the United Kingdom and Norway. The main objective 
of the initiative is to “halve the rate of loss of natural forests globally by 2020 and 
strive to end natural forest loss by 2030”.
27. Maritime Regions in Action against Climate Change646: Launched by the 
European Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions (CPMR), the initiative 
aims to reduce emissions, develop sustainable energy solutions and carry out 
effect adaptation in maritime regions.
28. Promotion of Smart Agriculture towards climate change and agroecology 
transition in West Africa647: The programme aims to cause 25 million homes 
in West Africa to adopt agro-ecological practices by 2025.
29. RE100648: The initiative’s acronym in English, RE100 for Renewable Energy 
100%, refers to its ambitious objective, which aims to involve and support big 
businesses that have committed to using 100% renewable energy by 2020. 
Launched in 2014 at the climate summit, with 13 big businesses including 
IKEA and the insurer SWISS RE, the initiative brings together businesses 
from both developed countries and developing countries. The aim being that 
the first businesses to be committed will create a virtuous circle, encouraging 
others to join the initiative. In 2015, Chinese and Indian businesses joined 
this global effort. The RE100 initiative is managed by The Climate Group 
and the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP).
642. last consulted on 3 October 2017.
643. http://idele.fr/reseaux-et-partenariats/life-beef-carbon.html
644. http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/forest/lima-challenge-bridging-the-emissions-gap- 
by-forest-intervention/
645. Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guyana, Liberia, Nepal, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and the Philippines. 
646. http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/resilience/maritime-regions-in-action-against-cli-
mate-change/
647. http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa/agriculture/promotion-of-smart-agriculture-towards- 
climate-change-and-agro-ecology-transition-in-west-africa/
648. https://www.theclimategroup.org/RE100
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30. Low Carbon Technology Partnerships Initiative (LCTPi)649: An initiative 
managed by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, 
in partnership with the International Energy Agency and the Sustainable 
Development Solutions Network, which brings together 150 big businesses 
and 70 partners in order to expedite the development of low carbon techno-
logical solutions for the purposes of limiting the global average temperature 
increase to not more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. In total, the initiative 
aims to support the deployment of 1.5 TW of additional renewable energy on 
a global scale before 2025.
31. R4 – Rural Resilience Initiative650: Launched in 2011651 by the World Food 
Programme (WFP) and Oxfam America with the support of the insurance 
company Swiss Re, the aim of the initiative is to integrate systems for disaster 
risk management, microinsurance and livelihood diversification, savings and 
credit in productive safety net programmes, in order to increase the resilience 
of 100,000 farmers by 2017. The programme has been implemented in Ethiopia, 
Senegal, Malawi and Zambia. 
32. Save Food Initiative (called “SAVE FOOD”)652: The overall objective of this 
initiative is to reduce food waste globally in order to guarantee more productive, 
resilient and low-emission food systems. This initiative recognises that the 
loss of food and reduction of waste are cross-sectional problems in the context 
of climate action and offers a clear path to reducing emissions and stimulating 
resilience in food systems. The increase in the availability of food, through 
food loss and a reduction in waste is crucial to ensure food and nutritional 
safety and to contribute to strengthening adaptation measures, risk reduction and 
resilience in vulnerable populations and regions. Furthermore, repairing food 
loss and the challenge of waste through the deployment of climate technologies 
along the whole value chain presents an additional opportunity to improve 
the potential mitigation in food systems and to mobilise climate funding.
33. SIDS Lighthouses initiative653: Developed by IRENA for SIDS, this initiative 
plans to support the strategic deployment of renewable energy in SIDS 
through the mobilisation of USD 500 million, the deployment of 100 MW 
of extra energy produced by photovoltaic solar power and 20 MW of extra 
power produced by wind turbine, a significant number of small hydropower 
and geothermal energy projects, and the development by all SIDS of a roadmap 
for renewable energies. To achieve these objectives, the initiative will enable 
capacity building and encourage technology transfer and the development of 
methodologies for implementation. 
649. http://lctpi.wbcsd.org/the-solution/
650. http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa-fr/resilience/initiative-pour-la-resilience-rurale-r4/
651. https://www.wfp.org/climate-change/initiatives/r4-rural-resilience-initiative
652. https://www.save-food.org/
653. http://www.sids2014.org/index.php?page=view&type=1006&nr=2716&menu=1507
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34. 30 by 30654: Launched by the International Road Transport Union in November 
2009, this initiative constitutes a voluntary commitment from the road transport 
sector to reduce their emissions by 30% by 2030, in comparison with 2007 
as the reference year. To achieve this ambitious objective, the members of the 
International Road Transport Union want to promote investments in innovative 
engines and automotive technologies that could contribute to reducing fuel 
consumption and, consequently, CO2 emissions, eco-driving and even innovative 
logistics approaches.
35. The New York Declaration on Forests655: Adopted in 2014 by more than 
130 governments, private sector businesses and civil society organisations, the 
declaration provides for the target of reducing the loss of natural forests on 
a global scale by half by 2020 and end the loss of forests by 2030 including 
a potential annual reduction in greenhouse gas emissions between 4.5 and 
8.8 billion tonnes of CO2 by 2030.
36. Zero Deforestation Commitments from Commodity producers and traders656: 
This is about eliminating deforestation caused by the production of cash crps 
by 2020, also contributing to the set objective to end the loss of natural forests 
by 2030.
I.15. equality of the sexes in the context  
of climate change negotiations 
Context: “gender”, “gender equality” and climate
Gender reflects the analysis of the status of men and women, the qualities or 
characteristics that society ascribes to each sex, social relationships between 
women and men, and socio-cultural perceptions of gender657. Gender in the 
Paris Agreement is included under “gender equality”658
From a general point of view, the recognition of gender equality in the context 
of climate change involves recognising and taking into account the particular 
vulnerabilities of each gender faced with climate change, knowing that these tend 
to exacerbate existing social and economic inequalities. In fact, a significant num-
ber of studies have shown that women, who are generally more affected by poverty 
654. https://www.iru.org/sites/default/files/2016-01/en-g100129-30-by-30-resolution- 
2009_0.pdf
655. http://forestdeclaration.org/
656. http://newsroom.unfccc.int/lpaa-fr/forets/engagements-zero-deforestation-des-pro-
ducteurs-et-courtiers-de-commodites-agricoles/
657. United Nations Organisation for Agriculture. Why “gender”? [Online] 
http://www.fao.org/gender/gender-home/gender-why/pourquoi-parler-de-genre/fr
658. See above, box “Gender equality in the Paris Agreement”
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and precariousness, are also often more vulnerable to the consequences of climate 
change659. At the same time, it has been proven that the daily activities of women 
are closely linked to the environment and the climate and, that for this reason, 
they have an important role to play, in particular in the conservation and transfer 
of traditional techniques and local expertise that is generally more respectful of 
natural resources. This key role is also stressed in the education of children, with 
whom the future of sustainable and resilient development lie. In the context of 
international climate negotiations, the recognition of gender equality also involves 
supporting the participation and representation of women at negotiations and in 
international climate action. 
Gender and climate
The gender aspect is a cross-cutting issue that – although not always considered 
central in the history of negotiations – is of great importance nonetheless. In 
effect, taking into consideration the differentiated role of women and men 
would allow to better fight against climate change and better adapt to it. 
In numerous countries, in particular countries said to be developing (a fortiori 
the most vulnerable ones), women are the first victims of the consequences of 
climate change. It is they who cook, fetch wood and bring water. It is therefore 
women who should be given priority when it comes to raising awareness of energy 
conservation. They are the first to benefit from the introduction of renewable 
energy, and also the first to suffer from scarcer water resources or environ-
mental deterioration in general. In their central role as educators of children, 
they are also at the forefront of awareness and education for future generations.
Better representation of women among negotiators and inside the different 
organisations created as a result of the Convention would also improve recog-
nition of their crucial role. That being said, it must be noted that, for the time 
being there is unanimous agreement that not enough progress has been made 
on advancing gender equality. 
On the other hand, the question of gender has been, for now, essentially dealt 
with from an organisational point of view whilst many consider that only a global 
approach would be fit for the issue.
Recognising and taking into account issues relating to 
gender and gender equality in international negotiations
The topic of gender became a factor in 1992, during the international Conference 
in Rio, notably through the adoption of Agenda 21, which, even then, identified 
women as one of the “main groups” in civil society whose participation was deemed 
659. See in particular: http://unfccc.int/files/gender_and_climate_change/application/pdf/ 
educposters_frelight.pdf
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essential to the realisation of sustainable development660. For this reason, Chapter 
24 of the document “Global action for women towards sustainable and equitable 
development,”661 was dedicated to them.
The issue of participation and representation of women in international nego-
tiations also very quickly became apparent. It first came up in the Beijing Declaration 
at the fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, which notably states that, 
“the reinforcement of power of action of women and their full participation on the basis 
of equality in all fields of social life,including decision making and access to power are 
essential conditions for equality, development and peace”662.
Based on the Beijing Declaration, the 7th session of the Conference of the 
Parties (COP7, held in Marrakech in 2001) to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) put forward the need to have a more 
balanced representation of men and women among the elected members f the 
bodies created under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol663. 
Other than the question of parity in decision instances, equality of sexes 
appears more generally as linked to efficiency of climate action. Thus, in the Cancún 
Agreements, in 2010, the COP recognised that “equality of sexes and effective par-
ticipation of […] are of great importance to act efficiently on all aspects of climate 
change664”. During COP17 in 2011, the Secretariat was asked to include the appli-
cation of methods and tools that respect gender equality665 among the cross-sector 
issues, in the framework of the Nairobi Work Programme on impacts, vulnerabil-
ity and adaptation to climate change. 
During COP18 (held in Doha in 2012), the Parties acknowledged that 
women continued to be under-represented in international negotiations. To remedy 
this situation, the Parties adopted a decision that set the goal of achieving a gender 
balance within the negotiation and decision-making bodies666.
In the same decision, the COP established ways of monitoring the implemen-
tation of this objective, in particular by asking the Secretariat of the Convention667 to:
• Maintain information on the gender composition of constituted bodies estab-
lished under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, including information 
on the representation of women from regional groups;
• Gather information on the gender composition of delegations to sessions under 
the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol;
660. United Nations, 1992b. Agenda 21, Chapter 23.
661. United Nations, 1992b. Agenda 21, Chapter 24.
662. United Nations, 1995, Annex 1, para. 13.
663. Decision 36/CP.7.
664. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 7.
665. Decision 6/CP.17.
666. Decision 23/CP.18.
667. Decision 23/CP.18 para. 8.
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• Report this information to the Conference of the Parties for its consideration 
on an annual basis, in order to enable the tracking of progress made towards 
the goal of gender balance in advancing gender-sensitive climate policy.
Ever since, each year, the secretariat produces a report on gender composition 
enabling us to monitor progress made668. Even so, beyond the commitments 
made, there is still a long way to go.
Still an uneven split between men  
and women in the incorporated bodies
The first report669 produced by the Secretariat was presented during COP19 
(held in Warsaw in 2013). Assessing the year 2013, it confirmed that equality 
was only achieved in one body670 and that on average, women represented just 
23% of the headcount in organisations incorporated into the Convention and 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
On the eve of COP21, held in Paris in 2015, the report on gender composition, 
assessing the same year, showed that equality was not achieved in any body incor-
porated in the Convention or the Kyoto Protocol671. The highest proportion of 
women in 2015, as a percentage, was around 40% in the Joint Implementation 
Supervisory Committee and the Compliance Committee facilitative branch. 
During COP22 (held in Marrakech in 2016), the Secretariat’s report672 showed 
that in 2016, the proportion of women ranged from 52% (in the Consultative 
Group of Experts (CGE) on National Communications from Parties not included 
in Annex I to the Convention) to 10% (in the Executive Board of the Clean devel-
opment mechanism and the enforcement branch of the Compliance committee)673. 
In comparison with 2015, the rate of representation of women increased in four 
incorporated bodies (up to 19% in the Consultative Group of Experts and the 
Advisory Board of the Climate Technology Centre and Network). In all other 
incorporated bodies, the rate of representation remained unchanged or had 
decreased.
Furthermore, decision 23/CP.18, adopted in 2012, seeks to make sure that 
policies on climate change respond to the differing needs of men and women in 
national and local contexts674. Likewise, the decision aims particularly to ensure 
that the needs of women and men are addressed equally in a more effective climate 
change policy675.
668. In accordance with Decisions 23/CP.18 and 18/CP.20.
669. FCCC/CP/2013/4.
670. The Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) on National Communications from Parties 
not included in Annex I to the Convention.
671. UNFCCC, 2015b, See Table 1, p. 4-5.
672. FCCC/CP/2016/4 [online] http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/cop22/fre/04f.pdf
673. FCCC/CP/2016/4. p. 6 [online] http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2016/cop22/fre/04f.pdf
674. Decision 23/CP.18.
675. Decision 23/CP.18, para. 2.
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Another achievement of COP18 was the acknowledgement, in the Doha 
programme on Article 6 of the Convention, of the issue of gender as a cross-sector 
issue concerning all the items of this Article, namely:
• public awareness and education programmed on climate change and its effects; 
• public access to information concerning climate change and its effects; 
• public participation in the review of climate change and its effects and the 
development of appropriate measures for combating it; 
• training of scientific, technical and management staff; 
• international cooperation in terms of design and exchange of materials for 
public awareness and education on climate change and its effects, and educa-
tional and training programmes676.
In another sign of the growing recognition of the central importance of gender 
balance, COP18 planned to organise a first workshop on gender, which became a 
full item on the agenda. To solidify the result of Doha, the aforementioned workshop 
took place in November 2013 in Warsaw677. 
Work generating the results of COP21 and the inclusion 
of gender equality in the Paris Agreement
Following the work conducted under the aegis of the Subsidiary Body for 
Implementation (SBI) in 2014, COP20 established the Lima work programme on 
gender for a two-year period678. The objective was to carry out a review in 2016, 
during COP22679, “with a view to taking any necessary action needed to strengthen 
the progress of furthering these goals”680. The adopted Decision recommends the Parties, 
on the one hand “advance gender balance”, in particular through the representation 
of women in bodies created in accordance with the Convention (and the Kyoto 
Protocol) and, on the other hand, “achieve gender-responsive climate policy in all 
relevant activities under the Convention”681.
As such, the need to expand the framework on gender in the context of climate 
change was highlighted by going beyond the simple participation of women in 
activities relating to climate action. The Conference of Lima was also an occasion 
to encourage various bodies created under the Convention, such as the Global 
Environment Facility and the Green Climate Fund, to integrate or reinforce inte-
gration of issues of gender in their activities682. 
676. Decision 15/CP.18, Annex para. 8.
677. UNFCCC, 2013c.
678. Decision 18/CP.20, Preamble.
679. See above, “Further work on gender and equality between men and women following 
the Paris results”.
680. Decision 18/CP.20, para. 16.
681. Decision 18/CP.20, Preamble.
682. Decision 8/CP.20, paras. 17 and 18.
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The Lima Work Programme also asked the Secretariat to organise two workshops 
in order to continue actions relating to gender by highlighting mitigation683 and 
adaptation684 at the same time.
Results of the workshops set up as part of the Lima  
Work Programme relating to gender by the intermediary SBI 
The first workshop was organised in Bonn in June 2015, during the 42nd session 
of the SBI. This workshop particularly focused on the policies relating to climate 
change that encouraged gender equality, by highlighting mitigation and the devel-
opment and transfer of technology. The question of definition of terms linked 
to the subject of gender was also dealt with. The report on the workshop685 was 
considered by the SBI during its 43rd session, held simultaneously with COP21686. 
The SBI’s main conclusions concerned the organisation of training and awareness 
building activities on issues related to gender and climate change, while stressing 
the efforts to step up existing work in the areas of adaptation, mitigation, funding, 
technology and capacity-building. The report also recapped the need to implement 
sensitive and appropriate actions on gender in these particular fields.687.
The second workshop was scheduled for May 2016, adhering to the continuity 
of the programme mentioned above, to focus in particular on adaptation, capacity- 
building and training of stakeholder representatives working on gender related 
issues. For its part, the Secretariat prepared a technical report on the directives 
and other tools designed to ensure the integration of questions of gender in 
activities related to climate change in April 2016688 for review by the SBI at its 
44th. session, during the Bonn Conference in May 2016. On Thursday 26 May, the 
SBI plenary session adopted thesee conclusions689, among which690, the SBI:
• expresses its appreciation for the two-year Lima Work Programme on Gender 
and the comments received in support of the programme;
• expresses its support for the continuation and strengthening of the work  
programme;
• asks the Parties and observers to provide information on progress towards 
achieving the gender balance objectives and gender-sensitive climate policy;
• agrees to continue to examine this issue [...] with a view to preparing a draft 
decision for review during COP22.
The result of this meeting is the culmination of a long process, for which hopes are 
running high, especially as a draft decision is included in the schedule for COP22.
683. Decision 18/CP.20, para. 11.
684. Decision 18/CP.20, para. 12.
685. FCCC/SBI/2015/12.
686. Decision 18/CP.20, para. 11.
687. FCCC/SBI/2015/L.31, para. 6 [online] http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/sbi/eng/ 
l31f.pdf
688. UNFCCC, 2016e.
689. FCCC/SBI/2016/L.16.
690. Report of the Bonn Climate Change Conference: 16-26 May 2016. Earth Negotiations 
Bulletin, Vol. 12 n° 676 pp. 16-17 [online] 
http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12676f.pdf
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With the biennial Lima work programme, it has become evident that the 
topic of gender equality constitutes a broad consensus, both on behalf of developed 
countries and developing countries, as a general principle and driver. Numerous 
Parties, including the countries of the Independent Alliance of Latin America and 
the Caribbean (AILAC), the Like Minded Group of States (LMDC), the LDC, 
Switzerland, Norway, Australia and Turkey, had thus made a call in September 
2015 to include gender equality in the preamble of the Paris agreement691. The EU 
and India had already made similar calls in June 2015692. The EU, the Africa Group 
of Negotiators (AGN) and even AILAC, among others, had also requested that it 
appear in the objectives693. These proposals were included in the draft agreement694 
written during the 11th part of the 2nd session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, which was held in Bonn from 19 to 
23 October 2015.
In the end, in the final version of the Paris Agreement, the word “gender” was 
replaced by “gender equality”, to ensure recognition of the necessary equal involvement 
of both sexes in combating climate change, in the essential adaptation to it, and in 
the capacity-building topic.
Gender equality in the Paris Agreement
Decision 1/CP.21 includes the topic of gender equality and the empowerment 
of women, by “Acknowledging that climate change is a common concern of humankind, 
Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and 
consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of 
indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and 
people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, 
empowerment of women and intergenerational equity”695.
This text is recalled from the preamble of the Paris Agreement, the Parties being 
aware that “climate change is a common concern of humankind, Parties should, when 
taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider their respective 
obligations on [...] gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity”696.
In Article 7 of the Agreement, which establishes the global goal on adaptation, “Parties 
acknowledge that adaptation action should follow a country-driven, gender-responsive, 
participatory and fully transparent approach, taking into consideration vulnerable 
groups, communities and ecosystems, and should be based on and guided by the best 
available science and, as appropriate, traditional knowledge, knowledge of indigenous 
peoples and local knowledge systems, with a view to integrating adaptation into relevant 
socio-economic and environmental policies and actions, where appropriate”697.
691. IIDD 2015c, p. 4.
692. IIDD, 2015d, p. 5.
693. IIDD, 2015c, p. 5.
694. ADP, 2015.
695. Decision 1/CP.21.
696. Decision 1/CP.21, Preamble of the Paris Agreement.
697. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 7, para. 5.
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Finally, the topic of gender equality is included in Article 11, which addresses 
capacity-building, and which should in particular “be guided by lessons learned,  
including those from capacity-building activities under the Convention, and should be an 
effective, iterative process that is participatory, cross-cutting and gender-responsive”698.
further work on gender and equality between men 
and women following the Paris results 
With COP21, the Parties to the UNFCCC recognised once again the importance 
of involving women and men on an equal footing in processes related to the 
Convention as well as in the creation and implementation of climate policies, this 
time on the basis of a strict acceptance of “gender equality”. Since 2012, the issue 
of gender and gender equality has been a whole topic of negotiations (notably 
being listed on the agenda of COPs and sessions of the SBI) and numerous efforts 
have already been made. COP21 confirmed the importance of the issue through 
the treatment of gender equality across the board in the Paris Agreement.
COP22 was expected to take stock of the progress of actions carried out on 
this topic, notably in the review of the Lima Work Programme relating to gender699. 
The Conference in Marrakech was an opportunity to strengthen the position 
taken around gender and gender equality, which has notably been conveyed by the 
organisation through a day specially dedicated to the topic700. 
Following COP22, the Parties decided to continue and strengthen the Lima 
Work Programme on gender for a period of three years, with the aim to undertake 
a new review of the work programme at COP25 (in 2019)701. All points relating 
to the continuation of this work programme are contained in Decision 21/CP.22 
between paragraphs 7 and 30. In a non-exhaustive manner:
• The Parties are invited to continue to assist the activities of training and awareness- 
raising for gender balance702 as well as building the skills and capacity of their 
female delegates to participate effectively in UNFCCC meetings703 (with a 
special focus on training and capacity-building for delegates from Parties that 
are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change704);
698. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, art. 11, para. 1.
699. Decision 18/CP.20, para. 16.
700. http://unfccc.int/gender_and_climate_change/items/9948.php
701. Decision 21/CP.22 para. 6.
702. Decision 21/CP.22. para. 7(a).
703. Decision 21/CP.22. para. 7(b).
704. Decision 21/CP.22 para. 8.
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• It is decided that annual in-session workshops will be held in conjunction 
with the sessions of the subsidiary bodies in the first sessional period of 2018 
and 2019705. The topics of these workshops should be elaborated during 2017 
by the SBI to be reviewed during COP23706;
• It is requested that the secretariat to prepare a technical paper identifying 
entry points for integrating gender considerations in workstreams under the 
UNFCCC process for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Implementation 
at its forty-eighth session (April–May 2018)707;
• It is requested that the secretariat prepares a technical paper on achieving the 
goal of gender balance708 for consideration by COP23709;
• It is requested that the SBI develops “a gender action plan in order to support 
the implementation of gender-related decisions and mandates under the UNFCCC 
process, which may include priority areas, key activities and indicators, timelines for 
implementation, the responsible and key actors and indicative resource requirements 
for each activity, and further elaborate its process of review and monitoring”710. 
A first workshop was organised by the Secretariat (in cooperation with the 
Parties, interested observers and other bodies) during the 46th session of the 
Subsidiary Bodies (May 2017) to define possible items of the aforementioned 
action plan, in order to be considered by the SBI at its 47th session (November 
2017).
An initial session of workshops was organised on 10 and 11 May 2017711, in 
Bonn, during the 46th session of the SBI712, on the possible items on a gender 
action plan713. The Parties714, as well as observers and other stakeholders715, were 
invited to submit their views. The follow-up to this workshop is planned during 
the 47th session of the SBI, in November 2017, at the same time as COP23.
705. Decision 21/CP.22 para. 11.
706. Decision 21/CP.22 para. 12.
707. Decision 21/CP.22 para. 13.
708. As mandated by Decisions 36/CP.7, 1/CP.16 and 23/CP.18.
709. Decision 21/CP.22 para. 20.
710. Decision 21/CP.22 para. 27.
711. http://unfccc.int/gender_and_climate_change/items/10289.php
712. FCCC/SBI/2017/1.
713. The programme of events and notes are available at this address: http://unfccc.int/files/
gender_and_climate_change/application/pdf/sbi46_ws_gender_provprog_v1.pdf
714. Available at the following address: http://unfccc.int/documentation/submissions_
from_parties/items/5900.php
715. Available at the following address: http://unfccc.int/documentation/submissions_
from_non-party_stakeholders/items/7481.php
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More generally, COP23 will be an opportunity to continue work on the topic 
of gender and gender equality, as there are a certain number of unresolved points. 
That being said, despite all the good intentions that have been declared, it should 
be noted that efforts to promote the realisation of set objectives in terms of gender 
and gender equality remain significant while from an overall point of view (beyond 
international negotiations on climate), awareness of the issue is taking a more and 
more prominent role.
Issues relating to gender and gender equality, widely  
recognised issues, beyond international negotiations on climate
Beyond the progress of the Paris Agreement, 2015 was a landmark year for 
recognition and awareness of the topic of gender equality on an international 
level. In fact, 2015 was also marked by the adoption by the United Nations, on 
25 September, of a 2030 agenda for sustainable development (2030 Agenda), which 
is set out in a document with the title “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda 
for Sustainable Development”716. Following on from the Millenium Development 
Goals, this programme rolled out 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) 
accompanied by 169 targets for achieving them. 
Figure 25. The SDG, Goal 5: Gender equality717
716. United Nations, 2015.
717. UN Women, 2015, p. 4-5.
The rest of the text page 175
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Among these SDGs, there is a separate objective that aims to Achieve gender 
equality and empower all women and girls (SDG 5) as well as a second goal based 
on reducing inequalities within and among countries (SDG 10). The targets set by 
SDG 5 on gender equality guide countries towards ending all forms of discrimi-
nation and violence, and ensuring that women, in all domains, can make their 
voice heard, make choices, and access opportunities and resources on an equal 
footing. Eleven other goals – concerning subjects as varied as ending poverty 
and work, health, water and sanitation, just societies and sustainable cities – 
provide targets which are explicitly linked to achieving gender equality.718
To take just one example, the 2017 United Nations SDG Report719 mentions that 
men still hold greater political and economic power, and insists on the fact that 
“Effective policymaking to achieve gender equality demands broad political participation”. 
Yet, “women’s representation in single or lower houses of parliament in countries 
around the world was only 23.4 per cent in 2017, just 10 percentage points higher 
than in 2000”5720 As this includes results in terms of the representation on women 
in bodies created under the UNFCCC, the “slow progress suggests that stronger 
political will and more ambitious measures are needed”. As such, COP23 will be an 
important step for international climate action and the strengthening of provisions 
relating to gender and gender equality, while the United Nations have compre-
hensively integrated these issues as crucial targets and prerequisite for realising 
ongoing large international programmes. 
According to the United Nations, “Gender equality is not only a fundamental human 
right, but a necessary foundation for a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable world. Providing 
women and girls with equal access to education, [...] decent work, and representation in 
political and economic decision-making processes will fuel sustainable economies and 
benefit societies and humanity at large”721.
718. United Nations, 2017, p. 29.
719. United Nations, 2017, p. 29.
720. United Nations, 2017, p. 29.
721. See Sustainable Development Goals, Gender and equality [online]
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/gender-equality/
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II.A. The implementation of the Agreement... 
From Marrakech to Bonn
The entry into force in record time of the Paris Agreement, on 4 November 2016, 
was within a context of renewed enthusiasm to combat climate change interna-
tionally, although two significant initiatives preceded the entry into force of the 
Agreement that same year. These initiatives especially included the adoption of the 
Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol which aimed to reduce by 80% the 
production and consumption of hydrofluorocarbon-type (HFC) greenhouse gases 
(GHG) over the next 30 years. The reduction in HFCs within the framework of 
the Amendment should avoid a temperature increase of 0.5 C from now until the 
end of the century, whilst continuing to protect the ozone layer. A second important 
development was the adoption of the reduction and compensation programme of 
international aviation-derived GHG emissions adopted by the international civil 
aviation Organisation. The Paris Agreement does not cover the international aviation 
industry, an industry currently responsible for 2% of global GHG emissions 
although this is increasing exponentially.
Within this context, some observers determined two key issues for the COP22. 
Firstly, for the UNFCC, it was an opportunity to show to the outside world that 
it was capable of taking up the mantle and thereby keeping this momentum 
alive722. Then, internally the COP22 presented a significant challenge for the Parties 
although these had forecast numerous technical advances since the very first session 
of the Conference of the Parties acting as the Conference of the Parties to the Paris 
agreement (CMA1) which sought to rapidly adopt the methods, procedures and 
guidelines allowing for the implementation of the Paris Agreement723. Expectations 
were therefore raised that it would be possible to make some solid progress by the 
time the COP22 ended. Finally, the deadlines for adopting the decisions on the rules 
of the Paris Agreement where pushed back to 2018. Indeed, at COP23 the CMA 
met once again to take stock of the progress achieved by the different subsidiary 
bodies for the purpose of complying with the December 2018 deadline. Nevertheless, 
722. IISD, 2016i, p. 41.
723. IISD, 2016i, p. 41.
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n in Marrakech, the less developed countries (LDC) maintained that the decisions 
should be adopted once they are ready rather than being adopted in block at the 
COP24,724 thereby hoping to avoid that some parts of the regulation would be 
subject to trade-offs.
The Parties met in Marrakech within the framework of COP22/CMA1 with 
the aim of resuming the discussions on developing the “Rules” of the Agreement 
or its “Handbook”725, discussions which had commenced earlier in the same year 
in Bonn. In this regard, numerous points were on the agenda of both the permanent 
subsidiary organs of the Ad Hoc working Group on the Paris agreement (APA). 
Therefore, at COP22, significant attention was paid to certain key aspects of the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement notably726: 
• The definition of the regulation for market mechanisms which will help to 
reduce the costs involved in achieving the mitigation targets included in the 
nationally determined Contributions (NDC);
• Adaptation in terms of institutional consistency and of financing;
• Pre-2020 Agenda;
• An important effort in capacity-building;
• An emphasis on the support to developing countries and technology transfer;
• An improved access sources of financing;
• Maintaining and monitoring international cooperation, commitment, financing, 
technology transfer and capacity-building will also be core subjects; and
• Consideration of the work of the intergovernmental expert group on climate 
change (IPCC) within the framework of the Global Stocktake i.e. to find out 
how this work can clarify the results of the stocktake. 
In Marrakech, the developing countries also reiterated the importance of 
combining the work of implementing the Paris Agreement, aimed at climate change 
action from 2020, with pre-2020 concrete actions. In relation to this, observers 
spoke of a certain form of deception by the developing countries727, although the 
discussions in Marrakech and Bonn specifically focused on action from 2020. 
Particularly, the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol which aims at increasing 
the ambition of the pre-2020 action has not yet come into force. These same 
observers reiterated that the Durban mandate focused on two work plans:
• The action from 2020 which translated into the adoption of the Paris Agreement; 
and,
• The pre-2020 action which has not yet been clarified. 
724. IISD, 2016i, p. 41.
725. IISD, 2017d, p. 22.
726. OIF/IFDD, 2016, pp. 3-4.
727. IISD, 2016i, p. 42.
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At the closing of the Marrakech Conference, the BASIC countries (Brazil, 
South Africa, India and China) highlighted their concern about how little progress 
had been made on the need to “treat pre-2020 issues equally”728 not only for the 
question of the pre-2020 action in itself, but also taking into account the fact that 
the contributions currently submitted by the Parties translated into emissions 
exceeding by 12 to 14 Gt of CO2e compared to the limit required to maintain 
global temperature increases well below 2°C 729 compared to pre-industrial levels. 
In Marrakech, some delegates also deplored that this aspect of their NDC was not 
tackled head on730.
Nevertheless the Moroccan Presidency was able to achieve the adoption of the 
Marrakech partnership on global climate change which seeks to strengthen the 
world programme on climate change adopted at COP20 in Lima, in 2014731. This 
new partnership aims “to establish a road map for action between 2017 and 
2020”732. This undoubtedly will represent a crucial challenge for the new Fijian 
Presidency at COP23, critically within the framework of a potential increase in 
the Parties’ ambitions to limit the average global temperature increase to 1.5° C 
(see also Section I.4.). 
Some significant progress made in Marrakech and in Bonn was in the prepa-
rations for the facilitation dialogue of 2018733. At the close of the Marrakech 
conference, the Moroccan and Fijian Presidencies where mandated by the COP “to 
conduct discussions related to the organisation of this dialogue and to report to COP23”734, 
a mission started in Bonn to lay the foundations to envisage the concept of the 
objective of this dialogue and to possibly strengthen the trust between the Parties 
in terms of collective efforts from 2020735. Also with regard to the pre-2020 action, 
the Paris Committee on capacity-building was able to hold its first meeting in 
Bonn during which the continuous working plan for 2017-2019 was adopted736.
Furthermore, the Parties arrived well prepared in Bonn and were ready to 
further the technical work of the objective adopted in Marrakech to finalise the 
operationalisation of the Paris Agreement at the latest by COP24 in 2018. Thus, 
over a hundred pre-session documents were submitted by the Parties prior to the 
Bonn meeting in May 2017737. This would have allowed also to clarify the thrust of 
the discussions on certain “orphan” issues since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, 
particularly738:
728. IISD, 2016i, p. 43.
729. UNEP, 2016, p. xvii.
730. IISD, 2016i, p. 42.
731. IISD, 2016i, p. 41.
732. IISD, 2016i, p. 41.
733. IISD, 2016i, p. 41.
734. IISD, 2016i, p. 42, on decision 1/CP.22, para. 16. 
735. IISD, 2017d, p. 23.
736. IISD, 2017d, p. 24.
737. IISD, 2017d, p. 22.
738. IISD, 2016i, p. 43, on APA, 2016a.
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n • the common NDC calendars;
• the adjustment of the existing NDC;
• the forum on the response measures;
• the acknowledgement of the adaptation measures used by the developing 
countries;
• financing-related issues;
• determining the new collective objective for financing;
• the biannual financial reports by the developed countries; and
• education, training and awareness.
II.A.1. Sessions and outcomes of the permanent  
subsidiary organs between COP22 and COP23
Amongst the items on the agenda addressed by the subsidiary organs, included the 
discussions that stalled in Marrakech regarding a decision to determine if one or 
two public NDC registers should be set up, given the lack of consensus in relation 
to the nature itself of the adaptation reports themselves and regarding the NDC739. 
In this regard, the Bonn Parties focused on making progress on the less contentious 
technical aspects such as the functionalities of the register and user accessibility740.
However, in relation to the transparency of financial supports, the Parties 
were able to make progress on the discussions both in Marrakech and Bonn. In the 
first case, progress was made on the methods of verifying the information about 
this support, critically in relation to financial supports provided or given by developed 
countries741. In the second case, the Parties were able to discuss the ex ante and ex 
post information which will be included within this framework of transparency on 
financial support742. 
Concrete progress was also made on the International Warsaw mechanism 
(IWM), although the COP approved the indicative framework of a rolling five year 
work plan by the IWM Executive Committee743. The Parties also discussed the 
procedure of periodic assessments post-IVM, at most, every five years744 Finally, 
the SBI received its mandate in Marrakech to address, within the framework of its 
work, two of the so-called “orphan” issues i.e.745:
• Common NDC calendars; and
• Article 12 of the Paris Agreement.
739. IISD, 2016i, p. 43.
740. IISD, 2017d, p. 23.
741. IISD, 2016i, p. 42.
742. IISD, 2017d, p. 23.
743. Decision 3/CP.22, para. 3.
744. Decision 4/CP.22, para. 2.
745. IISD, 2016i, p. 42.
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Some discussions were postponed till later, including746:
• the scope of the application of the review of the long-term global objective 
(postponed until 2019);
• the review of the modalities and procedures of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (November 2017 or December 2018);
• the framework for capacity-building (November 2017 or December 2018);
• national adaptation plans (November 2017 or December 2018).
II.A.2. Sessions and results of the Ad Hoc Working 
Group on the Paris Agreement between COP22 
and COP23
In Marrakech, although the technical work of the APA was brought to a close at 
the end of the first week of the COP22 – even if some Parties wanted to take 
advantage of the two weeks available- the Parties still held informal discussions 
through the whole of the second week of the COP on the following issues747:
• mitigation;
• adaptation;
• transparency;
• Global Stocktake;
• the implementation and compliance with provisions;
• other issues concerning implementation.
This informal work enabled the Parties to establish a specific work programme 
to prepare for the APA session held in Bonn in May 2017. Amongst other things 
the Parties added the role of the Adaptation fund as a topic under the remit of the 
APA, a stalling point for the developing and developed countries which was 
addressed in greater depth at the Bonn session. In particular, the Parties discussed 
in greater detail the legal issues surrounding the inclusion of the Adaptation Fund 
as an organ which would serve the Paris Agreement. Some observers emphasised 
especially that these legal discussion shone a light on the greater degree of complexity 
between the body and the Agreement and the need therefore to continue with 
technical discussions in this sense748.
Furthermore the parties in Bonn discussed numerous informal notes from the 
co-presidents and co-leaders of the APA which could have potentially laid the 
foundations required to hold basic negotiations on the various APA issues at 
746. IISD, 2017d, p. 23.
747. IISD, 2016i, p. 42.
748. IISD, 2017d, p. 23.
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n COP23749. In the hope of making more rapid progress on this work, the Parties 
extended the mandate of they co-presidents of the APA so that so they would still 
hold the post at COP23750.
Nevertheless there exists an important challenge that the Parties will have to 
tackle at COP23. These are discussions regarding the differentiation of responsibilities 
between the developed countries and developing countries which stalled both in 
Marrakech and in Bonn in May 2017 during the work carried out under the auspices 
of the APA. Specifically at COP 22, certain developing countries highlighted that 
their participation in progressing the discussions under the auspices of the APA 
were conditional on their inclusion in the discussion on the topics aimed at the 
implementing “the full scope of the NDCs,” including financing, technologies 
and capacity-building and not solely mitigation measures751. 
Finally in Bonn, the differences in opinion re-emerged, on the one hand, to 
the need to explicitly include the differentiation procedures into the Agreement 
rules or, on the other hand, considerations, whereby, the very fact of contributions 
to the Paris Agreement being determined nationally suffices to differentiate the 
efforts amongst the Parties752. Moreover, a number of developing countries reiterated 
in Bonn that they considered the discussions on mitigation measures were overly 
represented compared to other issues, such as transparency of action and of support753. 
Therefore, similar to COP22, it is indispensable that COP23 maintains the 
“spirit of Paris “and that the ambitions of the international community are more 
than ever embedded in trust and sustainability, even though the Parties agreed in 
Marrakech to push back certain final decisions until 2018 at COP24.
II.B Concise summary of the Paris Agreement754
Form and legal implications
As opposed to the Kyoto Protocol which contains legally binding commitments 
with figures for the Parties registered in Annex B, the Paris Agreement commits all 
Parties to adopt internal measures with the aim of conducting mitigation objectives 
that are self-determined. Several discussions brought to light the subject of the 
legal nature or legally binding character of the agreement that did not appear evident 
in the analysis of the text of the Agreement. Whilst the mitigation approach by 
749. IISD, 2017d, p. 24.
750. IISD, 2017d, p. 24.
751. IISD, 2016i, p. 43.
752. IISD, 2017d, p. 23.
753. IISD, 2017d, p. 23.
754. Update and summary adapted from the Guide to negotiations, 2016 edition. 
For greater detail on the analysis of the Paris Agreement, see OIF/IFDD, 2016.
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nationally determined contributions (NDC) represents a more significant, almost 
universal participation by the Parties to the Convention, their non-legally-binding 
nature and lack of collective ambition raised concerns755. Numerous actors expected 
that the Paris Agreement would result in commitments in terms of mitigation and 
financing that would be legally binding. To this, they were reminded that such 
regulations did not necessarily guarantee implementation, regarding previous 
experience, but that they could, on the contrary, reduce participation, and by 
extension, the level of global ambition of the agreement. 
Nevertheless, several elements testify to the legal force of the Paris Agreement756:
• It is an international treaty by virtue of the Vienna Convention on the law of 
treaties of 1969, submitted for signature and national ratification processes to 
guarantee its effectiveness;
• As the majority of international legal texts, it contains both mandatory provisions 
and non-mandatory provisions;
• Several clear legal requirements appear through elements and processes that 
are interdependent in the architecture of the Agreement, in relation to the 
long-term objectives, the individual obligations of the Parties, the national 
reports and reviews, the processes of harmonisation of temporal horizons 
of the NDC towards a common calendar, the frame of transparency and 
accountability as well as the mechanism aimed at facilitating implementation 
and promoting respect of the obligations of the Parties.
The set of provisions results in a certain number of obligations for Parties to 
the international community.
The sophistication of the architecture of the Paris Agreement can be seen as a 
hybrid model reconciling the “top down” and “bottom up” efforts757. This architecture 
has proven to be the most efficient to reconcile the divergent viewpoints of the 
Parties and makes the Agreement acceptable to everyone758. However, given that 
the Agreement must be ratified entirely without reservations759, several analysts 
concluded that the legal form of the Agreement is globally binding once in force 
even though it contain elements that are not binding760.
755. IISD, 2015a, p. 50.
756. Bodansky, 2016.
757. See discussion by Bodansky, 2016, p. 18-20.
758. Obergassel, et al., 2016.
759. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, art. 27 providing that “No restriction can 
be applied to this Agreement”. It is to be highlighted that in practice, some countries 
bypassed this and issued restrictions when they lodged their ratification instrument.
760. See Bodle, Donat, & Duwe, 2016; and Jeyaratnam, Whitmore, Hokpin, & Mountain, 
2015.
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between elements that are binding and others that are not. Among the non-binding 
elements are financing761 and emissions reduction762 whilst binding aspects of the 
Agreement include the periodic communication of NDC at regular intervals of 
five years763, transparency of actions and support764.
It is important to note the subtlety by which, despite the obligation for the 
Parties to communicate their NDC765, it is not on the other hand legally binding 
to implement or realise the targets set by these766. In effect, the Agreement only 
required the Parties to adopt internal mitigation measures to comply with the NDC 
objectives. According to the analysis by Galbraith767, only the procedural aspect of 
the NDC768 is binding and there is no legal obligation concerning the substance 
of Article 4.
Summary of the Paris Agreement 
The Paris Agreement contains 29 articles organised into three parts: 
• The context, principles and objectives of the Agreement, addressing the treatment 
of cross-cutting issues;
• The main obligations relating to substantive issues, in particular mitigation, 
adaptation, financing, the development and transfer of technology, transparency 
of action and support, and capacity-building;
• Institutional, procedural and legal issues.
This Agreement is guided by an ascending approach (“bottom-up”) sustained 
by the principle of self-determination of mitigation objectives and adaptation at 
the national level through NDC, strengthened by binding provisions. It is accom-
panied by Decision 1/CP.21 aimed at giving it effect and outlining the actions to 
develop to facilitate entry into force and sustain implementation of its regulations.
761. See Jeyaratnam, Whitmore, Hokpin, & Mountain, 2015; and Obergassel, et al., 2016.
762. Obergassel, et al., 2016.
763. Obergassel, et al., 2016.
764. IDDRI, 2015.
765. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4 para. 2.
766. See discussion by Bodansky, 2016, p. 13-14.
767. Galbraith, 2015.
768. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4 para. 2.
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Figure 26. The structure of the Paris Agreement in a few words769
769. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.
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n Figure 27. The principles of the Paris Agreement in a few words770
770. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.
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Article 2: Goal
The Paris Agreement is based on three main objectives indicated in its Article 2 
which are inscribed in the larger context of implementing the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), of sustainable development 
and fight against poverty:
Contain d the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above 
pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C 
above pre-industrial levels;
Increase the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster 
climate resilience and low greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions development, in a 
manner that does not threaten food production;
Make finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHG emissions and 
climate-resilient development.
The objectives of the Agreement, thus set out, focus mainly on the three 
elements of mitigation, adaptation and financing. The Parties to the Paris Agreement 
collectively commit to conduct actions to achieve these objectives, with levels of 
ambition regularly evaluated and reinforced on the basis of transparency.
Mitigation 
One of the main compromises reached in Paris concerns the long-term objective 
of limiting temperatures compared to pre-industrial levels from now until 2100. 
The emergence of scientific research in recent years on the risk encountered with 
the objective of 2°C has reinforced this position before and during the Paris 
Conference. The Paris Agreement ratified this long term objective requesting the 
Parties to pursue the actions made to limit the increase in global average temperature 
to 1.5°C compared to pre-industrial levels. 
Decision 1/CP.21 furthermore invited the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) to provide a special report in 2018 on the impacts of global warm-
ing at 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and on related scenarios of changes in 
global GHG emissions The IPCC has meanwhile accepted this invitation (see also 
section I.4).
The Agreement also defines a specific world target of mitigation in very clear 
terms: a balance between anthropogenic emissions and absorptions by sinks must 
be reached during the second half of the 21st century (see also Article 4). Acheiving 
such a balance between emissions and absorptions will require extensive deployment 
of negative emission technologies (e.g. Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage 
(BECCS)).
All these targets are clearly more ambitious than what was expected before 
COP21771.
771. IISD, 2015a, p. 50.
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Is the target of 2°C the safe limit which  
would avoid dangerous climate change?
The target of 2°C has long been presented as a safe limit identified by scientists, 
which would avoid dangerous climate change. According to Knutti, Rogelj, Sedláček, 
& Fischer772, this perception is erroneous because no scientific evaluation has 
clearly justified or defended the objective of 2°C as being a safety level of the 
warming. 
The question of the feasibility of the 1.5°C objective has been the subject of 
considerable academic debate. Some studies have shown that both scenarios of 
1.5°C et 2°C are economically and technically feasible but that unprecedented, 
immediate action is required to achieve them and reach zero net emission between 
2045 and 2060773. In the context of pursuing these two options (1,5°C/2°C), 
identical technologies are required with the sole difference that reaching 1.5°C 
would need more rapid deployment earlier by some ten years compared with 
that of 2°C774. 
Finishing the two scenarios means introducing strong economic incentives as 
quickly as possible (at least $40-80/tCO2 in 2020 and $50-100/tCo2 in 2030  
at global level)775. Achieving these objectives is important also for forecasting 
purposes: the sooner the efforts are made in implementing appropriate technology 
the lower the costs. 
Article 3: Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC)
The Paris Agreement allows the Parties to present their NDC under Articles 4 
(mitigation), 7 (adaptation), 9 (finance), 10 (technology development and transfer), 
11 (capacity building) and 13 (transparency). The implementation of the NDC at 
national level is one of the first steps to achieve in order to guarantee the effectiveness 
of the agreement. It requires converting the NDC into policies, strategies, programmes, 
projects, measures and initiatives that can contribute to the achievement of the 
targets related to the NDC. 
Once the first NDC have been reported, strong expectations are placed on 
the countries to ensure implementation and the preparation of the subsequent 
reporting cycles for future NDC. The implementation of the NDC and the strategies 
of development for low carbon emissions and resilience to climate change necessitate 
the commitment of all Parties as well as real international cooperation. 
The Paris Agreement provides for the evaluation of collective progress made 
in executing the purpose of the Agreement through periodic global stocktakes. 
The first Global Stocktake is anticipated in 2023 and should be repeated every five 
years after that unless the COP adopts a different decision.
772. Knutti, Rogelj, Sedláček, & Fischer, 2015.
773. Rogelj et al., 2015.
774. Schleussner et al., 2016.
775. Stiglitz et al., 2017.
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Unofficial assessments of NDC by research institutes agree unanimously that 
the reductions applied to day lead to warming of nearly 3°C in 2100 and are not 
enough to achieve 2°C776.
Figure 28. Conceptual diagram of the Global Stocktake777
This diagram shows how contributions to the Global Stocktake are related to the 
entire global uptake process. It emphasises the comprehensiveness, the collective 
nature and facilitation of the Global Stocktake.
776. Rogelj et al., 2016.
777. © Guide to the negotiations of COP23-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2017 – Based on the 
diagram of the UNFCCC Secretariat.
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n Article 4. Mitigation
With a view to achieving the long-term temperature goal laid down in Article 2, 
the Paris Agreement seeks to lead Parties to reach peaking of global GHG emissions 
as soon as possible and to make reductions rapidly thereafter, in accordance with 
the best scientific data available, in order to reach a balance between anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and anthropogenic removals by sinks of GHG in the course of 
the second half of the century, on the basis of equity and in the context of sustainable 
development and efforts to eradicate poverty.
As previously stated, the Paris Agreement does not assign mitigation objectives 
with figures on the Parties, nor does it define a global level of emissions to be reached. 
Rather it stresses the national mitigation plans on climate change through the 
INDC- which must be converted into NDC. The Agreement stipulates that the 
efforts of all Parties will represent a progression in time, recognising the need to 
help developing countries so that the Agreement is efficiently applied.
The decision seeking to implement the Agreement notes with concern that 
efforts to reduce levels of emissions significantly greater than those associated with 
the INDC will be required to maintain the rise of the planet’s temperature below 
2°C or 1.5°C compared to pre-industrial levels778. Consequently, an effort must be 
carried out at all levels in order to transform the entire economic system into the 
realisation of the mitigation objectives. The role of means for implementation: 
financing, investments, and innovative instruments both domestic and international, 
capacity building and technology transfer for this, shall be determining factors to 
this effect.
Obligations in reducing GHG emissions
The Agreement commits the Parties to communicate their NDC at intervals of 
five years, and to pursue measures of mitigation at the national level in order to 
make their contributions which should not only always progress in comparison to 
previous efforts, but also adjust to take into consideration the results of the Global 
Stocktake which will evaluate and aggregate global progress. Decision 1/CP.21 
aimed at making effective the Paris Agreement invites the Parties to communicate 
their first NDC no later than at the time of depositing their ratification, adherence 
and or approval of the Agreement. The INDC submitted by the Parties before the 
entry into force of the Paris Agreement are considered as being their first NDC 
unless said Parties decide differently. 
In order to harmonise the temporal horizons of the NDC, the decision commits 
the Parties, whose submitted INDC/NDC comprise a calendar until 2025, to 
communicate a new NDC and those whose INDC/NDC comprise a calendar up 
to 2030, at least to adjust it and then do so every five years779. The Conference of 
778. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 17.
779. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 4 para. 9.
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the Parties serving as a meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) was 
responsible for examining the common calendars for the NDC at its first session.
The Agreement gives very little detail on the elements of the NDC requesting 
developed countries to continue showing the way by assuming the objectives of 
emission reduction in absolute figures on the scale of the economy whilst the 
developing countries must continue to increase their efforts of mitigation and are 
encouraged to move progressively to objectives of reduction. The Ad Hoc Working 
Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) has the mandate of formulating other direc-
tives on the characteristics of Contributions determined at the national level for 
examination and adoption by the CMA at its first session780.
Low GHG emission development strategies
The Agreement also commits all the Parties to formulate and communicate 
between now and 2020 strategies for development of low GHG emissions in the 
long-term considering their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities, in respect of the different national situations and keeping in 
mind the three main objectives defined in Article 2.
Article 5. Forests 
The initial goal of the REDD+ mechanism was to reduce emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation in developing countries. The mechanism was established by 
Decision 2/CP.13 in 2007 and was developed further by subsequent decisions of 
the Convention. By Decision 1/CP.16, the COP  defines further the REDD+ 
activities which target reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
in developing countries and includes the role of conservation, sustainable forest 
management and development of forest carbon reservoirs in developing countries781. 
Decisions 9/CP.19 and 15/CP.19 set out the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, 
which led to more significant progress in implementation aspects of the REDD+ 
mechanism. 
The Paris Agreement ratified the progress made under the REDD+ by inviting 
the Parties to take measures to apply and enhance, mainly by results-based payments, 
the existing framework defined in the directives and relevant decisions already 
adopted under the Convention782. In the plenary session to adopt the Paris Agreement, 
Panama, on behalf of the Coalition of tropical Rainforest Nations, stated that the 
REDD+ implementation mechanism would allow the State and non-State players 
to participate and serve the communities which depend on ecosystem services 
provided by the rainforests783.
780. With the entry into effect of the Paris Agreement on 4 November 2016, the first session 
of the CMA took place in Marrakech.
781. Decision 1/CP.16, para. 70.
782. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 5, para. 2.
783. IISD, 2015b, p. 14.
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recognises the importance of suitable, predictable financial resources, including 
results-based payments, if appropriate, to implement general approaches and positive 
incentives to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, whilst 
encouraging the coordination of the support from, inter alia, public and private, 
bilateral and multilateral sources like the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and other 
sources, in application of the relevant COP decisions.
Article 6. Cooperation mechanisms:  
market and “non-market” mechanisms
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement provides for three international cooperation-
based mechanisms: it offers countries the opportunity to cooperate voluntarily on 
the implementation of mitigation activities (cooperative approaches, CA)784, it estab-
lishes a “mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and 
support sustainable development” (often referred to as the Sustainable Development 
Mechanism, SDM),785 and it finally recognises non-market based approaches786. All 
these different mechanisms can be considered to be the successful outcome of 
major and unhoped for negotiations. This success is due in part to the fact that the 
Parties have realised the potential that market mechanisms represent as well as other 
cooperative methods that can contribute to realising their NDC.
Table. Number of INDC/NDC indicating respectively the use 
and non-use of market instruments787 
Number of Parties Reference to the market instruments within the INDC/NDC
67 Yes 
7 Use not in terms of INDC/NDC, but in long-term strategies.
17 Use to be considered
53 No reference to market instruments
17+EU Indicate that they are not going to use the market instruments  in the implementation of their INDC or NDC
784. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 6, paras. 1-3.
785. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 6, paras. 4-7.
786. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 6, para. 8.
787. Source: “NDC tracker” of the international Association for emission exchange rights 
[online] http://www.ieta.org/ (last consulted on 3 October 2017).
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From Kyoto to Paris
Market-based mechanisms are not fundamentally new in the Paris Agreement, 
but the international community has gained experience through market-based 
mechanisms which it created under the under the auspices of the Kyoto Protocol and 
which allow Parties to generate and/or trade emissions reduction units, commonly 
called “carbon credits”. These are the international exchange of emission rights, 
the Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
Existing flexibility mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms include:
• International emissions trading. Countries concerned by the objectives 
of reduction of GHG emissions under the Kyoto Protocol have the possi-
bility to sell their emission rights, if they have surpassed their objective, 
or to buy some, if they cannot reach it;
• The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) permits developed countries 
to reach some of their objectives by bringing support to mitigation 
projects implemented in developing countries. The CDM is a compen-
sation mechanism where GHG reductions associated with low-carbon 
projects in relation to a reference scenario generates carbon credits 
(one credit = one tonne of equivalent CO2 eq), once certified, they are 
then sold on the carbon market;
• The Joint implementation (JI) functions on the same principal as the CDM, 
but relates to the trading of carbon credits between two developed 
countries, generated by projects carried out in one of these countries 
(the country with the lowest marginal costs in emissions reduction is 
the most attractive).
Since 2012, the revision of the methods and procedures of the CDM is undertaken 
by the Executive Board of the CDM (EB CDM). These last years, recommendations 
relative to projects have put the emphasis on aspects linked to environmental 
integrity, to the governance of the CDM and to facilitating access to the mechanism 
by under-represented countries or countries that have benefited little from these 
mechanisms.
In addition to the existing mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, the Parties 
expressed their opinions on the introduction of new instruments during the Bali 
Conference (2007). Prior to the Paris COP21, negotiations were focussed on 
two instruments in parallel: The new market mechanism (NMM) which seeks to 
create a market system under the central governance of the UNFCCC with the 
aim of achieving real and net mitigation globally. It needs to be emphasised that the 
framework for these various approaches (FVA) enable bilateral initiatives as well 
as non-market-based initiatives which would follow common, established principles. 
These negotiations constituted the starting point to establish Article 6 of the 
Paris Agreement and related mechanisms related788.
788. For further details on the history of the negotiations leading to Article 6 of the Paris 
agreement, OIF/IFDD, 2016.
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n Comparative analysis of Article 6 instruments 
Paragraph 1 of Article 6 provides a general framework for cooperation activities 
and an umbrella for subsequent provisions. It lists activities relating to mitigation 
and adaptation. Sustainable development and environmental integrity are defined 
as targets to be promoted and pursued. Article 6 paragraph 1 imposes no restriction 
on market-based approaches. In accordance with the aforementioned provision, 
the cooperative approaches defined in paragraph 2 of Article 6 are intended to 
contribute to increasing the ambition in implementing national contributions. 
The exact definition of the relationship between the market mechanisms and the 
NDC will play a key role in the debate on environmental integrity and must cul-
minate in a new definition or an improvement in additionality rules since those of 
the CDM.
Promoting sustainable development is given as the second general principle 
of activities planned within the framework of paragraph 2 of Article 6. This is also 
mentioned in paragraphs 4, and 8 of Article 6, which gives it broader scope in the 
Paris Agreement compared to the Kyoto Protocol. Operationalising this requirement 
without repeating the difficulties encountered in the context of the CDM will be 
an essential task for the forthcoming negotiations.
The major difference between the mechanisms provided for in paragraphs 2 
and 4 of Article 6 will be mainly the different degree of regulation for both mech-
anisms. Paragraph 4 of Article 6 provides for central governance by the United 
Nations by institutions and dedicated procedures, whereas paragraph 2 of Article 6 
simply provides a guideline. Nevertheless, both mechanisms share the same broad 
principles in that they must both contribute to a greater ambition and demonstrate 
robust accounting as well as promoting environmental integrity and sustainable 
development.
Details of the Paris Agreement cooperation mechanisms
The three instruments of Article 6 broadly reflect previous discussions relating to 
NMM, FVA and to non-market based approaches.
Cooperative approaches (CA) – Article 6, paragraph 2 
Within the framework of cooperative approaches (CA), the Parties are free to carry 
out mitigation activities on a bilateral or group basis and transfer the mitigation 
results at their convenience. CA can play a role in executing NDC, but this role 
has not yet been defined.
By virtue of the Paris Agreement, CA are not subject to a specific monitoring 
process by the UNFCCC, but the transactions take place within an accounting 
system which will be defined by virtue of the Agreement789. In this context, huge 
importance is given to the transparency of both activities and the transfer of mitigation 
789. In compliance with the provisions of Article 13 of the Paris Agreement on transparency.
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outcomes. With regard to core requirements for a robust accounting system, the 
main objectives arising from realising the provisions in paragraph 2 of Article 6 
will be to ensure that the mitigation activities that the CA contribute to a higher 
level of ambition are transparent and promote sustainable development.
The sustainable development mechanism (SDM) – Article 6 paragraph 4
The mechanism established in paragraph 4 of Article 6 known as the “Sustainable 
Development Mechanism” (SDM), is placed under the supervision of the United 
Nations. A complete set of rules, modalities and procedures must be developed. 
Decision 1/CP 21 regarding this requires that “experience and lessons [are] learnt 
from existing mechanisms and approaches adopted under the Convention and its related 
legal instruments”790. Clearly the previous sources of experience are the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism 
of the Kyoto Protocol.
Emission reductions within this mechanism must be “real, measurable and 
long-term”791. In addition, the reductions must be additional792, the activities must 
have a precise scope793 which has yet to be defined and they must be verified and 
certified by Designated Operational Entities (DOE)794, as is the case under the 
CDM framework. 
The SDM goes beyond the mechanisms of classic markets. This arises from 
the fact that both the host Party and the purchasing Party will have defined a contri-
bution, but also due to the fact that the SDM should “allow for the global mitigation 
of world emissions”795. Contributions to the net mitigation by the host Parties can 
be achieved through an explicit agreement or by a mitigation effect of an activity 
which does not mean the issue of negotiable certificates. The objective of overall 
mitigation of emissions could raise the ambition level beyond the sum total of 
NDCs of the Parties participating in the mechanism. Nevertheless, this question 
also relates to the appropriate accounting.
Non-market-based approaches – Article 6, paragraph 8
Unlike the CA or the SDM, the non-market-based approaches do not allow the 
transfer of mitigation results. The implications that this could have, and the way 
in which such approaches would affect international cooperation, remain topics for 
future analysis and consultation. The expectations from measuring, reporting and 
verification approaches (MRV) and any accounting system require clarification. 
790. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 37(f ).
791. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 37(b).
792. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 37(d).
793. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 37(c).
794. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 37(e).
795. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, art. 6, para. 4(d).
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n Numerous terms introduced into the two paragraphs have no definition and 
no history in international negotiations. This is especially true for the term non-
market-based approaches which the according to the text should be “integrated, 
holistic and balanced”. 
Article 7. Adaptation 
The Paris Agreement establishes for the first time a global goal on adaptation of 
enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience to climate change and reducing 
vulnerability to this change. The Agreement recognises the link between the mitigation 
ambition level and the adaptation needs796 but includes no quantitative element, 
mainly in terms of financing.
In terms of main guidelines, the Agreement establishes that action towards 
adaptation should follow an approach which is driven by the countries, sensitive to 
gender equality, participative and totally transparent and which takes into consid-
eration vulnerable groups, communities and ecosystems. It should also take account 
of and be inspired by the best scientific data available and, if appropriate, traditional 
knowledge, the know-how of indigenous peoples and local knowledge systems, 
with a view to incorporating adaptation into relevant socio-economic and environ-
mental policies and measures, if necessary. In terms of planning, each Party should, 
as appropriate, submit and update periodically an adaptation communication 
which could set out its priorities, its implementation and support needs and its 
projects and measures without imposing an additional burden on the developing 
countries. The communication on adaptation can be incorporated in a national 
adaptation plan, an NDC and/or a national communication. 
Progress of adaptation efforts towards the goal of Article 7 will be analysed 
during the Global Stocktake every five years. However, the overall assessment of 
individual efforts and needs in relation to such a qualitative long-term objective 
and the lack of precise indicators could prove to be difficult to achieve. Technical 
and methodological work will be necessary during sessions of future talks on this 
question.
Article 8. Loss and damage
Considering loss and damage in the Paris Agreement in a separate article from the 
one on adaptation is a major step taking account of residual, potentially irreversible 
impacts of climate change in the vulnerable developing countries.
The Agreement places the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIV) for Loss and 
Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts under the authority of the CMA. 
It will monitor its guidelines and may subsequently be enhanced in accordance 
with its decisions.
796. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 7, para. 4.
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The Parties should improve the understanding, action and support, especially 
through the Warsaw International Mechanism in the framework of cooperation 
and facilitation, with respect to loss and damage associated with the harmful 
effects of climate change. The work of the Executive Committee during the next 
sessions could fuel this thinking and culminate in concrete progress. 
Nevertheless, Decision 1/CP 21 states that this Article dedicated to loss and 
damage cannot lead to or serve as a basis for any liability or compensation797.
Article 9. Financing
The provision of financial support and other implementation means is the third 
objective of Article 2 of the Paris Agreement, to make finance flows consistent with 
a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development. 
This provision, helps to send a strong signal to the private sector to re-assess and 
redirect its investments798. 
Ultimately, the Paris Agreement has not jeopardised the provisions of the 
Convention which restate the primary responsibility of developed countries in 
providing developing countries with financial resources, for both mitigation and 
adaptation purposes, in continuation and with an increase of their obligations under 
the Convention and to existing commitments (mainly the promise of 100 billion 
made in Copenhagen). The “other Parties” are invited to provide or continue to 
provide voluntary financial support. 
The Agreement also calls for a balance between adaptation and mitigation in 
the provision of financial resources, taking into account country-driven strategies and 
the priorities and needs of developing countries, especially those that are particularly 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and have significant capacity 
constraints, such as the LDC and the SIDS.
The Paris Agreement offers the Parties the option of using a broad spectrum 
of sources, instruments and channels, through sundry actions, whilst bearing in 
mind the crucial role of public sources. Article 9, paragraph 4 also recognises the 
importance of public sources and donations in terms of adaptation. The Agreement 
places greater emphasis on the public sources by requesting the developed countries 
to communicate transparent, coherent information every two years on the support 
provided to the developing countries and raised by public interventions. It was 
planned that the methods, procedures and guidelines on communication of this 
information are adopted by the CMA during its first session.
Just like for the mitigation and adaptation actions, the Global Stocktake will 
also take into account the assessment of implementation means. In this respect, 
the developed countries are called on to continue to communicate every two years 
indicative quantitative and qualitative information, mainly on the projected amounts 
797. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 52.
798. Bodle, Donat, & Duwe, 2016.
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n of public financial resources for the developing countries. The other Parties which 
provide resources on a voluntary basis are invited to communicate this information 
every two years, also on a voluntary basis. 
Although the Paris Agreement requires individual communications of quanti-
fiable information, it makes no mention of information quantified on the overall 
financing needs. Only the decision accompanying the Agreement, in paragraph 
54, stipulates that the developed countries intend to continue their current collective 
mobilisation objective until 2025 with a view to concrete mitigation measures and 
transparent implementation. A new quantified collective objective based on a lowest 
level of 1000 billion dollars a year, is provided for before 2025. 
The Convention’s Financial Mechanism, including its operating entities, is 
called on to fulfil the functions of the Financial Mechanism of the Paris Agreement. 
As such, Decision 1/CP.21, in paragraph 59 considers that the Green Climate 
Fund (GCF) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the entities responsible 
for operating the Financial Mechanism, along with the Least Developed Countries 
Fund (LDCF) and the Special Fund for Climate Change (SFCC), can combine to 
implement the Paris Agreement. Decision 1 CRP 11 furthermore recommends 
that the CMA consider how the adaptation Fund can contribute to the application 
of the Paris Agreement799.
Article 10. Technology development and transfer
Article 10 of the Paris Agreement notes the importance of technology in imple-
menting mitigation and adaptation measures and recognises efforts to deploy and 
disseminate technology, strengthening cooperative action on technology development 
and transfer and the role of the Technology Mechanism created by virtue of the 
Convention in the Agreement.
It was decided in Paris to strengthen the Technology Mechanism and the 
Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network 
were entrusted with supporting the application of the Agreement and undertaking 
new work including, inter alia800:
a. Technology research, development and transfer;capacities;
b. Developing and building up of capacities and endogenous technologies. 
A technological framework was created801. This is responsible for giving general 
guidelines to the work of the Technology Mechanism to promote and facilitate 
enhanced action in technology development and transfer, in support of the imple-
mentation of the Agreement and for the purposes of the long-term vision.
799. In compliance with the provisions of Decision 1/ CP 21, para. 60-61.
800. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 66.
801. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 10 para. 4.
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In addition, Article 13 clearly outlines in paragraphs 9 and 10 that:
• The developed country Parties must, and other Parties which provide voluntary 
support should, communicate information on the support provided in the 
form of financial resources, technology transfer and capacity building to the 
developing country Parties under Articles 9, 10 and 11;
• The developing country Parties should communicate information on the support 
they need and which they have received, in the form of financial resources, 
technology transfer and capacity building under Articles 9, 10 and 11.
It must therefore be emphasised that even if the Parties did not reach agreement 
on a global objective for technology development and transfer or in defining 
national and global monitoring indicators, the work to be carried out under Decision 
1/CP.21802 on preparing guidelines for the Transparency network and for the Global 
Stocktake803, will be an opportunity to use the progress made by the Technology 
Mechanism and the Technology Framework to succeed with the necessary evaluations 
and provide relevant recommendations to move the technology development and 
transfer agenda forward.
Article 11. Capacity building 
Capacity-building should be driven by the countries, take into account and satisfy 
national needs and encourage the ownership by the Parties, especially for the 
developing countries, mainly at national, infra-national and local levels. It should 
be inspired by lessons learned from experience, mainly capacity-building activities 
performed under the Convention, and represent an effective, iterative, participative, 
transversal and gender-equality sensitive process. The Parties are called on to cooperate 
in order to increase the capacity of developing country Parties in implementing 
the Agreement. The developed countries should enhance their support for capacity- 
building measures in the developing countries.
The Paris Agreement invites all the Parties which assist developing countries 
with their capacity-building to communicate regularly on these capacity-building 
measures or initiatives. The developing countries should regularly provide information 
on progress made in the application of capacity-building plans, policies, initiatives 
or measures to implement this Agreement.
The Paris Agreement provides for appropriate institutional provisions for the 
capacity-building activities which, based on the pre-existing provisions under the 
Convention, help to bring about the application of the Agreement. At its first ses-
sion, the CMA will examine and adopt a decision on the initial institutional provi-
sions relating to capacity-building.
802. Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 94-94.
803. Decision 1/CP.21, paras. 99-101.
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and participation 
The Paris Agreement emphasises the cooperation of the Parties by taking measures, 
as appropriate, to improve public education, training, awareness and participation 
and access by the population to information on climate change, given the importance 
of such measures in enhancing the action engaged under this Agreement.
Article 13. Transparency of measures and support
Transparency and implementation of the Paris Agreement
The enhanced transparency framework is one of the key aspects of the architecture 
of the new global climate regime adopted in Paris in December 2015. Within the 
context of the “bottom-up” process, without the option of sanctions against 
defaulting governments, a strong framework on transparency is absolutely necessary. 
This framework is decisive for instilling confidence on an international scale in the 
implementation of effective mitigation actions and to allow them to be assessed. 
It informs the stakeholders who can apply pressure to strengthen these actions. 
The implementation of strong public policies therefore becomes more likely. 
Framework established ahead of COP21
The first reporting framework established for actions to mitigate climate change 
initially consisted of a system differentiated between countries. Firstly, all the 
Parties must submit their NDC (following set deadlines) to the UNFCCC804. 
For industrialised countries, this document must include information on GHG 
emissions and reductions, national circumstances, policies and measures in place, 
the assessment of vulnerability, financial resources and transfer of technology, 
education, training and public awareness measures and any other details of the 
activities undertaken to implement the Convention. Developing countries must 
provide information on GHG inventories, measures to mitigate and to facilitate 
adaptation to climate change and any other information relevant to implementing 
the Convention. These countries do not have to comply with set deadlines, but 
can submit their report gradually as resources become available to them from 
the industrialised countries. Many countries have not updated their reports for 
several years. Industrialised countries are also required to submit their annual 
inventories of GHG emissions to the Secretariat of the Convention in addition 
to this National Report. Within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol there is 
a rigid control of the inventories of the industrialised countries by expert groups. 
Several countries have had to revise their inventories following these controls and 
were excluded from market mechanisms until their inventories were corrected.
804. http://unfccc.int/national_reports/items/1408.php.
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The 2010 Cancun Agreements strengthened the existing transparency frame-
work. The Parties agreed to share information every two years on policies and 
measures to combat climate change, according to their specific circumstances. 
This enhanced framework was implemented in 2014 and includes three main 
phases:
• An initial Communication phase (reporting); 
• A second national technical assessment phase of the reports submitted;
• A third peer-to-peer exchange covering progress by the country. 
Developed countries are required to submit Biennial Reports, while the reporting 
by developing countries takes the form of Biennial Updated Reports. The second 
and third phases in reviewing reports are also differentiated. The Biennial Reports 
from developing countries are submitted for International Consultation and 
Analysis while the technical examination of the Biennial Reports from developed 
countries are submitted to a process known as an International Assessment and 
Review process. 
New, enhanced transparency framework
The biennial reporting and review process introduced in the u Agreements 
provides a solid basis to establish the enhanced transparency system explicitly called 
for in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement805. This new enhanced framework must: 
• Monitor advances/progress towards achieving individual and collective emission 
reduction objectives;
• Increase understanding of how to complete NDCs. However, for some types 
of NDCs, such as those that do not have detailed mitigation goals, it will be 
more difficult to evaluate progress or expected impacts.
The new mechanism will be flexible with regard to defining the scope, frequency 
and level of detail in the reporting, as well as the scope of the reviews. 
In relation to reports regarding the support provided to fulfil obligations and 
undertakings under the Paris Agreement, reporting will follow the process already 
established under the UNFCCC framework. The challenges of reporting and 
reviewing this type of information are well known. For the most part, they concern 
the availability and clarity of the information required and reported, as well as the 
lack of reporting methods and typology of activities related to climate change. 
In the absence of clearly-defined rules and methodologies, reporting on financial 
support for measures to combat climate change poses a greater challenge, compared 
with reporting on GHG emissions and emission reductions (for example, reporting 
on climate change financing through public interventions). In this instance, it is 
vital for all multilateral development banks, environment funds, international 
organisations, the private sector and national governments to participate in the 
communication and information effort. Communicating the support received 
805. OECD/IEA, 2016.
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established this process. In addition, ex-ante communication by industrialised 
countries on financing provided and used is seen as crucial, since this was previously 
done on a voluntary basis.
Moreover, in addition to the need to establish the rules and methodology for 
reporting climate financing, it also remains to establish a shared vision of the concepts 
introduced by the Paris Agreement. For example, the concepts of “progress in line 
with previous efforts” and the “provision of scaled-up financial resources”. 
Ending differentiation between the Parties is one of the main features of the 
enhanced transparency framework ushered in by the Paris Agreement. A second 
important difference which can be highlighted concerns the purpose of reporting. 
Prior to this, the transparency system was based primarily on mitigation actions. 
This new enhanced transparency and support framework must also take into 
account transparency regarding the resources provided to complete mitigation and 
adaptation actions, in other words, the financial, technical and capacity-building 
resources needed to achieve objectives. Transparency on adaptation actions will 
also be a core challenge for implementing the Paris Agreement. 
Article 14. Global stocktake 
The Paris Agreement provides for the evaluation of collective progress made in 
executing the purpose of the Agreement through periodic global stocktakes. The 
first Global Stocktake is anticipated in 2023 and should be repeated every five 
years after that unless the COP adopts a different decision. Prior to the first Global 
Stocktake, a facilitation Dialogue between the Parties is planned for 2018, to take 
stock of collective efforts by the Parties to achieve the long-term objective set out 
in Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Agreement and clarify the establishment of NDC.
The transparency framework and the Global Stocktake have been described 
by some as “the ambition mechanisms” of the Agreement. The dual obligation to 
report and take stock of mitigation, adaptation and support every five years creates 
a collective assessment of achievements and efforts required.
Article 15. Facilitation on the implementation  
and compliance
Apart from the Global Stocktake, the facilitation mechanism instituted by the 
Paris Agreement to facilitate its implementation and promote compliance with its 
provisions is a significant arrangement. This mechanism will comprise a Committee 
that is expert-based and facilitative in nature and will function in a transparent, 
non-adversarial and non-punitive manner. It will pay particular attention to the 
respective national circumstances and capacities of the Parties.
The Committee will operate under the modalities and procedures to be 
decided by the CMA during its first session. The Committee will report annually 
to the CMA.
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Articles 16-22. Institutional provisions and final clauses
The ordinary sessions of the CMA will coincide with the ordinary sessions of the 
COP. The CMA can, nevertheless, hold extraordinary sessions at any other time 
when it deems this necessary or if a Party so requests in writing, provided that this 
request is supported by at least one third of Parties within six months of it being 
communicated to the Parties by the Secretariat.
The permanent subsidiary bodies: the SBSTA and SBI created by Articles 9 
and 10 of the Convention, are operational, respectively, under the Paris Agreement.
The Paris Agreement was opened for signature at the United Nations 
Headquarters in New York on 22 April 2016 until 21 April 2017806. It was planned 
that it would come into force on the thirtieth day following the date on which at 
least 55 Parties to the Convention, representing a total of at least an estimated 55% 
of all global GHG emissions, deposit their instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession807.
As at 5 October 2016, 191 Parties out of 197 signed the Paris Agreement, 
including 72 Parties, which together account for 56.75% of the total of global 
GHG emissions808, had deposited their instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession with the Depositary. Thus, both thresholds in Article 21 of 
the Paris Agreement, have been passed, paving the way for of the Paris Agreement 
to come into force on 4 November 2016, a few days after the 22nd Conference of 
the Parties (COP22) in Marrakech (7-18 November 2016). This process is shown 
in Figure 29 below.
Given the entry into force of the Paris Agreement, the Marrakech Conference 
(COP22, November 2016) has since included809:
• The 22nd session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP22);
• The 12th session of the Conference of the Parties acting as the Conference of 
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP12);
• As well as the 1st session of the Conference of the Parties acting as the Conference 
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP1).
806. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 20, para. 1.
807. Decision 1/CP.21, Annex, Paris Agreement, Art. 21, para. 1.
808. http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php
809. http://unfccc.int/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/meeting/9567.php
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n Figure 29. Process for the entry into force of the Paris Agreement 
and ratification status810
810. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017 – Figures updated 
on 1 September 2017.
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III.A. Brief history of international negotiations 
on climate change
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
was adopted in 1992 during the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. In this 
framework document, the UNFCCC signatory countries undertake to stabilise 
greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Following this historic event, 
the question of global warming has increasingly taken centre stage on the interna-
tional agenda. The UNFCCC came into effect on 21 March 1994, and since then, 
the Parties have been engaged in international negotiations to strengthen the 
global response to climate change. The 1st session of the Conference of the Parties 
to the UNFCCC (COP1) was held in Berlin in 1995. Within this framework and 
to supplement the commitments made in Rio, the 3rd Conference of the Parties 
to the UNFCCC (COP3)811 adopted the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. This 
obliges the Parties included in Annex I of the UNFCCC (developed countries) 
that have ratified the Protocol to reduce jointly the emission level of six GHGs by 
at least 5% compared with the 1990 level in the period 2008-2012812. This was the 
first binding provision, by virtue of international law, to limit countries’ GHGs 
Controversies over certain points of the Protocol could not, however, be settled 
in Kyoto and the Parties continued to negotiate on these topics in subsequent 
years. The Marrakech Accords, adopted in 2001, finally allowed the adoption of 
operationalisation modalities for the Kyoto Protocol. However, the Protocol only 
came into force in February 2005 and its implementation was delayed in most 
countries. Australia only ratified it in December 2007, for example. Canada even 
withdrew in 2011. And the United States, the largest GHG emitter in the world 
until 2004 (since overtaken by China)813, has never ratified the Protocol. 
811. The Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP) meets annually. Each session 
of the COP is therefore referred to using the acronym COP x; Paris was the 21st conference 
and was therefore COP21.
812. Kyoto Protocol, Art. 3, para. 1.
813. According to data from the CAIT tool of the World Resources Institute on historical 
emissions of countries. [online] http://cait2.wri.org
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n With the aim of continuing to combat climate change after the first commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012) and formalising the contribution made 
by developing countries to mitigation and adaptation efforts, the Parties embarked 
on a dialogue about long-term cooperation in 2005. Two ad hoc working groups 
were set up in 2005 to facilitate the progress of negotiations. This involved an Ad 
Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for the Annex B Parties under 
the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP -implemented in 2005 in parallel with the dialogue 
on long-term cooperation), which discussed the modalities of the second commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol; and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA- set up in 2007), which constituted a specific 
framework for negotiations on the post-2012 issues under the Convention. 
COP13 (2007) provided a two-year road map on these issues known as the 
Bali Action Plan. This aimed to reach an agreement in 2009 in Copenhagen on a 
post-2012 climate regime under the Convention. The Parties did not manage to 
reach a detailed agreement at the planned date. The negotiations therefore continued 
during the next COP (in Cancún in 2010 and in Durban in 2011), before being 
concluded in Doha in 2012. At the same time, the Parties, acting as a Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, agreed on an amendment to the Protocol providing 
for GHG reduction targets during a second commitment period from 2013 to 
2020. With these decisions, the 18th Conference of the Parties (COP18) to the 
UNFCCC and the 8th session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting 
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP8) in Doha brought the mandates of the 
Ad Hoc Working Group under the Convention (AWG-LCA) and the Ad Hoc 
Working Group under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) to an end.
At the same time, a new stage had commenced with the creation of the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) in 
2011. This group has been working for more than three years on preparing an 
agreement that it hoped would be adopted at the COP21 in Paris, and expected 
to enter into force and be applied by 2020. The next Conferences of the Parties, in 
Doha, Warsaw and Lima, moved in this direction, whilst attempting to plug the 
ambition gap between the commitments taken by the Parties by 2020 and those 
necessary to limit global warming to less than 2°C compared to pre-industrial 
levels by the end of the century. In 2015, this process resulted in the adoption of 
the first universal agreement on climate at COP21 in Paris. Less than one year 
after it was adopted, the Paris Agreement came into effect on November 4, 2016, 
a few days after COP22. The Marrakech Conference (COP22, 7-18 November 
2016) paved the way for progress to be made for the implementation of the Paris 
Agreement, by setting 2018 as the target date to define the procedures to implement 
the said Agreement.
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Figure 30. International climate negotiations, main stages 1988-2015814
History of the negotiations – Main stages
Bali Action Plan (2007)
The 13th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP13), 
serving as the third session of the extensively -published meeting of the Parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol (CMP3), was held in Bali on 3-5 December, 2007, in a climate 
of citizen pressure. One of the key issues of this international meeting was to 
814. © Guide to the COP23-climate negotiations, OIF/IFDD, 2017.
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n establish a multi-lateral cooperation framework for the post-2012 period which 
would coincide with the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The 
conclusions drawn after several delegate meetings and sessions were an agreement 
on the Convention’s action plan and a roadmap over a two year period815. This Bali 
Action Plan consists of a set of decisions emanating from the Dialogue on long-term 
cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing implementation of the 
Convention, initiated during the Montreal Conference (2005)816. The Bali Action 
Plan forms a coherent basis for negotiations with a view to adopting an “agreed 
outcome under the Convention”, an essential part of a climate regime for the 
post-2012 period. 
A change in formulation was one of the most significant developments brought 
by the Bali Action Plan. For the first time, the terms “developed” and “developing” 
countries replaced the terms “Parties included in Annex I” and “non-Annex I Parties”. 
This innovation extended the perspective to new combinations and effort levels by 
the countries. Another major advance was the link established between the mitigation 
efforts of developing countries and the financial and technological support from 
developed countries.
The negotiation process opened up by the Bali Action Plan, that should have 
ended in 2009, only finally reached an end in 2012 in Doha. It is structured over 
five pillars: a shared vision, mitigation, adaptation, technology development and 
transfer, and financing.
Mitigation: This issue was shown as one of the most thorny issues of COP13. 
The United States, Canada and other Parties favoured tough language on developing 
countries’ actions and commitments; the Group of 77 and China (G77+China) 
sought greater emphasis on a discourse dealing more with the commitments of 
Annex I Parties, therefore of developed countries817. Lastly, both views were taken 
into account and the Parties agreed to examine the option of taking818: 
• For the developed countries: “measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally- 
appropriate mitigation commitments or initiatives, including quantified GHG 
emission limitation and reduction objectives”, taking into account differences 
in their national circumstances;
• For the developing countries: “nationally appropriate mitigation actions (...) 
in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, 
financing resources and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable 
manner”;
• Adaptation: It was decided to boost the action for adaptation to the adverse 
effects of climate change, mainly by examining international cooperation in 
order to achieve the urgent application of miscellaneous adaptation measures, 
815. Decision 1/CP.13.
816. Decision 1/CP.11.
817. IISD, 2007.
818. Decision 1/CP.13, para. 1(b).
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given the immediate needs of particularly vulnerable developing countries, 
mainly the Least Developed Countries (LDC), the Small Island Developing 
States (SIDS) and the African countries819; 
• Technology development and transfer: The Bali Action Plan provides for 
reflecting on effective mechanisms to eliminate the obstacles of access by devel-
oping country Parties of the UNFCCC to environmentally sound technologies 
at affordable cost and facilitate their roll-out820. The debates on these issues 
have mainly covered the financing of these technologies and the intellectual 
property rights. These issues are also discussed in other forums such as those 
of the World Trade Organisation (WTO);
• Financing: The mitigation measures of developing countries were linked for 
the first time in Bali to the financial and technological supports provided 
by the developed countries. Financing is also envisaged to help developing 
countries to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. The Bali Action 
Plan thus sets up the bases for the financial framework to support developing 
countries in their mitigation and adaptation efforts821.
Copenhagen Accord (2009)
The Copenhagen Conference (COP15) was intended to endorse the main compo-
nents of a post-2012 climate regime using two negotiating processes, firstly under 
the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) and secondly under the Convention (AWG-LCA). 
But the Parties were unable to agree on the setting up of this regime, resulting in 
the failure of the Copenhagen negotiations. It is nevertheless essential to retain 
that only a political agreement in the form of a high-level declaration by a few 
States could be reached during the COP15, known as the Copenhagen Accord. 
The day following the Copenhagen Conference, a total of 114 parties declared 
they would become part of it822. Despite not being legally binding, a positive point 
is that the Copenhagen Accord includes the two principal GHG emitters, namely 
China and the United States. 
The Accord underlines the political desire of States associated with it to address 
climate change in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities. Noted by the COP15823, the Copenhagen 
Accord clarifies certain aspects of the negotiations, like the long-term GHG emission 
reduction targets and financing. The developed countries set themselves the goal 
of assembling collectively 100 billion US dollars a year until 2020 to finance climate 
projects of developing countries. Finally this accord was the basis for negotiations 
leading to the Cancún Agreements but also to the Paris Agreement.
819. Decision 1/CP.13, para. 1(c).
820. Decision 1/CP.13, para. 1(d).
821. Decision 1/CP.13, para. 1(e).
822. http://unfccc.int/5262.
823. Decision 2/CP.15.
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The Cancún Conference was held between November 29 and 11 December, 2010 
and allowed for the launch of the foundations of a new cycle of negotiations under 
the UNFCCC. Despite the far more modest expectations than at the Copenhagen 
Conference, or perhaps because of it, the Cancún Conference resulted in a “balanced 
set” of decisions which the international community greeted with enthusiasm. The 
Cancún Agreements assembled the progress in Copenhagen into a formal agreement 
and sent a political signal to continue the discussions on the second commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol. The Parties associated themselves unanimously with 
this, with the exception of Bolivia. 
The significant progress brought by the Cancún Agreements mainly consists 
of the formal creation of institutions, such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF), the 
Adaptation Committee and the technology Mechanism comprised of the Technology 
Executive Committee (TEC) as well as the Climate Technology Centre and Network 
(CTCN). Other progress made includes creating a register to facilitate support for 
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA) and the launch of the REDD+, 
which aims at Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD) and includes the role of conservation, durable forestry management and 
the development of forest carbon reservoirs in developing countries (the “+” in 
REDD+). The Cancún Agreements also provide for the preparation of National 
Adaptation Plans (NAP), mainly by the least developed countries824.
Durban Platform (2011)
The Durban Conference (COP17) launched the process for negotiating a unique 
agreement under the UNFCCC, with the creation of the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). This group has the mandate 
of implementing “a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed 
outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties”, which should 
enter into force and be applied no later than 2020825. Also known as the Durban 
Platform, this process has made it possible to encourage long-term cooperation 
involving all the countries. It thus represents significant progress in the central 
question of whether the developed countries or the developing countries should 
make the effort. One of the goals of the Platform is “ensuring the highest possible 
mitigation efforts by all Parties”826. 
This progress was not achieved without difficulty. In fact, the main greenhouse 
gas emitters – Canada, Russia and Japan in particular – refused to commit to a second 
commitment period827, which provoked considerable controversy. However, by 
824. Decision 1/CP.16, paras. 14-16.
825. Decision 1/CP.17, paras. 2 and 4.
826. Decision 1/CP.17, para. 7.
827. Decision 1/CMP.7, Annex 1.
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reaffirming the willingness of the Parties to reach agreement on a second commitment 
period under the Kyoto Protocol, the outcome of the Durban Conference was 
ultimately to strengthen trust between the Parties. It testifies to a universal political 
will to combat climate change with a constructive commitment by the most 
vulnerable countries and emerging countries. China’s initiative announcing its 
willingness to commit to its emission reduction from 2020 onwards under certain 
conditions, encouraged other emerging countries with increasingly significant 
GHG emissions, such as Brazil and South Africa.
Progress was also made at the Durban Conference on the topic of adaptation 
to climate change, with a framework and guidelines for the NAPs created the 
previous year in Cancún828. These aim to build up the capacities of developing 
countries, mainly the least developed and most vulnerable countries, in terms of 
assessing and reducing their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change.
Doha Climate Gateway (2012)
In 2012, the United Nations Conference on climate change in Doha, Qatar 
(COP18/ CMP8) enabled delegates to consolidate the advances in international 
negotiations achieved over the last three years and opened up the road to raising 
the ambitions and doubling up efforts on all levels.
The Doha Climate Gateway, at outcome snatched at the last minute on the last 
evening of the 2012 conference, refers to two major elements. Firstly, the adoption 
of the “Doha Amendment” to the Kyoto Protocol that records the second 
commitment period in it. This commenced on 1 January 2013 and will end on 
31 December 2020. To date, 83 Parties have ratified the Doha amendment to the 
Kyoto Protocol829. The second element in the Doha Climate Gateway is the 
conclusion of negotiations under the Bali Action Plan of 2007. In Doha, the 
Parties finally disbanded the AWG-KP and AWG-LCA, whose mandates had been 
extended twice over the last three years of prolonged negotiations. 
COP18 therefore allowed a certain streamlining of the UNFCCC negotiation 
process. The ADP, SBI and SBSTA henceforth formed the only three negotiation 
channels, compared with the five that existed in 2012. The Doha Decision reaffirms 
the ambition to adopt “a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome 
with legal force” by 2015. It also provides for a negotiation text to be available 
before May 2015. 
828. Decision 5/CP.17.
829. To access the updated list [online] https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-c&chapter=27&clang=_in (last consulted on 3 October 
2017).
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Although the Warsaw Conference (COP19) proved flawed in terms of climate 
urgency, it nevertheless produced a series of decisions which map out the route 
towards the Paris Conference. One of its advances was to clarify further the modalities 
for preparing the draft negotiation text for 2015 and for the submission process 
for the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) of the Parties to 
the UNFCCC830. The INDC indicate the voluntary efforts of countries in terms of 
climate change that could be included in the 2015 agreement. The term “contri-
butions” adopted finally achieved consensus in the final minutes of the Warsaw 
negotiations. It nevertheless leaves major issues hanging;the legal nature of the 
contributions and the differentiation between the countries based on their different 
levels of development and emissions as well as financial support, technology transfer 
and capacity-building. 
In addition, the Parties were invited in Warsaw to intensify their efforts to 
reduce the ambition gap for the pre-2020 period, by cancelling, for example, the 
certified emission reductions (CER)831.
The agreement on the CTCN rules, which signals its operationalisation, and 
on the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) for Loss and Damage was a positive 
signal towards the implementation of the Cancún Agreements and the Durban and 
Doha decisions. REDD+ was also the subject of numerous decisions of a technical 
nature, which now form the “Warsaw Framework for REDD+”. In addition, 
pledges for finance amounting to almost 280 million US dollars were announced 
in Warsaw for the REDD+. A sum in total contrast to the sum the GCF could 
count on in December 2013, which was no more than USD 6.9 million. This 
figure greatly fuelled the loss of confidence among developed and developing 
countries, who deplored the 71% decrease in financing of climate-related activities 
in 2013832. To remedy this, a high-level ministerial dialogue on climate action 
financing was established in Warsaw, with meetings planned every two years until 
2020. Directives for the GCF were also adopted to make it more operational833. 
Lima Call for Climate Action and the road to Paris (2014)
On the final straight to Paris, the Lima Conference (COP20) capitalised on the 
outcomes of previous COPs and managed to lay the bases for the future agreement 
of 2015. After extended negotiations, the Parties adopted in December 2014 
“the Lima Call for Climate Action”, which contains, especially in its annex, a draft 
version of the future Paris agreement834. It also states that this should give balanced 
830. Decision 1/CP.19.
831. Decision 1/CP.19, para. 5(c).
832. IISD, 2013, p. 31.
833. Decision 4/CP.19.
834. Decision 1/CP.20, Annex.
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consideration to six issues: mitigation, adaptation, financing, development and 
transfer of technologies, capacity-building and transparency of measures and 
support. 
The Lima Call also includes a decision about the INDC. This sets out their 
scope, the data they can contain, the submission methods and measures to be 
taken by the secretariat835. The Parties are invited especially to include elements on 
adaptation and implementation resources. Lastly, they are asked to specify the 
reason why they believe their efforts to be fair and ambitious836.
The Parties also adopted a group of decisions within the framework of the 
COP and CMP10, taking place in parallel. These contribute among other things 
to the operationalisation of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and 
Damage. They establish the work programme for Lima on gender837, which results 
were due to be reviewed in 2016 at COP22. The Lima Ministerial Declaration on 
education and awareness-raising was also adopted during the COP20838. This aims 
to raise the awareness of children and the general public to the effects of climate 
change and encourage them to change their behaviour.
Progress on adaptation remained modest in Lima. Although many countries 
sought revised guidelines for the NAPs, the COP saw no need for the review. In 
addition, the COP expressed its concern in Lima over the lack of funds to meet 
the needs of the LDCs, and notably the deficit in the Fund for the LDCs (LDCF) 
and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), which could support the NAP 
formulation and implementation process839. 
In addition, the Parties held a first annual high-level ministerial meeting 
aimed at reinforcing the implementation of measures identified under the work 
relating to the commitments for the pre-2020 period.  In terms of financing, the 
Parties also held their first biennial ministerial meeting relating to the work 
programme on long term financing. Lastly, the first biennial reports and sixth 
national communications were evaluated under the auspices of the SBI for the first 
time in Lima, with the assessment of 17 developed countries.
The Paris Agreement, adoption of the first universal 
Climate agreement (2015)
At COP21, in Paris, the Parties adopted what would become the first so-called 
“universal” climate agreement, thus bringing together all Parties to the UNFCCC. 
The Paris Agreement and Decision 1/CP.21, which are aimed at operationalising it, 
enabled real progress to be made with regard to global issues. In addition to including 
835. Decision 1/CP.20, paras. 9-16.
836. Decision 1/CP.20, para. 14.
837. Decision 18/CP.20.
838. Decision 19/CP.20.
839. Decisions 3, 4 and 8/CP.20.
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n all the Parties to the UNFCCC, a certain number of issues were reaffirmed and/or 
confirmed, such as mitigation and market mechanisms, and also adaptation, loss 
and damage, financing, technology transfer, capacity-building, and the recognition 
of the role and necessary involvement of all players in combating global warming, 
and all this through the prism of monitoring implementation and transparency, 
with a view to achieving the targets.
At the end of COP21, the Parties agreed to implement a real long-term 
programme, which particular feature is the objective since then contained in a 
binding legal instrument that limits the global temperature increase to “well below 
2°C”, indeed to 1.5°C, from now to the end of the century, compared to pre-industrial 
levels. The fundamental principles of the Convention, such as equality, shared but 
differentiated responsibilities and the respective capacities were reconfirmed.
The key innovation arising from Paris consists in the implementation of fixed 
contributions on a national level (NDC) i.e. national targets to be implemented 
by the States which are required to be renewed every five years and which always 
increase. By 2023, global progress in terms of climate action will be revised by a 
“Global Stocktake” which will be afterwards implemented in five year cycles.
Marrakech...the “Action Conference”
COP22 was held in Marrakech on 7-18 November 2016. Announced as the 
“Action Conference” following the adoption of the Paris Agreement in the previous 
year, it allowed to track the road towards the operationalisation of the targets set 
in Paris. The keen interest around the event was reinforced by the speed in which 
the agreement was enforced on November 4, 2016 only a few days after the beginning 
of COP23. In compliance with this, the Marrakech Conference also included the 
first session of the Conference of the Parties as a meeting between the Paris Agreement 
Parties (CMA1).
Following the Conference, the Parties adopted over 30 decisions840, particularly 
in relation to the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement. In a non-exhaustive 
way, we note that the Adaptation Fund should benefit the Agreement841, the definition 
of the mandate of the Paris Committee on capacity-building (PCCB) or again the 
launch of the process to identify the information to be provided by the developed 
countries within the framework of their bi-annual financial reports842. It was also 
determined that 2018843would be a target date to define the methods to implement 
the Paris Agreement. Other transversal topics aimed at implementing the Agreement 
840. Access all the decisions adopted during COP22 [online] http://unfccc.int/meetings/
marrakech_nov_2016/meeting/9567/php/view/decisions.php#c
841. Decision 1/CP.22, para. 14-15.
842. In compliance with Article 9, para.5 of the Paris Agreement.
843. Decision 1/CP.22 para. 10; in compliance with Decision 1/CMA.1 para 5-7.
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were defined, for example the preparation of the facilitation Dialogue of 2018844, 
or again the strengthening the pre-2020 actions845.
COP22 was also the occasion to reinforce internationally the visibility of climate 
governance and of environmental multilateral ism, with the adoption of two policy 
decisions: the “Marrakech Proclamation”846 stating the engagement of the Party States 
to pursue the implementation of the targets set and a “Marrakech Partnership”847 
which establishes a programme of action between 2017-2020 recognizing the 
indispensable role the non-state actors should also play in international climate 
action and sustainable development. 
Nevertheless, the conference did not provide concrete results on a number of 
key elements relating to the implementation of the Paris agreement, but it helps 
to better understand the parties points of view on a multiplicity of questions (see 
Section I.). It is worthwhile noting that a shadow fell over COP22 with the 
announcement of Donald Trump’s election to the American presidency during the 
Conference. He had clearly indicated during his campaign that he would withdraw 
from the Paris Agreement if elected. For a certain number of observers, legitimate 
fears on international climate action ambition were raised regarding the impact on 
financing, or again, amongst other things, the achievement of the mitigation 
objectives in line with the challenges of the pre-2020 period.
III.B. Structure of the Convention and description 
of the role and mandate of its main bodies 
and ad hoc groups
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is 
composed of several bodies. Some have a decision-making role, others have consul-
tative roles and many are allocated to specific issues. The organisation chart below 
lists the various bodies The following table gives a brief description of each ones. 
844. Decision 1/CP.22 para 16.
845. Decision 1/CP.22, para. 17-22.
846. http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/application/pdf/marrakech_
action_proclamation.pdf
847. http://unfccc.int/files/paris_agreement/application/pdf/marrakech_partnership_for_
global_climate_action.pdf
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n III.B.1. Structure of the United Nations Framework  
Convention on Climate Change
Figure 31. Conceptual figure of the UNFCCC structure848
848. © Guide to the COP23 negotiations-Climate, OIF/IFDD, 2017, author translation 
– According to the UNFCCC [online] http://unfccc.int/bodies/items/6241.php
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Table. Bodies and entities formed under the Convention
Institution Responsibilities
Decision-making bodies
Conference of the Parties (COP)
The COP is the Convention’s supreme decision- 
making body. It is the association of all the country 
Parties to the Convention. The COP reviews the 
implementation of the Convention and assesses 
the Parties’ commitments in light of the Convention’s 
objective, new scientific discoveries and experience 
acquired in implementing climate change policies. 
The COP is held every year, unless the Parties decide 
otherwise
Conference of Parties acting as a meeting  
of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP).
The CMP is the supreme decision-making body  
of the Kyoto Protocol. It also meets every year 
since its inception. Here the Parties discuss the 
implementation of the protocol, its achievements 
and its efficacy.
The Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement 
(CMA);
The CMA is the Paris Agreement’s supreme 
decision-making body. It held its first meeting  
in November 2016
Subsidiary bodies common to the COP, CMP and CMA
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice (SBSTA)
Advises the COP, CMP and CMA on scientific and 
technical issues which are specific to or shared by 
them. 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)
Advises the COP, CMP and CMA to improve the 
effective application of the Convention, the Kyoto 
Protocol and the Paris Agreement. 
Specialist bodies created by virtue of the COP
Technological mechanism composed of the two elements below:
Technology Executive Committee
Seeks to carry out the application of the framework 
for implementing meaningful and effective actions 
to enhance the transfer of or access to technology.
Climate Technology Centre and Network
Facilitates the establishment of a network of 
organisations, initiatives and national, regional, 
sectoral and international technology networks.
Permanent finance committee Helps the COP to carry out its functions relating  to the Convention’s financial mechanism.
Adaptation Committee Promotes the implementation of enhanced action for adaptation.
Executive Committee of the Warsaw international 
mechanism on loss and damage
Addresses loss and damage associated with climate 
change impacts, in particular extreme weather events 
and phenomena that are gradual, in developing 
countries that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change.
Paris Committee on Capacity-building
Provided by the Paris Agreement to address gaps and 
needs, both current and emerging, in implementing 
capacity-building in developing country Parties and 
further enhancing capacity-building efforts, including 
with regard to coherence and coordination in 
capacity-building activities. The Committee mandate 
was adopted at COP22 in Marrakech. The Committee 
held its first meeting in May 2017.
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n Institution Responsibilities
Forum on the impact of response measures849 
Helps the countries concerned to deal with the 
impacts of response measures that have been 
implemented.
Ad hoc working groups created by virtue of the COP
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris  
Agreement (APA)
To prepare the operationalisation of the Paris 
Agreement through the development of decision 
projects that the COP would recommend to the CMA 
for assessment and adoption at its first session.
Specialist ad hoc groups created by virtue of the COP
Consultative Group of Experts on national 
communications of non-Annex I Parties (CGE)
Assists the non-Annex I Parties in preparing their 
national communications.
Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LDCEG) Advises the least developed countries on preparing and implementing NAPs among other things.
Specialist bodies of the CMP
Executive Board of the CDM Ensures the effective implementation and correct operation of the CDM.
Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee
Spearheads the implementation and verification 
 of the JI projects in the countries referred to in 
Annex I.
Compliance Committee
Responsible for guaranteeing compliance with 
commitments and supports the Parties finding  
it difficult to comply with their obligations under 
the Kyoto Protocol. This committee includes a 
facilitative branch and an enforcement branch.
Specialist body of the CMA
Committee to facilitate the implementation  
and to promote the compliance of the Paris 
Agreement provisions.
Must be made up of twelve experts and focus on 
facilitation. It should function in a transparent, 
non-accusatory and non-punitive manner. 
Committee procedures must be submitted to the 
CMA at the latest at COP24, in 2018, through  
the APA.
Coordination body
Secretariat of the UNFCCC
It assists and supports the application of the 
Convention. It coordinates and organises the 
meetings of the various bodies and provides 
technical expertise.
849. Work programme overseen by subsidiary bodies.
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III.B.2. Description of the role and mandate of the main 
decision-making bodies
The Conference of the Parties (COP), the highest authority of the Convention, 
brings together those countries which, by signing and ratifying the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), have become Parties to 
this Convention. As such, the COP aims to implement the ultimate Convention 
objective.
The Conference of the Parties as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol (CMP)850 is a totally separate legal entity from the COP and is the supreme 
decision-making body of the Kyoto Protocol. The CMP includes the sub-group of 
Parties to the Convention which have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The Parties to 
the Protocol alone have the right to participate in decisions made by the CMP.
The Conference of the Parties acting as a meeting of the Parties of the 
Paris Agreement (CMA) is the highest authority of the Paris Agreement. It brings 
together the countries that have signed and ratified the Paris Agreement and have 
become Parties to this Agreement.
The Bureau of the COP and the Bureau of the CMP administer the inter-
governmental process for the COP and for the CMP. The UNFCCC Secretariat 
coordinates and organises the meetings of the various bodies and provides technical 
expertise.
The Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) are two partner organisations of the UNFCCC and 
play a key role in the process. The GEF has been in existence since 1991 and was 
named as the entity responsible for administering UNFCCC funds earmarked to 
help developing countries. The IPCC helps establish the scientific base by publishing 
climate change assessment reports every seven years and specialist studies on specific 
topics. The IPCC is currently discussing the review reviewing the frequency of its 
assessment reports to potentially XXX them based on the five year Paris Agreement 
cycle critically in relation to the Global Stocktake851. 
III.B.3. Description of the role and mandate of the main 
ad hoc working groups
The Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) is mandated to advise the COP, 
CMP and CMA on improving the effective application of the Convention, the 
Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement.
The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) which 
advises the COP, CMP and CMA on scientific and technical issues specific to or 
shared by these bodies.
850. See Gagnon-Lebrun et al. 2005 for further information on how the CMP operates.
851. Decision of the GIEC IPCC/XLIII-7, para 8. [online] https://www.ipcc.ch/meetings/
session43/p43_decisions.pdf
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the entry into force and the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement by preparing 
draft decisions to be recommended through the Conference of Parties to the 
Conference of the Parties acting as a meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement 
for consideration and adoption at its first session852. Since 2016 it holds its sessions 
in parallel with the sessions of the Convention’s subsidiary bodies.
It is worth noting that the SBI and SBSTA are permanent bodies whereas the 
APA is an ad hoc group.
Description of the role and mandate  
of the special closed working groups
With the aim of continuing to combat climate change after the first commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012) and formalising the contribution 
made by developing countries to mitigation and adaptation efforts, the Parties 
embarked on a dialogue about long-term cooperation in 2005. Two ad hoc working 
groups were set up in 2005 to facilitate the progress of negotiations. This involved 
an Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for the Annex B Parties 
under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP -implemented in 2005 in parallel with the 
dialogue on long-term cooperation), which discussed the modalities of the second 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol; and the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA- set up in 2007), which constituted a 
specific framework for negotiations on the post-2012 issues under the Convention. 
Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for Annex B 
Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP)62853. This group was estab-
lished in 2005 to facilitate the negotiations on the commitments of developed 
countries (Parties included in Annex I of the UNFCCC) for the second commitment 
period from 2013 to 2020. These negotiations covered new GHG emission 
reduction targets and how to achieve them, for example market mechanisms854.
Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA). The 
Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing 
implementation of the Convention was initiated in 2005 during the Montreal 
Conference (COP11). It aimed to enhance the implementation of the Convention, 
mainly by making it easier to analyse cooperation approaches in respect of  
sustainable development, adaptation and technological potential. At the end of 
this two-year dialogue uniting all the Parties to the Convention a new subsidiary 
body, the AWG-LCA, was created in Bali in December 2007855. Its mandate was 
to complete successfully, in two years, a process to enable the effective application 
of the Convention through long-term cooperation action.
852. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 11.
853. By virtue of Article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol, following Decision 1/CMP.1, Study of 
paragraph 9 of Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol on the commitments of the Annex I 
Parties for the following periods.
854. The Kyoto Protocol’s Annex B is a list of Parties which have made quantified commitments 
to reducing or limiting GHG emissions.
855. Decision 1/CP.13.
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The mandate of both these working groups, scheduled to end in Copenhagen in 
2009, was extended until the Doha Conference (2012).
A new working group then took up the reins:
• Ad Hoc Working Group of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
(ADP)856. Set up in Durban in 2011, the ADP started its work in 2012. Its mandate 
is to develop for 2015 a protocol, another legal instrument or a commonly 
agreed text with legal value by virtue of the Convention and which would apply 
to all the Parties. This should come into force and be applied from 2020 onwards. 
It was also tasked with studying measures to compensate for the lack of pre-2020 
ambition level in terms of the 2°C objective.
The decision to create the Durban Platform marked the start of a new and 
significant chapter in the collective effort by Parties to combat climate change. 
In fact, after difficult discussions since Copenhagen in 2009, the Durban Platform 
opened a more inclusive climate regime transcending the traditional lines separating 
until then the group of so-called “developed” and “developing” countries. Its work 
ended at the end of the first week of the Paris COP, when the ad hoc/working 
group submitted to the COP Presidency a draft of the Paris Agreement.
III.C. Presentation and positions of the various 
negotiation groups
III.C.1. Presentation of the main negotiating groups
Introduction to the main negotiating groups857 
Each Party State to the United Nations Framework Agreement on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)858, to the Kyoto Protocol859 and to the Paris Agreement860, is represented 
in the sessions organised through the Convention, the treaties which rely on it and 
their constituent bodies, by a national delegation made up of several civil servants 
and experts skilled in representing and negotiating on behalf of their government. 
The climate change negotiation process revolves around regional groups and 
negotiation coalitions. The regional groups are defined by the official United Nations 
classification system, according to their geographical situation, whilst the negotiation 
coalitions are political alliances formed on the basis of common interests.
856. Decision 1/CP.17.
857. http://unfccc.int/portal_francophone/essential_background/convention/convention_ 
bodies/party_groupings/items/3273.php
858. 197 Parties as at 3 October 2017 [online] http://unfccc.int/essential_background/
convention/status_of_ratification/items/2631.php.
859. 192 Parties as at 3 October 2017 [online] http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ 
ratification/items/2613.php
860. 166 Parties as at 3 October 2017 [online] http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_
of_ratification/items/9444.php
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According to the organisational procedure set up within the United Nations system, 
the various Parties to the negotiation are organised into five regional groups included 
in the list below, which mainly come into play during the elections of the861 governing 
representative bodies:862
• Africa;
• Latin America and the Caribbean; 
• Asia and the Pacific region;
• Eastern Europe;
• Western Europe and “Others863”. 
Except for the African countries, often within the group which serves also as 
the negotiation coalition group (see below, the Africa Group), the member states 
of the other regional groups negotiate from within the strategic alliances through 
formal and less formal (ad hoc) coalitions to present their positions and to serve their 
interests in the negotiations. As previously announced, the negotiation coalitions 
are by nature political and strategic alliances, established on the basis of common 
interests. 
Negotiation coalitions
During the negotiations, the voices or positions of the countries are ideally presented 
on behalf of a negotiation coalition (common group position) or by default on behalf 
of their government (national position.). The following paragraphs distinguish 
between the formal and less formal coalitions among the most important and most 
strategic within the current organisational process of climate change negotiations 
The formal negotiating groups 
The Africa Group of negotiators (AGN) or Africa Group
The Africa Group is the only regional group to function as a genuine negotiation 
coalition. It has 54 member countries who share a variety of causes for concern, 
such as desertification, the lack of water resources, vulnerability to the impacts of 
climate change and the fight against poverty. The Group frequently makes common 
declarations, mainly on topics related to adaptation, technology transfer, capacity 
building and financing, key to the implementation of ambitious climate change 
actions for the countries represented by the AGN.
861. The officers of the bodies are elected from representatives of the various regional 
groups and from Small Island Developing States (SIDS) – see also OIF/IFDD 2016.
862. http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml
863. These “Other” States include Australia, Canada, Iceland, New-Zealand, Norway, 
Switzerland and the United States of America.
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Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)
The AOSIS is a coalition of 44 island states particularly vulnerable to the risk of 
rising sea levels, due to their geographical characteristic and location. They form a 
pressure group which acts as a mouthpiece for the majority of small developing 
island states (AOSIS) during negotiations. They are active as a coalition in the 
negotiations at the United Nations as well as within the framework of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Most AOSIS countries864 
also belong to the large group of developing countries (Group of 77 and China) 
and nine are among the Least Developed Countries (LDC)865. Bahrain is the only 
small member island state of the United Nations which is not part of AOSIS. 
Inversely, the Cook Islands and Nioué are Small Island Developing States, (SIDS) 
which are AOSIS members but not full members of the United Nations866.
Group of 77 and China (G-77 + China)867
This is a free and heterogeneous alliance of developing countries, set up in 1964 
within the framework of the first United Nations Conference on trade and devel-
opment. The developing countries generally work through the G-77 and China to 
establish common negotiation positions. The G-77 and China is today active 
across the whole United Nations System. It is currently made up of 134 members, 
and good governance is ensured by the country holding the presidency in New 
York based on an annual rotation system868. China is an associate member of the 
G-77 rather than a full member. The group seeks to develop a common position 
on the main negotiation topics. A majority group in the negotiations, representing 
approximately 85% of the world population, the G-77 and China especially supports 
the economic interests of its members across several issues at the United Nations. 
Nevertheless given that G-77 and China constitutes a diversified group with different 
strategic interests and socio-economic development priorities, its members can 
intervene in the debates individually, or in other coalitions or regional groups 
(AGN, AOSIS, the LDC group, etc., for example) within the G-77 and China, 
and sometimes they adopt divergent positions. Maintaining the unity of the group 
represents a major challenge. 
Least Developed Countries (LDC)
The LDC are low income countries facing serious structural obstacles which affect 
their legitimate ambition to pursue and achieve sustainable development. They 
have a poor level of human resources and are very vulnerable to economic and 
environmental risks impacts. Currently 47 countries869 are classified in the LDC 
864. http://aosis.org/members
865. http://unohrlls.org/about-sids/country-profiles
866. http://www.un.org/en/member-states/
867. http://www.g77.org
868. Since January 13, 2017 the government of Ecuador has held the presidency, pro temporis, 
of the G77+China Group.
869. 33 in Africa, 13 in Asia and 1 in the Caribbean.
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of Equatorial Guinea (2017) three years after Samoa in 2014. Equally active in 
terms of a negotiation coalition at the United Nations in New York, the LDCs are 
very involved in international negotiations on climate change, working together to 
defend their interests regarding recognising their specific vulnerability as well as 
their need for support to plan their adaptation. Therefore, the UNFCCC recognises 
in its Article 4 paragraph 9871 the “particular needs” and the “special situation” of 
the LDCs due to their having the weakest capacity to tackle the impacts of climate 
change.
European Union (EU)
The EU is a political and economic union of 28 member countries872. Its member 
states are represented by the EU. As an organisation of regional economic integration, 
the EU itself is a party both to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol873 and the Paris 
Agreement without however benefiting from a distinctive voting right of its indi-
vidual member countries. Despite certain internal differences, the EU member 
states manage to coordinate and adopt a common position and speak as a single 
voice during the negotiations on climate change. To achieve this, the 28 member 
states of the European Union meet in a closed-door meeting to agree on the common 
negotiation positions. The country holding the EU presidency874 – a post which rotates 
every six months-s peaks on behalf of the European Union and its 28 member 
states. 
Umbrella Group
The Umbrella Group is a flexible coalition of developed countries which do not 
belong to the European Union. Formed after the Kyoto protocol negotiation, it 
emerged from the JUSSCANNZ875 group and is active in all the United Nations’ 
fora, including international climate change negotiations within the UNFCCC. 
The composition of the group is not necessarily always the same. The standard list 
comprises Australia, Canada, United States, Russia, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway and Ukraine. Other countries join from time to time as they deem fit, 
based on the topics addressed.
870. Official LDC list [online] https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/
uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf
871. Convention text – official English version [online] http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_
and_support/cooperation_with_international_organizations/application/pdf/convfr.pdf
872. Despite Brexit, the United Kingdom is still a full member of the European Union and 
the resulting rights and obligations continue to be fully applied to this State and on 
its territory.
873. Initially as the European Economic Community.
874. From July to December 2017, Estonia holds the presidency of the EU Council.
875. JUSSCANNZ is an English acronym for Japan, United States, Switzerland, Canada, 
Norway and New Zealand”.
227
Guide to the Negotiations - UNFCCC (COP23) - OIF/IFDD, 2017
Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)
The EIG was formed in 2002 by members of the Organisation for economic 
cooperation and development (OECD) which did not agree with the positions 
adopted by the Umbrella Group. It includes Switzerland, Mexico and South Korea, 
joined later on by Monaco and Liechtenstein. Mexico and South Korea are rare 
OECD members not included in Annex I of the UNFCCC. Member countries 
are frequently known to negotiate on an individual basis given the huge differences 
in their national contexts876. Otherwise, the group is normally coordinated by 
Switzerland. Given the complexity and the issues of the negotiations, other strategic 
coalitions were formed based on issues of common concern. 
The ad hoc groups or most recently formed climate negotiation groups
Coalition for Rainforest Nations877
The origin of this coalition stems back to 2005 through an initiative by Papua 
New Guinea. The ultimate goal of this coalition is for recognition of the efforts 
made by developing countries to slow down emissions caused by deforestation. 
The composition of this coalition has varied over time. It includes approximately 
52 countries from Africa, Central America, South America, the Caribbean, Asia 
and Oceania. Its members do not always speak with the same voice sometimes 
making a statement on behalf of only some of its members.
BASIC
BASIC is a group made up of Brazil, South Africa, India and China878. It was 
founded at a meeting held in November 2009 to define a common stance for the 
Copenhagen Conference (COP15). After the meeting, BASIC published a series 
of positions considered to be non-negotiable by its members, in particular a second 
commitment period by virtue of the Kyoto Protocol for developed countries and 
scaled-up financing for the mitigation and adaptation of developing countries879. 
Since then, the group regularly meets in order to coordinate its positions and to 
develop a shared strategy. As BASIC is made up of the most important emerging 
countries including the large emitters, it now stands out as an indispensable actor 
in international climate negotiations.
The Group of countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Albania and Moldova 
(CACAM)
CACAM includes countries from Eastern and Central Europe, Central Asia, including 
Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan. There are also observers, such as Azerbaijan. These countries 
876. Yamin, F., & Depledge, J., 2004.
877. http://www.rainforestcoalition.org
878. SEI, 2010.
879. SEI, 2010.
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with economies in transition under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol880. 
Given that these countries are not included in Annex I of the Convention and given 
that there is a lack of clarity within the UNFCCC on the definition of “developing 
countries”,CAC AM countries distinguish themselves by this coalition in which 
they do not consider themselves as developing countries881. The CACAM countries 
rarely take a common stance on other issues.
Bolivian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA, from the Spanish)
ALBA was originally a political, social and economic organisation of socialist 
countries of Latin America and the Caribbean to promote cooperation in these 
areas and to offer an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas advocated 
by the United States882. ALBA thus became a negotiation coalition in 2010, repre-
senting a hub of six countries i.e. Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua 
and Antigua and Barbuda, joined occasionally by Dominica and Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines. This coalition bases its positions on the principle that developed 
countries must demonstrate ambitious action in world efforts to combat climate 
change883.
Like Minded Group of States (LMDC) 
The LMDC is a spontaneous coalition of countries created during the Bonn 
Conference on climate change in May 2012. It is part of the G-77 and China whose 
aim is to strengthen and unify884. The LMDC is made up of several countries from 
the Arab world, India, China, several emerging Asian economies and certain active 
South American Parties, especially Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba and Africa (Mali, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, etc.). Also called “Developing countries with 
similar views”, this coalition is also found in other international forums, especially 
the World Trade Organisation. It is a group of States uniting around a very strong 
central position on major questions for developing countries, mainly equity and 
respect for the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities885. 
Arab Group
The Arab Group is made up of 22 member States from the League of Arab States, 
namely Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, Sudan, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Kuwait, Algeria, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, 
Mauritania, Somalia, Palestinian Authority, Djibouti and the Comoros. The contours 
880. http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/213_149_1308559 
81051940810-CfRN_ADP2-10_opening_statement.pdf; et, www.rainforestcoalition.org 
881. https://unfccc.int/1031.php
882. www.alianzabolivariana.org; and www.americasquarterly.org/hirst/Article.
883. www.portalalba.org/index.php/2014-03-29-22-04-24/documentos/1299-2010-06-25- 
x-cumbre-otavalo-ecuador-declaracion-especial-sobre-cambio-climatico
884. www.twnside.org.sg/title2/climate/info.service/2012/climate20121005.htm
885. www.twnside.org.sg/title2/climate/info.service/2013/climate130301.htm
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of this coalition are well defined inasmuch as its members have been accustomed 
to working together since 1945 as a pressure group towards international institutions 
under the name of the League of Arab States (commonly called presented the Arab 
League). The Arab Group countries are linked together by a certain shared culture, 
the Arabic language and the Muslim religion. Nevertheless, the Middle-East conflicts 
cause tension between them.
Several other groups or coalitions whether formal or informal, collaborate together 
to defend their common interests within the framework of the International Court 
negotiations on climate change under the UNFCCC These include: countries from 
the petroleum exporting Organisation (OPEC), the Cartagena Dialogue, the 
Independent Alliance of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) to mention 
just some of the most active members.
III.C.2. Positions of the main negotiating groups
As outlined in the previous section introducing the main negotiation groups, several 
countries participate in climate negotiations in groups or in coalitions which, in 
most cases, constitute strategic alliances. These groups thus bring together countries 
which have common interests that need to be promoted within the framework of 
these negotiations. 
This section explores some of the topics of common interest around which 
the most active and main coalitions are organised in the negotiations of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
The Africa Group: Africa is a particular case in that it defends a common 
position886 tabled by the Africa Group of Negotiators. The specific nature of this 
group needs to be highlighted because generally the geographical spread of the 
groups does not imply a common position, given that the Parties are free to belong 
to one or several groups representing a common position This group emphasises 
the flexibility to be given to Africa due to the fact of it being recognised as the 
continent most vulnerable to climate change887; the historical responsibility and 
the leadership of the developed countries; the importance of making support 
available to developing countries in terms of adaptation888, financing, technology 
transfer and capacity-building. To ensure that the working programme of the Paris 
Agreement is achieved, the group requests a discussion on a new objective for 
long-term financing for 2025 and on the procedures regarding biannual reporting 
on the APA agenda items. The group also requests that developed countries provide 
support to developing countries for the formulation, implementation and update 
886. Decided and adopted by, respectively, the Ministries of the Environment of countries 
in question during African Environmental Ministerial Conferences of African Heads 
of States and Governments on climate change.
887. http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/211_230_131 
079795353246469-Opening%20statement_AGN.pdf
888. http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/586_334_1313870 
98169936631-AGN%20opening%20statement%20on%20SBI46%20submitted.pdf
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of adaptation communications, as a component part of the nationally determined 
contributions, so that the information on the needs of developing countries and 
related costs, including support required to implement adaptation measures through 
subventions, are taken into account. The Africa group insists on the fact that the 
facilitation dialogue should also tackle the question of pre-2020 emissions, calling 
on developed countries to find the resources to fill the gap, mainly the financial 
gaps to achieve a reduction of 8 gigatonnes of emissions, through, amongst other 
things, initiatives and programmes, so that the burden is not placed at the door of 
the developing countries after 2020.
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS): Since its inception in 1990, this group 
defends the specific nature of its extreme vulnerability to rising sea levels. This 
vulnerability, even greater due to climate change, which impacts are increasingly 
dangerous, has, in recent years, exacerbated the positions of the Island States, the 
spearhead of this coalition during climate negotiations889. A major objective par-
ticularly consists in finalising a binding agreement for the implementation of an 
indemnity mechanism for damage linked to climate warming, in addition to the 
set, but binding objective, of a target to limit climate warming to 1.5°C compared 
to pre-industrial baseline from now until the end of the century The objective is to 
limit the already predictable and catastrophic impacts of climate change.
G-77 and China: The name G-77 and China tends to underline the special 
position of the latter in relation to the whole group, specifically its position as an 
industrialised developing country. The divergent interests within the group often 
make consensus impossible and further puss the Parties to express their positions and 
submissions through sub-groups. The position of the G-77 and China is articulated 
through a call on the developed countries to be front-line in the efforts to combat 
climate change and its negative impacts. The G-77 + China especial encourages 
the Parties signatories to the Kyoto Protocol to ratify the Doha amendment from 
the viewpoint of a strengthened pre-2020 ambition. More broadly, the group in 
effect proposes increasing the pre-2020 ambition. Taking into account its level of 
socio-economic development and priorities for the eradication of poverty, the 
group emphasises the importance of financial support and of its transparency. 
Within this framework, the objective to clarify the mechanisms to achieve the 
financial goals of USD 100 billion now until 2020 is key, particularly, in relation 
to adaptation targets. It also insists on the question of technology transfer. Finally 
G-77 and China want the developed countries to increase their objective to raise 
100 billion US dollars every year from 2020 onwards to achieve a new more ambitious 
objective at the latest by 2025 (100 billion being the threshold for this new target)890, 
as approved in the chapter on finance of the operationalisation decision of the 
Paris Agreement891.
889. http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/53_152_1309379 
48115158180-AOSIS%20closing%20statement%20SBSTA%2043.pdf
890. http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/653_289_13123011 
9632936322-G77%20and%20China%20APA%201-2%20opening%20statement.pdf
891. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 53.U
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Least Developed Countries (LDC): These include 47 Parties to the Convention 
which include the most economically deprived countries but also the most vulnerable 
countries in terms of climate and environmental issues. Since 2001, these countries 
have been working together through the LDC group in negotiations within the 
framework of the UNFCCC. Within the negotiation process leading to the adoption 
of the Paris Agreement, the group strongly sustained the route towards limiting 
temperatures to 1.5° C and the need to agree binding provisions. Although contrib-
uting little to greenhouse gas emissions (GGH), this group has always shown its 
willingness to ensure that all the Parties contribute in an ambitious manner to 
limit emissions and to implement decisions in terms of climate change892.
European Union (EU): The 28 members of the European Union have adopted 
a common position during negotiations, defending the position whereby emerging 
developing countries should commit to reducing emissions in compliance with 
the Paris Agreement, and thereby contribute in a substantial manner to the reduction 
of emissions in the pre-2020 period893. They insist also on capacity-building in 
terms of adaptation.
The Umbrella Group: A heterogeneous group comprised of developed countries. 
The position of the group is that the reduction of GGH emissions to help achieve 
the target of maintaining temperatures below 2°C should be the result of the efforts 
of all the Parties, including the contribution by developing countries. By the same 
token, the group posits that demands in terms of communication and accounting 
of GGH should be the same for all countries. In this sense, according to it, historic 
levels of emissions should not be taken into account to determine the level of 
ambition for emission reduction, rather the level of ambition should should be 
based on the current level of accumulative emissions. It is to be reiterated that the 
position of the group has been weakened by the United States’ recently expressed 
intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, even if numerous observers hope 
that a solution to the crisis will be found
Environmental Integrity Group: Made up of Switzerland, Mexico, South Korea, 
Liechtenstein and the principality of Monaco. The only group representing both 
developed countries and developing countries, it aims to facilitate the rapprochement 
between the negotiation Parties by building bridges with other groups. Its positions 
are often close to the EU position. For COP21, this group was favourable towards 
a binding agreement equitable for the developing countries. In relation to the imple-
mentation of the Paris Agreement, particularly the methods of its implementation, 
the position of the group is more nuanced particularly Switzerland’s reservation on 
allocating additional financial resources to developing countries. The decision of 
the group is also mitigated in terms of the ambition of nationally determined 
contributions (NDC)894. 
892. http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/cop21cmp11_hls_
speech_ldcs_angola.pdf
893. http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/marrakech_nov_2016/application/pdf/slovakrepublic_
cop22cmp12cma1_hls.pdf
894. https://unfccc.int/files/meetings/paris_nov_2015/application/pdf/cop21cmp11_
hls_speech_eig_liechtenstein.pdf
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ALBA: The analyses and positions of the group are based on the vision by 
which climate change is a result of a capitalist economic model part of a development 
model predatory of natural and environmental resources. ALBA’s position is based 
on the theory that developed countries are historically responsible for climate change 
and therefore must drastically reduce their emissions and acquit their climate 
debt towards the developing countries. The efforts of the Parties to Annex 1 should 
allow for the average temperature increase to be limited to approximately 1.5°C 
indeed to 1°C. In addition, the developed countries should provide financial and 
technical resources to the developing countries to sustain their adaptation and 
mitigation efforts as well forestry restoration and conservation. For this group it is 
fundamental than any action in terms of combating climate change is based on the 
vision of the peoples and global organisations and not based on a capitalist vision 
of private and multinational companies.
Independent Association of Latin America and Caribbean (IALAC): uniting 
eight States895, it was formed during the COP18 in Doha in 2012. Its vision is 
progressive, expecting that the developed countries make a prior commitment to 
the emission reduction and a financial support that should be conditional on the 
implementation of a low-carbon development strategy896.
Like Minded Group of States (LMDC): This coalition created in 2012 by circa 
25 or more states, all members of G77 and China, is unified in its perception of 
climate change and international measures undertaken to tackle it, as impediments 
to the socio-economic development of its group’s members The demographic 
weight of this group is important because it includes more than half the world’s 
population. The position of the group centres on the fact that developing countries 
must act as role models and play a pioneering role in relation to mitigation, based 
on the principles of shared, but differentiated responsibilities and as such, must 
also support adaptation efforts providing finances and technology transfer solutions 
so as to not impede the development of the countries that make up the group.
Arab Group: On the strength of its 22 member countries of which the majority 
belong to the LMDC – which explains why positions of both groups are often 
similar – the Arab Group insists on the negative impacts of the measures to combat 
climate change on their economies. For the latter, the developing countries must 
also contribute financially to the collective effort. 
895. Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay and Peru.
896. http://www4.unfccc.int/Submissions/Lists/OSPSubmissionUpload/53_151_130935 
526347653856-AILAC%20SBSTA%20Opening%20Statement.pdfU
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BASIC: The acronym for Brazil, South Africa, India and China, this group was 
established in November 2009 just before COP15. The objective was to coordinate 
their efforts and streamline their positions prior to the negotiations which led to 
the Copenhagen agreement. BASIC insists on the fact of being a coalition within 
the G77 + China group and not a negotiating group. The group tends to defend 
the position of the emerging bloc countries within the G77 + China Group. The 
position of the group is that any flexibility within the context of the negotiations 
must be extended to all the developing countries without distinction. The group 
campaigned to limit the temperature increases to 2°C, in contrast to the developing 
countries who want a more ambitious limit set below 1.5°C. The group insists on 
the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capacities, the differentiation between the developed countries and developing 
countries and the pioneering role that industrialised countries should play. 
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General conclusion
The reality of climate change is acknowledged unanimously. The efforts made by the international community in terms of multilateral cooperation in 
combating climate change are made concrete by gradually introducing a complex, 
dynamic process under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC). However, and in spite of international negotiations, 
it has to be recognised that the progress made over recent decades has been too mod-
est with regard to the many challenges posed and the urgent need to take action. 
After twenty years of international climate negotiations, the Agreement 
adopted during the session of the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) to the 
UNFCCC in 2015 united all State Parties to UNFCCC for the first time. In this 
sense, it becomes the first so-called “universal climate agreement and, as such, has 
therefore already entered the history books. The quantified aim, which is now included 
in the Paris Agreement, is to limit the increase in the global average temperature 
to well below 2°C and to pursue efforts to maintain it at 1.5°C, above pre-industrial 
levels, from now until the end of the century.
In addition to the universal character of this agreement, a certain number of 
issues were reaffirmed and/or confirmed, with reference to mitigation and cooperation 
mechanisms, and also adaptation, loss and damage, financing, transfer of technology, 
capacity-building, or the recognition of the role and necessary multi-stakeholder 
involvement in combating global warming. The monitoring of implementation 
and transparency in order to achieve the goals were also reaffirmed. The next stage, 
which is essential for realising all these major advances, is the implementation of 
the commitments.
Adding these individual contributions fixed by the nationally-determined 
contributions (NDC) implies collectively achieving the objectives set by the Paris 
Agreement. As at 3 October 2017, 166 Parties have ratified the Paris Agreement897 
and 160 CND have been included within the interim registry898. However, the 
current pledges, even if they were fully met, would not be sufficient to keep the 
temperature increase below 2°C (at 1.5°C) by the end of the century, which is the 
target set in the Paris Agreement.
Paragraph 19 of Decision 1/CP.21 asked the Secretariat to prepare an assessment 
report on the national contributions for combating climate change899. According 
to this document published prior to COP22, entitled “Updated synthesis report on the 
aggregate effect of intended nationally determined contributions”900, a surplus of global 
897. http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php
898. http://www4.unfccc.int/ndcregistry/Pages/All.aspx 
899. This report, which was released in 2016, takes into account all of the INDC submitted 
by 4 April 2016.
900. UNFCCC, 2016a.
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GHG emissions, averaging 8.7 GtCO2e and 15.2 GtCO2 is expected in 2025 and 
2030 respectively, compared with a scenario that is compatible with a 2°C pathway. 
Other studies since then have confirmed this outcome of a shortfall in collective 
ambition to achieve the objective of maintaining temperatures901.
Under the entry into force of the Paris Agreement, the commitments by 
States that have ratified the Agreement have become NDC902. Nevertheless, for a vast 
majority of them, they have just been “copied” rom intended nationally-determined 
contributions (INDC), declarations of intent by States Parties to UNFCCC 
communicated prior to COP21. A Party’s acceptance903 of the Paris Agreement 
makes the submission of an NDC mandatory, if not already done through an INDC, 
or that they wish to modify them904, For all Parties that have simply transformed 
their INDC into an NDC, an opportunity to increase the collective goal has already 
been lost. Beyond issues of implementing the commitments, raising the ambition 
therefore remains an essential corollary to the achievement of the goals set. 
At COP22 (Marrakech, November 2016), the Parties decided to finalise items 
relating to the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement by COP24, in 2018, at 
the latest. COP22 concluded with the adoption of more than thirty decisions905, 
but a number of points remain unresolved. A certain number of discussions were 
continued in May 2017, during the intersessional negotiations in Bonn, where the 
46th session of the permanent Subsidiary Bodies (SBI46 and SBSTA46), as well 
as the third part of the first session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris 
Agreement (APA1-3), were held. COP23 will be key for continuing the ongoing 
work. 
By achieving the adoption of the Paris Agreement (December 2015) and by 
ensuring that it takes effect through its entry into force in less than a year (November 
2016), the international community has met two of the first major challenges. 
These are also two historic milestones. The first step is therefore, more than ever, 
the realisation of elements relating to the implementation of the Paris Agreement, 
by pursuing the realisation of these objectives during COP23.
Out of all of the points under negotiations, it is vital that the “Spirit of Paris” 
that has been present since the adoption of the Agreement is maintained in Bonn. 
The objective being that the aims of the international community are in line with 
trust and duration, while the Parties were heard in Marrakech to reject certain 
final decisions concerning the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement until 
December 2018, during COP24.
901. See in particular UNEP, 2016; or, Climate Interactive, 2017.
902. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 22.
903. Ratification or equivalent process according to national laws.
904. Decision 1/CP.21, para. 22.
905. Access all the decisions adopted during COP22 [online] http://unfccc.int/meetings/
marrakech_nov_2016/meeting/9567/php/view/decisions.php#c
Appendices
A.1. Themed Sheets
Sheet 1.  United Nations Framework Convention  
on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
Date of entry into force: 21 March 1994
Ratification status: 197 Parties906, including 196 countries and the European 
Union (EU)907
Supreme decision-making body: Conference of the Parties (COP)
Main objective [Article 2]: “[...] stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow 
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not 
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” “
UNFCCC Annexes:
Annex I – List of 41 Parties, including the EEC908: developed countries and countries 
with economies in transition909;
Annex II – List of 24 Parties, including the EEC910: wealthiest developed countries911.
Commitment of the Parties:
All Parties: for example, prepare a national greenhouse gas emission inventory, 
implement mitigation programmes and adaptation actions, offer cooperative sup-
port in technological research and dissemination and facilitate the education and 
awareness of the general public (Article 4.1).
Annex I Parties: mainly, implement national policies to mitigate climate change 
and weaken emissions in the long term (Article 4.2).
906. As at 3 October 2017 [online] http://unfccc.int/2631.
907. The European Union signed the Convention whilst it was still the European Economic 
Community (EEC).
908. EU Today.
909. http://unfccc.int/2774.
910. EU Today.
911. Originally 25, but Turkey was deleted from Annex II by an amendment that entered 
into force on 28 June 2002, in accordance with Decision 26/CP.7.
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Annex II Parties: support developing countries financially and technically, mainly 
by helping to prepare their national communications, to ease their adaptation to 
climate change and encourage access to technologies (Articles 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5).
Link to the Convention site: www.unfccc.int 
Link to the Convention text: www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/convfr.pdf
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Sheet 2. Kyoto Protocol
Date of entry into force: 16 February 2005.
Ratification status of the Kyoto Protocol: 192 Parties912, including the EU913; 
five Parties to the Convention have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.
Ratification status of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol: 83 Parties914.
Supreme decision-making body: Conference of Parties acting as a meeting of 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP).
Main objective: instigate quantified and legally-binding targets for limiting and 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions to boost the UNFCCC.
Protocol Annexes:
Annex A: List of the six greenhouse gases targeted by the Kyoto Protocol: carbon 
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), dinitrogen oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFC), perfluorocarbons (PFC) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).
Annex B: List of 39 Parties, included the EEC915: developed countries and countries 
with economies in transition which have made quantified commitments to reducing 
or limiting greenhouse gas emissions.
Commitment of the Parties:
Annex B Parties
Limit or reduce by 5.2% the quantity of GHG emissions compared with 1990 
emissions, except countries with economies in transition, which can choose a reference 
year other than 1990916;
Implement national or regional policies and measures to fulfil compliance with 
quantified commitments to limit and reduce greenhouse gases (Articles 2 and 4). 
The Parties can fulfil their commitments through domestic measures and flexibility 
mechanisms;
Publish an initial report giving the information required to implement the 
commitments, especially for the accounting of assigned amounts (Article 7);
912. As at 3 October 2017 [online] http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/ 
items/2613.php
913. The European Union (EU) signed the Protocol whilst it was still the European Economic 
Community (EEC).
914. As at 3 October 2017 [online] https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY 
&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-c&chapter=27&clang=_en
915. EU Today.
916. Article 3 para. 5 of the Kyoto Protocol.
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Publish a report demonstrating the progress made in achieving commitments 
(Articles 3 and 7); and 
Set up a national emissions inventory system based on methodologies approved by 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Article 5); 
All Parties
Prepare programmes to establish the national inventory of greenhouse gas emissions, 
to mitigate and facilitate the adaptation to climate change, cooperate to support 
technology transfer, research and education and present in their national communi-
cations information on the actions undertaken to combat climate change (Article 10); 
Parties included in Annex II of the UNFCCC
Finance developing countries, mainly to help them set in place their national 
emissions inventory and encourage technology transfer (Article 11).
Doha amendment: 
The second period of commitment of the Kyoto Protocol was adopted at CMP8917 
under the title “Doha Amendment” It commenced on 1 January 2013 and will 
end on 31 December 2020918. Thus this period will last eight years and not 
five years as for the first period. Regarding its effective date, although the Doha 
Decision encourages countries to implement the second commitment period 
before the countries ratify it, the countries are free to choose from what date they 
will enforce it.
Link to the Protocol text: www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpfrench.pdf. 
Link to the text of the Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol according to para-
graph 9 article 3 (Doha amendment) for the second period of commitment: 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/cmp8/fre/13a01f.pdf. 
917. Eighth Conference of Parties acting as a Meeting of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.
918. Decision 1/CMP.8.
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Sheet 3.  List of Parties to the UNFCCC, the Kyoto 
Protocol, the Paris Agreement and rati-
fication status
List of Parties to the UNFCCC and ratification status
Ratification status of the UNFCCC: 197 Parties919, including the European Union (EU)920
Access the detailed list of Parties to the UNFCCC here: http://unfccc.int/2631
List of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and ratification status
Ratification status of the Kyoto Protocol: 192 Parties921, including the EU922; five Parties to the 
Convention have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.
Access the detailed list of Parties to the Kyoto Protocol here:
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php 
Ratification status of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol: 83 Parties923.
Access the detailed list of Parties to the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol here:  
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-c&chapter= 
27&clang=_en 
List of Parties to the Paris Agreement and ratification status
Ratification status of the Paris Agreement: 166 Parties924, including the EU.
Access the detailed list of Parties to the Paris Agreement here:  
http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php 
919. As at 3 October 2017 [online] http://unfccc.int/2631
920. The European Union signed the Convention whilst it was still the European Economic 
Community (EEC).
921. As at 3 October 2017 [online] http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/ 
items/2613.php
922. The European Union (EU) signed the Protocol whilst it was still the European Economic 
Community (EEC).
923. As at 3 October 2017 [online] https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY 
&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-c&chapter=27&clang=_en
924. As at 3 October 2017 [online] http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php
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A.2. List of the documents from the negotiations
Name Description
Decision x/CP.x COP decision
Decision x/CMP.x CMP decision
Decision x/CMA.x CRA decision
FCCC/CP/x COP preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/KP/CMP/x CMP preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/KP/AWG/x AWG-KP preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/SBI/x SBI preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/SBSTA/x SBSTA preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/SB/x Preparatory document or provisional or current agenda of the two subsidiary bodies
FCCC/APA/x APA preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
GCF/x Preparatory document of the Green Climate Fund
/ARR/x Report of the individual examination of the GHG inventory (from 2005)
/TRR.x/x Report of the technical review of the biennial report
/WEB/IRI/x Report of the individual examination of the GHG inventory/Document published  on the Web only (listing used until 2004 inclusive)
/ASR/x GHG inventory annual status report
/WEB/SAI/x GHG inventory summary and assessment report/Document published on the Web only
/COM/x National communication
/DPR/x
Demonstrable Progress Report 
(Demonstrable Progress Report)
/IDR.x
In-depth Review
(In-Depth Review)
CDM EB-x CDM Executive Board Report
SMSN/IGO/x Document submitted by intergovernmental organisations
SMSN/NGO/x Document submitted by non-governmental organisations
/TP/x Technical document 
/Add.x Text added to a document presented previously (Addendum)
/Amend.x Amendment to a text 
/Corr.x Correction of a text
/CRP.x Conference Room Paper
/INF.x Information series containing general information
/L.x Limited distribution document: Draft report or text (Limited document)
/MISC.x Miscellaneous documents: Points of view of Parties and observers; list of participants
/Rev.x Text revision which supersedes the text published previously
Non paper Internal, unofficial document to facilitate the negotiations
Note: 
• x indicates a serial number or a year.
• For the Green Climate Fund documents (GCF/x), see: www.gcfund.org/documents/in-ses-
sion-documents.html
Source: http://unfccc.int/2644 
242
A
p
p
e
n
d
i
c
e
s
A.3. Abbreviations and acronyms  
(French – English)
French English
ABPA Alliance bolivarienne pour les  
Peuples de notre Amérique  
(ALBA en espagnol)
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples  
of our America (ALBA in spanish)
BAPA
AILAC Alliance indépendante de l’Amérique 
latine et des Caraïbes
Independent Alliance of Latin America 
and the Caribbean
AILAC
ALBA Alliance bolivarienne pour les peuples 
de notre Amérique
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples  
of Our America
BAPOA
AND Autorités nationales désignées Designated National Authorities DNA
APEI Alliance des petits États insulaires 
(www.sidsnet.org/aosis)
Alliance of Small Island States AOSIS
ADP Groupe de travail spécial de la 
plateforme de Durban pour une 
action renforcée
Ad Hoc Working Group on  
the Durban Platform for  
Enhanced Action
ADP
AEI Analyses et Examens internationaux International Analysis and Review IAR
CAI Consultations et Analyses 
internationales 
International Consultations  
and Analysis
ICA
CCNUCC Convention-cadre des Nations Unies 
sur les changements climatiques 
United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change
UNFCCC
CDD Cadre pour les Diverses Démarches Framework for Various Approaches FVA
CDN Contribution déterminée au niveau 
national 
Nationally Determined Contributions NDC
CdP Conférence des Parties à la 
Convention-cadre des Nations Unies 
sur les changements climatiques
Conference of the Parties to  
the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change
COP
CE Comité exécutif Executive Board EB
CESNU Conseil économique et social  
des Nations Unies
United Nations Economic  
and Social Council
ECOSOC
CET Comité exécutif de la technologie Technology Executive Committee TEC
CPDN Contribution prévue déterminée  
au niveau national 
Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution
CPDN
CPF Comité permanent des Finances Standing Committee for Finance SCF
CRA Conférence des Parties servant  
en tant que Réunion des Parties  
de l’Accord de Paris 
Conference of the Parties serving  
as the Meeting of the Parties to  
the Paris Agreement
CMA
CRP Conférence des Parties agissant  
en tant que Réunion des Parties  
au Protocole de Kyoto
Conference of the Parties serving  
as Meeting of the Parties to the 
 Kyoto Protocol
CMP
CRTC Centre et Réseau des Technologies  
du Climat 
Climate Technology Center a 
nd Network
CTCN
CSF Conseil de Stabilité financière Financial Stability Board FSB
DC Démarches concertées Cooperative Approaches CA
DSE Dialogue structuré entre experts Structured Expert Dialogue SED
EET Équipe d’experts techniques Team of Technical Experts TTE
243
Guide to the Negotiations - UNFCCC (COP23) - OIF/IFDD, 2017
French English
EOD Entités opérationnelles désignées Designated Operational Entities DOE
FA Fonds pour l’adaptation Adaptation Fund AF
FEM Fonds pour l’Environnement mondial Global Environment Facility GEF
FPMA Fonds des pays les moins avancés Least Developed Countries Fund LDCF
FPP Fonds de Préparation de Projets Project Preparation Facility PPF
FSCC Fonds spécial des Changements 
climatiques
Special Climate Change Fund SCCF
FVC Fonds vert pour le climat Green Climate Fund GCF
GEMO  
(ou PDVS)
Groupe d’États ayant la même 
optique (ou Pays en développement 
aux vues similaires)
Like Minded Developing Countries 
(Like Minded Group)
LMDC  
(ou LMG)
GEPMA Groupe d’Experts sur les pays  
les moins avancés
Least Developped Country Expert 
Group
LEG
GES Gaz à Effet de Serre Greenhouse Gas GHG
GETT Groupe d’Experts pour le Transfert  
de la Technologie
Expert Group on Technology Transfer EGTT
GIEC Groupe intergouvernemental 
d’Experts sur l’évolution du Climat 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change
IPCC
GtCO2e Gigatonne de CO2 équivalent Gigaton of CO2 equivalent GtCO2e
GTS-AP Groupe de Travail spécial pour 
l’Accord de Paris
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris 
Agreement
APA
G77 +  
Chine
Groupe des 77 et Chine  
(www.G77.org)
Group of 77 and China G77 +  
China
EEI Évaluation et Révision internationale International Assessment and Review IAR
AIEDE Association internationale pour 
l’échange de droits d’émission
International Emissions Trading 
Association
IETA
MCC Mécanisme de Crédit conjoint Joint Crediting Mechanism JCM
PALP Plan d’action Lima-Paris Lima-Paris Action Agenda LPAA
MAAN Mesures d’Atténuation appropriées 
au niveau national
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation 
Actions
NAMA
MDD Mécanisme pour un Développement 
durable
Sustainable Development Mechanism SDM
MDP Mécanisme de Développement 
propre
Clean Development Mechanism CDM
MNV Mesure, Notification, Vérification Measuring, Rapportage, Verification MRV
MOC Mise en œuvre conjointe Joint Implementation JI
M&P Modalités et Procédures Modalities and Procedures M&P
NMM Nouveau Mécanisme de Marché New Market Mechanism NMM
NR Niveaux de référence Reference Levels RL
NRE Niveaux de référence des émissions Reference Emission Levels REL
OACI Organisation de l’aviation civile 
internationale
International Civil Aviation 
Organization
ICAO
ODD Objectifs de Développement durable Sustainable Development Goals SDGs
OCDE Organisation de Coopération et  
de Développement économiques
Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 
OECD
OMM Organisation météorologique 
mondiale
World Meteorological Organization WMO
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French English
ONG Organisation non gouvernementale NGO Non- 
Governmental 
Organization
ONU Organisation des Nations unies United Nations UN
OS Organe subsidiaire Subsidiary Body SB
OSCST Organe subsidiaire de Conseil 
scientifique et technologique 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific  
and Technological Advise
SBSTA
OSMOE Organe subsidiaire de Mise en Œuvre Subsidiary Body for Implementation SBI
PANA Plan d’Action national d’Adaptation National Adaptation Programme  
or Action
NAPA
PED Pays en développement Developing country DC
PEID Petits États insulaires  
en développement
Small Island Developing States SIDS
PET Processus d’examen technique Technical examination process TEP
PIB Produit intérieur brut Gross Domestic Product GDP
PK Protocole de Kyoto Kyoto Protocol KP
PMA Pays les moins avancés Least Developped Countries LDC
PNA Plan National d’Adaptation National Adaptation Plan NAP
PNUE Programme des Nations Unies  
pour l’Environnement
United Nations Environment 
Programme 
UNEP
PTN Programme de Travail de Nairobi  
sur les incidences des changements 
climatiques et la vulnérabilité et 
l’adaptation à ces changements
Nairobi Work Program on impacts, 
vulnerability and adaptation to 
climate change
NWP
RB Rapport biennal Biennial Report BR
RBA Rapport biennal actualisé Biennial Updated Report BUR
RCMD Responsabilités communes mais 
différenciées
Common but differentiated 
responsibilities
CBDR
RCMD-CR Responsabilités communes mais 
différenciées et capacités respectives
Common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective 
capabilities 
CBDR–RC
REDD Réduction des émissions issues  
de la déforestation et de la 
dégradation forestière
Reducing Emissions from  
Deforestation and forest  
Degradation
REDD
RET Réunion d’experts techniques Technical Expert Meeting TEM
RIT Relevé international des transactions International Transaction Log ITL
SA Secteur d’activité Workstream WS
SA1 Secteur d’activité 1 Workstream 1 WS1
SA2 Secteur d’activité 2 Workstream 2 WS2
UE Union européenne European Union EU
UQA Unité de quantité attribuée Assigned Amount Unit AAU
URCE Unité de Réduction certifiée Certified Emission Reduction CER
UTCATF Utilisation des terres, changement 
d’affectation des terres et foresterie 
Land Use, Land Use Changes  
and Forestry
LULUCF
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A.4. Abbreviations and acronyms  
(English – French)
English French
AAU Assigned Amount Unit Unité de quantité attribuée UQA
ADP Ad Hoc Working Group on the 
Durban Platform for Enhanced Action
Groupe de travail spécial de la 
plateforme de Durban pour une 
action renforcée
ADP
AF Adaptation Fund Fonds pour l’adaptation FA
AILAC Independent Alliance of Latin America 
and the Caribbean
Alliance indépendante de l’Amérique 
latine et des Caraïbes
AILAC
AOSIS Alliance of Small Island States Alliance des petits États insulaires 
(www.sidsnet.org/aosis)
APEI
APA Ad hoc working group on the Paris 
Agreement 
Groupe de travail spécial  
de l’Accord de Paris
GTS-AP
BAPA Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples  
of our America (ALBA in spanish)
Alliance bolivarienne pour 
 les Peuples de notre Amérique  
(ALBA en espagnol)
ABPA
BAPOA Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples  
of Our America
Alliance bolivarienne pour  
les peuples de notre Amérique
ALBA
BR Biennial Report Rapport biennal RB 
BUR Biennial Updated Report Rapport biennal actualisé RBA 
CA Cooperative Approaches Démarches concertées DC
CBDR Common but differentiated 
responsibilities
Responsabilités communes  
mais différenciées
RCMD
CBDR–RC Common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective 
capabilities 
Responsabilités communes mais 
différenciées et capacités respectives
RCMD-CR
CDM Clean Development Mechanism Mécanisme de Développement 
propre
MDP
NDC Nationally Determined Contributions Contribution déterminée au niveau 
national 
CDN 
CER Certified Emission Reduction Unité de Réduction certifiée URCE
CMA Conference of the Parties serving  
as the Meeting of the Parties to  
the Paris Agreement
Conférence des Parties servant  
en tant que Réunion des Parties  
de l’Accord de Paris 
CRA 
CMP Conference of the Parties serving as 
Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol
Conférence des Parties agissant  
en tant que Réunion des Parties  
au Protocole de Kyoto
CRP
COP Conference of the Parties to the 
United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change
Conférence des Parties à la 
Convention-cadre des Nations Unies 
sur les changements climatiques
CdP
CPDN Intended Nationally Determined 
Contribution
Contribution prévue déterminée  
au niveau national 
CPDN 
CTCN Climate Technology Center and 
Network
Centre et Réseau des Technologies  
du Climat 
CRTC 
DC Developing country Pays en développement PED
DNA Designated National Authorities Autorités nationales désignées AND
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English French
DOE Designated Operational Entities Entités opérationnelles désignées EOD
EB Executive Board Comité exécutif CE
ECOSOC United Nations Economic  
and Social Council
Conseil économique et social  
des Nations Unies
CESNU
EGTT Expert Group on Technology Transfer Groupe d’Experts pour le Transfert  
de la Technologie
GETT
EU European Union Union européenne UE
FSB Financial Stability Board Conseil de Stabilité financière CSF
FVA Framework for Various Approaches Cadre pour les Diverses Démarches CDD
G77 + Chi-
na
Group of 77 and China Groupe des 77 et Chine  
(www.G77.org)
G77 +  
Chine
GCF Green Climate Fund Fonds vert pour le climat FVC
GDP Gross Domestic Product Produit intérieur brut PIB
GEF Global Environment Facility Fonds pour l’Environnement mondial FEM
GHG Greenhouse Gas Gaz à Effet de Serre GES
GtCO2e Gigaton of CO2 equivalent Gigatonne de CO2 équivalent GtCO2e
IAR International Analysis and Review Analyses et Examens internationaux AEI
IAR International Assessment and Review Évaluation et Révision internationale EEI
ICA International Consultations and 
Analysis
Consultations et Analyses 
internationales 
CAI 
ICAO International Civil Aviation 
Organization
Organisation de l’aviation civile 
internationale
OACI
IETA International Emissions Trading 
Association
Association internationale pour 
l’échange de droits d’émission
AIEDE
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change
Groupe intergouvernemental 
d’Experts sur l’évolution du Climat 
GIEC 
ITL International Transaction Log Relevé international des transactions RIT
JCM Joint Crediting Mechanism Mécanisme de Crédit conjoint MCC
JI Joint Implementation Mise en œuvre conjointe MOC
KP Kyoto Protocol Protocole de Kyoto PK
LDC Least Developped Countries Pays les moins avancés PMA
LDCF Least Developed Countries Fund Fonds des Pays les moins avancés FPMA
LEG Least Developped Country Expert 
Group
Groupe d’Experts sur les Pays les 
moins avancés
GEPMA
LMDC  
(ou LMG)
Like Minded Developing Countries 
(Like Minded Group)
Groupe d’États ayant la même 
optique (ou Pays en développement 
aux vues similaires)
GEMO  
(ou PDVS)
LPAA Lima-Paris Action Agenda Plan d’action Lima-Paris PALP
LULUCF Land Use, Land Use Changes  
and Forestry
Utilisation des terres, changement 
d’affectation des terres et foresterie 
UTCATF 
M&P Modalities and Procedures Modalités et Procédures M&P
MRV Measuring, Rapportage, Verification Mesure, Notification, Vérification MNV
NAMA Nationally Appropriate Mitigation 
Actions
Mesures d’Atténuation appropriées 
au niveau national
MAAN
NAP National Adaptation Plan Plan national d’Adaptation PNA
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English French
NAPA National Adaptation Programme  
or Action
Plan d’Action national d’Adaptation PANA
NMM New Market Mechanism Nouveau Mécanisme de Marché NMM
Non- 
Governmental 
Organization
NGO Organisations non gouvernementale ONG
NWP Nairobi Work Program on impacts, 
vulnerability and adaptation to 
climate change
Programme de Travail de Nairobi  
sur les incidences des changements 
climatiques et la vulnérabilité et 
l’adaptation à ces changements
PTN
OECD Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 
Organisation de Coopération et  
de Développement économiques
OCDE
PPF Project Preparation Facility Fonds de Préparation de Projets FPP
REDD Reducing Emissions from  
Deforestation and forest Degradation
Réduction des émissions issues  
de la déforestation et de la 
dégradation forestière
REDD
REL Reference Emission Levels Niveaux de référence des émissions NRE
RL Reference Levels Niveaux de référence NR
SB Subsidiary Body Organe subsidiaire OS
SBI Subsidiary Body for Implementation Organe subsidiaire de Mise en Œuvre OSMOE 
SBSTA Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advise
Organe subsidiaire de Conseil 
scientifique et technologique 
OSCST
SCCF Special Climate Change Fund Fonds spécial des changements 
climatiques
FSCC
SCF Standing Committee for Finance Comité permanent des Finances CPF
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals Objectifs de Développement durable ODD
SDM Sustainable Development Mechanism Mécanisme pour un Développement 
durable
MDD
SED Structured Expert Dialogue Dialogue structuré entre experts DSE
SIDS Small Island Developing States Petits États insulaires en  
développement
PEID
TEC Technology Executive Committee Comité exécutif de la technologie CET
TEM Technical Expert Meeting Réunion d’experts techniques RET
TEP Technical examination process Processus d’examen technique PET
TTE Team of Technical Experts Équipe d’experts techniques EET
UN United Nations Organisation des Nations unies ONU
UNEP United Nations Environment 
Programme 
Programme des Nations Unies  
pour l’Environnement
PNUE
UNFCCC United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change
Convention-cadre des Nations Unies 
sur les changements climatiques 
CCNUCC 
WMO World Meteorological Organization Organisation météorologique 
mondiale
OMM
WS Workstream Secteur d’activité SA
WS1 Workstream 1 Secteur d’activité 1 SA1
WS2 Workstream 2 Secteur d’activité 2 SA2
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A.5. Thematic glossary
Additionality Characterises the GHG emission reductions generated by the compensatory 
projects must be greater that the emissions which would have occurred 
without these projects. The goal of environmental additionality is to demon-
strate that a project produces actual, measurable, additional and long-term 
GHG reductions.
Adaptation Ability of a system to adjust its mechanisms, processes and structure to 
climate change. Adaptation can be spontaneous or planned; it can occur in 
response to or in advance of a change in conditions.
Hot air“Hot Air” Due to their industrial recession in the 1990s, certain Annex B countries to 
the Kyoto Protocol (like Russia and Ukraine) received higher emission limitation 
targets than their total amount of emissions without taking any measures 
for domestic reduction. This quota surplus (hot air) could potentially be 
sold to other countries via flexibility mechanisms.
Improvement in  
greenhouse gas  
removals
Calculated improvement of greenhouse gas removals between a baseline 
scenario and a project. The removal designates the penetration of greenhouse 
gases in a living organism that assimilates these gases, thereby allowing 
the disappearance of the removed greenhouse gases.
Annex I Annex I is attached to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change. 
It quotes forty developed countries and countries with economies in transition 
that have made commitments to stabilise the greenhouse gas emissions at 
1990 levels.
Annex II Annex II is attached to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change. 
It identifies 24 developed countries (including in Annex I) that have agreed 
to provide financial and technological aid to developing countries to combat 
climate change.
Annex B Annex B is attached to the Kyoto Protocol. It identifies 38 developed countries 
and countries with economies in transition that have made commitments 
to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions during the period 2008-2012.
Anthropogenic Greenhouse gas emissions caused by human activities are called anthro-
pogenic when they do not come from natural emissions. These are additional 
emissions which can be considered as pollution.
Mitigation Human intervention to reduce the sources of greenhouse gases or reinforce 
the sinks of greenhouse gases, either by extending the surface area or by 
improving their removal capacity.
Afforestation Action of planting trees on land that has had no forest cover for a certain 
number of years.
Bioenergy with  
Carbon Dioxide  
Capture and Storage
The combination of Carbon dioxide capture and storage with bioenergy 
causing CO2 to be absorbed by the atmosphere (BECCS). According to 
IPCC scenarios corresponding to the objectives of 1.5 to 2 °C, several 
GtCO2 per year must be removed from the atmosphere in the second half 
of the 21st century.
Carbon dioxide  
capture and storage
The process of increasing the carbon content of a carbon reservoir other 
than the atmosphere (CCS). This process designates the separation of CO2 
from flue gases or from processing fossil fuels to produce CO2-rich fractions 
and storage in underground geological formations or in seabeds.
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Carbon neutrality Can mean two different things: Either, the objective of releasing a minimal 
quantity of GHG emissions, which corresponds to the quantity that is physically 
removed by the atmosphere in the same time or the aim of releasing zero 
GHG. Also it is often about the action of investing in one or more projects 
that will avoid producing an equivalent quantity of GHG than generated by 
the entity seeking carbon neutrality.
Climate change Climate variations that are attributed directly or indirectly to human activities, 
altering the composition of the atmosphere , and which are added to the 
natural variability of the climate note during comparable periods.
Fossil fuel Natural gas, petroleum, coal or any solid, liquid or gaseous fuel derived 
from these materials.
Supplementarity In the context of the UNFCCC, supplementarity refers to the option available 
to the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to introduce, in addition to the Kyoto 
mechanisms, suitable domestic policies, energy-related or otherwise, to fulfil 
the GHG emission reduction objectives in the long term.
Compliance Obligation whereby the emitter is required to comply with his objectives 
of GHG emission reductions. The verification of compliance with the com-
mitments and mandatory objectives is an essential factor in a mandatory 
emission reduction system. Compliance includes the verification modalities, 
the organisation responsible for verifying the compliance and the possible 
sanctions.Synonym: obligation compliance
Business as usual Greenhouse gases resulting from general trends in an economy with no 
emission control policy. This reference is used to estimate the effectiveness 
of policies and measures undertaken to combat greenhouse gas emissions.
Compensatory credits Emission rights representing a tonne of sequestered or removed equivalent 
CO2, given to the promoter of a compensatory credit project to reduce 
GHG emissions.
Woodland clearance Conversion of forest to non-forest.Synonym: Deforestation
Emission right Any emission right symbolises the reduction of GHG emissions by one metric 
tonne of equivalent carbon dioxide, i.e. an emission unit, an emission quota 
or a compensatory credit. These rights can be traded inside international or 
national carbon trading systems.
Greenhouse gas  
emission
Total mass of a GHG which is released into the atmosphere during a given 
period.
CO2 equivalent The concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2) that would cause the same amount 
of radiative forcing as a given mixture of CO2 and other greenhouse gases.
NOTE 1: The CO2 equivalent is calculated using the mass of a given GHG 
multiplied by its global warming potential.NOTE 2: Annex B lists global 
warming potentials established by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change.
Greenhouse gas  
emission or  
removal factor
Factor reporting the activity data on the GHG emissions or absorption.
NOTE: A greenhouse gas emission or removal factor can include an oxidisation 
factor.
Fungibility Quality of what is consumed through use and which can be replaced by 
other similar products. In the context of the carbon market, fungibility 
makes no distinction between the categories of units and considers them 
all identical (one AAU would therefore be equivalent to a JI project unit and 
also to a unit resulting from an internal measurement of energy efficiency).
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Carbon leakage Part of GHG emission reductions in Annex B countries that may be offset 
by an increase in emissions in non-constrained countries above their baseline 
levels. This can occur through (i) relocation of energy-intensive production 
units in non-constrained regions; (ii) increased consumption of fossil fuels 
in these regions through decline in the international price of oil and gas 
triggered by lower demand for these energies; and (iii) changes in revenues 
(thus in energy demand) due to improved economic conditions. NOTE: The 
term also refers to the situation in which a carbon capture activity (tree 
planting, for example) on one piece of land inadvertently, directly or indirectly, 
triggers an activity, which in whole or part, counteracts the carbon effects 
of the initial activity.
Greenhouse  
gases (GHG)
Gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, 
that remove and re-emit the infrared radiation. They help maintain the 
heat in the Earth’s atmosphere. These gases are produced by both natural 
and anthropogenic processes. The main gases are water vapour, carbon 
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), dinitrogen oxide (N2O), the chlorofluorocarbons, 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), nitrogen trifluoride (NF3), perfluorocarbons (PFC) 
and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).
Energy intensity Ratio of energy consumption to economic or physical output. At the 
national level, energy intensity is the ratio of total domestic consumption 
or final energy consumption to Gross Domestic Product or physical output.
GHG inventory Assessment that measures the GHG emissions from activities of an entity 
(country, business, municipality, etc.). This assessment is calculated in relation 
to a reference year.
Carbon market Name for a group of greenhouse gas emissions trading and transaction 
mechanisms. The carbon market designates both the voluntary market for 
the voluntary compensation of GHG emissions and the regulated markets 
that make the regulated emitters compliant.
Voluntary market Carbon credits trading mechanism not linked to national or international 
regulations.
Materiality An item of information, an error or an inaccuracy are normally considered 
as material if they can influence people building on them. This concept 
comes into play when verifying project data and embodies the idea that 
there is a threshold beyond which the search for other potential errors is 
not longer justified in terms of time, money or the efforts required. Thus, if 
the error found generates a difference in the emission reductions of the 
project which is below the set threshold, this error is viewed as negligible 
or, in other words, immaterial.
Clean development 
mechanism (CDM)
Flexibility mechanism provided for under the Kyoto Protocol (Art. 12). 
It assumes the implementation of emission reduction or avoidance projects 
in the developing countries. The CDM projects or activity programmes require 
at least three partners to be realised: developing countries (host countries 
represented by the Designated National Authorities, or DNA), a project leader 
in the host country and a buyer of Certified Emission Reduction units, or CER.
Joint implementation (JI) Flexibility mechanism provided for under the Kyoto Protocol. This mechanism 
is used by the governments of developed countries and countries with 
economies in transition, and their companies, to finance greenhouse gas 
emission reduction projects in the other developed countries and countries 
with economies in transition (mainly the Eastern European countries and 
Russia). In return, these States receive emission credits that they can sell or 
deduct from their own national efforts.
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Baseline This is a historical level used to calculate subsequent changes in greenhouse 
gas emissions. This level is determined micro-economically or macro- 
economically. It is of crucial importance in determining the additionality 
level of reductions resulting from joint initiative projects or those implemented 
under the Clean Development Mechanism or the Joint Implementation.
Carbon black Carbon black, also known as furnace black or lamp black, is an amorphous 
form of the carbon produced by industrial activity. It is a climate forcer (has 
a warming effect on the climate) that has only been of interest to the scientific 
community for a few years.
Global warming  
potential (GWP)  
or planet warming  
potential (PWP)
Index describing the radiation characteristics of greenhouse gases. The GWP 
or PWP represents the combined effect of the time these gases remain in 
the atmosphere and their relative effectiveness in absorbing outgoing infrared 
radiation. This index approximates the time-integrated warming effect of a unit 
mass of a given greenhouse gas in the atmosphere, relative to that of CO2.
NOTE: The reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change contain 
planet warming potential tables.
Greenhouse gas  
programme
Voluntary or mandatory, international, national or sub-national system or 
plan which records, counts or manages the emissions, removals, greenhouse 
gas emission reductions or improvements in greenhouse gas removals.
Carbon sink Any process, activity or mechanism, natural or artificial, that removes a 
greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the 
atmosphere (for example, trees, plants and oceans).
Reforestation Planting of forests on lands that had previously contained forests but have 
been converted to other uses.
Additional reductions See Additionality
Greenhouse gas  
emission reduction
Calculated drop in GHG emissions between the baseline scenario emissions 
and the actual emissions avoided by a project.
Reduction in emissions  
from deforestation  
and forest degradation 
(REDD+)
International issue of the post-2012 climate regime on the financial provisions 
and the transfer of technology under the reduction plan for emissions 
caused by deforestation and forest degradation. This issue also includes 
the protection and sustainable management of forests and the promotion 
of forest carbon stocks in the developing countries resulting, for example, 
from adapted silvicultural practices or plantings.
Greenhouse gas  
reservoir
Physical unit or biosphere, geosphere or hydrosphere component capable of 
storing or accumulating a GHG removed from the atmosphere by a greenhouse 
gas sink or a GHG captured at its source.NOTE 1: The total mass of carbon 
contained in a GHG reservoir at a given moment can be called reservoir 
carbon stock.NOTE 2: A GHG reservoir can transfer GHG to another reservoir.
NOTE 3: Collecting a GHG at its source before it enters the atmosphere 
and stoking the GHG collected in a GHG reservoir can be called GHG 
capture and storage.
Baseline scenario Hypothetical reference case that represents in the best possible way the 
conditions that would be the most likely in the absence of the greenhouse 
gas project.NOTE: The baseline scenario coincides with the GHG project 
chronology.
Sequestration Action of removing the carbon from the atmosphere. CO2 sequestration 
projects can participate in two distinct and sometimes complementary ways 
to carbon sequestration: (i) by extracting the carbonic gas from the atmo-
sphere and storing it as over- and underground biomass; (ii) by producing 
additional renewable biomass where the waste-to-energy conversion can 
avoid the recourse to fossil fuels.
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Greenhouse gas source Physical unit or process releasing a GHG into the atmosphere.
Affected greenhouse  
gas source, sink or  
reservoir
GHG source, sink or reservoir influenced by the activity of a project through 
modifications to the supply and demand of the market regarding its asso-
ciated products or service or through physical movement.NOTE 1: Unlike 
the associated GHG sources, sinks or reservoirs which are linked physically 
to a GHG project, the affected GHG sources, sinks or reservoirs are linked 
to a GHG project by changes caused by market supply and demand.NOTE 
2: An affected GHG source, sink or reservoir is normally found off the proj-
ect site.NOTE 3: The reductions in emissions or the increases in GHG re-
movals attributable to the affected GHG sources, sinks or reservoirs are 
commonly called “leaks”.
Controlled greenhouse  
gas source, sink or  
reservoir
A GHG source, sink or reservoir that operates under the guidance or influence 
of an author of a greenhouse gas project proposal through financial, political, 
management or other instruments.NOTE: A controlled GHG source, sink or 
reservoir is normally found on the project site.
Associated greenhouse  
gas source, sink or  
reservoir
A GHG source, sink or reservoir with material or energy flows entering or 
exiting the project or which are contained within it.NOTE 1: An associated 
GHG source, sink or reservoir is normally found upstream or downstream 
of the project and can be located on or off the project site.NOTE 2: An 
associated GHG source, sink or reservoir can also include activities relating 
to the design, construction or declassification of a project.
Standard of  
performance
Simplified approach of additionality and the baseline scenario. Rather than 
seeking to prove the additionality and to determine the baseline scenario 
for each project, the standard of performance is an approximate evaluation 
that establishes a generic baseline scenario as a quantitative standard of 
performance. Any project where the emissions are below this predefined 
standard is considered as additional.
Monitoring Continuous or periodic assessment of emissions and removals of GHG or 
other GHG-related data.
Emission cap-and-trade 
system
System that assigns rights to companies for their greenhouse gas emissions 
based on governmental environmental objectives. Compensatory credits 
issued thanks to a GHG reduction project can also be traded in this system.
Tonne of carbon equivalent See equivalent CO2
Removal unit Unit issued by the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and which covers the net 
removal by carbon sinks of GHG from Land Use, Land Use Changes and 
Forestry (LULUCF) activities.
Emission unit Under the cap-and-trade system, an emission unit designates a right of 
emission generated by the government according to the declared GHG 
emissions verified by the companies. A right of emission relates to the 
authorisation to emit 1 tCO2eq.
Assigned amount  
units (AAU)
Units issued by the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in their national register. 
The amount assigned is calculated according to emissions of the base year 
and quantified emission reduction commitments. This quantity is expressed 
as a percentage.
Certified emission  
reduction (CER)
Certified emission reductions (CER) are emission credits obtained through 
CDM projects. These credits can be applied directly to fulfil the quantified 
commitments of Annex B countries.Note: the acronym UCRE for Certified 
units of emissions reduction is also used.
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Emission reduction  
units (ERU)
These are units converted from an assigned amount unit (AAU) or a removal 
unit and handed to the project participant under joint implementation 
activities.
Target user Person or organisation identified by those in charge declaring information 
relating to greenhouse gases and which relies on this information to take 
decisions.NOTE 1: The target user can be the customer, the responsible 
party, the administrators of the GHG programme, regulators, the financial 
community or other stakeholders involved such as local authorities, minis-
terial departments or non-governmental organisations.NOTE 2: The level 
of assurance is used to determine the accuracy a validator or verifier gives 
to his validation or verification plan to detect any errors, omissions or false 
declarations.NOTE 3: There are two assurance levels (reasonable or limited) 
that result in validation or verification reports that are formulated differently. 
See ISO 14064-3: 2006 A.2.3.2 for sample validation and verification reports.
Land Use, Land Use  
changes and Forestry 
(LULUCF)
Land use and their changes (forest, agriculture, natural areas, etc.) have a 
significant influence on carbon storage (sink) and methane (CH4) releases 
and therefore on climate change. They contribute to the anthropogenic 
emissions taken into account by the Kyoto Protocol. The problem of land and 
forest use goes hand in hand with the concerns of two other conventions: 
biodiversity and desertification.
Vulnerability Vulnerability defines to what extent a system can be degraded or damaged 
by climate change. It depends not just on the sensitivity but also on the 
adaptability of the system to new climatic conditions.
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A.6. Meeting agendas during COP23
COP23 – 6-17 November 2017925
1. Opening of the session. 
2. Organizational matters: 
a. Election of the President of the Conference of the Parties at its twenty-third 
session; 
b. Adoption of rules of procedure; 
c. Adoption of the agenda; 
d. Election of officers other than the President; 
e. Admission of organizations as observers; 
f. Organization of work, including for the sessions of the subsidiary bodies; 
g. Dates and venues of future sessions; 
h. Adoption of the report on credentials. 
3. Reports of the subsidiary bodies: 
a. Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice; 
b. Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation; 
c. Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement. 
4. Preparations for the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the first session 
of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris 
Agreement.
5. Consideration of proposals by Parties for amendments to the Convention under 
Article 15: 
a. Proposal from the Russian Federation to amend Article 4, paragraph 2(f ), 
of the Convention; 
b. Proposal from Papua New Guinea and Mexico to amend Articles 7 and 18 
of the Convention. 
6. Report of the Adaptation Committee. 
7. Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate 
Change Impacts. 
925. Available in English [online] http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/cop23/eng/01.pdf
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8. Development and transfer of technologies and implementation of the Technology 
Mechanism:
a. Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate 
Technology Centre and Network; 
b. Review of the effective implementation of the Climate Technology Centre 
and Network.
9. Second review of the adequacy of Article 4, paragraph 2(a) and (b), of the 
Convention.
10. Matters relating to finance: 
a. Long-term climate finance; 
b. Matters relating to the Standing Committee on Finance; 
c. Report of the Green Climate Fund to the Conference of the Parties and 
guidance to the Green Climate Fund; 
d. Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference of the Parties 
and guidance to the Global Environment Facility; 
e. Sixth review of the Financial Mechanism; 
f. Process to identify the information to be provided by Parties in accordance 
with Article 9, paragraph 5, of the Paris Agreement. 
11. Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention. 
12.  Reporting from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention. 
13. Capacity-building under the Convention.
14. Implementation of Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention: 
a. Implementation of the Buenos Aires programme of work on adaptation 
and response measures (decision 1/CP.10); 
b. Matters relating to the least developed countries. 
15. Assessment of the technical examination processes on mitigation and adaptation. 
16. Gender and climate change. 
17. Other matters referred to the Conference of the Parties by the subsidiary bodies. 
18. Administrative, financial and institutional matters: 
a. Audit report and financial statements for 2016; 
b. Budget performance for the biennium 2016–2017; 
c. Programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019;
d. Decision-making in the UNFCCC process; 
e. Review of the process established by decision 14/CP.1 relating to the selection 
and nomination of the Executive Secretary (at the level of Under-Secretary- 
General) and the Deputy Executive Secretary (at the level of Assistant 
Secretary-General). 
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19. High-level segment: 
a. Statements by Parties; 
b. Statements by observer organizations. 
20. Other matters. 
21. Conclusion of the session: 
a. Adoption of the draft report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty- 
third session; 
b. Closure of the session. 
CMP13 – 6-15 November 2017926
1. Opening of the session. 
2. Organizational matters: 
a. Adoption of the agenda;
b. Election of additional officers; 
c. Organization of work, including for the sessions of the subsidiary bodies; 
d. Approval of the report on credentials; 
e. Status of ratification of the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol. 
3. Reports of the subsidiary bodies: 
a. Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice; 
b. Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation. 
4. Matters relating to the clean development mechanism. 
5. Matters relating to joint implementation. 
6. Report of the Compliance Committee. 
7. Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund: 
a. Report of the Adaptation Fund Board; 
b. Third review of the Adaptation Fund. 
8. Report on the high-level ministerial round table on increased ambition of 
Kyoto Protocol commitments. 
9. Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I: 
a. National communications; 
b. Annual compilation and accounting report for the second commitment 
period for Annex B Parties under the Kyoto Protocol. 
926. Available in English [online] http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/cmp13/eng/01.pdf
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10. Capacity-building under the Kyoto Protocol. 
11. Matters relating to: 
a. Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Kyoto Protocol; 
b. Article 3, paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol. 
12. Other matters referred to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting 
of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol by the subsidiary bodies. 
13. Administrative, financial and institutional matters: 
a. Audit report and financial statements for 2016; 
b. Budget performance for the biennium 2016-2017; 
c. Programme budget for the biennium 2018−2019.
14. High-level segment: 
a. Statements by Parties; 
b. Statements by observer organizations. 
15. Other matters. 
16. Conclusion of the session: 
a. Adoption of the draft report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its thirteenth session; 
b. Closure of the session. 
CMA – 6-17 November 2017927
1. Opening of the session.
2. Organizational matters:
a. Adoption of the agenda;
b. Application of the rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties;
c. Election of additional officers;
d. Organization of work;
e. Status of ratification of the Paris Agreement;
f. Approval of the report on credentials.
3. Matters relating to the implementation of the Paris Agreement.
4. High-level segment.
5. Other matters.
927. Available in English [online] http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/cma/eng/01.pdf
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6. Conclusion of the session:
a. Adoption of the report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting 
of the Parties to the Paris Agreement;
b. Closure of the session.
SBI47 – 6-15 November 2017928
1. Opening of the session. 
2. Organizational matters: 
a. Adoption of the agenda;
b. Organization of the work of the session;
c. Multilateral assessment working group session under the international 
assessment and review process;
d. Facilitative sharing of views under the international consultation and analysis 
process;
e. Other mandated events;
f. Election of officers other than the Chair.
3. Reporting from and review of Parties included in Annex I to the Convention: 
a. Status of submission and review of second biennial reports from Parties 
included in Annex I to the Convention;
b. Compilation and synthesis of second biennial reports from Parties included 
in Annex I to the Convention; 
c. Report on national greenhouse gas inventory data from Parties included in 
Annex I to the Convention for the period 1990–2015.
4. Reporting from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention: 
a. Information contained in national communications from Parties not included 
in Annex I to the Convention; 
b. Work of the Consultative Group of Experts on National Communications 
from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention;
c. Provision of financial and technical support; 
d. Summary reports on the technical analysis of biennial update reports of 
Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention. 
5. Common time frames for nationally determined contributions referred to in 
Article 4, paragraph 10, of the Paris Agreement.
6. Development of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public 
registry referred to in Article 4, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement.
928. Available in English [online] http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/sbi/eng/08.pdf
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7. Development of modalities and procedures for the operation and use of a public 
registry referred to in Article 7, paragraph 12, of the Paris Agreement.
8. Matters relating to the mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol: 
a. Review of the modalities and procedures for the clean development 
mechanism;
b. Report of the administrator of the international transaction log under the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
9. Coordination of support for the implementation of activities in relation to 
mitigation actions in the forest sector by developing countries, including insti-
tutional arrangements. 
10. Matters relating to the least developed countries.
11. National adaptation plans. 
12. Report of the Adaptation Committee.
13. Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism 
for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts. 
14. Development and transfer of technologies:
a. Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate 
Technology Centre and Network;
b. Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer. 
15. Matters relating to climate finance: 
a. Review of the functions of the Standing Committee on Finance;
b. Third review of the Adaptation Fund. 
16. Matters relating to capacity-building: 
a. Capacity-building under the Convention;
b. Annual technical progress report of the Paris Committee on Capacity- 
building; 
c. Capacity-building under the Kyoto Protocol.
17. Impact of the implementation of response measures:
a. Improved forum and work programme; 
b. Modalities, work programme and functions under the Paris Agreement of 
the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures;
c. Matters relating to Article 3, paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol; 
d. Progress on the implementation of decision 1/CP.10.
18. Ways of enhancing the implementation of training, public awareness, public 
participation and public access to information so as to enhance actions under 
the Paris Agreement.
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19. Report on activities related to Action for Climate Empowerment. 
20. Gender and climate change.
21. Administrative, financial and institutional matters:
a. Budget performance for the biennium 2016–2017;
b. Audit report and financial statements for 2016;
c. Other budgetary and financial matters.
22. Other matters.
23. Closure of and report on the session.
SBSTA47 – 6-15 November929
1. Opening of the session. 
2. Organizational matters: 
a. Adoption of the agenda;
b. Organization of the work of the session;
c. Election of officers other than the Chair. 
3. Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate 
change. 
4. Report of the Adaptation Committee.
5. Report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism 
for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts. 
6. Development and transfer of technologies: 
a. Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate 
Technology Centre and Network; 
b. Technology framework under Article 10, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement. 
7. Issues relating to agriculture. 
8. Research and systematic observation.
9. Impact of the implementation of response measures: 
a. Improved forum and work programme; 
b. Modalities, work programme and functions under the Paris Agreement of 
the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures; 
c. Matters relating to Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Kyoto Protocol. 
929. Available in English [online] http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/sbsta/eng/05.pdf
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10. Methodological issues under the Convention: 
a. Common metrics to calculate the carbon dioxide equivalence of greenhouse 
gases; 
b. Emissions from fuel used for international aviation and maritime transport. 
11. Matters relating to Article 6 of the Paris Agreement: 
a. Guidance on cooperative approaches referred to in Article 6, paragraph 2, 
of the Paris Agreement; 
b. Rules, modalities and procedures for the mechanism established by Article 
6, paragraph 4, of the Paris Agreement; 
c. Work programme under the framework for non-market approaches referred 
to in Article 6, paragraph 8, of the Paris Agreement. 
12. Modalities for the accounting of financial resources provided and mobilized 
through public interventions in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 7, of the 
Paris Agreement. 
13. Local communities and indigenous peoples platform. 
14. Reports on other activities: 
a. Annual report on the technical review of information reported under 
the Convention by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention in their 
biennial reports and national communications;
b. Annual report on the technical review of greenhouse gas inventories of 
Parties included in Annex I to the Convention; 
c. Annual report on the technical review of greenhouse gas inventories and 
other information reported by Parties included in Annex I, as defined in 
Article 1, paragraph 7, of the Kyoto Protocol. 
15. Other matters.
16. Closure of and report on the session.
APA1-4 – 7-15 November930
1. Opening of the session. 
2. Organizational matters: 
a. Election of officers; 
b. Adoption of the agenda; 
c. Organization of the work of the session. 
930. Available in English [online] http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2017/apa/eng/03.pdf
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3. Further guidance in relation to the mitigation section of decision 1/CP.21 on: 
a. Features of nationally determined contributions, as specified in paragraph 26; 
b. Information to facilitate clarity, transparency and understanding of nation-
ally determined contributions, as specified in paragraph 28; 
c. Accounting for Parties’ nationally determined contributions, as specified in 
paragraph 31. 
4. Further guidance in relation to the adaptation communication, including, 
inter alia, as a component of nationally determined contributions, referred to 
in Article 7, paragraphs 10 and 11, of the Paris Agreement. 
5. Modalities, procedures and guidelines for the transparency framework for 
action and support referred to in Article 13 of the Paris Agreement. 
6. Matters relating to the global stocktake referred to in Article 14 of the Paris 
Agreement: 
a. Identification of the sources of input for the global stocktake; 
b. Development of the modalities of the global stocktake. 
7. Modalities and procedures for the effective operation of the committee to 
facilitate implementation and promote compliance referred to in Article 15, 
paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement. 
8. Further matters related to implementation of the Paris Agreement: 
a. Preparing for the convening of the first session of the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement; 
b. Taking stock of progress made by the subsidiary and constituted bodies in 
relation to their mandated work under the Paris Agreement and section III 
of decision 1/CP.21, in order to promote and facilitate coordination and 
coherence in the implementation of the work programme, and, if appropriate, 
take action, which may include recommendations. 
9. Other matters.
10. Closure of and report on the session. 
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ENERGIES 2050 was born of the certainty that the development 
trajectories of our societies are not inevitable. As an informal network 
since 2007, and as a French non-profit and non-governmental 
organisation working exclusively in the general interest since 2011, 
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our societies for a more humane, plural and united future.
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possibilities. As a collective adventure in the quest for better ways of living together , ENERGIES 2050 
has committed to the Great Transition, including combating climate change, implementing sustainable 
development, the energy transition, sustainable cities and regions and the shift towards a more humane, 
plural and united society, bringing peace and respecting the common goods of humanity.
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to show the possibilities.
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• Publishing research results to pool and share knowledge.
• Educating, training and building the capacities so that each individual can understand, know and act.
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action and the social solidarity economy. 
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potential and for deploying essential capacity-building programmes to support country ownership 
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The Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable (IFDD – Institute of the French-
speaking world for Sustainable Development) is a subsidiary body of the Organisation internatio-
nale de la Francophonie (OIF – International Organisation of the Francophonie) and its headquarters 
are in Quebec City.
Under its original name of Institut de l’Énergie des Pays ayant en commun l’usage du Français (IEPF – 
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de l’environnement de la Francophonie (Energy and Environment Institute of the French-speaking 
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pour le développement durable (IFDD – Institute of the French-speaking world for Sustainable 
Development). 
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players in French-speaking countries in the energy and environment sectors;
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programmes;
• the promotion of the sustainable development approach in French-speaking countries;
• the development of partnerships in the various economic and social development sectors, mainly 
environment and energy, for sustainable development.
IFDD action falls under the Strategic Framework of the Francophonie, within mission D “Sustainable 
development, economy and solidarity” and Strategic Objective 7 “Contribute to the preparation and 
implementation of the post-2015 development programme and sustainable development goals”.
The Institute is in particular lead partner in the following two programmes under the OIF 2015-2018 
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sustainable development strategies which are inclusive, participative and results-based;
• Build up the capacities of French-speaking players to allow active participation in international 
negotiations and decisions on the economic, environment and sustainable development, and their 
implementation.
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since January 2015.
58 member States and governments:
Albania • Principality of Andorra • Armenia • Kingdom of Belgium • Benin • Bulgaria • Burkina Faso 
• Burundi • Cabo Verde • Cambodia • Cameroon • Canada • Canada-New Brunswick • Canada-
Quebec • Central African Republic • Chad • Comoros • Congo • Côte d’Ivoire • Cyprus • 
Democratic Republic of Congo • Djibouti • Dominica • Egypt • Equatorial Guinea • Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia • France • Gabon • Ghana • Greece • Guinea • Guinea-Bissau 
• Haiti • Laos • Lebanon • Luxembourg • Madagascar • Mali • Mauritania • Mauritius • Moldavia • 
Principality of Monaco • Morocco • New Caledonia • Niger • Qatar • Romania • Rwanda • Saint 
Lucia • São Tomé and Príncipe • Senegal • Seychelles • Switzerland • Togo • Tunisia • Vanuatu 
• Vietnam • Wallonia-Brussels Federation.
26 observers:
Argentina • Austria • Bosnia Herzegovina • Canada-Ontario • Costa Rica • Croatia • Czech Republic 
• Dominican Republic • Estonia • Georgia • Hungary • Kosovo • Latvia • Lithuania • Mexico 
• Montenegro • Mozambique • Poland • Serbia • Slovakia • Slovenia • South Korea • Thailand • 
Ukraine • United Arab Emirates • Uruguay.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATION OF LA FRANCOPHONIE
19-21 avenue Bosquet, 75007 Paris, France
Tel.: +33 (0)1 44 37 33 00
www.francophonie.org
Guide to the Negotiations assessment form
To assist us in improving the next versions of the Guide to the negotiations, we should 
be grateful if you would assess this version on a scale of 1 to 4, adding your comments 
below.
1 = highly satisfactory 2 = satisfactory 3 = rather unsatisfactory 4 = highly unsatisfactory
Clarity of issues
1
2
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4
Presentation of main progress  
from COP21:
1
2
3
4
Presentation of main expectations of 
COP23 and in achieving objectives:
1
2
3
4
Relevance of the level of detail:
1
2
3
4
Comments on the format:
Other comments:
Please forward the form to the following address:
Institut de la Francophonie pour le développement durable (IFDD)
56 rue Saint-Pierre, 3rd floor
Quebec City (Quebec) G1K 4A1, Canada
Fax: +1 418 692-5644
E-mail: ifdd@francophonie.org
The reality of climate change is acknowledged unanimously. However, and in spite of international negotiations, it has to be recognised that the progress 
made over recent decades has been too modest with regard to the many challenges 
posed and the urgent need to take action. The agreement reached in Paris, in 
December 2015, at the end of the 21st session of the Conference of the Parties 
(COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) is of critical importance in the climate negotiation process. While 
emphasising different national circumstances and the UNFCCC’s founding 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, the Agreement reaffirms 
the necessary raising of ambition and measures to take in order for our societies 
to develop on low-carbon, resilient and united pathways. However, the challenge 
of implementation still remains and the next steps are crucial in transforming the 
collective vision and ambition into reality on the ground.
Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, huge progress has been made 
in Marrakech (COP  22, Marrakech, November 2016) and Bonn (under the 
auspices of the 46th session of permanent subsidiary bodies, May 2017) and the 
contribution of the COP  23 will be central in continuing with the work in 
progress. With the adoption of the Paris Agreement in December 2015 and then 
its entry into force less than a year later in November 2016, the international 
community has met two of the first major challenges. The goals now need to be 
made workable, by dealing with the challenges of implementation. Out of all of 
the points under negotiations, it is vital that the “Spirit of Paris” that has been 
present since the adoption of the Agreement is maintained in Bonn. The objective 
being that the aims of the international community are in line with trust and 
duration, while the Parties were heard in Marrakech to reject certain final decisions 
concerning the operationalisation of the Paris Agreement until December 2018, 
during COP 24.
Aimed at helping negotiators to understand better the challenges of the 
COP 23, this Guide the major issues being debated (Part I). Part II proposes a 
concise summary of the Paris Agreement and the challenges related to achieving 
the objectives from it, focusing upon the work carried out by the permanent 
subsidiary bodies and the special Paris Agreement Ad Hoc working group. The 
major issues at stake are then presented in Part III Lastly, Part III gives a brief 
history of the negotiations and presents the UNFCCC structure and the main 
negotiation groups and their positions. Boxes supplemented by information 
diagrams and themed sheets provide the reader with all the keys to understand 
the negotiations.
Although this publication is intended especially for negotiators from Franco-
phone countries, it should also be a useful tool for any other interested stakeholder. 
The negotiations, which remain the competence of the State Parties to the UNFCCC, 
will not succeed without the mobilisation of each and everyone of them, especially 
in terms of achieving the challenge of realising the resulting objectives.
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56, RUE SAINT-PIERRE, 3E ÉTAGE, QUÉBEC (QUÉBEC)  G1K 4A1  CANADA
The IFDD is a subsidiary body of the International Organisation of the Francophonie.
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